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Abstract
Although the relationship between immigration and crime has been a very controversial
subject in the UK, the empirical evidence is limited. This thesis intends to narrow this
gap by providing a comprehensive investigation for England and Wales of immigrants’
both active and passive involvement in criminal activities.
Before exploring the aforementioned relationship, Chapter 1 discusses and provides
solutions to an identification issue that aﬄicts leading models for under-reported count
data. It also provides some tips for practitioners that intend to use these models in
applied research. These findings are important for this thesis, since estimators that
deal with under-reporting are considered in Chapter 2.
Chapter 2 studies the individual-level relationship between immigration and crime
using self-reported crime data. Although this work focuses on property crime, vio-
lent crime is also considered. Both binary and count data models that account for
under-reporting are used, since under-reporting is a concern in crime self-reports. Our
findings suggest that, if anything, immigrants under-report by less than natives. Most
importantly, these models predict that after controlling for under-reporting and basic
demographics, immigrants are less involved in criminal activities, but the estimated
difference is statistically insignificant. Nevertheless, an extensive sensitivity analysis
indicates that this estimate is very robust, suggesting that this relationship exists, but
data limitations and complexities of the considered models reduce the precision of the
estimated coefficient.
Finally, Chapter 3 comprehensively examines whether victimization experiences are
different between immigrants and natives. Very interestingly, although observed demo-
graphic differences can explain the positive property crime victimization-immigration
differentials, unobserved factors give rise to a negative association between immigration
and violent victimization. All results suggest that this is due to immigrants’ lifestyle
choices associated with lower victimization risks. As will be explained throughout
Chapter 3, this finding is consistent with the findings of Chapter 2.
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Introduction
The phenomenon of international migration has been a subject of controversy for politicians,
policy makers, and the general public in all countries that sustained large inflows of immi-
gration.1 Consequently, academic communities have devoted a considerably large amount of
research to understand the actual impact of migration on many different aspects of both the
host countries and countries of origin. These include the effects of immigration on different
dimensions of the labour market (Borjas, 1994, 1999a, 2003) and the welfare state of the
host countries (Borjas and Trejo, 1991, and Borjas, 1999b), the impact of brain drain in the
countries of origin (Mountford 1997, and Beine, Docquier and Rapoport, 2001, 2008) and
the relationship between ethnic diversity and economic performance and growth (Alesina
and La Ferrara, 2005), to mention only a few.
Following this debate, scholars have also devoted a lot of research to understand the rea-
sons behind the heterogeneity in individual beliefs towards migration movements by studying
the economic and noneconomic determinants of people being anti or pro-immigration (see,
for example, Mayda, 2006, O’Rourke and Sinnott, 2006, and Facchini and Mayda, 2009).
A particular aspect of immigration where we expect to observe a high proportion of anti-
immigration protesters is the relationship between immigration and crime. Indeed, at least
for the UK where this thesis focuses on, using data from two important social surveys (look
at the introduction of Chapter 1) we can observe that a large fraction of population believes
that immigration and crime are linked positively.
However, very interestingly, a high proportion of the researchers’ community in social
sciences does not share the same view, particularly when it comes to the empirical evidence.
1Before getting into the main stage of this introduction, it is important to note that each chapter of this
thesis is independent and therefore provides its own comprehensive introduction and conclusion.
1
2Actually most research about the immigration situation in the US indicates that there is a
negative association, but results from Europe suggest that there is a positive or no associa-
tion between immigration and crime (see, Section 2.3). Nevertheless, we need to stress that
compared to other aspects of immigration, such as the ones described in the previous para-
graphs, the available evidence is rather inconclusive. It is also important to note that the
crime-immigration association has been generally overlooked by economists as the majority
of the empirical evidence comes from criminological or sociological research.
Most importantly, although this subject is of major interest in political and public debates
in the UK, there is lack of empirical evidence. Therefore, this thesis intends to narrow this
gap by providing a micro-investigation of immigrants’ involvement in criminal activities both
as offenders and victims in the UK. It will be made clear to the reader that looking at both
the offending behaviour and the victimization experiences of immigrants will provide a more
satisfactory picture of the immigration-crime relationship and the rationale behind it.
As this thesis focuses on the micro-immigration-crime link, microeconomic and microe-
conometric tools will be used throughout. However, in this work we particularly focus on
the econometric techniques and specifications that are used as an attempt to overcome data
or other methodological limitations. Actually, it could be said that this work is in a sense
two-dimensional, as there are two major themes that stand out independently. The first
one is the empirical research questions itself, while the second one is the microeconometric
methodology, specification, and theory developed to answer the research questions.
Actually, this thesis starts in an unusual way as the first chapter does not investigate
the main research question, but it is a small theoretical econometric investigation of some
estimators for count data that are used in the second chapter. However, it would be more
proper to briefly explain the subject of the first chapter once we understand the limitations
of the data and estimators used in the second chapter, which investigates the relationship
between immigration status and criminal behaviour in England and Wales.
In this chapter most attention is paid to property crime, although violent crime is also
considered. The chapter starts by developing a simple theoretical model of property crime
through which the individual link between immigration and property crime is discussed. The
model depicts several channels that may lead to higher (because of labour outcomes) or lower
3(because of deterrent or risk factors) involvement of immigrants in illegitimate activities,
in comparison to natives. Therefore, as opposed to the public sentiment in the UK that
immigrants are more criminal than natives, the theoretical analysis is not able to predict the
direction of the relationship in object. As a consequence, an empirical analysis is required
to establish this link. Nevertheless, a major limitation is that true crime is unobserved and
therefore, data on criminal activity are really difficult to obtain. Although police records
on criminal activity do exist, they do not give any information about immigration status of
offenders. Even if this information was available, this type of data would not be appropriate
for my study as there is evidence that two thirds of the crime remains unrecorded, but most
importantly (for reasons explained in Section 2.4) immigrant population is over-represented
in official criminal records. Moreover, prison data would be even more misleading, as people
in prison can be considered as a highly selected sample that does not represent the general
population.
Thus, the most appropriate strategy would be to use data of survey self-reported crime.1
For this purpose the Offending, Crime, and Justice Survey (OCJS) of 2003 is used, a rep-
resentative national survey of (computer-based) self-reported crime. Although the survey
design is developed so as to obtain the most reliable responses possible (see, Section 2.4),
under-reporting is still a major concern. Therefore, conventional econometric models that
ignore this type of measurement error provide inconsistent estimates of the determinants
of the actual crime, especially if respondents’ reporting behaviour depends on respondents’
characteristics. As the dependent crime variable is observed in count form, both count data
models, the Poisson-Logit and Negative Binomial-Logit (NB-Logit), and binary choice mod-
els, the Misclassification Probit model (MisProbit), that are developed to take into account
under-reporting are considered. These are two-index parametric models which, using only
observed crime self reports, give information for the determinants of both the true criminal
activity and the reporting behaviour. However, identification of the count data models con-
sidered in this chapter is aﬄicted by a subtle problem and further assumptions are required
in order to identify the parameters of interest.
1Another idea would be to conduct an appropriate controlled experiment for criminal actions, where
participants would form a representative part of the general population. This is left for future research.
4Therefore, in Chapter 1, which is an extended version of the paper by Papadopoulos and
Santos Silva (2008), we provide a thorough investigation of the conditions under which the
Poisson-Logit and two popular generalizations of this model (the NB2-Logit and the NB1-
Logit) are identified. Although these models are described in the well known monographs
for count data by Cameron and Trivedi (1998) and Winkelmann (2008), this identification
problem has not been recognized by any work prior to the present thesis. As mentioned in
the previous paragraph, the Poisson-Logit is a double index model where by only observing
the reported counts we want to draw inference for both the determinants of total counts
(modeled as if they follow the Poisson distribution) and the probability of a count to be
successful (modeled as a Logit). In the self-reported crime context, total counts correspond
to the number of actual but unobserved crimes and the probability of a successful count
corresponds to the probability of reporting a committed crime.
In this chapter we show that without appropriate restrictions, taking either the form of
at least one sign restriction on the Logit part, or at least one exclusion restriction on the
Poisson part, it is not possible to identify the parameters of the Poisson-Logit model, as two
identical “global” maxima exist. However, these restrictions must be “strong”. In the sign
restriction context this means that the sign of at least one coefficient must be determined
by well established theoretical results and that the estimated coefficient which we want to
impose the restriction on must be statistically significant. In the exclusion restriction context
this means that the excluded variables from the Poisson part must have a significant effect
on the Logit part and no effect on the Poisson part. Also note that exclusion restrictions on
the Logit part can be helpful towards identifying only those coefficients of the Poisson part
which are set to zero in the Logit part.
This study also reveals that the same identification problem is present in NB2-Logit.
However, even without the aforementioned type of restrictions, a “weak” form of identifica-
tion is achieved when the NB1-Logit specification is adopted. Here we use the term “weak”
as identification of the conditional mean is achieved solely because of an extra parametric
assumption on the form of the conditional variance of the dependent variable. Therefore,
identification of the mean is highly dependent on the specification of the variance, which
has negative consequences in terms of robustness of the estimator. Finally, this identifica-
5tion failure does not extend to models where a different conditional distribution function for
binary data is used for the reporting process, such as the Probit.
Although identification of the Poisson-Logit and the NB2-Logit is achieved when we im-
pose exclusion restrictions on the count process, it is high likely that another local maximum
exists. Actually the likelihood value of the local maximum will be very close to the like-
lihood value of the global one if the exclusion restrictions are not “strong”, and therefore,
identification will be more difficult. As a result, practitioners that intend to use the above
models must perform a thorough search for alternative maxima before accepting the first
achieved maximum as the global one. Thus, some tips are also provided that can be used to
help the practitioner find the global maximum. All theoretical results are supported by an
empirical illustration with data on labour mobility.
Back to Chapter 2, due to the small number of positives, a fact that affects the robustness
of the count data models, it has been considered as more appropriate to base the main results
on the binary choice models and use count data models for sensitivity analyses only. The
results of the MisProbit model indicate that respondents considerably under-report their
criminal activity. They also suggest that under-reporting is not constant, but it rather
depends on respondents’ characteristics. However, if anything, immigrants tend to under-
report by less than natives. These results are strengthened by the count data models which
also indicate that, the probability to report a committed crime depends on respondents’
characteristics and also, being an immigrant increases the probability to report a committed
crime. Nevertheless, although the interpretation of the coefficients in the Logit part of
the count data models is clear, it is important to note that we must be cautious with the
interpretation of the coefficients in the under-reporting equation of the MisProbit model,
as exactly the same model can be obtained under a zero-inflation framework. According
to the zero-inflation specification a fraction of people consists of genuine noncriminals who
regardless of their observed characteristics never commit and consequently never report any
crimes. Therefore, the MisProbit model is not able to distinguish between zero-inflation and
under-reporting. Moreover, this means that only a part of the population participates in the
binary model to either commit crimes or not and the estimates of the crime equation must
be interpreted as if we exclude genuine noncriminals.
6The MisProbit model reveals that, after controlling for under-reporting (zero-inflation)
and for basic demographic characteristics, the probability of committing a property crime is
lower for immigrants, but the difference is statistically insignificant. This finding is supported
by estimation of count data models as well, as being an immigrant (insignificantly) decreases
the mean number of actual crimes. Furthermore, violent crime results are in line with
the findings of property crime, as the immigrant-crime association is also negative but not
statistically significant. A further series of robustness checks (for example, different exclusion
restrictions, weighted versus unweighted estimation, and some types of restrictions in the
sample) indicates that, although statistically insignificant, the immigration-crime estimated
differential is very robust. This suggests that this relationship exists, but data limitations and
complexities of the models considered in this chapter reduce the precision of the estimated
coefficient.
In the next step, recognising that immigrants’ choice of location is not random, we de-
compose immigrants by region of residence. This exercise interestingly reveals that different
regions attract immigrants of different criminal behaviour, or that immigrants adapt differ-
ently across regions. According to these results, London is the place with the least criminal
immigrants, but South of England is the place with the most crime-prone immigrants. We
further allow for the fact that immigrant population is highly heterogeneous by decomposing
immigrants by ethnic background. The results of this exercise indicate that immigrants of
different ethnic groups exhibit different criminal behaviour. Particularly, black immigrants
are less involved in criminal activities than their native counterparts, even though this is
also the group that faces the most unfavorable labour outcomes. However, this analysis is
restricted by the limited variation between the (small) number of individuals in each partic-
ular group and the small number of positives in the dependent variable. For this reason the
analysis is kept very descriptive in the sense that we do not investigate the forces behind
the underlined estimated relationships. Further research considering a much larger sample
could be useful. However, at the moment the OCJS is the only available survey for England
and Wales.
Finally, it is also important to stress that this chapter does not use “validation” data,
that is data that correspond to respondents’ true criminal behaviour. Although the results
7are relatively robust across several specification and models, both binary and count data
models that take into account under-reporting are based on similar assumptions and there-
fore, to some extent it is expected that they would provide similar results. Hence, we cannot
say with certainty that these models “work” and whether they provide results that reflect
the true criminal activity. Thus, it would be important for future research to find relatively
similar situations where both the under-reported number and the actual number of inci-
dents is observed. As a potential example we could consider the investigation of individual
determinant’s of students absenteeism, where we observe both survey data on self-reported
absenteeism and official school records of absences. Thus, if the models used in this chapter
“work”, we would expect that the estimates from the models that use the under-reported
data but control for under-reporting to be similar to the estimates of the model that uses
the actual number of absences. Of course, availability of such data is questionable.1
In Chapter 3, we study the “other side of the coin”; that is, the relationship between
immigration status and victimization in England and Wales. Although investigation of this
relationship is very important to understand the whole immigration-crime picture, it has
been totally neglected by the researchers’ community. For this purpose, we use data from
the 2007/08 sweep of the British Crime Survey, a representative victimization survey where
respondents were asked in face-to-face interviews about their victimization experiences in
household and personal crime. As will be made clear from the results of this chapter, the
investigation of this relationship provides many interesting insights for both the criminal
behaviour and the reporting behaviour of immigrants.
In the empirical analysis we look at both instrumental and violent crime, but we partic-
ularly focus on the latter.2 This is because, compared to instrumental victimization, violent
victimization is a much more complex process since it is highly dependent on interactions
and interrelations between both potential offenders and potential victims prior to the inci-
dent. Therefore, as opposed to instrumental crime, (unobserved from the author) potential
1Another potential application could consider victimization data from the British Crime Survey. People
tend to report for some reasons only one third of the suffered crimes to the police. However, for each
victimization incident we know whether the victim reported it to the police. Thus, we know the (under-
reported) number of incidents reported to the police and the actual number of incidents.
2Instrumental crime can be defined as any criminal action where the offender targets victim’s property,
whereas in violent crime the offender’s target is to hurt the victim itself. This is actually very important for
the understanding of the forces behind the empirical results.
8victim’s personal behaviour is a very strong determinant of violent crime.
Regarding the empirical results, we first find that the probability of being a victim of a
burglary or a personal theft is higher for immigrants, which as expected however, can be well
explained by the fact that immigrants exhibit some demographic characteristics associated
with higher victimization relative to natives. Contrary to the above, we interestingly find
that conditional on basic demographic characteristics, immigrants face a lower risk of violent
victimization compared to natives.1 Thus, because of some unobserved characteristics such
as unobserved behavioural factors, immigrants encounter a lower risk of violent victimization
although they face the same risk of instrumental crime. For instance, a possible story, which
is examined throughout the chapter, is that immigrants follow different lifestyle choices
associated with lower victimization risks.
However, violent crime is composed of three very different crime types with respect to the
relationship between offenders and victims. We actually have information about whether a
violent crime was committed by a stranger, or an acquaintance, or a family member. Very
interestingly, breaking down violence into these three groups, we find that the immigration-
violence estimated differential is driven by the lower crime immigrants suffer by acquaintances
and by family members relative to natives, as there is no association for crime by strangers.
This is not consistent with the previous hypothesis though, because if immigrants followed
the aforementioned lifestyle choices we would expect a lower probability of victimization by
strangers as well. The next sections are devoted to examining this pattern.
Firstly, we examine whether immigrants are less willing to report crime committed by
familiar people relative to natives due to some cultural factors, but they do not mind report-
ing crime by strangers. Using data on self-reported domestic victimization (which data are
proved to be less under-reported) and the information on whether there was someone else
present during the face-to-face interview (which might have affected the reporting behaviour
of respondents), we show that immigrants do not under-report domestic crime by more than
natives. Therefore, we do not expect that they under-report crime by acquaintances either.
In the next step we investigate whether the unexpected pattern could be explained by
1Controlling for many other observed characteristics associated with the risk of victimization does not
alter the result. Actually, the effect of immigration on violent victimization is remarkably robust.
9the fact that immigrant are more likely to suffer racially motivated crime (RMC) relative to
natives, a crime that does not depend (or at least in depends much less compared to other
types of violence) on interactions and interrelations between the victim and the offender.
Using the information about whether the victim perceived a violent action as being racially
motivated, we show that if immigrants did not face RMC, they would also face a significantly
lower risk of victimization by strangers.
Finally, we examine whether immigrants’ lower risk of victimization by acquaintances
or family members could be because more recent immigrants have a smaller number of
acquaintances (network effect) or smaller households. First of all, we find that even the
most recent immigrants have larger households than natives of the same age. Moreover, as
information about the number of acquaintances is not available, we examine the “network
effect” hypothesis by assuming that immigrants start with small networks when they enter
the country which are being broadened over time. Therefore, we attempted to capture this
effect by exploiting the information about duration of time that immigrants have spent
in the host country. However, based on the results, we argue that although assimilation
patterns exist (for all violent crime types), the contribution of the “network effect” should
be relatively weak.
Therefore, all evidence of this study suggests that indeed, immigrants face a lower risk
of violent victimization because they follow lifestyles associated with a lower exposure to
criminal activities. This result is consistent with the findings of Chapter 2. For instance,
individuals that exhibit a relatively lower involvement in violent crime activities are directly
less exposed on violent victimization. Another plausible story is again related to the results
of the second chapter but from the offenders’ point of view. That is, if we assume that
people primarily socialize with people of the same background and if we also accept that
immigrants are slightly less likely to commit violent crimes, holding everything else constant,
we would expect a negative relationship between being an immigrant and the probability to
suffer a violent crime by acquaintances or family members, but a much lower difference for
crime by strangers (see, subsection 3.2.1 for a numerical example).
In the rest of the chapter, based on criminological theories of repeated victimization, the
total number of victimization incidents is used to investigate whether the effect of being an
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immigrant on the probability of victimization is different from the effect of being an immigrant
on the number of victimization incidents. To investigate this issue we use several count data
models that allow for the effect of the independent variables to be different at different parts
of the outcome variable’s distribution, such as hurdle models for counts (Mullahy, 1986) and
the quantile estimator for counts (Machado and Santos Silva, 2005). However, the results
show that patterns of repeated victimization are generally the same between immigrants
and natives and that if differential repeated victimization between immigrants and natives
exists, this is only for individuals that suffer large numbers of victimization incidents.
The count data models used in this section seem very promising towards analysing the de-
terminants of victimization incidents. Although some interesting relationships are revealed,
our analysis was restricted by the fact that the number of positives is relatively too small.
Therefore, it would be interesting to re-investigate the issue once we pool several sweeps of
the BCS.
In a nutshell, this thesis provides interesting contributions to both the empirical relation-
ship between immigration and crime, and to some econometric issues surrounding models
for counts and models developed to take into account under-reporting. Moreover, this study
opens several fields for future research, which are going to further enrich the understanding
of the empirical questions and the econometric issues analysed in this thesis.
Chapter 1
The Poisson-Logit Model:
Identification Issues and Extensions
1.1 Introduction
In applied work, researchers are in many occasions forced to use variables which are measured
with error, sometimes due to the data collection methods or because of the special nature
of some variables. Under-reporting or, under-recording can be listed as a particular type of
measurement error, where the observed size of the variable of interest is only a subset of its
actual size. For example, this problem is present in surveys, where people are reluctant to
reveal the true size of a particular activity, or, in cases where the recording mechanism is
unable to record the total amount of actual events.1
Specifically, this paper is concerned with the problem of under-reporting/under-recording
in count data models.2 This is a well known problem in the statistics and econometrics liter-
ature3 and well described in the two monographs of Cameron and Trivedi (1998) and Winkel-
1See, for example, Feinstein (1991), who discusses the tax evasion problem, Alessie, Gradus and Me-
lenberg (1990), who explore the consequences of not observing small expenditures in consumer expenditure
surveys and propose solutions (using a “count amount” model - see, also Van Praag and Vermeulen, 1993),
and MacDonald (2002), who discusses the so-called “dark figure” of recorded crime.
2This first Chapter is essentially a much more extensive version of the paper “Identification Issues in
Models for Underreported Counts”, (2008) co-written with Professor Joa˜o Santos Silva. Therefore, this
Chapter shares many common features with the aforementioned paper.
3Studies on this problem can be traced back to early works by statisticians such as Leslie and Davis
(1939) and Moran (1951) who discuss the problem of estimating the number of total animals in a given area
having information only on the trapped animals, by using the assumption that the underlined population
of animals decreases as more of them are trapped (and given that there is no reproduction). More recent
works include, Olkin, Petkau and Zidek (1981), who develop some estimators to estimate the true number
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mann (2008).1 Although some theory has been developed to deal with this problem, empirical
research on this topic is still limited. It needs to be stressed that under-reporting/under-
recording is a concept beyond its literal meaning. It includes every situation where the
amount of observed, reported events is only a subset of the total number of unobserved, ac-
tual events. There are many examples in empirical applications where the above idea can be
put into effect. For instance, in a crime survey, respondents may not be willing to reveal the
actual number of the crimes they have committed (see, Papadopoulos, 2011b). Moreover, in
an application of workers’ absenteeism, it may be the case that some absences in a workplace
will not be recorded if the monitoring mechanism is weak (see, Mukhopadhyay and Trivedi,
1995). In a different context, a researcher interested in labour mobility may wish to model
(unobserved) job offers during a fixed period of time, having only data on (observed) job
changes. Since the number of job changes is only a subset of job offers, this situation can be
included in the broad concept of under-reported/under-recorded counts (see, Winkelmann
and Zimmermann, 1993).
We need to note that the concept of “under-reporting” is conceptually different from
“under-recording”. In under-reporting, the individual who is responsible for an action is
the one that determines the decision whether to report this particular action. For instance,
in a crime survey, whether someone reports a crime that he/she has committed, depends
on his/her own characteristics. Contrary to that, what determines whether a crime com-
mitted by an individual is recorded or not, may be totally irrelevant to the offender’s char-
acteristics. In this particular example, this will depend for example on police effectiveness
or on laws severity. As will be made clear later in this paper, this is important for the
identification of the model presented in the following section that intends to correct for
under-reporting/under-recording. Nevertheless, from now on we will be referring to this
measurement error problem as under-reporting for ease of exposition.
of trials (and discuss their stability), given that successful trials are independent random binomial variables,
Feinstein (1989, 1990) who explores the problem of compliance and detection, Solow (1993), who discusses the
problem of incomplete records of counts of some historic events and estimates the “inclusion” probability
under the assumption that this probability monotonically increases over time, and Yannaros (1993) who
discusses under-reporting in the context of reported/recorded to police crime and estimates a lower bound
for the probability of reporting and consequently an upper bound for the number of the true number of
crimes, to mention only a few.
1Furthermore, a model accounting for under-reporting is implemented in a popular software for econo-
metrics (see, Econometric Software, Inc., 2007).
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The special nature of count data (non-negative integers) has concerned econometricians
throughout the last decades.1 The benchmark model for count data is the Poisson regression
model, an important property of which is that its density falls within the Linear Exponential
Family (LEF).2 As Gourieroux, Monford and Trognon (1984a) show, if a density belongs to
the LEF, consistency of the Maximum Likelihood Estimator (MLE) only requires correct
specification of the conditional mean. Thus, the Poisson MLE is a very robust estimator
since it is consistent even when the true density (true data generating process) is not Poisson,
given correct specification of the mean.3 The Poisson MLE that permits misspecification of
higher moments is known as Poisson Pseudo-MLE (see, also, Cameron and Trivedi, 1998,
and Winkelmann, 2008).
A limitation of the Poisson model is the assumption of equi-dispersion, which (in a
regression framework) means that the conditional mean equals the conditional variance. If
the data in hand are over-dispersed (under-dispersed), meaning that the variance is higher
(lower) than the mean, conventional Poisson MLE standard errors, obtained from estimating
the variance matrix n−1I−1 (where I is the information matrix), will be under-estimated
(over-estimated) resulting in inflated (deflated) asymptotic t-statistics and thus, in incorrect
inference (see, Cameron and Trivedi, 1986). This is not very restrictive though, since as
Gourieroux, Monford and Trognon (1984a) showed, we can still obtain valid inference by
estimating the variance matrix as n−1I−1JI−1 (where J is the variance of the score vector).4
This results in the Pseudo-ML standard errors, which are simply known as robust standard
errors. If the variance is higher than the mean, an alternative is to use a different distribution
that allows for over-dispersion, such as the Negative Binomial family of distributions (NB).
The NB2 and NB1 are the most popular models in the literature.5 Although the NB models
1Milestone works dealing with methods appropriate for count data are, among others, Jorgenson (1961),
Gourieroux, Monford and Trognon (1984a,b), Hausman, Hall and Griliches (1984), and Cameron and Trivedi
(1986).
2A density function with mean λ belongs to the LEF if it can be written as f(y, λ) = eA(λ)+B(y)+C(λ)y.
Thus, the Poisson model belongs to the LEF with A(λ) = −λ, B(y) = − ln (y!) and C(λ) = ln (λ).
3Very briefly, this important property comes from the fact that the first order condition (Score Funcion)
of any LEF can be written as (∂C(λ)/∂λ)[y − λ] (see, for example, Winkelmann, 2008) and therefore, if
E(y) = λ the expected score converges to the observed score, since the MLE sets the observed score to zero.
4This simple modification of the variance-covariance matrix is similar to the modification required in
continuous data under heteroskedasticity (see, White, 1982).
5These models allow for over-dispersion, as we will describe in detail later, by introducing an unobserved
gamma distributed parameter with mean equal to one and variance equal to a parameter αi. The NB2 model
with mean λi is obtained if αi is the same for every individual (homoskedastic), while the NB1 follows if αi
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can lead to efficiency gains in the presence of over-dispersed data compared to Poisson MLE
(since they exploit information of the second moment), they do not belong to the LEF and
hence, they are less robust in the sense that both the conditional mean and variance must
be correctly specified (see, Cameron and Trivedi, 1998).1
However, although quite robust, the conventional Poisson model becomes inappropriate
under some other types of misspecification, under-reporting of the count outcome being one
of them.2 Consequently, when under-reporting is evident, a conventional regression model for
count data will be misspecified and the estimation procedure will generally yield inconsistent
estimates. On this direction, models that take into account this source of misspecification
have been developed. In the next section, such a regression model will be presented. This
model is named Poisson-Logit (Poisson-Logistic Regression Model) since it is a double index
model based on the mixture of a Poisson with a Logit. True counts are generated by a Poisson
process and a different process, modeled as a Logit, determines whether an actual event is
reported. This is the simplest and the most popular among all other models developed for
this purpose. As will be made clear later, its simplicity can be attributed to the assumption
of independence between the count and the reporting process. Two natural extensions of the
Poison-Logit model are also presented, the Negative Binomial 2-Logit (NB2-Logit) and the
Negative Binomial 1-Logit (NB1-Logit). As in the simple NB regression model, NB-Logit is
used to take into account gamma distributed unobserved individual heterogeneity.3
is a function of the regressors such that αi = δ/λi (heteroskedastic).
1However, note that the NB2 belongs to the LEF only if α is known (fixed), which is not true in practice.
2For a detailed analysis on sources of misspecification, see Winkelmann (2008), page 102.
3In the literature of econometrics and statistics there are a few studies that deal with under-reporting.
These are the following: a NB2-Probit model is developed by Feinstein (1989) under the name of “Detec-
tion Controlled Random Poisson”. In this study he discusses the problem that inspectors of nuclear plants
sometimes fail to detect a number of violations, so that the detected violations are only a number of the true
violations. This concept can be naturally applied in any situation that involves compliance and inspection
(see, also, Feinstein, 1990). A Poisson-Probit model is applied in transportation research by Kumara and
Chin (2005) who want to identify the determinants of actual road accident given the recorded ones. Winkel-
mann (1998) presents a model where the strong assumption of independence between the two underlined
processes is relaxed. This is succeeded by allowing unobservables from both processes to be correlated. For
convenience, the reporting process is developed as a Probit. Pararai, Famoye and Lee (2006), use the Gener-
alized Poisson distribution instead of the Poisson, a model that is appropriate in the presence of both over and
under-dispersion. Li, Trivedi and Guo (2003) on the other hand, develop a structural Generalized Negative
Binomial mixture of Poisson regression, suitable for both under and over-reporting. Winkelamann (1996)
adopts a Bayesian approach, where he can estimate the parameters of the model by simulating their joint
posterior distribution using the Marcov chain-Monte Carlo simulation method, although each parameter’s
marginal posterior distribution is analytically intractable. On the other hand, Fader and Hardy (2000) are
able to derive analytic expressions for the marginal posteriors of interest, by using a Beta Binomial-Negative
Binomial Distribution model, however, not in a regression but in a univariate framework. Van Praag and
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Although very useful as an idea, identification of the Poisson-Logit model is problematic,
in the sense that even under the strong parametric assumptions required for setting up the
model, two identical “global” maxima exist and therefore, identification of the parameters of
interest is not possible. However, as will be made clear later, identification of the parameters
of the Poisson-Logit model can be achieved under further assumptions, which take the form
of either sign restrictions or exclusion restrictions. Moreover, it will be shown that exactly the
same identification issues arise in the NB2-Logit. Contrary to this, another parameterization
of the Negative Binomial distribution gives rise to the NB1-Logit model, whose structure
makes identification easier. Finally, all the analysis implies that the identification problems
affecting the Poisson-Logit cannot be extended to a model where the Probit specification is
used instead of the Logit.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: in Section 1.2 the Poisson-Logit model is
presented. Section 1.3 generalizes this model to allow for gamma specific unobserved individ-
ual heterogeneity, giving rise to the Negative Binomial family of models. Section 1.4 discusses
the identification issues of the presented frameworks. In Section 1.5 some possible solutions
to these identification issues are discussed. A general discussion on the aforementioned anal-
ysis follows in Section 1.6. Section 1.7 briefly discusses other models that are used in different
contexts but either their conditional mean is specified as the Poisson-Logit’s one or they face
similar identification problems. Section 1.8 uses an empirical application to labour mobility,
adopted by Winkelmann and Zimmermann (1993), to illustrate the theoretical results of this
study. Finally, Section 1.9 consists of concluding remarks.
1.2 The Poisson Logistic Regression Model
In this section we present the Poisson-Logit model, introduced in Winkelmann and Zim-
mermann (1993), but also discussed in Mukhopadhyay and Trivedi (1995). To begin with,
consider the data generating process (DGP) where true events are generated by a Pois-
Vermeulen (1993) develop a “count-amount” model based on a different approach, utilizing the extra in-
formation that an event is recorded only if it exceeds a threshold value. Finally, Cohen (1960) discusses
a situation of Poisson distributed counts where a proportion of ones are recorded as zeroes. For example,
when an inspector examines an item he/she may conclude that it is perfect even if there is one small defect,
while he/she records correctly items with two or more defects. However, he recognizes that this situation is
unrealistic.
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son process, but whether each event is reported is determined by a Bernoulli process, a
mechanism known in the literature as binomial thinning.1 According to this procedure, for
individual i, the total amount of events is considered as the sum of a sequence of Bernoulli
trials, where for every particular event there is a constant probability of “success” equal to
p. If an event turns to be successful, it is consequently reported, whereas if unsuccessful,
with probability 1 − p, it remains unreported. As a consequence, the observed counts are
only a subset of the true counts. In a regression framework, the estimates of a conven-
tional Poisson model which aims to identify the parameters of the true events will most
probably be inconsistent, since these estimates are based on the reported events rather than
the true events (see, Winkelmann, 2008). However, a more appropriate compound Poisson
distribution, combining the poisson process with the reporting process can be developed.2
It should be mentioned that throughout the analysis a regression framework is assumed,
in which the object of interest is the distribution of the true (unobserved) events for individual
i, y∗i , conditional on a set of regressors xi = (x1i, x2i). Vector x1i is assumed to affect the
Poisson process while vector x2i affects the reporting process. These two sets of regressors
may be identical, disjoint or overlapping.3
To start with, assume that y∗i , conditional on the set of covariates x1i, follows the Poisson
distribution. Therefore, the conditional probability of the random variable to be equal to a
realization y∗i is given by,
Pr(Y ∗i = y
∗
i |x1i) = e−λiλy
∗
i
i /y
∗
i !,
λi = E[y
∗
i |x1i] = ex
′
1iβ,
(1.1)
where λi is both the Poisson conditional mean and variance, a result known as “equi-
dispersion”. As it is very common in econometrics literature, λi is assumed to depend
1The “binomial thinning” process is introduced in count data regression models for time series. See, for
example, Steutel and Van Harn (1979), and McKenzie (1985). In this paper, the binomial thinning operator
will be modeled as a Logit.
2For a detailed discussion of compound and mixture distributions refer to Johnson, Kemp, Kotz (2005).
3According to note 5, in cases that we deal with under-reporting, x1i and x2i will generally be identical,
unless there are good reasons to advocate an exclusion restriction either from the reporting or the count
process. However, if our research project deals with under-recording, x1i and x2i will generally be disjoint
or overlapping, but not identical. As will be seen later, this is important for the identification of the models
presented in this paper.
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exponentially on x1i, which ensures non-negativity of the Poisson conditional expectation.
1
More importantly, assume that yi, which denotes the number of events reported in a given
period (observed events) by individual i, is given by the sum of independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d) random Bernoulli variables Bij, so that,
yi = Bi1 +Bi2 + . . . . . .+Biy∗i =
y∗i∑
j=1
Bij, (1.2)
where y∗i is the total number events and therefore, yi ≤ y∗i .2 Moreover, the probability of an
event to be reported (successful), is assumed to depend on the set of regressors x2i. In the
present specification this is modeled as a Logit, thus given by,
Pr(Bij = 1|xi) = Λ(x′2iγ) = Λi =
ex
′
2iγ
1 + ex
′
2iγ
. (1.3)
If it is assumed that y∗i is conditionally independent from Bij, (1.2) implies that yi has a
compound, or differently, a stopped-sum distribution , i.e. a binomial distribution stopped by
Poisson.3 The distribution of yi can be derived using probability generating functions (PGF)
(see, for example, Feller, 1968). The PGF of the Poisson and the Bernoulli distributions, for
any real k and z, are given by
Gy
∗
(k) = eλ(k−1),
GB(z) = 1− p+ pz,
(1.4)
where λ is the Poisson parameter and p is the probability that an event is reported. Then,
1Following the results of the Pseudo-MLE, if the true mean is misspecified, for example if it is not
log-linear in the population, then MLE is inconsistent. There have been suggestions to use a more general
function for the mean, such as E(y|x) = [1 +ω(x′β)]1/ω which is known as the Box-Cox transformation (see,
Wooldridge, 1992). This transformation nests both the linear case for ω = 1 and the exponential case for
ω = 0.
2Here, it is implicitly assumed that it would never be the case that someone reports an event that did not
happen, so that there is no over-reporting. For a model allowing for both under-reporting and over-reporting,
see Li, Trivedi and Guo (2003).
3The name stopped-sum comes from the fact that the summation of Bernoulli variables is “stopped”
by the value of the Poisson distributed latent variable y∗i . It needs to be noted that the assumption of
independency is quite strong. It is highly likely that the reporting probability depends on the number of
true events and vice versa. For example, an individual would be less likely to report a crime if the number of
crimes he/she has committed is quite high. Also, an absence from work is more probable if the probability of
recording this particular absence is quite low. Of course, this assumption can be relaxed, something that will
lead to more complicated results which are beyond the scope of this paper (see, for example, Winkelmann,
1998)
18
it can be shown that the compound PGF of y, under independence of y∗i from Bij, is given
by,
Gy(k(z)) = Gy
∗
(GB(z)) = eλ(G
B(z)−1) = eλ(−p+pz) = eλp(z−1) = eµ(z−1). (1.5)
Thus, the distribution of y is also Poisson with mean and variance equal to µ = λp.1 In the
regression framework, λi = e
x′1iβ and pi = Λi. The resulting conditional probability of yi,
and the conditional mean are given by,
Pr(Yi = yi|xi) = e−µiµyii /yi!,
µi = E[yi|xi] = λiΛi,
(1.6)
respectively. This model is named Poisson-Logit for obvious reasons. Parameters β and γ
(henceforth denoted as θ = (β, γ) ) can be estimated by the method of Maximum Likelihood,
as we can easily specify the likelihood function from (1.6). The resulting log-likelihood
function is given by,
`(θ) = lnL (θ) =
n∑
i=1
(
− µi + yi log µi − ln (yi!)
)
. (1.7)
Estimation of θ follows by maximization of (1.7) using numerical algorithms, such as the
Newton-Raphson, as the first order conditions (FOCs) for optimality are non-linear.2 Hence,
according to this framework, by only observing the reported events, we are able to estimate
the impact of x1i and x2i on the true events and on the probability for each event to be
1This result can be traced even further back than Feller (1968) to the early works in statistics by Neyman
(1939) and Catcheside (1948). Neyman explains that in a given area, if the number of eggs laid by a fly per
plant follow the Poisson distribution with λ, and if these masses of eggs hatch independently with probability
of survival p, then the survived flies also follow the Poisson distribution with µ = λp. Similarly, Catcheside,
in an example adjusted to genetics, says that if a given dosage of radiation causes breakages to chromosomes
(where the number of total unobserved breakages per cell follow the Poisson distribution), and if there is a
constant probability, 1− p, for a break chromosome to heal , then the observed breakages follow the Poisson
distribution with parameter µ = λp.
2The Score and Hessian of the Poisson-Logit model are given by, s(θ) = ∂`(θ)∂θ =
n∑
i=1
(yi − µi)
[
x′i1
x′i2(1−Λi)
]
and H(θ) = ∂
2`(θ)
∂θ∂θ′ =
n∑
i=1
−µi
[
xi1x
′
i1 xi1x
′
i2(1−Λi)
xi1x
′
i2(1−Λi) xi2x′i2
[
(1−Λi)2+ yi−µiµi Λi(1−Λi)
] ], respectively. The lower right block
of the second matrix is negative if yi < λi(2Λi − 1) and therefore, H(θ) is not always negative definite.
Consequently, `(θ) is not globally concave which may lead to multimodality. This feature and its consequences
will be discussed later.
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reported, respectively.
We notice that the Poisson-Logit probability distribution is the same as the one of the
traditional Poisson model, with a modified conditional mean. Therefore, as the density of
the traditional Poisson model belongs to the LEF (see, Gourieroux, Monfort, and Trognon,
1984), so does the density of the Poisson-Logit model with µ in place of λ. Therefore, using
the result of the Pseudo-MLE, consistent estimation of θ only requires correct specification
of the conditional mean. That is, the true DGP need not be Poisson-Logit but the true mean
must be given as µi = λiΛi. However, in cases of misspecified distributional assumptions,
estimates of higher moments will be inconsistent. Therefore, valid inference still requires
that the conditional variance is correctly specified (equal to µi in the case of Poisson-Logit).
Particularly, as it is the case for the conventional Poisson model, it can be shown that
if V ar(yi|xi) > E(yi|xi), the Poisson-Logit MLE standard errors will be underestimated
yielding false inference for the parameters of interest. In these cases, statistical inference
must be based on Pseudo-ML standard errors which consistently estimate the variance of θ as
explained in the introduction. Therefore, as long as we are confident about the specification
of µi, the Pseudo-ML is a consistent estimator for both θ, and the variance of θ.
It is clear that the above compound model is applicable not only in cases of under-
reporting, but whenever the observed number of events is a subset of the actual number.
Thus, as mentioned in the introduction, “under-reporting” can be considered as a broader
concept. For example, Winkelmann and Zimmermann (1993) analyze job offers, which can
be considered as the true DGP in labour mobility models, by merely observing the number of
job changes (see also, Section 1.7). In this sense, using the Poisson-Logit, that imposes more
structure to the model, they are able to estimate the impact of employee’s characteristics on
both the number of outside job offers they receive and the probability of accepting an outside
job offer. As another example consider firms’ innovative activity. As Wang, Cockburn, and
Putermam (1998) discuss, economists usually use the number of patents as an indicator of
a firm’s inventive activity since inventive activity is not directly observed. However, having
only data on the count of patents, the Poisson-Logit model enables the researcher to draw
inference for the probability of an invention to be patented and the determinants of the true
inventive activity.
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1.3 Extensions - The Negative Binomial Logit Case
A basic property of the Poisson-Logit model is that µi is both the conditional mean and
variance of the dependent variable. This result often makes the Poisson distribution less ap-
propriate in fitting “real” data, since many empirical applications reveal that over-dispersion
exists. In the presence of over-dispersion, although the Poisson MLE complemented by ro-
bust standard errors is totally appropriate, given that the conditional mean is correctly
specified, researchers tend to use models more suitable for over-dispersed data, the most
popular being the Negative Binomial family of models (NB). One way to obtain the NB
model is by combining a Poisson distribution with an independent gamma distributed error
term (see, for example, Cameron and Trivedi, 1986). This error term can be regarded as
an unobserved individual heterogeneity, for instance, because of omitted regressors from the
mean specification.
To this end, suppose that there is an unobservable individual effect, υi = e
εi , which is
gamma distributed with E(υi) = 1 and V ar(υi) = αi. Moreover, assume that y
∗
i conditional
on x1i and υi is Poisson distributed with mean λie
εi . Thus, conditional on x1i only, the
distribution of y∗i is Poisson-Gamma with conditional probability,
Pr(Y ∗i = y
∗
i |x1i) =
∫
e−λiυi(λiυi)y
∗
i
y∗i !
g (υi, 1/αi) dυi ≡ Eυ
[
Pr(Y ∗i = y
∗
i |x1i, υi)
]
, (1.8)
where g(.) is the gamma density function with parameter 1/αi. Averaging out (1.8) leads to
the NB distribution1 with mean, λi and variance,
ωi = λi + αiλ
2
i . (1.9)
Therefore, this formulation allows for over-dispersion since αi > 0, implies that, ωi > λi.
2
Now, similarly to the previous section, assume that yi has a stopped-sum distribution as
given in (1.2), however, in this case this sum is stopped by the value of y∗i , which follows
1For a proof, see, Cameron and Trivedi (1998), p101.
2The mean of the NB can be obtained by using the Law of Iterated Expectations as E(y|x) =
Eυ [E(y|x, υ)] = Eυ[λυ] = λ. The variance is obtained by using the Law of Total Variance, as V ar(y|x) =
Eυ [V ar(y|x, υ)] + V arυ [E(y|x, υ)] = Eυ[λυ] + V arυ[λυ] = λ + αλ2. For further details about the Nega-
tive Binomial models refer to Hausman, Hall and Griliches (1984), Cameron and Trivedi (1986, 1998), and
Winkelmann (2008).
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the NB rather than the Poisson distribution. Again, the probability of an actual event to be
reported, conditional also on this error term, is given by Λi. The distribution of yi can be
similarly derived using a compound PGF, resulting from compounding a NB PGF together
with a Bernoulli PGF. Following Anscombe (1950), the NB PGF for y∗, with mean equal to
λ and variance equal to λ(1 + αλ), is given by,
Gy
∗
(k) = (1 + αλ− αλk)−α−1 . (1.10)
Therefore, the compound PGF for yi is the following:
Gy(k(z)) = Gy
∗
(GB(z)) = (1 + αλ− αλGB(z))−α−1 = (1 + αλ− αλ(1− p+ pz))−α−1
= (1 + αλp− αλpz)−α−1 = (1 + αµ− αµz)−α−1 .
(1.11)
Thus, the distribution of y is NB with mean µ and variance µ(1 + αµ). According to the
regression framework, similarly to the procedure followed for the simple NB model, the
distribution of yi conditional on xi only, is NB with mean equal to µi and variance given by,
ωi = µi + αiµ
2
i . (1.12)
As it is clear from (1.12), the NB-Logit converges to the Poisson-Logit model as αi approaches
zero, since consequently, ωi converges to µi.
1
The NB2 is the most used and cited model among the NB family. It is obtained if it
is assumed that the variance of the error term, αi, is constant (homoscedastic), so that
the variance of yi is ωi = µi + αµ
2
i , which is quadratic on µi. The conditional probability
of the NB2-Logit follows the conditional probability of the simple NB2 model, with mean
1A formal proof that shows how the NB probability function converges to Poisson as α → 0, can be
found in Wineklmann (2008), p23.
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parameter µi = λiΛi in place of λi, such that,
Pr(Yi = yi|xi, α) = Γ(yi + α
−1)
Γ(yi + 1)Γ(α−1)
(
α−1
α−1 + µi
)α−1 (
µi
α−1 + µi
)yi
=
Γ(yi + α
−1)
Γ(yi + 1)Γ(α−1)
(1 + αµi)
−(α−1+yi)(αµi)yi .
(1.13)
We can estimate θ and the additional “overdispersion” parameter α by Maximum Likelihood,
specifying first the log likelihoods from (1.13), which is,
lnL (α, β, γ) =
n∑
i=1
(
ln
(
Γ(yi + α
−1)
Γ(yi + 1)Γ(α−1)
)
−(α−1+yi) ln(1+αµi)+yi(lnµi+lnα).
)
(1.14)
Another model of this family that is extensively used in empirical works is the NB1. The
NB1 is obtained if we consider that αi is not constant but instead, it is a function of the
regressors (heteroscedastic) according to the following relationship, αi = δ/λi. Substituting
this relationship into (1.12) we obtain the variance of the NB1-Logit,
ωi = µi + δλiΛ
2
i . (1.15)
Thus, this different parameterization leads to a variance form which is no more quadratic
on µi, but rather, linear with respect to λi and quadratic with respect to Λi. Given (1.15)
the probability distribution of the NB1-Logit model is given by,
Pr(Yi = yi|xi, δ) = Γ(yi + δ
−1λi)
Γ(yi + 1)Γ(δ−1λi)
(
δ−1λi
δ−1λi + µi
)δ−1λi ( µi
δ−1λi + µi
)yi
=
Γ(yi + δ
−1λi)
Γ(yi + 1)Γ(δ−1λi)
(1 + δΛi)
−(δ−1λi+yi)(δΛi)yi .
(1.16)
The log likelihood of NB1-Logit is therefore given by,
lnL (α, β, γ) =
n∑
i=1
(
ln
(
Γ(yi + δ
−1λi)
Γ(yi + 1)Γ(δ−1λi)
)
− (δ−1λi + yi) ln (1 + δΛi) + yi(ln δ + ln Λi)
)
.
(1.17)
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From (1.17) it is clear that the parameters of the NB1-Logit model do not always appear
together, as opposed to both Poisson-Logit and NB2-Logit where the regressors of both
the count and reporting processes affect the log likelihood function only through µi. The
interesting implication of this feature will be discussed in Section 1.5. Similar to the NB2-
Logit, maximum likelihood can be performed to estimate the values of β, γ and δ that
maximize the likelihood of having obtained the observed data.1
We need to stress, however, that although these two models may lead in efficiency gains
in the presence of over-dispersion, they do not belong to the LEF.2 Thus, the robustness
properties of the Pseudo-MLE do not hold in this case. For consistency of the NB-Logit
models it is required that the true DGP is NB-Logit, so that the individual unobserved
heterogeneity is gamma distributed with variance equal to α and δ/λi for NB2-Logit and
NB1-Logit, respectively. Therefore, by using the NB-Logit models instead of the Poisson-
Logit we trade-off robustness for a possible gain in efficiency.
1.4 Identification Issues in the Poisson-Logit model
Even though the Poisson regression model is very robust, the Poisson-Logit is a double-index
model where identification of θ is problematic. As will be made clear in this section, apart
from all the aforementioned assumptions in the set up of the model, further parametric
assumptions are needed in order for the parameters β and γ to be identifiable. This iden-
tification problem stems from the fact that the Poisson-Logit mean is given as the product
of the Poisson mean (exponential) and the Logit function. Consider the following simple
manipulation of µi:
µi ≡ ex′1iβ e
x′2iγ
1 + ex
′
2iγ
= ex
′
1iβ+x
′
2iγ
1
1 + ex
′
2iγ
= ex
′
1iβ+x
′
2iγ
e−x
′
2iγ
1 + e−x′2iγ
≡ µ∗i , (1.18)
1Studies that explore the NB1-Logit and NB2-Logit models are limited. However, a detailed description
of the NB2-Logit model together with its FOCs and its Information Matrix can be found in Mukhopadhyay
and Trivedi (1995), and Cameron and Trivedi (1998). In addition, a conditional probability function similar
to the NB1-Logit is obtained by Van Praag and Vermeulen (1993).
2The NB2-Logit belongs to the LEF only for given α. Nevertheless, in practice α is subject to estimation
as there is no a priori information about its value.
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where we notice that the conditional mean can be written in two different ways as µi = λiΛi
and µ∗i = λie
x′2iγ(1 − Λi), where µi ≡ µ∗i . This simple, yet important, result has critical
consequences for the identification of the Poisson-Logit model.
First, recall that the Poisson-Logit MLE aims to determine the values of θ that maximize
the value of the likelihood function. From (1.7) we can see that these parameters enter the log
likelihood function only through µi, which appears in the log likelihood only as a whole (the
Poisson mean is not separated from the Logit at any point). Therefore, identification of β and
γ will depend only on µi. Now assume that there is µi that maximizes the likelihood function.
However, since µi ≡ µ∗i , µ∗i also maximizes the same likelihood function. This means that,
µi is observationally equivalent to µ
∗
i , unless appropriate restrictions are imposed on θ.
1
Particularly, as will be made clearer in the next paragraphs, unless at least one exclusion
restriction is imposed on β, (1.18) implies that there are two Poisson-Logit regression models
with conditional means µi and µ
∗
i , that lead to the same likelihood value.
To fix ideas, consider first the case where the same regressors appear in both processes,
so that xi = x1i = x2i. According to this assumption, (1.18) gives,
µi ≡ ex′iβ e
x′iγ
1 + ex
′
iγ
= ex
′
i(β+γ)
e−x
′
iγ
1 + e−x′iγ
= ex
′
iβ
∗ ex
′
iγ
∗
1 + ex
′
iγ
∗ ≡ µ∗i (1.19)
Therefore, there are always two observationally equivalent models and identification fails.
The parameters θ and θ∗ of the two models are related to each other in the following manner:
if the parameters of the first model are given by β for the Poisson and γ for the Logit part,
then the parameters of the second model are given by β∗ = β+γ and γ∗ = −γ, respectively.
In Section 1.7, we illustrate this result using a real data set.
1.5 Possible Solutions to the Identification Problem
In this section, we firstly present the conditions under which the Poisson-Logit model is
identified. One possible identification strategy is to use sign restrictions on the Logit process,
henceforth called “reporting process”, which is helpful whenever prior information of the sign
1By “observational equivalence” we mean that there are two different linearly dependent sets of param-
eters, for example, θ = (β, γ) and θ∗ = (β∗, γ∗), that maximize the value of the likelihood function.
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of at least one parameter of the reporting process exists. Moreover, exclusion restrictions on
the reporting or the count process can be used. This requires that we have initial information
for at least one parameter of β or γ to be zero, meaning that a regressor that belongs to
the reporting process has no effect on the reporting process, or the opposite.1 Following
another direction, we consider small departures from the Poisson-Logit model by assuming a
different distribution for the count process, or a different model for the reporting process, or
any combination of the two. We will also show that it is possible to identify θ by imposing
a different structure on the density function. In this section only the theoretical results are
presented. Discussion of these findings and empirical illustrations follow in subsections 1.6
and 1.8, respectively.
1.5.1 Sign Restrictions on the Reporting Process
A first way to identify θ is by imposing at least one sign restrictions on the reporting
process. It must be stressed that this option is valid only if established theoretical results
clearly suggest the direction of the impact of an independent variable on the reporting
process. For instance, consider the example of labour mobility adopted by Winkelmann and
Zimmermann (1993), where job offers follow the Poisson distribution and the probability
to accept an offer is given as a Logit. Now suppose that a hypothetical “well” established
theory for labour mobility suggests that more “firm specific” human capital accumulation
(FS-HCA) by employees increases wage in the current job but not the wage offered by outside
firms. Therefore, more FS-HCA increases the wages differential between the current job and
potential outside job offers. Consequently, following this theory, an increase in FS-HCA will
have a negative effect in the probability of a worker to accept a job offer, therefore, resulting
in a negative coefficient in the Logit part.2
Since without exclusion restrictions two observationally equivalent models always exist
with θ = (β, γ) and, θ∗ = (β + γ,−γ), the effect of this variable will be positive in the one
1If the model was not aﬄicted by this identification problem, it would be natural to assume that the
individual characteristics affecting the count process are the same with the individual characteristics deter-
mining the reporting process. For example, assume that the decision to commit a crime depends on the
gender, age and race. However, the probability of reporting this crime would be naturally affected by the
same features. Therefore, it is a quite strong assumption to a priori restrict a coefficient to zero. There
must always be rational reasons behind our choices.
2Winkelmann (2008) in section 9.7 presents a brief review on theories developed for labour mobility.
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model but negative in the second. Hence, identification is achieved since we reject the model
in which the coefficient appears with the wrong sign. Finally, notice that sign restrictions
on the count process are not appropriate as β and β∗ = β + γ can be of the same sign, so
that the effect of a variable can possibly be of the same direction in both models.
1.5.2 Exclusion Restrictions on the Reporting Process
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, imposing exclusion restrictions can help
identifying θ. However, it is easy to show that if exclusion restrictions are placed only on the
Logit part, by restricting some elements of γ to zero, only the elements of β corresponding
to the zeros in γ are identified.
Consider the case where we a priori know that at least one regressor belongs only to the
count process. Differently, this can be considered as restricting the corresponding elements
of γ to zero. When exclusion restrictions are placed on γ, vector x2i can be considered as
a subset of x1i, so that in vector x1i there is at least one variable that does not appear in
x2i. Assume that this set of regressors is denoted by wi. Thus, since vector x1i consists of
vector x2i plus vector wi, the exclusion restrictions on the Logit part could be thought of as
having added another set of regressors wi in the Poisson part, changing the Poisson-Logit
mean into µi = e
x′2iβ+w
′
iηΛi, where η consists of the parameters corresponding to the zeros
in γ. Now, following the same reasoning as in (1.18) and (1.19) we have that,
µi ≡ ex′2iβ+w′iη e
x′2iγ
1 + ex
′
2iγ
= ex
′
2i(β+γ)+w
′
iη
e−x
′
2iγ
1 + e−x′2iγ
= ex
′
2iβ
∗+w′iη
∗ ex
′
2iγ
∗
1 + ex
′
2iγ
∗ ≡ µ∗i . (1.20)
Therefore, even in this case two observationally equivalent models exist where β∗ = β + γ
and, γ∗ = −γ, but η∗ = η. It is clear that β and γ remain unidentified, since two different
set of these parameters will lead to exactly the same likelihood value. In spite of this, all
the elements included in η are identified, as η is identical in both µi and µ
∗
i . Hence, unless
we are interested only in η, this kind of restrictions seems inappropriate.
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1.5.3 Exclusion Restrictions on the Count Process
Now assume that exclusion restrictions are placed in the Poisson part, by setting some
parameters of β to zero. Consequently, x2i consists of x1i plus a set of regressors that
corresponds to the excluded variables of the Poisson part. Let us denote this vector by
qi. Therefore, the probability of reporting an event is now given by Λ(e
x′1iγ+q
′
iϕ), where ϕ
contains the parameters in the reporting process corresponding to the restricted to zero
parameters of β. Accordingly, we have:
µi ≡ ex′1iβ e
x′1iγ+q
′
iϕ
1 + ex
′
1iγ+q
′
iϕ
= ex
′
1i(β+γ)+q
′
iϕ
e−x
′
1iγ−q′iϕ
1 + e−x′1iγ−q′iϕ
6= ex′1iβ∗ e
x′1iγ
∗+q′iϕ
∗
1 + ex
′
1iγ
∗+q′iϕ∗
≡ µ∗i , (1.21)
where β∗ = β + γ, γ∗ = −γ, and ϕ∗ = −ϕ. As we notice from (1.21), the two models µi and
µ∗i are not observationally equivalent in this case, since the vector qi appears in the Poisson
mean of µi but not in µ
∗
i , and identification for the whole model is achieved.
1.5.4 Specifying the Count Generating Process, as Negative Bi-
nomial 1
As mentioned before, models for count data that use the Negative Binomial distribution
have been very popular as they allow for over-dispersion through the extra parameter α (or
δ, in NB1 case). As presented in Section 1.3, allowing for gamma distributed unobserved
heterogeneity in the Poisson-Logit model gives rise to the NB-Logit family of models. There,
the two basic generalizations of the Poisson-Logit model were presented, the NB2-Logit and
the NB1-Logit.
Concerning the NB2-Logit model, it is clear from (1.14) that its log likelihood depends
on the regressors only through µi, as it is the case in the Poisson-Logit model. This is
because of the homoscedastic form of the variance of the gamma distributed error term α.
As a consequence, identification of the NB2-Logit model requires exactly the same conditions
established for the Poisson-Logit model.
On the other hand, according to the NB1-Logit model, the variance of the error term
is heteroscedastic of the form δ/λi. This is incorporated into the log likelihood function
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(1.17), where it now depends on x1i through λi, and on x2i through Λi, separately. Thus,
in a sense, the likelihood function of the NB1-Logit model can distinguish the count process
from the reporting process, and consequently, β from γ. As a result, adopting the NB1
distribution, identification becomes possible even when both parts of the model contain the
same regressors.
Nevertheless, it is very important to stress that NB1-Logit model is not a LEF and
therefore, it is not robust in misspecifications of moments higher than the conditional mean.
Therefore, since NB1-Logit MLE achieves identification of the mean by assuming a particular
form of hetersoskedasticity of the error term, and consequently, by imposing a different
structure on ωi, the estimates of θ will be inconsistent if the variance form is misspecified.
1.5.5 Specifying the Reporting Probability as a Probit or CLogLog
Another very popular model that deals with binary choice problems is the Probit model,
which exhibits nearly the same properties as the Logit model (see, Maddala, 1983). Never-
theless, assume that the correct specification for reporting a particular event is given by a
Probit model instead of a Logit. According to the Probit model, Pr(Bij = 1|xi) = Φ(x′2iγ),
where Φ(.) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function (CDF).
Given this assumption, the Poisson-Logit changes into the Poisson-Probit model with
mean equal to µi = λiΦ(x
′
2iγ). As opposed to the Logit, the functional form of the Probit
model cannot give rise to the identification problem described in Section 1.4, even when
the regressors are the same in both parts of the model. This is obvious, since now µi =
ex
′
iβΦ(x′iγ) 6= ex′i(β+γ)Φ(−x′iγ). Therefore, when the probability of reporting an event is
given by a Probit, identification of the whole model is achieved.
Although less popular, the complementary log-log model (CLogLog) has also been used
in the literature. Contrary to the Probit or Logit, this model assumes a non-symmetric
CDF that is derived from the extreme value distribution. Therefore, according to this model
Pr(Bij = 1|xi) = 1 − exp(−ex′iγ). As CLogLog relaxes the assumption of symmetry, it
becomes more appropriate in cases where the observed average probability of the outcome
is close to one or close to zero. Therefore, if there are good reasons to believe that the
probability of reporting a true event is very close to one or very close to zero, a researcher
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could advocate that a Poisson-CLogLog model is more appropriate and use the CLogLog
CDF instead of the symmetric Logit. As it is the case for the Poisson-Probit, µi = e
x′iβ(1−
exp(−ex′iγ)) 6= ex′i(β+γ)(1− exp(−e−x′iγ)) and this model is identified.
1.6 Discussion
The theoretical results developed in this paper suggest that identification of the Poisson-
Logit, and the NB2-Logit models is problematic, in the sense that without further parametric
assumptions two identical “global” maxima exist. However, identification is achieved if true
events follow the NB1 distribution, or if the reporting process is specified as a Probit model.
In this section, further implications of the above results will be discussed. Moreover, some
tips for researchers who intend to use the above models will be described.
As explained in subsection 1.5.1, a first way to achieve identification is by sign restrictions
on the reporting process. We need to stress that this type of restriction becomes more
appropriate the more certain we are about the theoretical result that determines the sign of
the “restricted” coefficient. For instance, in the example of subsection 1.5.1, if information of
the FS-HCA was publicly available, it could increase the wage of outside offers as well, making
the change in wages differential uncertain. Moreover in practice, given correct specification of
the conditional mean,1 the effect of the “restricted” variable should be statistically significant.
In fact, the more significant the effect, the more certain we are about the appeared sign in
the two models. Finally, in many cases the “restricted variable” is not directly observed and
therefore, the researcher is forced to use proxy variables. In the previous example, FS-HCA
is not observed in practice but it can be approximated by “job experience”. However, it is
ambiguous whether general “job experience” captures the true effect of FS-HCA.
More interestingly, the results of subsection 1.5.3 showed that when exclusion restrictions
are imposed on the count process, identification of the whole model is achieved, since there
cannot be two linearly dependent sets of parameters that lead to the same likelihood value.
However, even in this case, it is clear from (1.21) that the identification problem is exactly
1By correct specification we mean that not only should the true mean be given by λiΛi but also that
both processes include all the required information. That is, we do not include irrelevant variables, and we
do not omit variables that must be included.
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restored when ϕ = 0, or when the regressors excluded from the Poisson part, qi, are perfectly
collinear with the remaining elements of this vector, x1i. Hence, the closer we move towards
the one of these two conditions, the smaller the effect of the exclusion restriction, and the
more difficult the identification becomes. Practically, we find that if the exclusion restriction
is very “weak”, meaning that the excluded from the count process variable has a very small
effect on the reporting process, another local maximum probably exists with likelihood value
very close to the global one and estimated parameters very close to θ∗ = (β + γ,−γ). If
a second maximum does exist, the estimation process, using zeros or conventional Poisson
estimates for starting values in the count process, will always converge either towards the
global or the local maximum. If a researcher performing the Poisson-Logit or the NB2-Logit
MLE in real data is unaware of these problems, he/she may be puzzled estimating parameters
with unexpected signs or implausible values. Section 1.7 will present a very comprehensive
example of this situation.
Thus, although an appropriate restriction guarantees identification of θ, it is not guaran-
teed that the global maximum has been found. Therefore, estimation of the above models
must be always accompanied by a thorough search for alternative maxima. A very useful way
of searching for other candidate maxima is the following: firstly, a regression is performed
using randomly chosen values for the coefficients of the reporting process and conventional
Poisson or NB2 estimates for the coefficients of the count process. This helps the estimation
to be smoother, avoiding possible numerical errors in the optimization procedure. Unless
more problems exist, the model will converge on log likelihood value ln Lˆ , corresponding to
estimates θˆ = (βˆ, γˆ). According to the theoretical results, the other maximum will be close
to θˆ∗ = (βˆ + γˆ,−γˆ). Hence, the estimated values of θˆ∗ can be used as starting values for a
second regression. If the second maximum exists, it will be found by this second regression,
with log likelihood value ln L˜ ∗ and θ˜∗ ≈ θˆ∗. Consequently, if we find both maxima, we will
accept the set of parameters that maximize the likelihood of obtaining the observed data.
It would also be useful to note that sometimes, different numerical algorithms work better
in different models or different data, in the sense that they perform with lower number of
numerical errors and achieve convergence more easily.1 Therefore, in case a numerical algo-
1Some popular algorithms available in econometric packages are: the Newton-Raphson which uses an-
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rithm does not perform well, before coming to the decision that there is something wrong
with our model, it would be very practical to run the same model with alternative numerical
optimizers.
In footnote 2 of page 14, we mentioned that the likelihood function of the Poisson-Logit
model is not always globally concave which might lead to multimodality. Therefore, not
always can we be certain that only two maxima exist. In practice, there might be cases where
more than two maxima exist. The method described above could not succeed in reaching
a, supposedly, third local maximum. One way to reach a potential third maximum would
be to use random starting values for all the parameters and to experiment with different
numerical algorithms. If this is repeated many times, it is highly likely that the regression
procedure will converge in every candidate maximum.
Of course a researcher, using over-dispersed data could assume that the observed data
are generated by a NB1-Logit model and avoid using sign or exclusion restrictions. However,
the NB1-Logit MLE is less robust than the Poisson-Logit MLE, since it does not fall within
the LEF. Therefore, consistency of the estimated parameters requires not only correct spec-
ification of µi, but also that the data are truly generated by a NB1-Logit process. Most
importantly, as mentioned in Section 1.5.3, identification is achieved by assuming a specific
form of heteroskedasticity for αi. Therefore, the estimates will be inconsistent if the variance
form is misspecified.
As explained in subsection 1.5.5, the Poisson-Probit model is identified even when x1i =
x2i. In spite of this, since the shape of the standard normal pdf is very similar to the logistic
probability function, it is quite possible that still multiple maxima exist, whose likelihood
values are very close to each other. The procedures described above can assist the researcher
to check for alternative maxima as ex
′
iβΦ(x′iγ) ' ex′iβΛ(x′iγ/s) ' ex′i(β+γ/s)Φ(−x′iγ), where
s is a scaling parameter (≈ 31/2/pi, see, Maddala, 1983) used in order for the Probit and
Logit parameters to be approximately the same. Finally, the Poisson-CLogLog model is also
identified even when x1i = x2i. However, the empirical results (which are not presented in
alytic second derivatives and performs very well if the likelihood function is globally concave. The Bernt-
Hall-Hall-Hausman (BHHH) which uses only first derivatives (outer product of the score), which results in
lower computational intensity, and the Broyden-Fletcher-Goldfarb-Shanno (BFGS) which is a refinement of
Davidon-Fletcher-Powell (DFP) and also uses first order derivatives. For details, see Chapter 10, in Cameron
and Trivedi (2005).
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Section 1.8 but are available on request) show that again a second maximum exists with
likelihood value very close to the global one and estimates very close to θˆ∗. This might
be, because conditional on vector xi the distribution of the Logit model is similar to the
distribution of the CLogLog model.
1.7 Other Related Models
Now that the conditions under which identification of the Poisson-Logit model (and small
departures from it) are understood, it would be important to briefly discuss other models
that are used in different contexts but either their conditional mean is specified as the
Poisson-Logit’s one or they face similar identification problems.
To begin with, it would be interesting to briefly discuss the connection between the
Poisson-Logit model and the popular Zero-Inflation Poisson model (ZI-Poisson) as intro-
duced by Mullahy (1986) and Lambert (1992). Although the interpretation of the Poisson-
Logit for under-reporting can be very different from the interpretation of ZI models, the
conditional mean in both models is specified as µi = λiΛi, where in Poisson-Logit, Λi is the
conditional probability of reporting an actual event, while in the ZI-Poisson model it denotes
the conditional probability of having no Zero-Inflation.1 However, the ZI-Poisson model is
not aﬄicted by the identification problem discussed above because it imposes more structure
in the log likelihood function (see, Lambert, 1992). Actually, the extra structure imposed on
the likelihood function has as a result that it depends separately on λi and Λi and thus, we
can still identify the parameters β and γ without extra restrictions. Nonetheless, this type of
ZI models does not belong to the LEF and therefore, they are very sensitive to distributional
misspecfications.2
Instead, Staub and Winkelmann (2010) propose the less parametric Poisson Quasi-
1According to the ZI models there are two different sources of zeroes. As a comprehensive example,
consider the question “how many times you go fishing per month”. A proportion of people will reply “zero
times” regardless of their characteristics x, because they actually never go fishing (perhaps because they do
not like it at all, or because there is not a lake, river, or sea around the area they reside so that they can
use it for fishing - these are called “structural zeros”). The rest of them, who fish sometimes, will say either
“zero” (incidental zeroes) or “n times” depending on whether they actually went fishing during the given
period. However, it is important to note that the ZI-Poisson model can be also interpreted as a model of
total under-reporting. That is, everybody that under-reports, reports exactly zero counts.
2Particularly, even if the mean is correctly specified, the ZI-Poisson MLE is not consistent if the DGP is
given by a distribution different from the ZI-Poisson.
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Likelihood (PQL) estimator that estimates the same conditional mean without making any
assumptions on the exact distribution of the counts, resulting in a model that is formally
identical to the Poisson-Logit. Thus, they use the results of the Pseudo-ML to advocate that
consistency of this estimator only requires correct specification of the mean. As it is clear,
identification of this model requires exactly the same assumptions needed for identification
of the Poisson-Logit, which will be discussed in the next section.
It is also important to stress that this identification problem is not limited to count data
models. Actually, it arises in any model where the conditional mean is specified as the
product of an exponential function and a Logit, and there is not extra structure imposed
by the researcher on the estimation procedure. Mullahy (1998), for example, motivated by
the earlier work of Duan at al (1983), introduces a two-part model for non negative data
(calling it Modified two-part model (M2PM)) that is applicable in both count and continuous
data. According to this model, conditional on x, the probability to observe a positive value,
Pr(y > 0|x), is given by a Logit, and once a non-zero outcome is observed, the expected value
of the observed amount, E(y|x, y > 0), is given as an exponential function that also depends
on x. The conditional expectation is thus given by µi = E(y|x) = Pr(y > 0|x)E(y|x, y >
0) = Λiλi, which is the same as the conditional mean of the Poisson-Logit model. This model
can be put into effect in applications that include a quite frequent zero “corner solution”,
such as the amount money spent on medical care, or expenditures in unhealthy products
such as alcohol.
According to this model, the effect of x on the probability of observing a positive outcome
is allowed to be different from the effect of x on the total amount, conditional on having
observed a positive outcome (see, also Pohlmeier and Ulrich, 1995). Mullahy proposes two
estimation procedures: 1) the two-steps estimation (M2PM-2), where in the first step a
Logit is used to model Pr(y > 0|x) and in the second step E(y|x, y > 0) = ex′iβ is estimated
by nonlinear least squares (NLLS), and 2) the one-step estimation (M2PM-1), where µi =
E(y|x) = Λiλi is directly estimated using NLLS, minimizing the objective function
∑n
i=1(yi−
µi)
2. It is clear that in the M2PM-1, the sum of square residuals depends on θ only through
µi and thus, the same identification problem arises. However, in M2PM-2, by estimating
β and γ separately, more structure is imposed on the model and therefore, θ is identified
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without further restrictions.
Finally, a similar identification issue arises in a model for binary choice data that al-
lows for missclassification probabilities developed by Hausman, Abrevaya, and Scott-Morton
(1998). According to this model, Pr(y∗i = 1|xi) = Φ(x′iβ), where y∗ refers to the true
but unobserved outcome, and Φ(.) denotes the Probit CDF. The true outcome, however,
is subject to missclassification, where the missclassification probabilities are given by a0 =
Pr(yi = 0|y∗i = 1) and a1 = Pr(yi = 1|y∗i = 0), where y refers to the observed outcome. In
the context of misreporting, the misclassification of one as zero takes the interpretation of
under-reporting, while the misclassification of zero as one takes the interpretation of over-
reporting. It can be easily shown that the probability to observe an outcome is given by
Pr(yi = 1|xi) = a1 + (1 − a0 − a1)Φ(x′iβ). Estimation is straightforward by ML using nu-
merical optimizers. Hausman, Abrevaya, and Scott-Morton (1998) show that the model is
not globally identified since, a1 + (1 − a0 − a1)Φ(x′iβ) = a˜1 + (1 − a˜0 − a˜1)Φ(−x′iβ) where
a˜0 = 1 − a1 and a˜1 = 1 − a0. Thus, there are two observationally equivalent models with
parameters (a0, a1, β) and (a˜0, a˜1,−β). Identification is achieved by imposing the “mono-
tonicity” condition, which states that a0 + a1 < 1. According to this, we are able to rule out
the “wrong” maximum, since a0 + a1 < 1 implies that a˜0 + a˜1 > 1. If this condition fails,
the misclassification probabilities are too large, and therefore, the data are most probably
too noisy to provide reasonable results.
1.8 An Illustration using Data on Labour Mobility
This section provides some examples that illustrate the theoretical results of this study. This
illustration, should by no means be considered as an empirical application aiming to identify
the determinants of labour mobility. It should be regarded instead as an example showing
readers a practical application of the theoretical results discussed above.
This illustration uses the same data used by Winkelmann (2008) in an empirical applica-
tion to labour mobility, in Chapter 9 of his monograph.1 The original data set comes from
the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) which is provided by the Deutsches Institut
1The data used throughout the empirical illustration have been kindly provided by Rainer Winkelman
and are from the public use version of the German Socio-Economic Panel Study.
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fur Wirtschaftsforschung.1 This subsample considers 1,962 males between 25 and 50 years
old in 1974. The dependent variable is the number of Direct Job Changes, thus, it is a pure
count variable. The set of independent variables includes, Education∗10−1, Experience∗10−1,
Experience2 ∗ 10−2, Union Membership, German, Qualified White Collar, Ordinary White
Collar, Qualified Blue Collar (excluded group being ordinary blue collar) and Single. These
are the variables that Winkelmann also uses in his aforementioned work. For descriptive
statistics and details about the data and the variables used in this empirical application
refer to Winkelmann (2008).
Moreover, the model used in this illustration is also adopted by Winkelmann and Zim-
mermann (1993). As briefly described in Section 1.2, this model intends to identify the
determinants of job offers and the probability to accept an offer by merely observing ac-
cepted job offers. That is, workers receive (unobserved) job offers, assumed to be distributed
as Poisson, NB2 or NB1 variables. For every job offer a decision is taken whether to accept or
reject it. If a job is accepted (successful event) it is consequently reported, where decision of
acceptance is modeled as a Logit or a Probit. Therefore, given that the process of receiving
(a number of) job offers is independent from the process of accepting or rejecting them, then
(observed) job changes follow a stopped sum distribution given by (1.2). Consequently yi
follows the Poisson-Logit, or any other of the generalizations considered in this paper, de-
pending on the assumptions we make on the distribution of true events and the probability
of acceptance.
All the theoretical results obtained in the previous sections are being tested in the re-
mainder of this section.
1.8.1 Same Regressors in both Processes
This subsection examines the case where both the count process (offers) and the reporting
process (probability to accept an offer) are assumed to be affected by the same vector of
regressors xi. In this example, we can see in practice the identification failure described
earlier. The results are given in Table 1.1. The reporting probability process, modeled as a
Logit is reported in the upper part of this table, whereas the count process is reported at
1See, Wagner, Burkhauser and Behringer (1993) for more information.
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the lower part. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. Results of using the
Probit specification to model the reporting process are presented in subsection 1.7.4.
The identification failure is obvious. For the Poisson-Logit and NB2-Logit, two identical
“global” maxima exist (same log-likelihood value). Therefore, there are two observation-
ally equivalent models with very different parameterizations of the conditional mean. Very
clearly, it can be checked that if the estimated coefficients of the one model are given by
θˆ = (βˆ, γˆ), the estimates of the other model are given by θˆ∗ = (βˆ + γˆ,−γˆ). Thus, as far as
the Logit part is concerned, we see that the coefficients of the two equivalent models have
the same values but opposite signs. Regarding the count process, any βˆj(2), which is the
estimated coefficient of regressor j in model (2), is given by βˆj(1), the estimated coefficient
of the same regressor in the count process of model (1), plus γˆj(1), the estimated coefficient
of the same regressor in the Logit part of model (1), and vice versa.1
The NB2-Logit results are presented in columns (3) and (4). We notice that exactly the
same situation occurs for this model, confirming the theoretical results of subection 1.5.4.
Moreover, it is also clear that NB2-Logit fits the data better than the Poisson-Logit model,
given by the better log likelihood value of the NB2-Logit. This may be the result of including
the extra parameter α to account for gamma distributed unobserved heterogeneity.
The most interesting results appear in model (5), where the NB1-Logit estimated coef-
ficients are reported. This column establishes the theoretical argument of subection 1.5.3,
that if a NB1 distribution is used instead of the Poisson or the NB2 one, the identification
problem vanishes. Here, only one maximum seems to exist (at least one could be found
after many repeated regressions and different methods), with coefficients approaching the
coefficients of the first and third column (apart from the Experience2 ∗ 10−2 case). Also, it is
worth noting that the NB1 model exhibits the highest log likelihood value, which situation
holds in all results presented in the following subsections. Nevertheless, these differences are
quite small in magnitude.
Moreover, it was argued in Section 1.5 that an appropriate sign restriction solves the iden-
tification problem. For example, in subsection 1.5.1 we explained that a hypothetical theory
1Therefore, for example, the education coefficient at the count process of column 1 (2), which is 1.962
(-0.976), is given by the education coefficient of the count process of column 2 (1), -0.976 (1.962), plus the
education coefficient of the Logit process of column 2 (1), which is 2.938 (-2.938).
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of labour mobility suggests that as experience increases, the probability to accept an external
job offer should decrease, so that the coefficient in the Logit process is expected to be nega-
tive. However, as can be seen from model (2), both Experience∗10−1 and Experience2 ∗ 10−2
are positive which means that the probability to accept a job offer increases at an increasing
rate. Hence, according to the “established” theoretical results we should reject model (2) and
accept model (1). However, notice that these coefficients are not statistically different from
zero and therefore, this sign restriction becomes less appropriate in this particular example.
Of course, this is just an illustration where µi is probably misspecified. In real empirical
applications, this kind of decisions must be based on well established theoretical results and
well specified models.
1.8.2 Exclusion Restrictions on Logit
It has been established in subsection 1.5.2, that the model can be only partially identified
by restricting at least one coefficient of the Logit part to zero, since only the elements of β
corresponding to the zeros in γ can be identified. This situation is depicted in Table 1.2,
where the constant, along with the coefficients of other five dummies in the Logit process
are restricted to zero.1
Table 1.2 supports all theoretical results given in subsection 1.5.2. Once more, it is
very interesting that two observationally equivalent models exist with θˆ =
(
(βˆ, ηˆ), γˆ
)
and
θˆ∗ =
(
(βˆ + γˆ, ηˆ),−γˆ). Thus, the parameters in the count process that correspond to the
excluded variables in the Logit part, ηˆ, are identified as they are the same in both models.
Concerning the remaining coefficients in which no exclusion restrictions have been imposed,
we notice that two different but linearly dependent sets of estimates maximize the log like-
lihood function. Therefore, β and γ remain unidentified.
Finally, according to the results of NB1-Logit, the model is identified since only one max-
imum seems to exist. However, in this case, it cannot be said as before that the coefficients
of NB1-Logit are in accordance with the first or the second model.
1It should be noted that in this example we follow the specification followed in Winkelmann and Zim-
mermann (1993). The results of specification (2) and (4) are the results presented in Table 1.2 (overlapping
case) in Winkelmann and Zimmermann (1993). However as opposed to their study, here we use robust
(Pseudo-ML) standard errors.
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1.8.3 Exclusion Restrictions on Count Process
We have seen in subsection 1.5.3 that one way to identify all elements of θ is to restrict
at least one coefficient of the count process to zero. However, it is still possible that local
maxima exist. In the few next pages two different cases are presented. In the first one, the
variable excluded from the count process has a very small effect on probability of accepting
a job offer, so that it is a “weak” exclusion. On the other hand, the second case shows the
situation where a “strong” exclusion restriction is imposed, in the sense that the excluded
variables’ impact on the probability of acceptance is large.
1.8.3.1 Excluding a very Insignificant Variable from the Count Process
It has been argued in subsection 1.5.2, that by excluding a variable from the count process
identification is achieved, yielding estimates θˆ = (βˆ, γˆ). However, if all elements of ϕ ap-
proach zero, a second maximum will possibly exist with estimates θ˜∗ = (β˜∗, γ˜∗) very close
to θˆ∗ = (βˆ + γˆ,−γˆ). Suppose now, that the correct specification of the mean is given by
including the Ordinary White Collar variable to the already existed regressors of subsection
1.8.1. Furthermore, assume that this variable belongs only to the reporting process so as it
can be excluded from the count process. Moreover, note that Ordinary White Collar has a
very small effect on the acceptance decision.
The results, presented in Table 1.3, are a good illustration of the situation explained
before. When Ordinary White Collar is excluded from the count process, two maxima still
exist with log likelihood values very close to each other. Moreover, it is remarkable how close
the estimates of the second maximum are to θˆ∗ = (βˆ + γˆ,−γˆ). However, as the estimated
parameters that maximize the likelihood of having obtained the observed data are obtained
by model (1), the second model should be rejected. The results for NB2-Logit reinforce these
findings. Finally, it is interesting that the maximum of the NB1-Logit model gives estimates
with values closer to the ones of the accepted model.
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1.8.3.2 Excluding Dummies from the Count Process with Large Effect on Logit
Process
Contrary to the previous case, the example in this subsection shows how the identification
problem is suppressed when the excluded variables have large coefficients in the Logit process.
Here we examine the effect of excluding the dummies Unionist and German. Although there
are reasons to believe that these regressors should have been included in the count process, in
this illustration we assume that they belong only to the Logit part. The results are presented
in Table 1.4.
According to the findings of the Poisson-Logit, being a Unionist, or German significantly
decreases the probability of accepting a job offer. In contrast, although larger in magnitude,
these dummies are very imprecisely estimated in the NB2-Logit. In both cases, however, we
can see that although a second maximum exists, its log likelihood value is much smaller than
the one of the global maximum. Thus, according to these results we accept the maxima of
models (1) and (3). Recall that this is the model that we accept when we exclude Ordinary
White Collar from the count process. Furthermore, for both Poisson-Logit and NB2-Logit,
the estimates of the second maximum, θ˜∗ = (β˜∗, γ˜∗), are far away from θˆ∗ = (βˆ + γˆ,−γˆ).
Finally, the estimates of the NB1-Logit model are more similar to the estimates of the
accepted models. Thus, it is important for the researcher to perform a thorough search of
alternative maxima, as local maxima may still exist.
1.8.4 Specifying the Reporting Process as a Probit
In this section we illustrate the results of assuming the probability of accepting a job offer to
be given by a Probit. As noted in subsection 1.5.5, we are able to identify all elements of θ
in both the Poisson-Probit and NB2-Probit models, even when x1i = x2i. However, it is still
possible that at least a second maximum exists with likelihood value close to the ones from
the Poisson-Logit model. This situation is depicted in Table 1.5, where the same regressors
as in subsection 1.8.1 are considered.
First of all, from Table 1.5, we can see that still at least two maxima exist. Basically, for
this particular specification of the mean, several maxima exist in the neighborhood of the
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maximum of models (2) and (4). Nevertheless identification is achieved, since the maxima
in models (1) and (3) have the largest log likelihood values. It can also be seen that the
difference between the log likelihood values of the two models is very small. Furthermore, a
quite interesting result from Table 1.5 is that the estimated coefficients of the local maximum
cannot be associated to θˆ∗ = (βˆ+ γˆ,−γˆ).1 Finally, NB1-Probit still fits the data better than
the NB2-Probit.
The findings in this table suggest that we should accept models (1) and (3) which are
similar to the models (2) and (4) from Table 1.1. Nonetheless, it would be more appropriate
to compare the Poisson-Probit and NB-Probit models with their corresponding Logit models
when we use a specification that guarantees identification of the Poisson-Logit or NB2-Logit
models. We consider, for example, the estimates when we exclude the dummies Unionist
and German from the count process when the reporting process is modeled as a Probit, and
compare them with the results from Table 1.4, where the same exclusion restrictions are
considered in Poisson-Logit and NB-Logit models. Table 1.6 shows that only one maximum
for each model seems to exist. In this case, we can see that the estimates of the Poisson-
Probit and NB2-Probit MLE are similar to the ones of the accepted models (1) and (3) of
their Logit counterparts from Table 1.4. Moreover, the NB1-Probit results are quite close
to the results of the NB1-Logit. However, this by no means should be considered as an
indicator that the aforementioned models provide similar results under similar conditions.
Further research must be done to shed light on the properties of the count data models that
specify the reporting process as a Probit.
1.9 Conclusion
This paper investigates the conditions under which the Poisson-Logit and other simple mod-
ified models for under-reported count data are identified. The theoretical results reveal that
it is impossible to identify the parameters of the Poisson-Logit model, unless further para-
1Results of considering different specifications (in terms of regressors used) for the mean of the Poisson-
Probit and NB2-Probit models (however, with the same data), showed that in all cases that local maxima
exist, their coefficients have no relationship with θˆ∗ = (βˆ + γˆ,−γˆ) even after taking into account that the
coefficients of the Probit model can be approximated by rescaled Logit coefficients (look at last paragraph
of Section 1.6).
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metric assumptions are imposed. A first way to identify this model is to assume that at
least one regressor does not affect either the reporting or the count process. Although par-
tial identification is achieved when exclusion restrictions are imposed only on the reporting
process, the whole model is identified whenever we exclude at least one variable from the
count process. However, these variables must not have a zero coefficient in the Logit part
and neither can they be perfectly collinear with the remaining regressors of this vector. If
such a regressor is not available, sign restrictions on at least one parameter of the reporting
process can be used. This restriction must be based on rational choice, for example, by
considering established economic theories.
Two basic extensions of the Poisson-Logit model that take into account possible over-
dispersion have also been presented. As this study shows, in order to identify the NB2-Logit
model we require exactly the same conditions established for the Poisson-Logit. On the other
hand, identification of the NB1-Logit model seems easier, since the different specification of
the variance disentangles the effect of the regressors on the mean of the count process and
on the probability of reporting. However, in this case identification of µi is achieved by
assuming a different parametric specification for ωi. This has obvious consequences for the
robustness of the NB1-Logit MLE. Finally, it has been noted that the identification problems
of the Poisson-Logit and NB2-Logit do not extend to models where Pr(Bij = 1|xi) is not of
the Logit form, like in a Poisson-Probit model.
Nevertheless, although under further parametric assumptions identification is achieved,
it is still possible that multiple maxima exist. Therefore, an estimation of the above models
must be accompanied by a thorough search for alternative maxima. Otherwise, we are not
able to know whether a global or a local maximum has been found. For this reason, in
Section 1.6 few methods assisting a practitioner that uses the above models to find alterna-
tive maxima have been proposed. Finally, an empirical application to labour mobility has
illustrated all the theoretical results of this paper.
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Table 1.1. Modelling Reporting Probability as a Logit 
Same Regressors in both Processes 
Y= Number of Direct  
Job Changes 
Poisson - Logit 
(1)           (2) 
NegBin2 – Logit 
(3)         (4) 
NegBin1–Logit 
(5) 
Logit Process 
3.439*** -3.439*** 3.327*** -3.327*** 2.696 
Constant 
(1.075) (1.075) (1.059) (1.059) (3.515) 
-2.938 2.938 -2.798 2.798 -1.709** 
Education*10-1 
(2.263) (2.263) (2.462) (2.462) (0.806) 
-0.791 0.791 -0.661 0.661 -0.686 
Experience*10-1 
(1.254) (1.254) (1.319) (1.319) (1.196) 
-0.362 0.362 -0.449 0.449 0.126 
Experience2*10-2 
(0.538) (0.538) (0.593) (0.593) (0.256) 
Count Process 
-1.451 1.988 -1.317 2.010 -0.078 
Constant 
(2.005) (1.455) (2.120) (1.571) (0.677) 
1.962 -0.976** 1.842 -0.957** 0.538 
Education*10-1 
(2.610) (0.462) (2.803) (0.445) (0.453) 
-0.464 -1.255* -0.630 -1.292* -0.489 
Experience*10-1 
(1.013) (0.655) (0.976) (0.743) (0.337) 
0.549 0.187 0.643 0.196 0.056 
Experience2*10-2 
(0.455) (0.123) (0.495) (0.134) (0.099) 
0.705 0.705 0.610 1α
−
 (Negbin2-Logit) 
1
δ
−
 (Negbin1-Logit) 
- - 
(0.084) (0.084) (0.502) 
Log Likelihood -2,058.99 -2,058.99 -1,888.99 -1,888.99 -1,882.34 
N 1,962 1,962 1,962 1,962 1,962 
           Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
              (***), denotes statistical significance at 1% significance level 
              (**), denotes statistical significance at 5% significance level 
              (*), denotes statistical significance at 10% significance level 
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Table 1.2. Modelling Reporting Probability as a Logit 
Exclusion Restrictions in Logit Process  
Y= Number of Direct 
 Job Changes 
Poisson – Logit 
(1)           (2) 
NegBin2 – Logit 
(3)          (4) 
NegBin1 – Logit 
(5) 
Logit Process 
-3.619 3.619 -3.784 3.784 -0.701*** 
Education*10-1 
(2.261) (2.261) (2.986) (2.986) (0.169) 
5.715 -5.715 5.981 -5.981 -0.173 
Experience*10-1 
(4.458) (4.458) (5.490) (5.490) (0.280) 
-3.102 3.102 -3.240 3.240 0.031 
Experience2*10-2 
(2.483) (2.483) (3.036) (3.036) (0.083) 
Count Process 
0.823 0.823*** 0.929*** 0.929*** 0.825*** 
Constant 
(0.265) (0.265) (0.313) (0.313) (0.243) 
3.291 -0.328* 3.429 -0.354 0.984*** 
Education*10-1 
(2.317) (0.198) (3.049) (0.233) (0.416) 
-6.380 -0.665*** -6.704 -0.723 -0.527 
Experience*10-1 
(4.472) (0.197) (5.503) (0.170) (0.392) 
3.172 0.070 3.323 0.082 0.069 
Experience2*10-2 
(2.501) (0.067) (3.054) (0.056) (0.118) 
-0.292 -0.292*** -0.308*** -0.308*** -0.272*** 
Unionist 
(0.094) (0.094) (0.082) (0.082) (0.079) 
-0.397*** -0.397*** -0.422*** -0.422*** -0.342*** 
German 
(0.130) (0.130) (0.097) (0.097) (0.104) 
0.069 0.069 0.036 0.036 -0.020 
Qualified White Collar 
(0.196) (0.196) (0.174) (0.174) (0.165) 
0.179 0.179 0.184 0.184 0.188 
Ordinary White Collar 
(0.193) (0.193) (0.229) (0.229) (0.174) 
0.133 0.133 0.114 0.114 0.066 
Qualified Blue Collar 
(0.117) (0.117) (0.112) (0.112) (0.106) 
0.735 0.735 0.200 1α
−
 (Negbin2-Logit) 
1
δ
−
  (Negbin1-Logit) 
- - 
(0.066) (0.066) (0.082) 
Log Likelihood -2,039.40 -2,039.40 -1,875.95 -1,875.95 -1,869.62 
N 1,962 1,962 1,962 1,962 1,962 
Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
            (***), denotes statistical significance at 1% significance level 
            (**), denotes statistical significance at 5% significance level 
            (*), denotes statistical significance at 10% significance level 
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Table 1.3. Modelling Reporting Probability as a Logit 
Excluding an Insignificant Dummy (“Ordinary White Collar”) from Count Process  
Y= Number of Direct 
 Job Changes 
Poisson – Logit 
     (1)         (2)                                
NegBin2 – Logit 
(3) (4)
NegBin1–Logit 
       (5) 
Logit Process 
3.420*** -3.415*** 3.313*** -3.271*** 2.638 
Constant 
(1.048) (1.088) (1.024) (1.031) (3.641) 
-2.877 2.951 -2.751 2.729 -1.695*** 
Education*10-1 
(2.316) (2.357) (2.423) (2.485) (0.830) 
-0.813 0.722 -0.680 0.602 -0.688 
Experience*10-1 
(1.257) (1.411) (1.313) (1.443) (1.229) 
-0.352 0.388 -0.442 0.466 0.128 
Experience2*10-2 
(0.547) (0.610) (0.592) (0.880) (0.262) 
0.082 0.231 0.094 0.287 0.104 
Ordinary White Collar 
(0.204) (1.073) (0.194) (0.880) (0.312) 
Count Process 
-1.395 1.966 -1.273 2.030 -0.067 
Constant 
(2.047) (1.496) (2.090) (1.658) (0.724) 
1.887 -0.973** 1.783 -0.963** 0.539 
Education*10-1 
(2.683) (0.470) (2.770) (0.456) (0.455) 
-0.460 -1.236* -0.628 -1.293 -0.484 
Experience*10-1 
(0.983) (0.686) (0.953) (0.796) (0.345) 
0.543 0.183 0.639 0.192 0.054 
Experience2*10-2 
(0.456) (0.130) (0.490) (0.143) (0.101) 
0.706 0.705 0.601 1α
−
 (Negbin2-Logit) 
1
δ
−
  (Negbin1-Logit) 
- - 
(0.084) (0.084) (0.522) 
Log Likelihood -2,058.87 -2,058.90 -1,888.89 -1,888.91 -1,882.29 
N 1,962 1,962 1,962 1,962 1,962 
  Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
              (***), denotes statistical significance at 1% significance level 
              (**), denotes statistical significance at 5% significance level 
              (*), denotes statistical significance at 10% significance level 
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Table 1.4. Modelling Reporting Probability as a Logit 
Excluding “Unionist” and “German” from the Count Process 
Y= Number of Direct 
 Job Changes 
Poisson – Logit 
    (1)          (2)                                
NegBin2 – Logit 
(3) (4)
NegBin1-Logit 
       (5) 
Logit Process 
3.897*** -6.547*** 4.007** -4.269*** 6.317 
Constant 
(0.756) (2.196) (1.671) (0.798) (4.850) 
-2.234 2.681*** -1.193 -0.879* -1.562** 
Education*10-1 
(1.788) (0.933) (3.577) (0.490) (0.603) 
-0.298 1.323 -1.005 -0.209 -1.251 
Experience*10-1 
(1.337) (1.137) (2.929) (0.480) (1.133) 
-0.421 -0.150 -0.221 0.038 0.138 
Experience2*10-2 
(0.594) (0.257) (0.677) (0.134) (0.252) 
-0.461** -0.315*** -0.557 -0.300*** -0.820** 
Unionist 
(0.202) (0.107) (0.350) (0.092) (0.361) 
-0.764** -0.351*** -0.955 -0.333*** -2.312 
German 
(0.375) (0.133) (0.762) (0.117) (3.429) 
Count Process 
-1.015 6.652*** -0.324 4.901*** -0.328 
Constant 
(1.413) (2.255) (2.296) (0.701) (0.352) 
1.403 -2.404*** 0.542 0.722** 0.448 
Education*10-1 
(1.839) (0.776) (2.686) (0.433) (0.447) 
-0.978 -1.994* -0.870* -0.579 -0.537*** 
Experience*10-1 
(0.800) (1.103) (0.480) (0.422) (0.197) 
0.567 0.269 0.475 0.077 0.107* 
Experience2*10-2 
(0.517) (0.229) (0.338) (0.122) (0.064) 
0.754 0.004 0.888 1α
−
 (Negbin2-Logit) 
1
δ
−
  (Negbin1-Logit) 
- - 
(0.090) (0.000) (0.263) 
Log Likelihood -2,027.18 -2,045.04 -1,868.97 -1,870.95 -1,864.02 
N 1,962 1,962 1,962 1,962 1,962 
   Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
               (***), denotes statistical significance at 1% significance level 
               (**), denotes statistical significance at 5% significance level 
               (*), denotes statistical significance at 10% significance level 
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Table 1.5. Modelling Reporting Probability as a Probit 
Same Regressors in both Processes 
Y= Number of Direct  
Job Changes 
Poisson - Probit 
    (1)          (2) 
NegBin2 – Probit 
    (3)          (4) 
NegBin1-Probit 
       (5) 
Probit Process 
-2.134*** -2.403 -2.059*** -1.353 0.544 
Constant 
(0.660) (3.717) (0.617) (1.610) (9.165) 
1.820 -0.590 1.707 -0.398 -0.733 
Education*10-1 
(1.540) (0.469) (1.574) (0.380) (1.877) 
0.513 -0.978 0.440 -1.354 -0.229 
Experience*10-1 
(0.823) (0.748) (0.873) (1.208) (1.333) 
0.226 0.020 0.276 0.018 0.046 
Experience2*10-2 
(0.337) (0.053) (0.356) (0.035) (0.237) 
Count Process 
1.992** 4.378 2.039 2.200 0.496 
Constant 
(0.660) (9.693) (1.681) (2.722) (6.266) 
-0.977* 2.228 -0.962** 1.053 0.537 
Education*10-1 
(1.540) (3.996) (0.443) (1.643) (0.733) 
-1.279 2.684 -1.328 2.355 -0.536 
Experience*10-1 
(0.823) (1.863) (0.863) (0.592) (0.550) 
0.194 0.394 0.202 0.811 0.059 
Experience2*10-2 
(0.337) (0.832) (0.157) (1.527) (0.116) 
0.705 0.703 0.360 1α
−
 (Negbin2-Probit) 
1
δ
−
 (Negbin1-Probit) 
- - 
(0.084) (0.084) (2.379) 
Log Likelihood -2,058.88 -2,060.21 -1,888.91 -1,889.61 -1,882.69 
N 1,962 1,962 1,962 1,962 1,962 
  Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
              (***), denotes statistical significance at 1% significance level 
              (**), denotes statistical significance at 5% significance level 
              (*), denotes statistical significance at 10% significance level 
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Table 1.6. Modelling Reporting Probability as a Probit 
Excluding “Unionist” and “German” from the Count Process 
Y= Number of Direct 
Job Changes 
Poisson–Probit 
(1) 
NegBin2–
Probit 
(2)                
NegBin1–
Probit 
    (3) 
Probit Process 
2.840*        3.246       4.034        
Constant 
(1.590)       (2.157)       (2.852)        
-0.773       -0.637       -0.852**     
Education*10-1 
(0.584)       (0.449)       (0.354)       
-0.778       -0.994      -0.833       
Experience*10-1 
(0.642)       (0.686)       (0.694)        
0.027        0.082        0.095        
Experience2*10-2 
(0.146)       (0.182)       (0.153)       
-0.415*       -0.465**       -0.525***      
Unionist 
(0.225)       (0.235)       (0.197)        
-0.742      -0.944       -1.563       
German 
(0.669)       (1.041)       (2.109)        
Count Process 
-0.326       -0.207       -0.268       
Constant 
(0.627)       (0.443)       (0.302)        
0.447       0.279        0.369        
Education*10-1 
(0.761)       (0.478)       (0.354)        
-0.547**    -0.533**      -0.545***     
Experience*10-1 
(0.267)       (0.250)       (0.185)        
0.202        0.173        0.109*    
Experience2*10-2 
(0.150)       (0.165)       (0.061)        
0.750    0.923      1α
−
 (Negbin2-Probit) 
1
δ
−
 (Negbin1-Probit) 
- 
(0.089)       (0.215)        
Log Likelihood -2,029.79 -1,869.80 -1,864.23 
N 1,962 1,962 1,962 
       Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
                    (***), denotes statistical significance at 1% significance level 
                    (**), denotes statistical significance at 5% significance level 
                    (*), denotes statistical significance at 10% significance level 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2
The Relationship between
Immigration Status and Criminal
Behaviour
2.1 Introduction
Academic debates on the relationship between immigration and crime date back at late 1800s
and early 1990s (see, for example, Hart, 1986, Hourwich, 1912, and Taft, 1933), following
large inflows of European and Canadian citizens into the United States. It seems that the
native born population of countries that sustained heavy migration inflows always developed
hostile feelings against foreigners. This can be attributed to the fact that natives always
feared that immigrants could take away their jobs and deteriorate several problems of the host
countries, including crime. Although the bulk of the media in the host countries supported
and even strengthened this hostile feelings against immigrants, researchers’ community often
concluded the opposite. Many found evidence that immigrants seem to commit fewer crimes
than natives, even though they usually encounter unfavorable circumstances, such as blocked
opportunities, or acculturation problems (Tonry, 1997, Hagan and Palloni, 1998, and Mears,
2001).
The present study attempts to investigate the relationship between immigration and
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crime in England and Wales.1 In spite of the fact that the immigration-crime link is such
a controversial subject, it is generally overlooked by the research community compared to
other aspects of crime. To my knowledge, apart from the very recent study by Bell, Machin
and Fasani (2010), there is not any other study that investigates whether such a relationship
exists in the UK.2
As figure 2.1 demonstrates, England and Wales have recently experienced a steady in-
crease in immigration stock relative to the total population. It is notable that, as explained
by Hatton and Tani (2005), immigration net flows were responsible for about one half of the
population growth during the 90’s. Moreover, Hatton (2005) explains that after reaching
the minimum between 1993 and 1995, immigrant net flows increased until 2000, reaching the
figure of 100,000 individuals per year. After 2000, the proportion of immigrants increased
even more, because of the large inflow of around 560,000 Eastern European workers between
2004 and 2006.3
Following this increase in foreign population, immigration in the UK became a very
controversial subject, and one of the “hottest” topics in political agenda. During the last
two decades natives have developed negative beliefs against their immigrant counterparts,
with regard to labour market outcomes, cultural issues, and crime. This hostile tendency
is quite clear if we look at the UK sample of two very important attitudes surveys, the
European Social Survey (ESS) of 2002, and the International Social Survey Programmes
(ISSP) of 1995 and 2003, where questions related to immigration and crime were included.
According to the ESS (see, Table 2.1) there is a clear tendency towards the perception
that immigrants have worsened UK’s crime rates. Even more interesting findings come from
the ISSPs (Table 2.2). Although in ISSP of 1995 only 26% of the respondents believe that
immigrants increase crime rates (agree and strongly agree), this figure increases to around
40% in 2003. These findings coincide with the increase in population of immigrants. It is
1Scotland and Northern Ireland are excluded from the survey used to investigate this research question
because of their separate criminal and justice system, which generates incomparable crime statistics.
2However, there is a crucial difference between the present study and the study of Bell, Machin and
Fasani (2010); that is, the present study looks at this relationship from a micro perspective, examining
whether immigrants are more prone to criminal activities than natives, whereas their study focuses on the
effect of two waves of large inflows of immigrants on crime rates.
3This evidence comes from the Worker Registration Scheme and National Insurance Number applications
(see, Gilpin at al, 2006, Blanchflower at al, 2007, and Lemos and Portes, 2008).
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quite interesting that natives developed negative beliefs about immigrants despite the fact
that crime rates (at least for total crime) started falling after 1995 (see, figure 2.1 and 2.2.
Also see, Smith, 2006, and Kershaw and al, 2008, p.2). To reinforce these findings, the
results of an ordered Probit regression model are presented in Table 2.3, where a simple
dummy for year 2003 aims to capture the evolution in natives’ attitudes, once we have
pooled the data from ISSP 1995 and ISSP 2003. This is done because we recognize that the
sample in 1995 might differ in many aspects from the sample in 2003. It is clear that even
after controlling for some basic characteristics correlated with respondents’ attitudes, such
as education, party affiliation, income, gender, and age, moving from 1995 to 2003 strongly
increased the sentiment that immigrants increase crime rates.1
But which are the theoretical reasons that link immigration with crime? There are two
distinct effects of immigration on crime. The first one, that I call the “aggregate” effect or
macro effect, states that immigration inflows are related to economy’s crime rates as they: 1)
can affect aggregate outcomes of the domestic economy, such as wages and unemployment,
and 2) may impose cultural conflicts and social disorganization according to criminological
theories (see, for example, Martinez and Lee, 2000). The second one, which I call the
“individual” or micro effect, is the direct effect. This states that immigrants are more or
less crime-prone than natives for reasons that are described in detail in the next section.
This paper attempts to shed light on the direct relationship by investigating the question:
Are immigrants more or less involved in criminal activities than natives and why? It should
be also stressed that this work focuses on property crime, which can be better explained
by economic theory, as opposed to violent crime, which is better explained by psychological
factors rather than material needs. Therefore, psychological theories developed basically by
criminologists, rather than economic theory, would stand better to explain violent crime.2
In the next section a simple economic model of crime is presented to investigate the direct
1The base group for the variable “party” is “left-wing”. For “education” the base group is “high educa-
tion”. The marginal effects on the “year 2003” dummy, which are not presented here but are available from
the author upon request, show that the probability of responding with “agree that immigrants increased
crime rates” increased by 7.3 percentage points from 1995 to 2003, and the probability of responding with
“strongly agree. . . ” by 5.9 percentage points. These differences, calculated using the ‘nlcom’ command in
Statar, are statistically significant at 1% significance level. Note that the standard errors are calculated
using the delta method.
2However, as the explanatory variables used to the empirical analysis may also determine the decision
to commit violent crimes, the results of a violent crime model are presented in subsections 2.8.2-2.8.4
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immigration-crime relationship.
For the purposes of the empirical analysis individual level crime data are needed. A
first choice would be to use recorded by police crime and compare the crime records of
immigrants to those of natives. However, data on recorded crime in England and Wales
are very poor in terms of information provided, and therefore, are inappropriate for an
individual empirical investigation. Most importantly, these data provide no information on
the immigration status of criminals. In Section 2.4, other shortcomings of this kind of data
are explained. In another direction, self-reports on crime can be used, a practice that is
very common among criminologists and sociologists (see, Junger-Tas and Marchall, 1999).
Therefore, in the present study the Offending, Crime and Justice Survey (OCJS) of 2003 is
used, a nationally representative survey that asks people in England and Wales about their
experiences and attitudes towards criminal activities (Hamlyn at al, 2003).1 Not only does
this kind of surveys reveal to some extent unreported/unrecorded to the police crime, but
it also provides a rich set of respondents’ attributes which enables the investigation of the
determinants of criminal behaviour.
Of course, to identify these relationships it is required that respondents truthfully reveal
their criminal activity. Nevertheless, reliability of self-reports on crime is a major concern as
many individuals may be reluctant to provide sincere answers to questions related to such
sensitive activities. Therefore, under-reporting is a major concern, although nowadays many
techniques are used to improve the reliability and validity of these data (Thornberry and
Krohn, 2000). From the econometric point of view, estimators that ignore under-reporting
are inconsistent (see, for example, Hausman, Abrevaya and Scott-Morton, 1998, for binary
outcome models, and Winkelmann and Zimmermann, 1993, for count data models). There-
fore, it is highly possible that they provide misleading estimates for the coefficients of inter-
ests. This problem becomes even more salient if differences in respondents’ characteristics
are associated with different reporting behaviour (so that under-reporting is not random),
and more importantly, if immigrants’ reporting behaviour differs from natives’ one. Never-
theless, more appropriate econometric models incorporating this problem can be developed
1The OCJS data used in this Chapter are sponsored by the Home Office and provided by the UK Data
Archive.
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and applied. Given that these models are correctly specified, they consistently estimate the
determinants of true crime by using only data of self-reported crime. Section 2.5 presents in
detail the issue of econometric modeling.
Initially, we treat immigrants as a homogeneous group of people. However, this may not
be proper for plenty of reasons. For example, immigrants of different ethnic backgrounds
might be very different from each other. Furthermore, location of immigrants is not ran-
domly assigned, but it is a rather complicated process that depends on many factors. For
example, if immigrants try to match their abilities with the opportunities that each area pro-
vides, more crime-prone immigrants would decide to reside in areas that offer more criminal
opportunities. Or, as the location of immigrants also depends on central decisions, it might
be that different kind of immigrants are located in areas characterized by different socioe-
conomic features. For example, following the 1999 Immigration and Asylum Act, asylum
seekers were located by the National Asylum Support Service in specific areas, London being
excluded (see, Bell, Machin and Fasani, 2010). Given the facts above, the estimated effect
of immigrant status on criminal behaviour might be misleading and therefore, the effect of
immigration on crime is also investigated once we decompose immigrants by ethic group and
location.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 puts the individual
decision to commit property crimes in a simple economic framework of individual supply of
crime. Utilizing this simple economic model, it also investigates the individual relationship
between immigration and property crime. In Section 2.3 a very brief review of studies on this
topic is presented. In Section 2.4 some methodological issues of self-reports are discussed.
Section 2.5 offers a presentation of the econometric models that are more appropriate in the
presence of under-reporting. Section 2.6 discusses the data and the variables and offers some
basic descriptive statistics. The main results follow in Section 2.7. In Section 2.8 robustness
of these results is checked. Section 2.9 investigates whether the immigrant-native property
crime differentials depend on ethnic status or the regions they reside. Finally, discussion of
the empirical results follows in Section 2.10, and Section 2.11 concludes.
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2.2 An Economic Model of Property Crime
As discussed in the introduction, this study investigates whether immigrants are different
from natives with regard to their behaviour towards criminal activities, and particularly
towards property crime. Therefore, in this section the individual relationship between im-
migration and property crime is examined. We start with a general examination of a simple
model of property crime. In the next subsection we examine how immigration status is as-
sociated with this model, and consequently what this model predicts about criminal activity
of immigrants compared to natives.
Generally, the economic theory of crime is based on the idea of the rational individual
who chooses how to allocate his/her time between legitimate and illegitimate activities so
as to maximize his/her personal expected utility. As there is a probability of apprehension,
the final outcome of the criminal act is uncertain.
Becker (1968) has offered the first prominent paper to incorporate economic theory on
the analysis of criminal behaviour. However, in this early work illegal and legal activities
were considered as mutually exclusive. A few years later, Ehrlich (1973), in a cornerstone
work, relaxed this assumption so as individuals are utility maximizers who allocate their time
between crime and work. In another vital work, Block and Heineke (1975) criticize the two
previous works on the grounds that they treat crime and punishment outcomes as if they can
be always represented by their pecuniary equivalents. Using a more general, multiattributed
utility function, they show that the results of Becker’s and Ehrlich’s works hold only under
very special conditions, and that determining the supply of property crime is a harder task
that needs further assumptions.1 From then on, many other economic theoretical models
have been developed2 and tested using micro or macro data.3 It needs to be stressed that
in general, property crime fits better in the economic models of crime, since violent crimes
can be considered as non market activities that are primarily motivated by hate or passion
1The utility function is given as consisting of three attributes, U(L, T,W ), (where L and T are, time spent
on legal and illegal activities respectively, and W represents wealth), rather than a wealth only function.
2Cameron (1988) and Eide (1999) are good surveys on this topic. Freeman (1999) is also an excellent
survey that discusses many aspects surrounding the economic theory of crime from both a theoretical and
an empirical perspective.
3See, for example, Sjoquist (1973), Woplin (1978), Witte (1980), Myers (1983), Reilly and Witt (1996),
Cornwell and Trumbull (1994), and Kelly (2000), to mention only a few.
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(Ehrlich, 1973).1
Economic models of crime have been extended beyond the classical theory of crime de-
terrence, particularizing in examining relationships such as investment in human capital and
crime (Lochner, 2004, Lochner and Moretti, 2004), inequality and crime (Chiu, Madden,
1998), the effect of economic incentives on crime (Machin and Meghir, 2004), crime and
unemployment (Burdett, Lagos and Wright, 2003), crime and social interactions (Glaeser,
Sacerdote and Scheinkman, 1996), etc. Nevertheless, there is no theoretical framework that
investigates the relationship between immigration and crime. For this reason, the follow-
ing subsection presents a simple model that incorporates immigration with the purpose of
demonstrating why immigrants might exhibit different criminal behaviour than natives.
To make it as simple as possible, the following model is a one period model under un-
certainty that borrows features from Ehrlich (1973), and Lochner and Moretti, (2001). This
model is by no means a complete investigation of criminal behaviour, but it illustrates quite
well why someone would expect differences in participation rates of illegitimate activities
between immigrants and natives.
Consider a rational individual who, after receiving the initial endowment z, optimally
decides how to allocate his/her total time available, τ , between criminal activity, τi, and
work, τ`. We assume that leisure time, where the individual consumes all his/her outcomes,
is constant and therefore does not affect the results of the model.2 Although in general z can
represent other individual characteristics such as, age, gender, parental features, respondent’s
location features, etc., in this model z is an indicator variable that determines immigration
status. In turn, z is assumed to affect most of the parameters of this model.
Uncertainty is incorporated in the model because of two reasons. First, there is a prob-
ability of apprehension, pi(τi, z), in case the individual is involved in criminal activities.
Second, legal outcomes are also not certain because there is a probability of unemployment,
µ(z), which is assumed to be given exogenously at the beginning of the period.
If the individual is employed in the legal sector, he/she receives wage w(τ`, z). This legal
1However, as will be clear later, some factors determining property crimes, such as probability of appre-
hension, severity of punishment and risk aversion, are directly associated with violent crime as well.
2Without loss of generality, τ can be considered as the time available for allocation between the legal
and illegal activities after extracting leisure time from total available time.
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wage depends positively on τ`, such that dw(τ`, z)/dτ` > 0, and d
2w(τ`, z)/dτ
2
` < 0. The
latter can be assumed to be negative as productivity and efficiency may decrease as more
time is spent on work. On the other hand, if unemployed he/she receives an unemployment
benefit D(τ`), which is the same for immigrants and natives, but depends linearly on τ`, so
that dD(τ`)/dτ` > 0 and dD
2(τ`)/dτ
2
` = 0. Thus, this benefit is acquired only as long as the
individual spends time on legal sector, such as time on looking for a new job (which time
must be then reported) and increases with τ`. Also it is assumed that w(τ`, z) > D(τ`) and
dw(τ`, z)/dτ` > dD(τ`)/dτ` , where w is the minimum wage rate.
1
Apart from legal opportunities, the individual also faces illegal opportunities, given by
k(τi, z), which consists of financial and psychological (mental) outcomes measured in their
pecuniary equivalent.2 Apart from financial and psychological gains, k(τi, z) also includes
some costs (measured in their pecuniary value) associated with a crime, such as bad reputa-
tion, compunction, regrets, uneasiness, etc. The costs of trial, conviction and punishment,
are not included in these costs but, as will be shown shortly, they will be introduced as
distinct components of the utility function. Similarly to the legal wage, “criminal wage” also
depends continuously on τi, with dk(τi, z)/dτi > 0, and d
2k(τi, z)/dτ
2
i < 0. Thus, when the
individual enters the market he/she considers a continuous set of illegal opportunities. We
assume that illegal opportunities that pay high pecuniary returns require considerable time
in the illegal sector and that they also involve higher psychological costs.3
There are two states of nature, the good State A, where someone is employed with
probability 1 − µ(z), and the bad State B, where someone is unemployed with probability
µ(z). The corresponding returns from legal and illegal actions in the good and the bad states
1Otherwise, there could exist cases where it would be optimal for the individual to remain unemployed,
so that the probability of being unemployed would be endogenous, and the model would have been more
complicated.
2By pecuniary equivalent we mean the amount of money that someone is willing to pay in order to get
this gain or to avoid a cost.
3Therefore, regardless of psychological costs, someone who pursuits high returns to illegal actions can
either commit many crimes, or one high value crime which requires much time spent in the illegal sec-
tor though. This can be the case, as this type of property crimes requires much time for organization,
preparation, etc.
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respectively are the following,
ya = w(τ`, z) + k(τi, z),
yb = D(τ`) + k(τi, z),
(2.1)
where ya is associated with State A, and yb with State B. Therefore, the expected utility
once consuming ya, yb, (without considering potential punishment) is given by,
(1− µ(z))u(ya) + µ(z)u(yb) (2.2)
with u′(y) = ∂u(y)/∂y > 0, and u′′(y) = ∂2u(y)/∂y2 < 0, where  = (a, b).
Moreover, crime is a risky action. Thus, if someone is involved in criminal activities
he/she faces a probability of arrest, pi(τi, z), as described before. We assume that this
probability increases with time spent on illegal sector, so that dpi(τi, z)/dτi > 0, but the
sing of the second derivative is uncertain.1 Here we assume that if arrested, conviction, and
thus, punishment is certain. Nothing is lost from this simplification since it can be shown
that it does not affect the implications of the model. Conviction occurs at the end of the
period, where the individual receives a punishment P (τi, z), pecuniary or not pecuniary such
as imprisonment, with dP (τi, z)/dτi > 0 and dP (τi, z)/dτi > 0.
2 According to the above, the
present value of the expected future punishment is given by,
Π(τi, z) = ρ(z)pi(τi, z)P (τi, z) (2.3)
where ρ(z) discounts punishment since it occurs at the end of the period. For simplic-
ity, expected punishment is measured in utility terms as in Lochner and Moretti, (2001).3
1It could be negative, since self-protection improves as people spend more time in criminal activities.
On the other hand, it could be positive as well, as more time in the illegal sector allows the law enforcement
to acquire more evidence against the criminal, which increases the probability of apprehension
2Any kind of punishment, as in the cases on Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1973), is measured in its monetary
equivalent. Here it is assumed that the more serious the crime the stricter the punishment becomes.
3That this future potential punishment is measured in utility terms has as implication that punishment
is separable from (2.2). Otherwise, this future punishment should have been incorporated in the utility
function in the same manner as in (2.2). In that case, there should have been four mutually exclusive
states, for employed and not arrested, unemployed and not arrested, employed and arrested, and unem-
ployed and arrested, as described in Ehrlich (1973). This would result in four mutually exclusive utility
outcomes, each associated with the probability of the state of nature to be observed and the total expected
utility would have been, U(τi) = (1− pi(τi)) (1 − µ)u (w(τ`) + k(τi)) + (1− pi(τi))µ · u (k(τi)) + pi(τi)(1 −
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Henceforth, z is omitted from the equations for brevity.
Given all the above, the total expected utility received by both legal and illegal activity
from both states is the following,
U(τi, τ`) = (1− µ)u (ya) + µu (yb)− ρ pi(τi)P (τi). (2.4)
Thus, the problem of the individual is to allocate his/her available time between legal and
illegal activities in order to maximize (2.4) subject to the time constraints,
τ = τi + τ`, and, τi ≥ 0, τ` ≥ 0. (2.5)
Substituting τ` = τ − τi, and (2.1) into (2.4), the problem simplifies into an optimization
problem with one variable. The Kunh-Tucker first order condition for τi is given by,
dU (τi)
dτi
τi = 0,
dU (τi)
dτi
≤ 0, τi ≥ 0. (2.6)
The interior solution of spending some time in illegal activities is dU(τi)/dτi = 0,
⇒
(
(1− µ)u′(ya) + µu′(yb)
)
dk
dτi
−
(
(1− µ)u′(ya)dw
dτ`
+ µu′(yb)
dD
dτ`
)
= ρ
(
dpi
dτi
P (τi) +
dP (τi)
dτi
pi(τi)
)
, (2.7)
so that the marginal utility from criminal activities minus the marginal utility from legal
activities must be equal to the marginal punishment.1 The sufficient condition for a strict
µ)u (w(τ`) + k(τi)− ρP (τi)) + pi(τi)µ · u (k(τi)− ρP (τi)) rather than the simpler function (2.4).
1The LFS of the FOC could also be written as, (1− µ)u′(ya)
(
dk
dτi
− dwdτ`
)
+ µ u′(yb)
(
dk
dτi
− dDdτ`
)
, so that
the marginal utility from the good and the bad state must be equal to the marginal punishment. Here,
dw(τ`)/dτ` and dD(τ`)/dτ` can be considered as the opportunity costs of crime of not spending the extra
time dτi on the legal sector.
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global maximum is given by,
∆ = (1− µ)
[
u′′(ya)
(
dk
dτi
− dw
dτ`
)2
+ u′(ya)
(
d2k
dτ 2i
+
d2w
dτ 2`
)]
+ µ
[
u′′(yb)
(
dk
dτi
− dD
dτ`
)2
+ u′(yb)
d2k
dτ 2i
]
− ρ
(
d2pi
dτ 2i
P + 2
dpi
dτi
dP
dτi
+ pi
d2P
dτ 2i
)
< 0. (2.8)
Since the term on the right hand side of (2.7) is weakly positive, and given that (2.8)
holds, it is required that the marginal utility from criminal activities is at least as high as the
marginal utility from the legal sector. This is because crime is a risky action that involves
losses in the case of a potential future punishment. Thus, the term on the right hand side
can be considered as the extra marginal compensation required for crimes to be committed.
Note also that if dk
dτi
< dw
dτ`
, so that the marginal return from crime is lower than the marginal
legal return, it is highly unlikely that (2.7) holds. However, it could still hold in cases where
the unemployment rate is very high, the unemployment benefits are very small, and the
marginal legal return is only a bit larger than the marginal illegal return.
As the criminal wage rate is in general quite small in comparison to the legal wage
rate for most property crimes, and if we consider that for most people the criminal wage
further decreases by the psychological costs associated with a crime, the corner solution
where someone allocates all his/her time in legal actions is highly possible.1 Moreover,
property crimes that pay a quite high financial return are also very rare, as according to
our assumptions, crimes that pay high returns require plenty of time which in turn increases
the risk of apprehension and the severity of punishment.2 Also, crimes that pay a high
return involve much higher psychological costs than psychological gains for most people, so
that k(τi) is not large enough. Finally, we must also consider that many individuals do not
exhibit strong criminal ability which might decrease k(τi) (if less able criminals target in
criminal activities that pay low returns) or increase pi(τi). All the above are possible reasons
to explain why crime is such a rare event.3 On the other hand, the individual will specialise
1For most people, property crimes would include more psychological costs because of regret, bad repu-
tation, etc, rather than psychological gains because of possible satisfaction.
2Think for example bank robberies, or car thefts. Although the crimes itself may not need so much time,
we can assume that they need a lot of preparation, which is also measured in τ i.
3In my sample, the proportion of people who have have admitted committing at least one property crime
during last year is just 5%.
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in the illegal sector (τ` = 0), if and only if, the marginal legal utility plus the marginal cost of
punishment is smaller than the marginal utility from illegitimate activities, which is highly
unlikely for most people.
A main point of (2.7) is that, starting from an equilibrium where the individual spends
some time on the illegal sector, the better the opportunities in legal sector, expressed as
higher dw(τ`)/dτ`, the higher the opportunity cost of crime is. Therefore, holding everything
else constant, the participation in illegal activities will decrease. The same is true if there
is an exogenous increase in D(τ`). This change will increase the marginal legal utility, and
therefore it is less likely that (2.7) is satisfied. The opposite holds for the marginal return
to crime. As it becomes higher compared to the marginal return to legal activities, the
individual is better off if he/she allocates more time to criminal activities than before.
Another important result is that, starting from an interior solution for crime, the effect of
an increase in unemployment rate is positive, as somebody would expect. The comparative
static analysis shows that dτ ∗i /dµ = −
(
u′(yb)( dkdτi − dDdτ` )− u′(ya)( dkdτi − dwdτ` )
)
/∆, which is
positive iff,
u′(yb)
(
dk
dτi
− dD
dτ`
)
− u′(ya)
(
dk
dτi
− dw
dτ`
)
> 0. (2.9)
Now, as dD
dτ`
< dw
dτ`
, we know that ( dk
dτi
− dD
dτ`
) > ( dk
dτi
− dw
dτ`
). But, moreover, as w(τ`) > D(τ`)
we have that ya > yb, and since the individual is risk averse (u
′′(y) < 0), which implies that
u(.) is strictly concave, we know that u′(yb) > u′(ya). Thus, the first term of the LHS of
(2.9) is always higher than the second term and (2.9) always holds.
The effect of all the components of the potential punishment is also the expected one.
For example, following an exogenous increase in the probability of punishment, the marginal
return to criminal activities must also go up to compensate this increase in potential pun-
ishment. Otherwise the individual would decrease τi. The same will be the effect if there is
an exogenous increase in the severity of punishment.1
1Note that in my model, the deterrent effect of a 1 percent increase in pi is equal to the deterrent effect
of a 1 percent increase in P . This is because of the simplification that punishment is measured in utility
terms, which means that all individuals are risk neutral with respect to punishment, although they are risk
averse with respect to legal or illegal wages. If the punishment was incorporated in the utility functions of
a risk averse individual, as described in note 3 of page 52, it can be shown, as in Ehrlich (1973), that an 1
percent increase in P has a larger effect than an 1 percent increase in pi.
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Finally, risk attitudes, which can be expressed through the discount factor or the cur-
vature of the utility curves, are quite important. As someone becomes less risk averse or
more impatient, he/she discounts future potential punishment more heavily (lower ρ). In
this way, the marginal return from crime must be higher for a more risk averse or a more
patient individual, since he/she puts much weight on the consequences of a possible future
apprehension. Moreover, as y goes up, u′(.) decreases by more for a more risk averse indi-
vidual (as his/her utility function is more “curvy”), which consequently decreases the left
hand side of (2.7), resulting in a higher extra compensation required for the more risk averse
person to participate in the illegal sector.
2.2.1 Immigration and Crime
What could this simple model tell us about immigrants’ behaviour towards crime? Since
z determines whether someone is an immigrant or a native, immigration status affects the
first order condition (2.7) through many channels. Although immigrants do not form a
homogeneous group of people, as individuals of very different ethnic backgrounds are included
in this group, they exhibit some common features that distinguish them from natives. As is
explained below, some of these features are positively related to crime and some negatively,
so that link between being an immigrant and criminal behaviour is not obvious.
First of all, since immigrants generally face lower legal opportunities, meaning that they
have on average lower dw(τ`)/dτ`, or higher µ (see, for example, Algan at al, 2010), we would
expect a positive link. For instance, they hold lower quality jobs and a lower chance of
getting accepted in higher status jobs. This might be for instance because of discrimination,
limitations in human capital or in language proficiency, etc. According to this, they may find
opportunities in illegal sectors more attractive. Regarding criminal opportunities, it is not
clear whether immigrants face a higher or a lower dk(τi)/dτi. It is therefore not appropriate
to associate immigration with crime using the return to criminal activities.
On the other hand, there are a few reasons which would indicate a negative associa-
tion between being an immigrant and criminal behaviour. Some evidence by criminologist
shows that the criminal justice system and law enforcement are biased in various stages
against ethnic minorities (see, for example, Smith, 1997, Feilzer and Hood, 2004). This
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implies that immigrants may face more severe punishments compared to natives. Moreover,
highly deprived areas are generally associated with both higher concentration of immigrant
population and higher concentration of police force. This increases the risk of apprehension.
Finally, immigrants also face deportation which is a punishment specific to them. This could
be considered as a large disincentive to commit crimes (Butcher and Piehl, 2007). Thus,
according to the above, we would expect that the average immigrant faces both higher pi(τi)
and P (τi).
In another direction, discount factors and risk attitudes may also be different for immi-
grants. It could be said that immigrants are willing to take more risks, since migration is in
general a risky action with quite uncertain outcomes (see, for example, Jaeger at al, 2010).
On the other hand, there is empirical evidence that immigrants are more risk averse than
the native population (see, for example, Bonin at al, 2009). A considerable number of im-
migrants leave their families back at their countries of origin. Even though they have taken
the risk to migrate away from their countries, they target on a better life for them and their
families. In addition, they would like to feel socially equal to natives by presenting a highly
responsible and credible behaviour. They may not be willing to take highly risky actions
which can cost them their presence in the host country. In addition, a large proportion of
immigrants come from poor countries. Since they have already faced quite harsh conditions,
it could be assumed that they are more resilient not only in financial difficulties but also in
psychological and physical severities.
Furthermore, discount factors and risk behaviour are strongly associated with cultural
factors. Therefore, coming from different cultures, risk attitudes and discount factors may
have been shaped quite differently. Cultural differences are also important for the percep-
tions towards the moral dimension of crime. Thus, psychological costs, also incorporated in
dk(τi)/dτi, may be very different between immigrants and natives.
Finally note that, the model does not explicitly include variables for demographic fac-
tors such as age, gender, or location features, that are found to be associated with crime.
Therefore, there could be also some indirect effects of immigration on crime if immigrants
are different from natives with respect to these demographic features.1 Thus, taking all the
1All the discussion above concerns the individual supply of property crime that economic theory predicts.
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above discussion into consideration, the individual relationship between immigration and
property crime cannot be determined by this theory, and can only be established by an
empirical analysis, using a well specified model and appropriate data.
2.3 Immigration and Crime. A Review of Research
Although other indicators of crime, such as education, inequality, labour opportunities, etc.,
have been well studied by economists, the empirical research of the immigration-crime nexus
is limited. However, the literature by criminology and sociology scholars is much more
extended, both theoretically and empirically. Traditionally, these studies are developed in
countries which have experienced large inflows of migrants. For instance, the US with the
inflow of Latino and Afro-Caribbean population, Germany with immigrants from Turkey
and the former Yugoslavia, Netherlands with Turkish and Moroccans, etc.
The results of various researchers are often contradictory. This is natural, mainly be-
cause the empirical results by each researcher are subject to the composition of immigrant
population in each destination country, the circumstances that immigrants encounter in dif-
ferent countries, the differences in the data sets they use, and last but not least, the different
statistical tools and strategies each researcher follows. Thus, we cannot identify globally
what is the effect of immigration on crime by looking only at one country, or one approach,
but we need to look at the broader picture.
The literature review is presented in two subsections. In the first one the results found
by economists are presented, whereas the second one briefly presents the results found by
sociologists and criminologists. A basic difference between studies by criminologists and
sociologists and studies by economists is the theoretical hypothesis. The first group bases
its theory on disorganization and culture conflicts whereas economists associate immigrants
In another direction, long before economists, criminologists developed some ideas on the immigration-crime
nexus. Starting with eccentric ideas that immigrants commit more crimes just because they are a group of
inferior individuals (see, Armstrong, 1935, and, Sellin, 1938), they switched to more rational theories based
on psychological patterns. One of the earliest theories is based on the so-called “strain” theory, presented by
Merton (1938), which states that immigrants present adverse behaviour due to accumulative pressure, as for
example, because of discrimination, racism and unequal social and financial opportunities. Other theories
suggest that there might be deviant behaviour by both immigrants and natives because of cultural conflicts.
Thus, contrary to economic theory, criminologist’s theories stand better for violent crime. For an excellent
survey on these theories the reader may refer to Martinez and Lee (2000).
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with crime through the economic models of crime. The second main difference stems from
the fact that economists traditionally use more analytical statistical and mathematical tools
than the other group. Thus, in general the studies by economists use more sophisticated
and in many cases, more appropriate statistical models.1
Before presenting details of the empirical findings, in a nutshell, the available literature
seemingly agrees on the following: both macro and micro-analysis in the US indicates that
there is a negative association between immigration and crime. Regarding Europe, crimi-
nologists find that immigrants are over-represented in official records, but less involved in
criminal activities according to crime self-reports. Finally, the empirical work by economists
in Europe suggests either a positive link (mostly for property crime) or no link.
2.3.1 Empirical Evidence by Economists
To begin with, as mentioned in the introduction, to my knowledge there is only one study
concerning the UK. Bell, Machin and Fasani (2010) examine how two separate large waves
of immigrants affected crime rates. These waves are, the late 1990s wave of asylum seekers
and the large inflow from the “A8” Eastern European countries since May 2004. What they
find is that the first wave is associated with higher property crime, even after controlling
for endogenous location using fixed effects and instrumental variables.2 However, they find
that the A8 wave did not affect property crime.3 Moreover, their results indicate that
there is no effect for violent crime. They argue that this finding is consistent with a simple
economic model of crime, as asylum seekers face much lower legal opportunities realtive to
A8 immigrants and natives, and therefore, illegal activities seem more attractive to them.
As far as I know, the first attempt by economists to investigate the immigration-crime
relationship is that of Bucher and Piehl (1998a). Using data from the Uniform Crime Re-
ports and Current Population Surveys, they first look at the aggregate effects of immigration
on crime in the US, during the 80s. Although they find that there is a positive relationship
1This review does not intend to criticize or judge the methods and specifications of different researchers,
but instead, it is purely descriptive.
2As asylum seekers where located by the National Asylum Support Service, they were mostly located
in unpopular areas with a large amount of vacant houses. Thus, they instrument for endogenous location
decisions by the number of dispersal accommodation in each local area.
3In this case they control for endogenous location by using the availability of flights to A8 countries as
an exogenous variation for immigrants choices of location.
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between crime rates and the fraction of recent (within one year) immigrants, this association
fades out once they include controls both correlated with the location choice of immigrants
and crime rates. Actually, the effect of immigration becomes negative but statistically in-
significant. Using fixed effect analysis, they find that there is no association (negative but
insignificant) between flows of immigrants and crime rates, or flows of immigrants and growth
in crime rates (one year changes). Their results are strengthened by the use of self reports
from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth of 1980. What they find is that in all cases
immigrants report considerably less crime (statistically significant at 5% in most cases), a
relationship that is more clear once they control for other individual characteristics associ-
ated with crime. Immigrants are also less involved in arrests and convictions. Nevertheless,
they do not use any strategy to control for any possible under-reporting, a major concern in
self-reports.
Bianchi, Buonanno and Pinotti (2007), study the same research question but for Italy,
by using police administrative records for Italian provinces. Using a panel data set from
1990 to 2003, they find a positive relationship between the size of immigrant population
and most categories of crime rates, even after controlling not only for other determinants
correlated with the factors that determine both crime and the location choice of immigrants,
but also for province and year dummies. However, they recognize that even after controlling
for these factors, there can still be some time varying unobserved factors correlated with
both immigration and crime (for example, a economic crisis in a specific area would reduce
the cost of living, which would in turn attract immigration population, but at the same time,
also increase crime rates). Moreover, there is the concern of reverse causality, since crime
rates in an area could affect the location choice of immigrants. Therefore, they employ a
two-stage least square approach, using changes over time of immigrant population in the
rest of Europe as an instrument for changes of immigrant population in Italy. Arguing that
this is not a “weak” instrument, they find that there is no relationship between immigration
and most categories of crime. However, there still exists a positive association for murders,
robberies and thefts.
Finally, in another direction Bucher and Piehl (1998b, 2007), use institutionalization rates
as a proxy for incarceration rates. Using the 5% Public Use Microsamples of the US census
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in 1980, 1990, and 2000, they find that the probability of an immigrant being incarcerated is
much lower, even after controlling for educational attainment and ethnic status. They also
find that this difference has increased over the last three decades, as more recent immigrants
have the lowest incarceration rates. They attribute this to two reasons. First, they argue
that this improvement is due to the stricter legislation for immigrants, since recent laws
have broadened the crimes for which an immigrant is deported. They find that although
deportation itself does not drive the results (meaning that the share of immigrants is not
lower in prisons just because they get deported), it acts as a deterrent effect specific to
immigration population. Second, they show evidence that the recent migration process to
the US selects individuals who are either less crime-prone, or more responsive to deterrent
effects.
2.3.2 Empirical Evidence by other Scholars
As opposed to economists, criminologists and sociologists have paid more attention to this
relationship. Here, I will try to briefly describe the results of the most important works in
each country.
The majority of immigration-crime studies come from the US and focuses on violent
crime.1 Most of evidence from the US shows that although the public opinion keeps as-
sociating immigrants with crime, immigration is not associated with higher crime, and in
many cases it is associated with lower crime. Hagan and Palloni (1998), perform an empir-
ical analysis using a sample of 34 Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas of the US. By
regressing logged arrests on the proportion of immigrants in the population, they find no
association between immigration and both property and violent crime. Reid at al. (2005),
combining 2000 US Census data and 2000 Uniform Crime Report (UCR), explore how the
immigrant population affects crime rates across a sample of metropolitan areas. They find
that, after controlling for demographic and economic conditions, immigration does not af-
fect violent and nonviolent crime. Lee, Martinez and Rosefend (2007), examine whether
1A more detailed review can be found in Hagan and Paloni (1998), and Martinez and Lee (2004). For
most recent evidence refer to Stowell (2007). Also, each individual study described in the subsection provides
some related literature. For example see, Ousey and Kubrin (2009), Stowell at al (2009), and Wadsworth
(2010). Stawell at al (2009), also provide a table that presents important information for the main studies
in the US (Table 1, p.895).
66
immigration increased homicide in the three border cities of Miami, El Paso, and San Diego,
using 3,345 homicide occurrences happened between 1985 and 1995. Poisson regression re-
sults indicate that there is no relationship, or, even a negative relationship between the
percentage of new immigrants and homicide levels. Stowell (2007), in the same direction
examines the crime-immigration nexus for three US cities, Alexandria, Houston and Miami.
Using neighborhood-level data from 2000, he also finds no direct evidence between the pro-
portion of recent (less than ten years) immigrants in the population and violent crime levels.
However, he finds a negative association for Miami.
Even more recently, there was a quite large amount of publications on this subject for
the US.1 Most of those studies also show that if there is an association, this is negative.
Very briefly, Ousey and Kubrin (2009), using fixed effects for 159 US cities (with more than
100,000 residents) for the three time periods 1980, 1990 and 2000, find that the proportion
of recent immigrants decreases violent crime. Wadsworth (2010), in a similar manner, uses
a fixed effect model for 459 cities (with more than 50,000 residents), between 1990 and 2000.
Both robbery and homicide rates are examined. The results of this study suggest that the
proportion of foreign born population and the proportion of new immigrants decreased crime
rates within this time period. Stowell at al (2009) use a panel over the period 1994-2004
for 103 metropolitan areas (with more than 500,000 residents). Their results indicate that
there is a negative association between changes in immigration concentration and changes
in crime rates. This effect is particularly stronger for robberies.
The “Homicide Studies” journal published an issue on 2009 that solely focuses on aspects
between immigration and homicides and other crime types. Graif and Sampson (2009), in a
neighborhood study of Chicago, using a “weighting” estimator that assigns different weights
for points of different proximity to each data point, find that higher concentration of for-
eign born population is either negatively or not associated with homicide. Feldmeyer and
Steffebsmeier (2009), using homicide arrest data from California, find that the proportion of
recent (entered USA between 1990 and 2000) immigrants does not affect the mean number
of overall homicides, but it does affect negatively the mean of homicides against white and
black people. Ve´lez (2010), by allowing the effect of immigration to be different between ad-
1For all studies described in this paragraph, crime data are collected from the Uniform Crime Reports.
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vantaged and disadvantaged neighborhoods of Chicago (by using an interaction term), finds
that an increase of recent immigrants decreases the number of homicides in disadvantaged
areas but has no effect in the more advantaged ones. In another study for Chicago, Chavez
and Griffiths (2009), argue that growing immigrant population was unrelated to homicide
patterns. Polczynski at al (2009), look at arrest rates for different types of crime in Orange
County, Florida, and show that arrest rates are generally lower for foreign born individuals.
Moreover, their results suggest that concentration of immigration is not associated with the
number of arrests. Finally, the studies of Akins, Rumbaut, and Stansfield (2009), and Stow-
ell and Martinez (2009), focus on the area of Miami. The former suggests that for the area of
Austin, Miami, where the immigration population increased by around 580 percent, there is
no association between migration and homicides. In the latter, they find that neighborhoods
with higher number of Latino immigrants exhibit lower levels of homicide.
In Germany the studies of immigration-crime link are based on official criminal statistics,
since in official records from police or courts there is a categorization of people as foreigners or
not. Using police and court data Albrecht (1987) finds that foreign population’s involvement
in criminal activities is higher than that of Germans. However, this relationship disappears
once controls for socio-economic conditions and demographic differences are accounted for.
The same positive relationship is also found in Albrecht (1997). However, in this second
study the higher involvement of immigrants in crime persists, even after controlling for the
above factors. Finally, Chapin (1997), using basic statistic analysis finds that changes in
foreign population increase the growth of crime levels.
Evidence from official statistics of Switzerland also suggests that immigrants are less
law-abiding. For example, Killias (1997) using police and conviction statistics finds that,
although in the 70s immigrants displayed similar crime rates with natives, after the 80s
immigrants were over-represented in crime statistical tables. However, he expressed many
concerns about the reliability of official crime statistics. Contrary to that, using self-reported
data from more than 3,000 adolescents and employing basic statistics, Vazsonyi and Killias
(2001), find that first generation adolescent immigrants display slightly lower crime rates
than native Swiss adolescents. This result coincides with other works in Switzerland that
have used self-reported crime data. They also find that second-generation immigrants are
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more crime-prone than natives, a result that it is common in literature.
In Netherlands, Junger-Tas (1997), finds that Moroccans and Antilleans are overrepre-
sented in official criminal statistics. Contrary to that, he also presents a review of self-report
studies in Netherlands which suggest that the above groups, and other groups of ethnic mi-
norities, are less involved in crime. Concerning France, Tournier (1997), finds that although
immigrants are over-represented in prison statistics and statistics of criminal suspects, a
large fraction of their crimes concerns violations of immigration law regulation. Thus, when
he controls for this fact the difference between foreigners’ and natives’ involvement in crime
is considerably lower. In a study for Sweden, Martens (1997), finds that the fraction of
immigrants who have been suspected for crimes is clearly higher than the fraction of native
population. A difference still exists even after immigrant-native differences are accounted
for, although it becomes noticeably smaller. He also finds that first-generation immigrants
display higher crime rates than second-generation immigrants, a result that contradicts with
findings in other countries. Finally, Yeager (1997) presents a cross-country review of immi-
gration and criminality. According to this review, immigrants are not as highly involved in
crime as natives in Canada and Australia. Criminal records form France, Sweden, Nether-
lands and Germany indicate that immigrants are over-represented in various criminal aspects.
He also briefly describes the results of crime self-reports for Switzerland, Netherlands and
Germany, which suggest that immigrants are less involved in crime than natives citizens.
2.4 The OCJS. Some Methodological Issues
The basic target of the present study is to identify whether immigrants are more or less
crime-prone than natives, even after controlling for the fact that immigrants might exhibit
some differences in basic demographic characteristics associated with higher or lower crime.
For this purpose the Offending Crime and Justice Survey (OCJS) of 2003 is used, a nationally
representative survey which asks people in England and Wales about their experiences as
offenders and their attitudes towards criminal activities.1 Although a few earlier offending
1Although three subsequent OCJSs exist (2004, 2005, 2006), they are particularized in adolescent delin-
quency (people from 10 to 25 years old). Thus, they are not appropriate for the purposes of my research
question.
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surveys in the UK exist, this is the largest one and the most sophisticated in terms of design
and construction.1 This section discusses some features, advantages and limitations of the
OCJS, and self-report studies in general.
A basic target of the OJCS is to provide an accurate measure of the prevalence of offending
in the general population, as opposed to studies of already convicted criminals, and to
investigate the factors related to committing crimes (Hamlyn, and Hales 2003).2 However,
this is a hard task if we consider a few limitations of the OCJS.
To begin with, validity and reliability of the responses is a concern, since questions try
to elicit information in a very sensitive part of personal activities such as crime. Particu-
larly, a response error is expected that most probably takes the form of under-reporting if
respondents conceal some aspects of true crime activities. However, it is important to stress
that computer-based interviews are used as opposed to face-to-face interviews, a method
that is found to increase the reliability of responses (see, for example, Turner at al, 1998,
and Newman at al, 2002).3 As will be explained in Section 2.5, a conventional regression
model that does not take into acount under-reporting would result in inconsistent estimated
coefficients for the true crime, as it is developed to estimate the coefficients of the observed,
reported crime. More importantly, if for any reasons immigrants under-report by more than
natives, the estimated effect of being an immigrant on crime will be downward biased.
Another concern stems from the fact that some individuals selected by the survey’s
conductors denied participation in the survey. In spite of the fact that response rates of
the OCJS are very close to response rates of other population surveys,4 such as the Labour
Force Survey or the British Crime Survey (BCS) (see, Sharp and Budd, 2005), estimates of
prevalence of crime will be downward biased in case non-respondents commit more crimes
(see, Farrington at al., 1990).5 In addition, if the effect of being an immigrant on criminal
1For a review of other self-report studies the reader can refer to Farrington (2003), Thornberry and
Krohn (2000), and Junget-Tas and Marsall (1999).
2For surveys of convicted criminals see, Budd at al. (2005).
3Actually, the OCJS aimed to get the highest level of reliability possible by using well trained interviewers,
appropriately designed questionnaires and feasibility studies.
4The response rate for the core sample and youth-boost sample is around 74%. For the nonwhite-boost
sample the response rate is around 50% which is common in surveys that include nonwhite boosts. Depending
on the assumptions used to provide the response rate estimates, Hamlyn at al (2003) provide un upper and
lower limit on the response rate estimates. For the core and youth-boost sample these are 78.5% and 73%
and for nonwhite-boost, 60% and 45% respectively, a figure that matches closely the figures of 2001 census.
5Although the weights used in empirical analysis take into account non-respondents (see, Hamlyn and
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behaviour is different between respondents and non-respondents, the coefficient measuring
the difference between immigrants and natives propensity to crime will be biased. Moreover,
this survey does not capture individuals currently in institutions who would most probably
commit more crimes than the general population if they were free. The consequences are
similar to the previous point.
Despite these limitations, relying on self-reports constitutes the most suitable method to
identify predictors of criminal behaviour. As Thornberry and Krohn (2000) point out, the
best way to identify factors of criminal behaviour would be to observe the actual behaviour
of potential criminals, self reports being the nearest proxy to actual criminal behaviour. The
OCJS also provides important information on a wide range of characteristics of potential
criminals as opposed to victimization surveys and official statistics. Actually, self-reports
is the most commonly used technique in criminology research to discuss causes of crime
(see, Hagan, 1993, and Junger-Tas and Marshall, 1999). Moreover, it would be misleading
to attempt to identify the determinants of criminal behaviour by comparing convicted and
non-convicted individuals, since there is quite a large number of individuals that have com-
mitted crimes but are not convicted. Similar logic applies to comparisons between arrested
immigrants and natives.
As we saw in the previous section, some criminologists prefer to use data of recorded
crime. There are two main pitfalls in using official recorded crime by the police. First of all,
these statistics are very poor in terms of information provided. Concerning official statistics
in England and Wales, they offer no information concerning immigration status. Therefore,
they are inappropriate for native-immigrant crime comparisons. Furthermore, even if the
same information was available, it is widely accepted that many crimes are not reported
to the police, and many reported crimes are not even recorded because of inside-police
operational reasons (for example, some reported crimes are not considered serious enough
to be recorded). This is the so-called “dark-figure” of crime, for which a vast literature
exists (see, for example, MacDonald, 2001, 2002).1 Moreover, there is some evidence by
Maxwell, 2003, and Budd, Sharp and Mayhew, 2005), they do not control for possible higher crime of
non-respondents.
1For example, using data from the BCS of 2007/08 we find that around 60% of crimes were not reported
to the police.
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criminologist that the criminal justice system and law enforcement are biased in various
stages against ethnic minorities, mostly against black individuals (see, for example, Smith,
1997, Feilzer and Hood, 2004). Perhaps, immigrants are also more “visible” to the police
because of over-policing in target areas where ethnic minorities are concentrated, increasing
the likelihood of immigrants to be arrested (Sharp and Budd, 2005). Therefore, official
statistics would overestimate immigrants’ crime if immigrants face a higher probability of
arrest for the same crimes, or, if police officers disproportionately record crimes that are
supposedly committed by immigrants.
On the other hand, although victimization surveys, such as the BCS for England and
Wales, provide the most precise estimates of the actual crime, they do not provide any
information about criminals’ characteristics. However, if we accept that the BCS reveals the
figure of crime that is the closest to the true one, we could compare official and OCJS’ crime
figures to BCS’ one in order to evaluate their precision in measuring crime. Kershaw and
Walker (2008), suggest that recorded crime is only 42% of the total crime in England and
Wales. Concerning the OCJS, Budd, Sharp and Mayhew (2005), suggest that the figure of
violent crime is quite close to that of BCS, but the count of property crime is quite lower
than in BCS. This would suggest that there is under-reporting in property crime. However,
these figures must be treated with caution since there are fundamental design differences
between these two sources, and therefore, they do not provide comparable crime figures (see,
Budd, Sharp and Mayhew, 2005).
2.5 Econometric Models
As will be described in the next section, the dependent variable is observed in count form
(number of crimes committed during the twelve months prior to the interview). Therefore,
count data models (number of crimes) or binary choice models (crime or not) are more
appropriate than simple linear models. Nevertheless, as will be better explained in the next
section, the very large number of zeros in the property crime variable, resulting in very low
variation in the dependent variable, will make estimation of count data models quite harsh,
mainly when estimators to allow for under-reporting are used. Alternatively, a safer choice
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would be to use the binary information, whether or not someone has committed a crime last
year although these models do not use all available information. Therefore, a compromise
would be to base my empirical results on binary choice models, while count data estimation
models can be used for robustness check analysis.
As explained in detail before, under-reporting is the main concern in this data set.1 Tra-
ditional nonlinear estimators for binary and count data are inconsistent if under-reporting,
or more generally, response error in the outcome variable is present (Hausman, Abrevaya
and Scott-Morton, 1998, Cameron and Trivedi, 1998 (p.313), and Winkelmann, 2008).2 The
problem is even more salient if under-reporting depends on individual characteristics which
is most probably the case with self-reports in crime. On this direction, parametric models
that take into account misreporting (both under and over-reporting for binary choice mod-
els, but only under-reporting in count data models) will be used. Another concern is the
large number of zeros (95%) in the dependent variables. This has obvious consequences for
the precision of the estimates in both binary and count data models. Adding the fact that
estimation of models that account for under-reporting is quite demanding, to achieve precise
estimates quite rich samples are required.
Moreover, as explained in the previous section, there is also a potential sample selection
problem, since it is likely that people who refused participation in the survey are more
prone to crime. However, models that correct for sample selection problems, such as the
Heckit procedure (see, Heckman 1976, 1979), would require information of non respondents,
which is not available. Therefore, this problem is ignored in the analysis, hoping that non
respondents exhibit the same criminal behaviour, or at least that the crime differentials
between immigrant and natives respondents follow the same pattern with crime differentials
between immigrant and native respondents. In the following subsections models that control
for misclassification, or, under-reporting are described.
1Although we could assume that someone would never report a crime if he/she has not committed one,
we could not rule out that over-reporting may be present as well. This could be attributed to the fact that the
OJCS is a retrospective study and measurement error in both directions could be possible. Although over-
reporting is most possible unintentional, so that it is random, under-reporting is most probably intentional.
2Note that, as it is well known, random response error in linear models does not affect consistency. The
only consequence of the presence of this error is the increase of the error variance which leads to less precise
estimates. However, in our case, estimation of linear models is inappropriate as we deal with count data.
Moreover, the error component because of under-reporting is most probably not random but it depends on
respondents’ attributes, which leads to endogeneity.
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2.5.1 Binary Choice Models
In this section the model of Hausman, Abrevaya and Scott-Morton (1996, 1998) is presented,
a parametric model that takes into account both probabilities of under-reporting (misclas-
sification of a true one as zero) and over-reporting (misclassification of a true zero as one).
Throughout the present study I refer to this model as MisProbit (Misclassification-Probit).
The model comes naturally from a latent variable specification. To simplify things,
assume that in a given period of time, an individual would commit a crime (or a number
of crimes) if the total utility from committing this crime is higher than the utility obtained
from not committing it. So, let u∗i be the (unobserved) utility obtained if committing the
crime(s) minus the utility if not committing it (them). We specify u∗i to depend linearly on
the vector of characteristics xi such that,
u∗i = x
′
iβ + i, (2.10)
where i is a random i.i.d error. Thus, the individual commits at least one crime according
to the following,
y∗i =
 1 if u
∗
i > 0
0 if u∗i ≤ 0
(2.11)
where y∗ is a dummy for the true but unobserved crime. Given (2.10) and (2.11), conditional
on xi, the probability of committing a crime is given by,
Pr(y∗i = 1|xi) = Pr(u∗i > 0|xi) = Pr(i > −x′iβ|xi) = F (x′iβ) (2.12)
where F (x′iβ) is assumed to have a known functional form such as the standard normal, if
i ∼ N (0, 1).
Let us now define yi to be a dummy for the reported and therefore, observed crime.
Suppose that the reported crime does not coincide with the actual crime since there is mis-
reporting (in this context defined as misclassification). The probabilities of misclassification
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are defined as follows,
a1 = Pr(yi = 1|y∗i = 0),
a0 = Pr(yi = 0|y∗i = 1),
(2.13)
where a1 is the probability of reporting a crime, conditional on committing no crime (over-
reporting) and a0 is the probability of reporting no crime, conditional on committing crimes
(under-reporting). Notice that according to this specification the misclassification probabil-
ities do not depend on xi but only on y
∗
i .
It is easy to derive the conditional probabilities of the observed crime, incorporating the
probabilities of misclassification. The response tree in figure 2.3 is a very clear way to do
that. It is clear that these probabilities are given by,
Pr(yi = 1|xi) = (1− F (x′iβ)) a1 + F (x′iβ)(1− a0)
= a1 + (1− a0 − a1)F (x′iβ),
(2.14)
Pr(yi = 0|xi) = (1− F (x′iβ)) (1− a1) + F (x′iβ)a0
= 1− a1 − (1− a0 − a1)F (x′iβ),
(2.15)
and therefore the expected value E(yi|xi) is also given by (2.14). We can estimate, a0,
a1, and, β, using the method of Maximum Likelihood (MLE) once we have specified the
log-likelihood function as,
lnL (β, a0, a1) =
n∑
i=1
(
yi ln [Pr(yi = 1|xi)] + (1− yi) ln [Pr(yi = 0|xi)]
)
. (2.16)
Given correct specification of the model, meaning that the specified model of constant mis-
classification is the correct model under the true data generating process (DGP), maximiza-
tion of (2.16) using numerical optimizers, such as the Newton-Raphson, yields consistent
estimates for the coefficients of true crime, the probability of under-reporting, and the prob-
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ability of over-reporting.1
We notice that a0 is only designed to capture total under-reporting as opposed to partial
under-reporting. That is, the probability of under-reporting will ignore the cases where indi-
viduals report just a portion of the total number of crimes they have committed. However,
as will be explained later in this section, models that use the count form of the dependent
variable are able to estimate the probability of any committed crime to be reported, given
that this probability is constant for each individual.
Hausman, Abrevaya and Scott-Morton (1998) show that the model is not globally iden-
tified since for symmetric F (.), a1 + (1− a0− a1)F (x′iβ) = a˜1 + (1− a˜0− a˜1)F (−x′iβ) where
a˜0 = 1 − a1 and a˜1 = 1 − a0. Thus, there are two observationally equivalent models with
parameters (a0, a1, β) and (a˜0, a˜1,−β). Identification is achieved by imposing the “mono-
tonicity” condition, which states that a0 + a1 < 1. According to this, we are able to rule out
the “wrong” maximum, since a0 + a1 < 1 implies that a˜0 + a˜1 > 1. If this condition fails,
the misclassification probabilities are too large, and therefore, the data are most probably
too noisy to obtain reasonable results.
As the assumption of constant misclassification is not realistic in many applications,
including the present study, it can be easily relaxed if we model a0 and a1 to be functions
of covariates, so that, a0 = F (z
′
iγ), and a1 = F (w
′
iδ), where F can be the cumulative
distribution of a binary model, such as a Probit or a Logit. Vectors x, z, w can be the same,
disjoint or overlapping. No further assumptions are required to identify this model. There
are some papers in the literature that have utilized this estimator (see, for example, Leece,
2000, Artis at al, 2002, Caudil and Mixon, 2005, and Falaris, 2007). Nevertheless, none of
them allows the probabilities of misclassification to depend on covariates.2
1Hausman, Abrevaya and Scott-Morton (1996) explain why estimating a simple nonlinear binary model,
under the presence of misclassification, leads to inconsistency even when misclassification is constant. In-
tuitively, the MLE of a simple binary model that ignores misclassification will set the score (FOC) to zero,
although if misclassification exists the expected score of the ML is not zero, which leads to inconsistency. So,
if constant misclassification is a problem, the likelihood function that must be maximized is (2.16). Notice
however, that identification of the model comes from the nonlinear specification of the log likelihood function.
This has negative consequences on the robustness of this model. For this reason, Hausman, Abrevaya and
Scott-Morton (1996, 1998) also propose a semi-parametric estimation.
2It is interesting that this estimator is very similar to the Detection Controlled Estimator, presented
in Feinstein (1989). In that paper Feinstein explains that sometimes inspectors fail to detect a violation.
However, they never detect a violation if there is not one. Therefore, in the simplest form, when the
probability of detection and the probability of violations are independent, he derives the same log-likelihood
function as (2.14), if we set a1 to zero. However, in his estimator, a0 depends on regressors. This concept can
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Although this is quite an easy model to implement in econometric software, in practice
estimation is quite difficult, particularly when the misclassification probabilities are allowed
to depend on variables, and when the data are quite noisy with very low variation partic-
ularly in the dependent variable. Always, exclusion restrictions could help the estimation
procedure. Moreover, as Hausman, Abrevaya and Scott-Morton at al (1996) stress, it is quite
difficult to get precise estimates and imprecision will increase the higher the misclassification
becomes. They note that this is partly because the corrected for misclassification Informa-
tion Matrix is not block diagonal. Simple binary models ignore this fact and consequently,
underestimate the true standard errors. Thus, it could be said that the MisProbit MLE
corresponds to the true precision, given correct specification of the model. According to
this, in cases where misclassification is very high, as it may be the case for crime self-reports,
quite rich samples are needed in order to obtain precise estimates.
So far, we have regarded zeros coming from two different sources; misclassification of 1 as
0, and zeros from the traditionally binary choice model. Nonetheless, zero-inflation can be
incorporated into this model if we think of zeroes coming from a third source. That is, there
are some individuals who, regardless of the conditioning set xi, never commit any crimes
(and consequently they do not report any). We will call these individuals “genuinely non
criminals”. If we do not incorporate this zero-inflation probability separately, the estimated
probability a0 cannot distinguish under-reporting from zero-inflation.
1 This is clear if we
examine figure 2.4, where a0 and a1 are expressed as probabilities of zero-inflation and
one-inflation respectively. Following this tree we notice that the conditional probabilities of
observing 1 and 0 are exactly as in (2.14) and (2.15). However, in this case the interpretation
of a0 and a1 is very different. Although, probability of one-inflation is unrealistic, zero-
inflation is quite possible.2 Nevertheless, it is possible to separate under-reporting from
be naturally applied in any situation that involves compliance and inspection, as for example, tax evasion
(Feinstein, 1991).
1This idea of adding in a probability of inflation can be traced back to Gaudry and Dagenais (1979)
where they developed an estimator for multinomial choice models, calling this the “dogit” model. Gaudry
(1980) and Swait and Ben-Akiva (1987), apply this model for individual choices between a set of different
transportation modes. They explain that given a set of choices, an individual is either captive to one choice
regardless of his/her characteristics (inflation probability) or free to choose from the full set of choices
(traditional multinomial choice model). In this models there is inflation probability for each category,
whereas in the model presented here there is only zero-inflation probability, making this model more similar
to zero-inflation models for count data as described in Mullahy (1986) and Lambert (1992).
2One-inflation could be interpreted as follows: there are some individuals who, regardless of xi, always
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zero-inflation by incorporating zero-inflation separately in the likelihood function. This
model is presented in Appendix A.1
2.5.2 Count Data Models
The models presented here are based on the Poisson Logistic Regression model of Winkel-
mann and Zimmermann (1993), also presented in Mukhopadhyay and Trivedi (1995).2 This
model is a particular case of a Poisson stopped-sum distribution where the i.i.d random vari-
ables to be summed follow the Bernoulli distribution with constant probability of success p.
According to this specification, the observed number of counts is given as,
y = b1 + b2 + . . . . . .+ by∗ , (2.17)
where y∗ is a latent variable of the true counts that follows the Poisson distribution with mean
and variance equal to λ.3 A basic assumption of any stopped-sum distribution, is that y∗
and bi are conditionally independent.
4 Under this independency condition it is easy to show
(for example, using probability generating functions as in, Feller, 1968) that the observed
counts, y, also follow the Poisson distribution with parameter µ = pλ (see, for example,
Papadopoulos, 2011a). It is clear that y ≤ y∗, and it is said that the observed counts are
“under-reported”. We must underline that this specification assumes no over-reporting.5
The above concept can be extended in a multiple regression framework, where the prob-
ability of success and the true Poisson process are allowed to depend on covariates. In the
Poisson-Logit model, the true counts follow the Poisson distribution with,
Pr(Y ∗i = y
∗
i |xi) = e−λiλy
∗
i
i /y
∗
i !,
λi = E[y
∗
i |xi] = ex
′
iβ,
(2.18)
commit crimes in the specified time period and they are always willing to report that they have committed
them.
1However, note that this model is identified only because its nonlinear functional form.
2Here, only a brief discussion of these models is presented. For a more detailed analysis the reader may
refer to Winkelmann, 2008, Cameron and Trivedi, 1998, and Papadopoulos, 2011a.
3The name stopped-sum comes from the fact that the summation of Bernoulli variables is stopped by the
value of the Poisson distributed latent variable y∗.
4This assumption is relaxed in Winkelmann (1998).
5At least we need that over-reporting is not correlated with the regressors, so that it is totally random.
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and the probability of success is given as a Logit, so that,
Pr(bij = 1|zi) = Λ(z′iγ) = Λi =
ez
′
iγ
1 + ez
′
iγ
. (2.19)
Consequently, it can be shown that the observed counts also follow the Poisson distribution
(see, Papadopoulos, 2011a) with conditional probability distribution and expectation,
Pr(Yi = yi|xi, zi) = e−µiµyii /yi!,
µi = E[yi|xi, zi] = λiΛi,
(2.20)
respectively. The log-likelihood function is given by,
lnL (β, γ) =
n∑
i=1
(
− µi + yi lnµi − ln (yi!)
)
. (2.21)
Papadopoulos and Santos Silva (2008), show that identification of all the parameters of this
model requires at least one exclusion restriction in the Poisson process, or at least one sign
restriction on a parameter of the Logit part (see also, subsection 2.8.1). This means that we
know with certainty that either at least one of the elements of β is zero, or the sign of at
least one element of γ (see, Papadopoulos, 2011a, for a detailed discussion).
Despite the fact that consistency of the Poisson-Logit estimator only requires that µi =
E[yi|x1i], as this model belongs to the Linear Exponential Family (see, Papadopoulos, 2011a),
we can extend this model to account for possible over-dispersion, relaxing the strong assump-
tion that both the conditional mean and variance of yi are equal to µi. This approach is
quite popular as in many empirical applications it is high likely that E(yi|xi) < V ar(yi|xi).
The standard way to do this is by adding an unobservable individual effect υi = e
i which
will account for extra unobserved heterogeneity. Now, conditionally on xi and υi, yi has a
Poisson distribution with parameter µiυi. Under the usual assumption that υi has a gamma
distribution with unit mean and variance αi, the distribution of yi conditional on xi only,
after integrating out the unobservable individual effect, is negative-binomial with mean µi
and variance ωi = µi +αiµ
2
i . If the variance of υi is constant (homoscedastic), we obtain the
Negative Binomial 2-Logit (NB2-Logit) with variance, ωi = µi + αµ
2
i .
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The log-likelihood of the NB2-Logit is the following,
lnL (α, β, γ) =
n∑
i=1
(
ln
(
Γ(yi + α
−1)
Γ(yi + 1)Γ(α−1)
)
−(α−1+yi) ln(1+αµi)+yi(lnµi+lnα).
)
(2.22)
Maximization of (2.22) will yield consistent estimates for (α, β, γ), given correct specification
of the model, that is, the true DGP is NB2-Logit.1 As Papadopoulos and Santos Silva (2008)
show, the conditions required for identification of this model are exactly the same as the one’s
required for the Poisson-Logit model (for more details see, Section 2.8.1, or Papadopoulos
2011a). To provide evidence against equi-dispersion a Lagrange-multiplier (Score) test can
be performed since Poisson-Logit and NB2-Logit are nested, as can be shown that NB2-
Logit reduces to the Poisson-Logit when α goes to zero (see, Cameron and Trivedi, 1998,
or Winkelmann 2008 for a formal proof).2 Other possible NB-Logit models considering a
different functional form for the variance are presented in Appendix B. Finally, we need
to stress that similarly to the models for binary choice, models for count data with under-
reporting incorporated can also be generalized to take into account zero-inflation. These
models are also presented in Appendix B.
2.6 Data Set and Discussion of Variables
Before describing the details of the data set, it must be stressed that some effort has been
made to keep the sample size as large as possible. The reason behind this is twofold. First,
the econometric methods used in the empirical analysis are very demanding, as explained in
the previous section. Secondly, the variation of the dependent variable is very low, as 95% of
respondents reported no property crime. Therefore, larger samples will assist on estimating
the coefficients of interest more precisely.
To achieve the highest sample size possible, I exploit the sophisticated design of the
1Correct specification of the mean is not enough for consistency as the NB2-Logit is an LEF only for fixed
value of α. However, since α is subject to estimation, practically NB2-Logit is not an LFE and therefore,
misspecification of higher than the mean moments will lead to inconsistency. Therefore, we actually need to
assume the much stronger assumption that the data are generated by a NB2-Logit distribution.
2Note that both the likelihood-ratio and the Wald tests are not valid for testing the null that α = 0.
This is because these statistics have a limiting χ2 distribution only in the interior of all possible values of α.
However, under the null, α is on the boundary since it can only be positive. However, the Score test is valid
even if we want to test α on the boundary. For details, see, Wooldridge (2010).
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OCJS that makes use of “boost” samples. There are three independent samples in the
OJCS; the core sample (10-65 year olds, 58%), the youth-boost sample (10-25 year olds,
27%), and the nonwhite-boost sample (non-white individuals, 10-65 years old, 15%).1 Each
sample is accompanied by its (sampling) weighting variable, which must be used to restore
the representative of each sample. I increase the sample size by around 5,000 individuals by
adding these three samples together. However, to re-establish representativeness, a weighting
variable that combines the three separate weights is used.2 A tabulation by sample type
follows in Table 2.4. Thus, the resulting data set I use in my empirical investigation consists
of 11,658 individuals, 5,604 males and 6,054 females, between 10 and 65 years old.3
Concerning the dependent variable, as explained before, this paper focuses on property
crime which consists of: thefts and attempted vehicle thefts, thefts and attempted thefts
of parts from inside or outside vehicles, domestic and commercial robbery, domestic and
commercial burglary, thefts from person, thefts from work, thefts from school, thefts from
shops, other thefts, and criminal damage of cars or other objects. The information on
property crime can be either used to construct a dichotomous variable which takes the value
one if someone has committed a property crime during the year prior to the interview,
or a count variable measuring the number of property crimes during the same specified
period. The latter will be used for robustness analysis only, as the large number of zeroes
complicates the estimation of count data models.4 The observed distribution of the property
1Criminal behaviour of people between 10 and 25 years old is the primary interest of the OJCS. The
subsequent OJCSs of 2004, 2005 and 2006 include only 10-25 years old individuals. Some of them are
included in all OJCSs constituting a panel. The percentages in the parentheses of Table 2.4 denote the
fraction of people of each sub-sample to the total sample size. This is the total sample size I use in my
analysis and not the initial total sample size of the unrefined OJCS.
2This weighting variable was kindly provided by the Home Office. A detailed analysis of the construction
of the combined weighting variable is given in the Appendix F of Hamlyn and Hales (2003).
3We need to note that by using individuals from 10 to 65 years old, we include students, retirees and
people not in the labour force such as house keepers. Therefore, there is a departure from the economic
model of crime which is designed for people in the labour force. However, these groups could somehow fit
in the model as we can think that students are looking at their future legal opportunities, housekeepers are
considering the household income, and retirees receive a legal stream of pensions. Anyhow, in the empirical
analysis we try to formulate and estimate the behaviour towards property crime for the whole population.
This was inevitable, as limiting the sample only to individuals in the labour force reduces the sample size at
a point where obtaining sensible results seems impossible (at least for the models with under-reporting and
misclassification).
4Alternatively, one could use the variable “ever committed a property crime” which increases the per-
centage of positives to around 30%. However, this is not an appropriate variable to use because of two
reasons. Firstly, the possibility of response error would be much higher if we considered the whole lifespan
of an individual, since this is a retrospective survey. Secondly, some crimes that immigrants report are
committed long before the decision of an immigrant to immigrate in the host country.
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crime variable is given in Table 2.5. We observe that 94% is concentrated in 0 crimes, 5.5%
is concentrated between 1 and 14 crimes, and the rest 0.5% is spread from 15 up to 225
crimes. Using the sampling weights, we find that the unconditional mean is 0.34 crimes
per person, whereas the unconditional variance is 34.32. Therefore, the raw data suggest
that there is over-dispersion, which indicates that Negative Binomial models may provide a
better fit to the data. Moreover, notice that the sample size differs between the count and
the binary form of the variable. This is because some respondents who reported a crime were
reluctant to report the number of crimes they committed. Consequently, these observations
are recorded as missing cases, leading in further reduction in the variation of the dependent
variable.
Information about violent crime is also available.1 Although violent crime is not the main
subject of this paper, a few empirical results of violent crime are presented in subsection 2.8.2.
Moreover, it would be possible to separate crime in more types (such as burglary, robbery,
criminal damage, vehicle thefts, other thefts, etc). The large number of zeros, however, does
not allow to use these crime types separately.
Although many respondents’ characteristics are available, only controls for basic demo-
graphic characteristics, such as age, gender, regions and ethnic background are considered
in the empirical investigation. This followed strategy is attributed mainly to two reasons.
Firstly, the main target of this study is to identify whether immigrants’ criminal behaviour
(mainly for property crime) would be different from natives’ one if immigrants and natives
shared the same basic demographic characteristics. Of course, it would be interesting to
explore the behaviour of the impact of immigration on criminal behaviour once other con-
trols such as education, working status, parental characteristics, marital status, risk factors,
etc, are included. However, most of these variables are derived from questions that involve
only people older than 17 years old, which results in reducing the sample by around 2,500
individuals. Moreover, some other variables, such as risk factors, contain many missing cases
which would reduce the sample size even more.2 Thus, the reduction in the sample size is
1Violent crime consists of: assaults with and without injuries, and commercial and personal robberies.
Notice that both property and violent crime include robberies. However, also note that only 9 individuals
reported a robbery.
2Some of the independent variables include many missing values, ranging from 180 to 424 cases. Dropping
all these missing cases would result in losing around 1,300 extra cases. Instead, dummy variables, which take
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the second reason why these controls are not used. Actually, the empirical investigation
showed that when the estimators that control for misreporting are used, the variation of
the reduced sample does not allow identification of the parameters of interest.1 Instead, an
“open” discussion will try to identify the factors that result in potential estimated crime
differentials between immigrants and natives.
Proceeding now to the independent variables, it would be proper to first discuss the main
regressor, a dummy that indicates whether someone is an immigrant or a native. While it is
common in empirical studies to define an immigrant as the person who is not born in the host
country, a question for country of birth is not available in the questionnaire. The question
used to construct immigration status is the following: “Can I just check how long have you
lived in the United Kingdom?” Respondents that replied with “All my life” are considered
as natives. Otherwise, they are classified as immigrants.2 A limitation of this construction is
that there can be some natives who had left UK but returned after a certain period of time.
These people may have categorized themselves as living in the UK less than their whole life,
therefore as “immigrants”, although they should be considered as natives, particularly if the
period of staying outside the UK was very small. People born in the UK but lived most
of their life in another country would exhibit very common characteristics with immigrants.
Thus, it would not be very unreasonable to place them in the same group with actual
immigrants. Nevertheless, I would not expect this number to be large enough, as according
to the core sample, the weighted percentage of people who did not live in the UK their whole
life is 9.2%, which is quite close to the percentage of immigrants in the UK from other sources
in 2003.3 Although in the initial core sample only 729 immigrants appear, I have increased
their number to around 2,000, by exploiting the youth-boost and most importantly the
the value one if the associated variable has a missing value could be constructed and used together with the
“parent” variable. However, the use of these variables seemed impossible, since in most cases the variation
between the regressand and these “missing” variables is very low.
1Actually, to achieve convergence we had to impose many exclusion restrictions from both processes,
which led to bad misspecification of the models, since some of the excluded variables actually belong to the
two processes. Thus, using these models would not be enough to shed light on the question of interest, and
possibly it would result in misleading conclusions.
2Respondents had to choose among the following alternatives: 1) Less than 12 months, 2) More than 12
months but less than 2 years, 3) More than 2 years but less than 5 years, 4) more than 5 years but less than
10 years, 5) 10 years or more but not the whole life, and 6) All of his/her life.
3For instance, according to the OECD estimates, the proportion of foreign born population in the total
population in the UK was 8.8% in 2003 and 9.3% in 2004.
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nonwhite-boost. This has been done mostly to increase precision of “immigrant” estimates.
To restore representativeness, as described shortly before, a combined weighting variable of
the weights of the three distinct data sets is used.
In the remainder of this section a description of the other covariates that are used in
the regression analysis is presented. These variables involve very basic characteristics of
the population, such as age, gender, and region of residence. Descriptive statistics of the
independent and the dependent variables can be found in Table 2.6.
It is well known in criminologists’ research that age is closely linked to criminal be-
haviour (see, for example, Farrington, 1986). Most evidence suggests that crime peaks in
the teenage years and then falls steadily. Therefore, higher powers for the “age” variable
should be also used. Gender is another very significant determinant of crime as men’s crime
rates are universally much higher than women’s ones (see, for example, Steffensmeier and
Allan, 1996). Thus, a dummy distinguishing men from women is used. Finally, controlling
for the region where the respondent lives seems to be quite important to capture regional
unobserved characteristics associated with crime (see, for example, Glaeser and Sacerdote,
1999), such as high poverty rates, or high unemployment rates. Moreover, different areas
may be associated with higher returns to illegal acts, or, lower probabilities of arrest. Using
the standard regional variable, ten regional dummies have been constructed. Nonetheless,
the very demanding econometric models require the grouping of regions into four groups.
These are North (North, York, North West), Midlands (East, West, and Wales), and South
(East Anglia, South East and South West). London will be the baseline group.
In a second specification also ethnic background is added. Criminologists have devoted
much research on how different ethnic groups relate to different criminal behaviour (see,
for example, Torny, 1997). Most of them find that individuals from ethnic minorities are
disproportionately represented in official crime records.1 However, using self-reports the
opposite is found (see, for example, Sharp and Budd, 2005). The reasoning behind any
possible link between different ethnic groups and crime shares many arguments similar to
the link between immigration and crime. Since a higher fraction of immigrants come from
ethnic minorities compared to the native population, we would expect that inserting dummies
1It must be stressed that ethnic minorities are most of the times defined as non-white individuals.
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for ethnic groups would have a strong effect on the impact of immigration status on crime.1
Five dummies for ethnic groups are constructed. White or not, Black or not, Asian or not,
Mixed or not, and Other Ethnicity or not. As the proportion of people of other ethnicity is
very low, Other Ethnicity is grouped together with Asians. This does not seem inappropriate
as around 50% of people from other ethnic groups are Chinese.
Finally, I would like to devote a few lines to two “special” variables which will be also
used in the next sections. As described in Section 2.5 identification of count data models
requires at least one exclusion restriction on crime process, or a sign restriction on the re-
porting process. Although, as we will see at the next sections, there is no available a priori
information on any sign of the parameters in the reporting process, we can use some informa-
tion in the data set to impose an exclusion restriction on the crime process by constructing
a variable assumed to belong to the reporting process only. Note that, as was also described
in Section 2.5, the binary choice models are identified even without any exclusion restriction.
However, this extra information will be also used in binary choice models in order for the
analysis to be consistent across all models, and because it can also facilitate the estimation
procedure. However, as will be made clear in the subsection 2.8.4 the exclusion restriction
does not drive the binary models results. In the next two paragraphs two available options
are described.
Firstly, respondents have been asked whether they replied to the questions concerning
crime truthfully. Thus, a dummy variable of truthfulness can be generated. As will be
explained also later, it is reasonable to assume that this variable belongs only to the reporting
process, because can be considered as a characteristic that shapes the reporting behaviour.
Therefore, since this variable appears only in the reporting process, we technically have an
exclusion restriction on the crime process. This will help to distinguish the probability to
report a crime from the probability to commit a crime, even though reliability of responses
on this question is also doubtful.2
Secondly, although interviewers tried to provide a private environment while conducting
the interviews, in 32% of the cases (3,768 cases) there was someone else present during
1In the core sample, the fraction of immigrants to the total population of ethnic minorities is about 61%.
2It is noteworthy that 93% of the respondents replied that they truthfully answered all questions con-
cerning crime.
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the interview, mostly in the cases of young individuals. Even though crime questions in the
OCJS are self-completed in a computer (as opposed to face-to-face interviews), and although
it was stressed by the interviewers that nobody should disturb the interviewee during the self-
completion part, it is still possible that presence of someone else could affect the reporting
behaviour of the respondents. Therefore, a dummy is constructed that takes the value 1 if
someone else was present. Since there are 409 missing cases, I have also constructed a dummy
that takes the value one for these missing cases. Moreover, in the cases where someone else
was actually present during the self-completion part, there is the extra information whether
this other person actually looked at the screen (15% of the 3,768 cases). Thus, a dummy
variable is generated to capture the fact that the reporting behaviour might have been more
affected in the cases where someone else looked at the answers. More discussion of these
variables will follow in subsections 2.7.2 and 2.8.4.
2.7 Main Results
As discussed in Section 2.5, the main results follow from the binary choice variable, whether
or not someone has committed a crime last year, whereas the extra information from counts
is used for robustness checks.1 In this section, first the results of conventional models for
binary and count data are presented. The main findings of the binary models that allow for
misclassification probabilities follow in subsection 2.7.2. It must be stressed that throughout
the empirical analysis the appropriate sampling weights to restore representativeness of the
sample are used. This is mainly because there are different sampling probabilities for young
people (youth-boost) and ethnic minorities (ethnic-boost).2
1All the empirical analysis of this study is implemented in Statar and TSPr econometrics software.
2It must be stressed that in a stratified sample, which is the case in the current sample because of
different sampling probabilities for youth boost and ethnic boost groups relative to the core sample, if
the conditional expectation is correctly specifies, the unweighted MLE is still consistent and more efficient
than the weighted MLE (see, for example, Wooldridge, 2010). However, since weighted and unweighted
regressions yield different estimates across different models, it is more appropriate to use the sampling
weights. However, as will be discussed in subsection 2.8.3, the unweighted results of the covariate-dependent
Probit with misclassification are very similar to the weighted ones.
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2.7.1 Preliminary Results
To acquire a first idea of the impact of being an immigrant on crime, conventional Probit
results of regressing the crime variables on immigration status only are presented in Table
2.7.1 Even though this work focuses on property crime, in this table also results for all
the different categories of crime are presented in order for the reader to obtain a more
general idea. Assuming that there is no misreporting, this table clearly shows that being an
immigrant does decrease the probability of committing crimes for all categories. Table 2.8
portrays the results for the count form of these variables, using a Negative Binomial 2 model
(NB2). Not only are immigrants less likely to commit crimes but they also commit fewer
crimes. This is evident in these results, since taking into account the number of reported
crimes, immigration coefficient becomes even more statistically significant in all but drugs
related offences. As mentioned in the previous section, there are 54 extra missing cases in
the count form of property crime variable. However, this is not much of a concern since the
Probit results hardly change even when these missing cases are dropped.
As these models are nonlinear, interpretation requires the calculation of marginal effects.
Focusing on property crime, we find that being an immigrant reduces the probability of
committing a property offence in last year by 1.81 percentage points (from 5.68% to 3.87%),
a relative change of 46.78%. Regarding the NB2 model, this preliminary estimation says
that, without taking into account differences in demographic factors, an immigrant yearly
commits 0.160 crimes on average whereas a native commits 0.366 crimes, a difference of
0.206 crimes (a percentage increase of 128.75%).
Nonetheless, it would be more interesting to see whether immigrants exhibit different
criminal behaviour than otherwise comparable, in terms of basic demographic characteristics,
native-born individuals. Thus, in Tables 2.9 and 2.10 we look at this difference, once we
have controlled for fundamental demographical features such as gender, age and region of
residence in specification 1, and also for ethnicity in specifications 2 and 3. Although the
sign maintains, the statistical significance fades away in both binary and count models.2
1Although, Complementary Log-Log (CLogLog) models might be more appropriate when there are so
many zeroes, as it assumes an asymmetric cumulative function, the empirical results showed that nothing was
gained by using this model, in terms of better fit or any differences in the estimates. Moreover, specification
tests were not of support of using an asymmetric binary model such as the CLogLog.
2Although insignificant, it would be interesting to evaluate the magnitude of these coefficients once we
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Specifications 2 and 3 show that the coefficient on immigration dummy becomes even smaller
and less significant once we control for ethnicity. This is expected, since immigrants are
relatively more nonwhite than natives (see, Table 2.6) and, as the results show (without
controlling for under-reporting), white individuals are more crime-prone. However, in the
NB2 model the immigration status coefficient does not lose so much of its magnitude. Finally,
from specification 3 in both Tables 2.9 and 2.10 we can see that Asians & Others, and in a
lesser degree Blacks, are less prone to crime than otherwise comparable Whites.1
The above results are just a first indicator of the crime picture as we can hardly draw
inference for the actual crime relying on the reporting crime, unless there is no under-
reporting. According to these results we are only confident to say that for some reasons
immigrants report less crime than natives, but this difference fades away once we control
for some basic characteristic. However, someone would argue that this difference exists
because immigrants may under-report criminal activities by more than natives. If this is the
case, immigrants may still commit more crimes than natives but at the same time under-
report by more, resulting in this negative coefficient. This can also be argued for the case
of white individuals if the groups of ethnic minorities are reluctant to report truthfully.
Nevertheless, more appropriate (yet, parametric) models that control for this possibility,
resulting in estimated coefficients corresponding to the actual crime, are presented in the
following subsection.
2.7.2 Probit Model that allows for Misclassification
2.7.2.1 Constant Misclassification
In this subsection the results of the MisProbit model are presented. As discussed in Section
2.5.1, this is a parametric model that takes into account both under-reporting (misclassifica-
have constructed a “representative” individual. Thus, what would be the difference in the probability of
committing a property crime between a native and an immigrant, who are both 25 years old, males, and live
in London? According to this model this is -1.95 percentage points but statistically insignificant, a relative
effect of 26.37%. The NB2 model says that being an immigrant, holding all other characteristics constant,
reduces the expected number of crime by 0.12, which is statistically insignificant as well.
1Note that the variable ‘age’ and its quadratic do not provide a very good fit. To obtain the pattern
of the impact of age on property crime we need to include up to the fourth power of age. Following this,
immigration dummy’s effect becomes slightly more significant. Here, we present only the quadratic term in
order to be in line with the specifications we use in the models that control for misreporting.
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tion of one as zero) and over-reporting (misclassification of zero as one). This model captures
the actual probability of committing a crime, but it will be misspecified if probabilities of
misclassification do depend on covariates. Although it may be sensible for over-reporting to
be considered as constant, since we can assume that people may over-report randomly, it
cannot be the case for under-reporting. It is highly possible that the same characteristics
affect both the probability of committing a crime and the probability of reporting it. The
assumption of constant misclassification will be relaxed in the next subsection.
Table 2.11 presents the results of MisProbit in three specifications, as in the previous
subsection. There are a few important findings that deserve some discussion. To start with,
we notice that in the 1st specification, being an immigrant still decreases the probability of
committing a crime. However, this coefficient is even less significant than the conventional
Probit. We can also see that this coefficient turns positive once we control for ethnicity but
it is always very statistically insignificant.
It is also very important to stress the estimated value of misclassification of one as zero,
which is around 81% and statistically significant at any level of significance. This seems very
large, as this estimate indicates that 81% of people have committed crimes but have reported
none of them. However, as emphasized in the previous section, we must be cautious with the
interpretation of this probability as this model cannot distinguish the probability of under-
reporting from the probability of never committing a crime and therefore never reporting
one (zero-inflation). Nevertheless, nothing can be said about the importance of each, unless
we model it somehow into the likelihood function.1 In any way, the interpretation of the
coefficients does not change, which still capture true crime given that misclassification is
constant. Concerning the probability of misclassification of zero as one, it has a clear-cut
interpretation as probability of over-reporting, since interpretation as one-inflation seems
unreasonable.2 Moreover, the estimated value of this probability of 0.012 is also expected,
1Such a model together with results is presented in Appendix A. Although it seems that identification of
this model requires the same conditions as the simple MisProbit, it does not behave very well in estimation
terms and consequently its results are questionable. This may be a consequence of the very noisy (crime
self-reported) data used in this paper. Future research using less noisy data and larger/richer samples could
reveal more interesting things about the behaviour of this model. Also, further theoretical investigation of
this model could reveal interesting outcomes. Also, the parametric assumptions of this model may be too
strong to give reasonable estimates.
2In this context, one-inflation would mean that: given the set of covariates xi some people always commit
and always report that they have committed crimes independent of these xi.
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as we would not expect that people would report crimes that they did not commit. However,
we cannot ignore it since it is very statistically significant.
Moreover, as was also discussed in Section 2.5.1, although the sample size is fairly large,
the estimates are very imprecise perhaps because of the noisy nature of crime self-reports.1
The only coefficients that preserve some of their significance are the coefficients on gender
and ethnicity. We also notice that although less imprecise, the coefficients are quite larger
in size. Furthermore, the average conditional probability of committing a crime calculated
as ̂Pr(yi = 1) =
∑n
i=1 Φ(x
′
iβˆ)/n, is now around 29%. This is much higher than the predicted
average probability of the simple Probit model, which is calculated to be 6%. More discussion
on this finding will follow in the next subsection.
It can be also noticed that the maximum of the MisProbit model corresponds to a log
likelihood value that is only slightly larger than the log likelihood of the conventional Probit,
even though two extra statistically significant parameters are added into the model. This
can be attributed to the fact that the estimated coefficients of the MisProbit model are less
precise in comparison to Probit.
2.7.2.2 Allowing Misclassification of 1 as 0 to depend on Regressors
As opposed to the previous subsection, this subsection presents the results of a MisProbit
model in which misclassification of true ones as zeroes (under-reporting) is allowed to depend
on regressors, whereas misclassification of true zeroes as ones (over-reporting) is assumed to
be constant.2 Since the same individual is responsible for both actions of committing and
reporting a crime, logically both processes are functions of the same variables.3 However,
1Note also, that if misreporting exists, the standard Probit model overestimates the asymptotic t-
statistics. As Hausman, Abrevaya and Scott-Morton (1998) point out, the higher the misclassification
probabilities, the more difficult it is to obtain a good fit. However, the estimated variance will correspond
to the true precision, given of course that misclassification is constant.
2Treating over-reporting as constant helps identifying all the parameters of interest. Although constant
over-reporting is a sensible assumption to make, there might still be cases where this probability depends
on the regressors. Nevertheless, the estimation analysis showed that identifying all coefficients of a fully
specified model (a model that includes the same regressors in both probabilities of misclassification) seemed
impossible. The estimation analysis also showed that it is feasible to identify all parameters of a model where
there are extra exclusion restrictions from the reporting process (these results are available upon request).
However, this practice would result in a mispecified model, since many variables that actually belong to the
reporting process are excluded.
3For instance, age affects both the probability to commit a crime, as younger people commit more crimes
in general, and the probability to report a crime, as younger individuals would be less willing to reveal their
true criminal behaviour. Similar arguments hold for the other independent variables.
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as mentioned in Section 2.5, exclusion restrictions would assist the estimation procedure,
even though this model is identified even without any exclusions (see, Hausman, Abrevaya
and Scott-Morton, 1998). To be consistent with the NB2-Logit model which is used as a
robustness check (see, subsection 2.8.1), an exclusion restriction on the crime process is used,
as this is crucial for the identification of the NB2-Logit.1 The exclusion must be “strong”, in
the sense that the variable which is excluded from the crime process must have a significant
effect on the reporting process. Otherwise, inserting variables that have no effect on the
reporting part, and at the same time are correlated with the rest of the variables in this
part, could result in undesirable outcomes. As described in the previous section, some
information in the data set can be used to construct two variables that are assumed to affect
only the reporting process.
A first choice would be to use the information whether someone else was present during
the self-completion part. There is evidence, at least for face-to-face interviews (see, for ex-
ample, Aquilino, 1993) that someone else’s presence during responding to sensitive questions
affects the reporting behaviour. However, since the questions about crime were (computer-
based) self-completed, which is a much more private environment, the effect of this dummy
could be much smaller than in face-to-face interviews. Indeed, as the results show (see,
subsection 2.8.4), this turns to be a “weak” restriction.
In another direction, the variable “truthfulness” can be exploited, a dummy that takes
the value one if people said that responded in all questions concerning crime truthfully. This
variable is used only in the reporting process, as it makes sense to assume that whether or
not someone has truthfully reported his/her actual criminal activity at the time of the survey
could not affect the action of committing a crime before the survey took place. If any empir-
ical relationship exists, this would be because “truthfulness” is correlated with unobserved
characteristics correlated with crime, or because there is a reverse causality of committed
crimes on “truthfulness”.2 The problem is that it is also not correct to assume that “truthful-
1Note that exclusion restrictions on the reporting process does not solve the identification problem (see,
Papadopoulos and Santos Silva, 2008)
2For example, the probability to answer “I was truthful” would be higher for people who commit more
crimes but report fewer, if this was a way to hide misreporting. Or, it might be that, it is less possible for
people who commit no crimes to say that they are not truthful, as there is no reason for them to lie. In both
cases we would expect a negative relationship between reported crime and “truthfulness”. In fact, a weighted
Probit regression of “trufulness” on number of reported property crimes, showed that this is actually the
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ness” actually affects the reporting behaviour, unless the reported “truthfulness” coincides
with the actual behavioural characteristic of how truthful someone is. However, what we
assume here is that being “truthful” while answering questions about crime is a feature that
“shapes” some behavioural attributes, which in turn affects the reporting behaviour. In
any way, as will be discussed also later, the results show that “truthfulness” actually has
a very significant effect on the reporting process but no effect on the crime process, once
“truthfulness” is included in both processes.1
According to all the above, the main results of this section are based on the specification
where “truthfulness” affects only the reporting process. In the robustness check section
it will be shown that this exclusion restriction does not drive the results. Some results of
using “other’s presence” as an exclusion restriction are also presented in the robustness check
section. There, we will also see that the inclusion of this dummy has some undesirable effects
on the estimation of the model. As we discussed in the previous section a dummy “someone
looked at the screen during the self completion part” can be also constructed. The results
also show that this information is unrelated to the probability of not reporting committed
crimes.2
The results of this model are depicted in Table 2.12. The estimated coefficients of the
crime process are reported in the upper part of this table, whereas the coefficients of the
“reporting” process are presented in the lower part. Before discussing the effect of the
immigration dummy, I would like to mention some main features of the findings of this
model. First of all, the log likelihood corresponding to the global maximum is considerably
improved comparing to the previous model. Since the covariate-dependent MisProbit model
nests the MisProbit with constant misclassification (when all coefficients but the constant
of the “reporting process” are zero), we can construct a likelihood ratio test to test whether
misclassifying one as zero is constant. Since the likelihood ratio statistics is around 49 for all
three specifications, there is strong evidence against the null hypothesis that misclassification
case.
1This is true for both binary choice, and count data models. If “truthfulness” is included only in the
crime process, it has a small but statistically significant effect.
2This dummy has no effect either using it as an interaction term (so that conditional on the presence of
someone else there is no effect of some of them looking at the screen), or using it alone without controlling
for the cases where someone was present but did not look at the screen.
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of one as zero is constant.1
According to this models, the predicted average probability of committing a property
crime during the last period, calculated as
∑n
i=1 Φ(x
′
iβˆ)/n, is around 29%, which is in line
with the result of the previous subsection.2 However, notice that if we accept the interpreta-
tion of misclassification of 1 as 0 as zero-inflation, this is actually the predicted probability
of committing a crime only for those that participate in the binary choice model. Moreover,
the average probability of misclassifying an one as zero, calculated now as
∑n
i=1 Φ(z
′
iγˆ)/n,
is now 10 percentage points lower than the estimate of the Probit model with constant mis-
classification. Finally, notice that the coefficient of over-reporting is again around 1.3% and
statistically significant at 1%.
Concerning the main objective of this research work, this table shows that even after con-
trolling for any potential difference in the reporting behaviour of immigrants, the coefficient
on immigration status is still negative and fairly larger than before. In the 1st specification
this coefficient doubles in size, comparing to the previous model, and becomes statistically
significant at 10% significance level. However, after controlling for ethnicity, although still
negative and fairly large, it becomes insignificant. Finally, from all three specifications we
can say that being the “representative” individual and immigrant, reduces the probability of
committing a property crime by around 6 percentage points, before controlling for ethnicity,
and around 4 percentage points, after controlling for ethnicity.3
The reason why immigration status coefficient becomes larger in magnitude can be at-
tributed to the fact that native-born individuals in fact under-report by more than immi-
grants, and not the opposite. However, as mentioned before, the coefficients on the reporting
behaviour can also take a zero-inflation interpretation. Therefore, the negative coefficient
might also mean that a smaller proportion of immigrants belong to the group of genuine
1A Wald test that all coefficients of the “reporting” process but the constant are zero gives similar results.
2Note that, although the estimates of the BCS are not directly comparable to the ones from the OCJS,
we have estimated that the probability of suffering a crime in 2008 was around 0.235. Notice finally, that
in BCS commercial crimes and crimes against children are not included. Also note that crime rates were
slightly higher in 2003 according to both recorded to the police crime and the BCS (see, Kershaw at al,
2008).
3The predicted probabilities to commit a crime for the “representative” individual are 4.27%, and 9.87%,
for an immigrant and a native, respectively. This corresponds to the marginal effect of 5.6 percentage
points, and relative effect of 131.14%. After controlling for ethnicity the above figures become ≈ 6%, 10%,
4 percentage points and 66.7%, respectively.
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non-criminals. These two interpretations contradict each other but we cannot say which
effect is larger. If the “reporting” process was measuring only under-reporting, it would be
easier to analyze what would be the direction of the change in crime process coefficients once
we control for the corresponding characteristics in the “reporting” process. Thus, if immi-
grants under-report by less, this would result in the coefficient of crime process to become
more negative. However, the effects of changing the portion of zero-inflation on the crime
process coefficients are not clear. According to this interpretation, a positive coefficient for
immigration status would just mean that fewer immigrants comparing to natives participate
in the binary choice decision of committing crimes or not. Thus, it does not give information
about how the remaining individuals, who may or may not commit crimes, behave. In any
case, we must say that the total effect of controlling for under-reporting on the coefficients of
the crime process is not easy to predict, since this will depend on all inter-correlations of the
variables across the two processes and all variables within a process. However, notice that
the coefficient of immigration status on the reporting process is statistically insignificant in
all specifications.
It would be also interesting to briefly discuss the effects of the other explanatory variables.
To begin with, it is notable that being a white individual still increases the probability of
committing a crime. However, this effect is only significant at 10% significance level. From
the 3rd specification, we notice that black individuals’ coefficient is negative and significant
at 10%, in contrast to the previous model where it was very insignificant. On the other
hand, the coefficient on “Asian & Others” dummy is still negative but now insignificant.
Concerning gender, the sign on “male” dummy is still the expected one since males
commit more crimes than females. Males’ coefficient is still significant at 1% significance
level, even though the sign in the reporting process is negative and significant at 10%. This
negative sign indicates that females are more reluctant to report their criminal activities
truthfully, perhaps because of “embarrassment” effects.1 However, this may also indicate
that it is more likely for a female to belong to the genuine non criminal group of people,
which is also reasonable.
The results of the regional dummies are also interesting. First of all, including these
1It is relatively less acceptable by the society if a woman commits a crime.
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dummies in the reporting process, we control for area-specific unobserved characteristics
that may affect the decision to misclassify. We see that people who do not live in London
commit more crime. Comparing to the previous models, the magnitude and significance of
these three coefficients increase. Nevertheless, only people living in North England seem to
commit significantly more crime (but just in 10%). This change may be attributed to the
significant effect that this dummy has on the reporting process.
Furthermore, we can see that both “age” and “age squared” have a significant effect in
both processes. Concerning the crime process, the negative sign on age and the positive sign
on age squared variables indicate that crime falls with age but in a decreasing rate. A quick
calculation using the coefficients in Table 2.12 show that the minimum is reached at about
42 years of age. We must notice that these results do not coincide with the theoretical views
of the effect of age on crime, where crime increases with age during the adolescence years and
then steadily falls. Although for conventional Probit this shape is captured once a quartic
on age is included, for covariate-depended MisProbit, including higher powers of age does
not provide a better fit.1 The coefficients of age and age2 variables in the reporting process
are also negative and positive respectively. This also predicts that people under-report by
less as they are getting older at a decreasing rate (or that they are increasingly likely to
switch to the category of potential criminals).
Special attention must be finally paid to the effect of the “truthfulness” dummy. As
mentioned before, this dummy belongs only to the reporting process.2 Table 2.12 shows
that this dummy has the largest coefficient among all the regressors in the reporting part.
It is also statistically significant at 1% significance level. This coefficient can be interpreted
in two contradictory ways. Respondents who replied that they answer all crime questions
truthfully are honest people who, regardless the other observed characteristics, never commit
and never report crimes. On the other hand, this coefficient may also indicate that “truthful”
1Regressions that include up to the 5th power of “age” have been performed. Including more powers,
results in no convergence of the optimization procedure.
2The estimation results, when “truthfulness” is also included in both processes of the covariate-dependent
MisProbit model, show that this dummy has no effect in the crime process. The rest of the estimates are
virtually unchanged. Thus, these results also support the theoretical assumption that “truthfulness” should
not be included in the crime process. However, even if there was an effect, this would be misleading since a
significant effect would just capture unobserved characteristics that are both correlated with crime and how
truthful someone is.
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respondents are people that under-report by more than “non truthful” respondents, so that
they commit more crime than what they actually report.
2.8 Robustness Checks
2.8.1 Count Data Models
In this section we examine whether the results of modified count data models that take
into account under-reporting coincide with the main findings of the MisProbit. Of course
these two models are not directly comparable, since the count data models use the extra
information of the number of property crimes. Nevertheless, similar estimates between the
count and the binary models used in the present study, mostly with respect to the reporting
process, would strengthen the reliability of the results of the main analysis. As described
in Section 2.6, the unconditional variance of the dependent variable is much larger than the
unconditional mean. This is a first rough but strong indicator against the equi-dispersion
assumption of the Poisson distribution that the mean equals the variance. Therefore the
NB2 distribution, that allows for over-dispersion by using an extra parameter that accounts
for extra unobserved heterogeneity, may provide a better fit to the data. Table 2.13 portrays
the results of three NB2 models. The 1st column reproduces the results of the simple NB2
model for the sake of comparisons. The 2nd model, which is the NB2-Logit, controls for
under-reporting, while the 3rd one also incorporates Zero-Inflation.1
Regarding the NB2-Logit model, Papadopoulos and Santos Silva (2008) showed that
unless exclusion restrictions are imposed on the count part, there are two linearly dependent
sets of parameters that correspond to the same maximum likelihood value. Consequently,
the model is unidentified since it cannot be said which set of estimated parameters is the
“correct” one. Although sign restrictions in the reporting part is a possible solution, here
there is not any a priori information to suggest the sign of any of the parameters of the
reporting process. Therefore, in line with the binary choice models, to identify all the
parameters of the model the “truthfulness” dummy is used in the reporting process only. In
1The formulation, the density, and the log likelihood function of the ZI-NB2-Logit is presented in Ap-
pendix B.
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subsection 2.8.4 we will show the consequences of excluding the dummy “other present” from
the crime process. However, we must be very cautious since, although the model is globally
identified, there can still exist more than one maxima. Therefore, a thorough analysis must
be performed to find all possible maxima.1 Also notice that this model does not control for
over-reporting, differing in this aspect from binary choice models. However, the covariate-
dependent MisProbit gives very similar results even when the probability of over-reporting is
assumed to be zero.2 It is also important to stress that the structure of this model provides
more information about the data generating process than the binary choice model. The
binary models only provide information about reporting or not crimes, regardless of how
many crimes someone has committed. This model on the other hand, provides estimates for
the probability of any given committed crime to be reported.3
The regression analysis showed that the global maximum of the NB2-Logit is the one
depicted in Table 2.13.4 The upper part of this table presents the coefficients of the crime, or
differently, count process. The lower part presents the coefficients of the reporting process,
which is the probability of reporting a committed crime. First of all, the very large value of
α must be noticed, which is statistical significant in any significance level.5 Therefore, there
is evidence that the data are over-dispersed even after conditioning on the set of regressors.
Concerning the immigration status coefficient in the crime process, we can see that
even after controlling for under-reporting, it is negative and even larger in value than the
conventional NB2 model. This is the consequence of immigrants’ coefficient in the reporting
process being positive. That is, being an immigrant increases the probability of reporting a
given crime and therefore decreases the conditional expectation of crime by more than the
1Some tips on several possible ways to find the best maximum are described in Papadopoulos and Santos
Silva (2008). In the present analysis, the regression analysis showed that several local maxima exist.
2These results are available upon request. This similarity of the coefficients across the two models was
expected, since the probability of over-reporting is too small to affect the parameters of the other processes.
3Although this probability is allowed to differ across individuals, it is assumed to be constant for all
committed crimes by individual i regardless of the number of committed crimes he/she has committed.
4The estimation analysis showed that another maximum exists with log likelihood value of 2,315.80. This
maximum corresponds to coefficients very different from the global maximum. These results are available
from the author upon request. As shown in Papadopoulos and Santos Silva (2008), there is a relationship
between the coefficients of the two models. A brief description of this relationship follows in subsection 2.8.4.
Although the log likelihood value of this local maximum is close to the log likelihood value of the global
maximum, the difference is sufficient to permit identification of the “correct” maximum depicted in Table
2.13. This is because the excluded variable “truthfulness” has a strong significant effect on the reporting
process. In subsection 2.8.4 we show what are the consequences of a “weak” exclusion restriction.
5The log likelihood of the corresponding global Poisson-Logit maximum is -9,132.31.
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conventional NB2 model. This finding is consistent with the binary models. In addition, in
line with the binary models, the coefficient of immigration dummy is insignificant in both
processes. I would like to mention that in NB2-Logit, contrary to the covariate-dependent
MisProbit, the immigration status coefficient does not depend on whether or not we control
for ethnicity. This is the reason why only the model that controls for ethnicity is presented
in this subsection. Finally, the marginal effect of our “representative” individual says that
being an immigrant decreases the expected number of crimes by around 0.19 crimes (this
difference was 0.11 for the simple NB2 model).1
As far as the rest of the coefficients in the crime process is concerned, their direction is
in accordance with the coefficients of the MisProbit model. However, we must stress that
the NB2-Logit models the conditional mean of crime events, whereas the MisProbit models
the conditional probability of committing a crime. Therefore, it is always possible that a
few differences exist across binary and count data models, even if both models are correctly
specified.2
As far as the reporting process is concerned, this model predicts that the average condi-
tional probability of reporting a committed crime is 43%. However, we need to distinguish
this probability from the probability of under-reporting in the binary models. The MisProbit
estimates the probability of reporting zero crimes given that some crimes have been com-
mitted (or the probability of never committing and consequently never reporting crimes),
whereas the NB2-Logit model estimates the probability of someone reporting a commit-
ted crime, regardless of the number of crimes he/she has committed (see also footnote 78).
Therefore, this model is in a sense more structural, since it also captures cases where people
under-report but still report some of their crimes. On the other hand, the binary model
ignores this kind of under-reporting since it can capture only reporting zero crimes. We can
see that most of the coefficients of the Logit (reporting) part in the NB2-Logit have opposite
signs to the ones of the under-reporting (zero-inflation) part of the MisProbit model. This
1The expected number of committed crimes by the “representative” individual are, 0.1771, and 0.3628,
for an immigrant and a native, respectively. This corresponds to the marginal effect of 0.19 crimes, and the
relative effect of 104.9%.
2For example, here the coefficient of “white” dummy is insignificant but it was significant at 10% signifi-
cance level in the MisProbit model. This might mean that although white people are more likely to commit
a property crime, they do not commit more crimes than nonwhite individuals, so that taking into account
the extra information of the counts reduces the white-nonwhite crime differential.
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is expected, since here we measure probability of reporting a committed crime, whereas in
MisProbit we were measuring probability of not reporting crimes.1
In the 3rd column, the results of the ZI-NB2-Logit model are presented. According to this
model, some people never report crimes just because they never commit crimes, or because
they do not report any of the committed crimes. Therefore, the zero-inflation probability,
in line with the MisProbit, gives the proportion of people that totally under-report or the
proportion of genuine non-criminals. The rest of the individuals may or may not commit
crimes, but their responses are still subject to under-reporting. In this sense, we assume that
not everyone is a potential criminal, so that not everyone participates in the choice whether or
not to commit crimes. In other words, the Logit part of this model measures the probability
of reporting a committed crime once we partial out people that always under-report with
zero, or people that never commit and consequently never report crimes.
Since identification of this model requires the same conditions as in NB2-Logit, the
exclusion restriction of “truthfulness” from the crime process is also followed. To model the
zero-inflation process I make use of the same variables I use to model the crime process.
The coefficients of the ZI-NB2-Logit model that correspond to the global maximum are
presented in the last column of Table 2.13.2 An interesting finding of this model is that the
conditional predicted probability of zero-inflation is around 62%. This is very close to what
the covariate-dependent MisProbit predicted. There, the same probability was calculated to
be around 71%.
This model also predicts that, even after controlling for zero-inflation, the probability
of reporting a committed crime is 37.6%, which is even lower than in NB2-Logit model.
According to this model, once we control for zero-inflation and under-reporting, immigrants’
coefficient decreases even more. However, it is still statistically insignificant as the preci-
sion of the estimate decreases. We can also notice that in ZI-NB2-Logit, males’ coefficient
1However, I would like to repeat that in MisProbit we could not separate zero-inflation from under-
reporting, and therefore exact comparison between the coefficients of the two models would not be appropri-
ate. Anyhow, the only striking difference is that the NB2-Logit model predicts that being a male decreases
the probability of reporting a given crime, while in the MisProbit being a male decrease the probability of
reporting no crimes, either because of misclassification or because of never committing and consequently
never reporting crimes.
2As was the case for NB2-Logit, the estimation analysis shows that, again, another maximum exists with
log likelihood value of 2,261.28. These results are available from the author upon request.
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becomes insignificant. More interestingly, the coefficient of “white” dummy turns negative.
This is perhaps because of the negative and statistically significant coefficient of this variable
on the zero-inflation process, which may mean that the probability of white individuals to
always under-report with zero is smaller than non-white persons. Finally, we notice that
people who live in South and in North commit more crimes than people who live in London
(significant at 5% and 1% respectively).
Since the “zero-inflation” process of the ZI-NB2-Logit has the same interpretation as
the “misclassification of one as zero” process of the covariate-dependent MisProbit, it would
be interesting to compare the corresponding coefficients of the two models. We notice that
apart from the coefficients on “age” variables, all other coefficients follow the same direction.
Furthermore, it can be observed that there are a few differences in the statistical significance
of some coefficients. Finally, the coefficients of the “reporting a committed crime” process
are relatively similar across the two NB2 models.
2.8.2 Violent Crime
In this subsection we briefly investigate what is the relationship between immigration and vi-
olent crime. Although violent crime is more impulsive, some of the reasons used in Section 2.2
can be also applied here to hypothesize a link between being an immigrant and committing
violent crimes. For example, according to Merton’s (1938) “strain theory” immigrants may
become violent due to accumulation pressure because of discrimination, or racist behaviour
against them by native population. On the other hand, a credible behaviour associated with
“no crime” would be a good path of integration in the host country. Furthermore, risk atti-
tudes and deterrent effects, which are very important in explaining the decision to commit
both property and violent crimes, might be different between immigrants and natives. Other
reasons that act in the one or the other direction can be thought of. Therefore, as was the
case with property crime, empirical investigation can offer more insights on this link.
The results, presented in Table 2.14, are obtained using the MisProbit model. The same
specification as the 2nd specification of Table 2.12 is used. In the 1st column the results
of property crime are reproduced, whereas in the 2nd column the violent crime results are
depicted. It is striking how close the results between the two models are, since apart from
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the coefficients of the regional dummies, all other coefficients are very similar.1 We can see
that the same basic demographical characteristics are good predictors of both violent crime
as well as property crime. Also, we can see that the probability of committing a violent
crime but not reporting it is lower than for property crime. Finally, separating ethnicity in
three groups as before, I find that now Asians & Others is the least crime-prone group.
Concerning the effect of the immigration dummy, it is again negative but slightly less
significant. Hence, immigrants are slightly more law-abiding than natives for both crime
types. This might be because immigrants are more risk averse, or because they are more
responsive to deterrent effects.
2.8.3 Weighted versus Unweighted Regressions of Property Crime
As mentioned at the beginning of Section 2.7, throughout the empirical research the ap-
propriate weights to restore representativeness of the sample are used. However, if the
conditional expectation is correctly specified, both weighted and unweighted estimators are
consistent, but the unweighted one is also more efficient (see, Wooldridge, 2010). Thus, if
the estimated parameters of the unweighted model are very close to the parameters of the
model that uses weights, there is some support of correct specification of the model.
According to my results, the weighted estimates are very different from the unweighted
estimates in the constant-misclassification MisProbit model.2 It is noteworthy, however, that
the coefficient values of the weighted estimates of the covariate-dependent MisProbit are very
close to the unweighted ones (see, last column of Table 2.14). Moreover, it is evident that
the coefficients of the unweighted regression are more precisely estimated. The only notable
difference is that in the unweighted estimation the effect of immigration is higher, in terms of
1The tetrachoric correlation coefficient (see, Edwards and Edwards, 1984) is 0.5760, so that it is not
the case that the results are too close just because the same people who committed property crimes also
committed violent crimes. In addition, notice that although both crimes include robberies, this type of
crime accounts only for a very small proportion of the total number of property or violent crimes (1.2% for
property crime and 1.1% for violence.
2Although the differences in the coefficients between conventional weighted Probit and unweighted Pro-
bit are smaller than the differences between weighted constant-misclassification MisProbit and unweighted
constant-misclassification MisProbit, this cannot be an argument that the conventional Probit model is a
better specified model than the MisProbit. This is because Probit is designed to capture reported crime
but MisProbit intends to capture actual crime. What these results might indicate, is that a Probit model is
probably a correct specification for reported crime, but constant-misclassification MisProbit is a misspecified
model for actual crime.
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magnitude, and statistically significant at 5%. This might be the case because the unweighted
estimator is more efficient, so that the immigration coefficient in the weighted estimation
is less precisely estimated. Furthermore, as we have included an ethnic-boost data set,
immigrant population is over-represented in my sample. Thus, using weights has as a result
to down-weigh the immigration sample, which may induce differences in immigration status
coefficient. Note also that among all variables used in these models the immigration dummy
is the variable with the most zeroes. Hence, down-weighing (over-weighing) a variable with a
low variation could result in higher differences between weighted and unweighted regressions,
than down-weighing (over-weighing) a variable with higher variation. For instance, we can
see that although the use of the weighting variable down-weighs young people (as we use a
youth-boost), the differences of the age variable coefficients are marginal. Finally, notice that
the biggest differences are observed in the coefficients of the variables that are insignificant
when we use weights, such as the coefficients of the regional dummies.
2.8.4 Are the Results Driven by the Exclusion Restriction of the
“Truthfulness” Dummy?
In this subsection I briefly intent to show that the main results are not driven by the use of the
exclusion restriction “truthfulness”. Indeed, the covariate-dependent MisProbit gives quite
similar results even without any exclusion restrictions. Moreover, we briefly examine the
consequences of using the dummy “other present” as an exclusion restriction, which seems
to be a rather weak restriction for property crime but a “strong” restriction for violent crime.
On the other hand, exclusion restrictions are necessary to identify both the NB2-Logit and
the ZI-NB2-Logit models. Therefore, also the results of using “other present” as a dummy
in count data models are discussed. It needs to be stressed that when the dummy “other
present” is used, as was explained in Section 2.6, a dummy for its missing cases must be also
included.
First of all, the results of the covariate-dependent MisProbit are discussed, which are
given in Table 2.15 for property crime and Table 2.16 for violent crime. The 1st specification
of Table 2.15 and Table 2.16 reproduces the 1st (for property crime) and 2nd (for violent
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crime) specifications of Table 2.14 respectively, where the variable “truthfulness” is used.
For both property and violent crime we can clearly see that the coefficients of the 2nd
specification, where there is no exclusion restriction, are fairly similar to the coefficients of
the 1st specification. Concerning the coefficient of main interest, we can see that for both
property and violent crimes, the probability for an immigrant to commit a crime slightly
increases, but it is still negative and similar in terms of significance. Thus, according to
these results, the use of “truthfulness” does not affect the main results of the model.
In specification 3 of Table 2.15, we look at the consequences of excluding “other present”
from the property crime process. It seems that this dummy has no effect on the reporting
process of property crime, therefore, the restriction is very “weak”. We can see that inclusion
of “other present” actually results in much less precise estimates for most of the parameters.1
Thus, not only has this dummy no effect on the probability to under-report, but its inter-
action with the other variables in the reporting process also worsens the general behaviour
of the model.2 Consequently, the effect of immigration status dummy, which is the case for
most variables, decreases in both magnitude and significance. However, it still retains its
sign. On the other hand, it occurs that “other present” has a significant positive effect (at
1% significance level) on the reporting behaviour of violent crime (it increases the probability
of misclassification of one as zero). Contrary to property crime, it is noteworthy that all
the estimates of this specification are very close to both the 1st and 2nd specifications of
Table 2.16, in terms of both precision and magnitude. Again, the magnitude of immigrants’
coefficient slightly decreases but so does the standard error, leaving significance almost unaf-
fected. Thus, all together, there is some evidence that the results of the covariate-dependent
MisProbit are robust in relation to the exclusion restriction, as long as this is a “strong”
restriction.
Regarding count data models, in Table 2.17 I present results of including “other present”
in the reporting process of NB2-Logit model to test whether the results of count data models
are also robust in relation to the exclusion restriction.3 The 1st column reproduces the results
1Note that, if the variable for the missing cases of “other present” is not included, the precision of the
estimates increases, although it is still worse than the other two specifications.
2If we include “other present” in the crime process as well, regardless of whether we include dummies
for the missing cases, we obtain much more precise estimates which are fairly close to the 2nd specification.
3Results of ZI-NB2-Logit, which are also available from the author on request, are very similar.
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of the 2nd column of Table 2.13 for the sake of comparisons. As can be seen from the 2nd
column, “other present” has again no effect on the probability of reporting a committed
property crime. However, in this case we must be very careful as another maximum very close
(in terms of the log likelihood value) to the global maximum exists that corresponds to very
different parameter estimates. This is presented in the 3rd column. As Papadopoulos and
Santos Silva (2008) show, it appears that there is a close relationship between the parameters
of the two maxima. Given that θ = (β, γ) is the set of true parameters of the model, where
β corresponds to the vector of parameters of true crime and γ to the vector of parameters of
the probability to report a committed crime, if the exclusion restriction is “weak”, another
maximum very close to the true one exists with parameter values θ˜ ' (−β, β + γ). The
stronger the exclusion, as for example the case for “truthfulness”, the easier it is to distinguish
the correct maximum and the higher the deviation of θ˜ from (−β, β + γ) becomes.1 Despite
the identification problem of this model, given that we accept that the correct maximum is
the one in column 2, it is clear that the estimated parameters are very similar whether we
use “truthfulness” or “other present” as an exclusion restriction. Once more, the coefficient
on immigration status slightly reduces in magnitude but it gains in precision, resulting in a
slightly higher p-value.
Note finally, that the dummy “someone else looking at the screen during the self comple-
tion part” has no effect neither in binary nor count data models for property crime, regardless
whether we use it alone, or when we use two dummies, “other present but did not look” and
“other present but looked”. However, both dummies have an equal, statistically significant
(at 5%) impact on violent crime.
Thus, according to the analysis of this subsection, the results from both binary and count
data models are not driven by the exclusion restriction of “truthfulness”.
To sum up, all the results of this section strengthen the relationship found in the main
results of subsection 2.7.2.2. That is, immigrants’ involvement in criminal activities is lower
than natives’ one. More robustness checks presented in Appendix C also agree with this
1Actually, there are cases where the model identifies as global maximum the “wrong” maximum, where
the parameters of the reporting process have the opposite from the expected sign. However, from the author’s
experience, this happens only in cases where the exclusion is very “weak”.
104
finding. Thus, although the main results indicate that this relationship is statistically in-
significant, this section (and the results of Appendix C) suggest that it is very robust.
2.9 Decomposition of Immigrants by Ethnicity and Re-
gions
Throughout the empirical analysis, a negative relationship between property crime and being
an immigrant has been observed, other things being equal. However, we have treated immi-
grants as a homogeneous group of people which is not realistic. Therefore, in this subsection
I decompose immigrants by ethnic groups and by region (by using interaction terms), to
investigate whether different groups of immigrants are different with regard to their criminal
behaviour. These results are presented in Table 2.18 where the covariate-dependent MisPro-
bit is used in all cases. Although this table presents only the estimates of the crime process,
the interaction terms are also inserted in the reporting process. Thus, as in all models so
far, there is only one exclusion restriction with the form of including “truthfulness” only in
the reporting part. Note that all the coefficients of the interaction terms in the reporting
process are statistically insignificant. All results are available from the author upon request.
Finally, I would like to stress that this subsection is used to illustrate the results of the
aforementioned decomposition, letting discussion be a part of the next section.
2.9.1 Interaction between Immigration and Ethnicity
It is a fact that immigrant population in England and Wales is very heterogeneous, as far as
the ethnicity is concerned. For example, there are black immigrants coming from Caribbean
or African countries, Asians from both the south and the east parts of Asia, and white
population from both Europe and the “old” Commonwealth of Nations, such as Australia
or Canada. Naturally, immigrants from different countries of origin have grown up with
different principles, in different socioeconomic conditions, so that they differ a great deal in
many aspects, both between each other and with respect to the native population. Thus,
their criminal behaviour may differ as well. Moreover, following the same reasoning, we might
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also expect that foreigners who belong to an ethnic group, for instance Asians, will exhibit
different behaviour than natives of the same ethnic group, as the latter are better adapted
in the British lifestyle. In this subsection I intend to investigate the above concepts by
decomposing immigrants in four groups, which are, ‘White immigrants’, ‘Black immigrants’,
‘Asian & Other immigrants’, and ‘Mixed immigrants’.1
First of all, comparing each group with the whole native population (regardless the
ethnicity of natives), we find that the probability to commit a crime is considerably smaller
for black immigrants (significant at 1%).2 Moreover, ‘Asians & Other’ immigrants also
commit less crime than natives, but it is significant only at 20% significance level. Finally,
the coefficients of the other two groups are also negative but very insignificant. From the
above, it seems that there are differences in the criminal behaviour among the immigrant
groups. However, the only statistically significant difference is between black immigrants
and white immigrants (at 10%).
Next, we investigate whether there are differences in criminal activity between each group
of immigrants and their native counterparts. For this purpose, three interaction terms are
used, and the results are presented in the 1st specification of Table 2.18.a. From this table it
seems that black immigrants commit less crime than black natives. Moreover, according to
these results there is no difference in crime between the other three immigrant groups and
their native counterparts. Although the interaction term “black & immigrant” is statistical
insignificant, redefining the dummies by disaggregating the population in eight groups (see,
Table 2.18.b) we find that black immigrants commit significantly (at 5% significance level)
less crime than black natives. We also find that this is the least crime-prone group. They
commit significantly less crime than all other groups but ‘Asians & Others’ and ‘Mixed’
immigrants. This is quite interesting since the involvement of black natives in criminal
activities is not different than the involvement of all other groups. We can conclude that,
due to some unobservable characteristics, black immigrants are less crime-prone than black,
1It would be better if there was a disaggregation of immigrant population in more groups, since, for
example, black immigrants from Caribbean would be different from black immigrants from Africa. The data
set actually includes a derived variable that separates immigrants in 15 groups. However, the use of this
variable would be impossible, because there is not enough variation between these groups and the dependent
variable to identify the parameters of interest.
2These results are also not presented but they are available upon request.
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white, and mixed natives.
Finally, note that interaction terms between immigration status and ethnic groups for
violent crime show that the effect of being an immigrant on violent crime does not differ
among the different ethnicities.
2.9.2 Interaction between Immigration and Region
As mentioned in the introduction, location of immigrants is not randomly assigned. Differ-
ent locations may attract different types of immigrants, or, immigrants located in different
places may face different conditions, which in turn may affect their criminal activity. In this
subsection interaction terms between regional dummies and immigration status are used.
The results are shown in the 2nd specification of Table 2.18.a.
From this table there are two things that merit some discussion. Firstly, we can notice
that immigrants located in London are much less involved in criminal activities than na-
tives located in London (since this is what the coefficient of the dummy “immigrant” now
captures). This difference is significant at 1% level of significance. Also, we notice that
immigrants who live in South England commit considerably more crime than immigrants of
London. This relationship is much clearer in Table 2.18.c, where we redefine the popula-
tion in eight groups according to the immigration status and the region of residence. It is
clear that immigrants of London are the least crime-prone group. Apart from immigrants
located in North and Midlands, they commit considerably less crime than all other groups.
On the other hand, it is also interesting that immigrant population located in South is the
most crime-prone category. However, they do not commit significantly more crime than
the native population of Southern regions. Finally, we find that although immigrants from
Midlands and North commit less crime than their native counterparts, these differences are
statistically insignificant.
Finally, as it is the case for ethnic background, interaction terms between immigration
status and regional dummies are very insignificant in the case of violent crime.
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2.10 Discussion
In Sections 2.7 and 2.8 I presented and evaluated the results of different models that control
for under-reporting. Particularly, the results of the covariate-dependent MisProbit showed
that if immigrants exhibited the same basic demographic characteristics with natives, there
would be a negative association between actual criminal behaviour and immigration status.
Even though the estimated difference is statistically insignificant, all the results in the sen-
sitivity analysis section (and in Appendix C) suggest that it is actually quite robust. Most
importantly, the results of the unweighted MisProbit signified that if we were able to obtain
a larger sample, the estimated negative association would be much more precise. Therefore,
altogether the robustness of the association indicates that this relationship probably exists,
but the nature of the models and data do not allow precise estimation.
In Section 2.2 some channels through which there can be a positive or a negative relation-
ship between property crime and immigration were discussed. However, it was concluded
that even if these channels are “active”, the final outcome is uncertain as they operate in
opposite directions. How can the estimated difference can be explained by the theoretical
framework? A possible story is the following. It is a fact that immigrants are located in
more deprived areas and confront blocked opportunities, perhaps because of human capital
limitations (for instance, in terms of language efficiency), because employers tend to prefer
natives, or due to other reasons (see, Algan at al, 2010). There are also, to some extent,
cultural conflicts, and difficulties of adjustment. However, at the same time immigrants may
be more risk averse and discount future less heavily. They might also be more responsive to
the deterrent effects of potential punishment (Bucher and Piehl, 2007). In addition, not only
do immigrants face a higher probability of apprehension, but they are also confronted with
the threat of deportation. Finally, coming from poorer countries, they are satisfied even with
much lower economic outcomes than natives. Therefore, if we accept that some of the factors
associated with more crime actually exist, we must also accept that the factors associated
with lower crime work in the opposite direction over-balancing the situation. Therefore, if
immigrants did not encounter the problems associated with more crime, they would be even
less prone to crime compared to natives.
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The use of interaction terms have provided some interesting insights. Although as a
whole immigrants are insignificantly less involved in criminal activities, immigrants located
in London are considerably less likely to participate in illegal activities than natives of
London (but also natives of all other regions). It might be that immigrants integrate in
London more easily than in other locations. Furthermore, concentration of immigrants in
specific areas might create strong social controls that discourage criminal activities. In
addition, as immigrants are more responsive to deterrent factors, strict policing in London
would discourage criminal activities of immigrants by more than natives. The sure thing is
that there are many unobserved cultural differences between immigrants and natives with
respect to criminal behaviour. Finally, it could be that immigrants with different criminal
propensities are located in areas other than London by central agencies, such as the National
Asylum Support Service. For example, asylum seekers, which is the group that according
to their economic outcomes would find illegal sectors the most attractive, were located in
unpopular areas outside London (see, Bell, Machin and Fasani, 2010).
But why are immigrants located in South more crime-prone than most of the other
groups? This may indicate that immigrants in these areas encounter problems of adaptation
in the English society, or that the socioeconomic conditions they face are less favorable
than those of other regions. They may also present adverse behaviour due to accumulative
pressure, for example, because of discrimination, racism by natives, or cultural conflicts.
Additionally, it might be the case that South England pulls the most crime-prone groups
of immigrants, perhaps because there are criminal opportunities that suit them better than
other groups of immigrants. It must be stressed though, that in spite of the fact that
immigrants in South are more crime-prone than immigrants in London, their involvement in
crime is not statistically different from the involvement of natives in South.
Finally, we have found evidence that the group of black immigrants is significantly less
involved in criminal activities than both black natives and white natives. This is very
interesting if we consider that black immigrants, particular those emigrating from Africa,
exhibit the most unfavorable socioeconomic conditions (see, for example, Algan at al, 2010,
and Dustmann and Theodoropoulos, 2010). Therefore, unobserved cultural and deterrent
factors may have a stronger effect for this group.
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2.11 Conclusion
This study investigated the individual relationship between immigration and property crime
in England and Wales. Although there is a public sentiment that immigrants are more
involved in criminal activities, both the theoretical and the empirical results of this paper
lead to different conclusions.
A simple economic model of crime that incorporates immigration has been developed in
Section 2.2. Both this model and other theories developed by sociologists and criminologists
illustrated that, even though there are reasons to believe that immigration can be associated
with crime, the sign of this association is not clear. Therefore, in order to investigate the
empirical relationship between immigration and property crime, the Offending, Crime, and
Justice Survey of 2003 was employed, a representative national survey of self-reported crime.
Models that account for under-reporting were developed and used, as this is the major
concern in crime self-reports. First of all, the empirical analysis showed that under-reporting
exists. Moreover, we showed that under-reporting is not constant, but it rather depends
on respondents’ characteristics. However, if anything, immigrants tend to under-report
by less than natives. Nevertheless, it was explained that the coefficients of the reporting
process of the covariate-dependent MisProbit model must be treated with caution, since
the reporting process can be also interpreted in a zero-inflation framework. The models
indicated that reporting zero crimes because of total under-reporting or because of zero-
inflation, conditional on the set of covariates, is around 70%.
Concerning the crime process, the results of the covariate-dependent MisProbit model
suggested that, taking into account under-reporting or zero-inflation, the predicted probabil-
ity to commit a property crime is about 29%, much higher than what the conventional Probit
model predicts (about 6%). Most importantly, according to the findings of the covariate-
dependent MisProbit, there is a negative but not statistically significant association between
immigration and crime, which is, however, significant at 10% significance level if we do not
control for ethnicity.
It is important to also stress that all robustness checks reinforce the above relationship
and suggest that although insignificant, this relationship exists. For example, the estimated
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difference is much more precise (significant at 5%) if we do not use sampling weights that
downweigh the immigrant population. Moreover, exploiting the extra information of the
count form of the property crime variable, and using a NB2-Logit framework, we get to
the same conclusion. Natives commit more crimes than immigrants, but this difference is
statistically insignificant. The effects of the other covariates on crime are also robust across
the binary and the count data models. Moreover, our findings also suggest that immigrants
are slightly less involved in violent criminal activities as well. Finally, it is quite important
that the results of the models used in empirical analysis are not driven by the assumption
that “truthfulness” affects only the reporting process.
Finally, the use of interaction terms offered some interesting insights. Immigrants lo-
cated in London are considerably less involved in property crime activities than natives.
Contrary to that, immigrants in South are more crime-prone than immigrants in London,
but not more crime-prone than natives in South (although South immigrants’ effect on the
probability to commit a crime is higher than all other groups but statistically insignificant).
Thus, it might be that either different socio-economic conditions that immigrants encounter
in different locations and their interactions with the native population may affect their crim-
inal behaviour, or that different areas attract different types of immigrants. Finally, the
decomposition of immigrants by ethnic group showed that black immigrants display a con-
siderably lower probabilities of committing a property crime than black natives and white
natives, despite the fact that they are the least favored group with regard to their economic
outcomes. However, notice that the analysis of interaction terms is limited by the small
sample size of each separate group and the low variation in the dependent variables. Further
investigation is required to establish whether the effect of being an immigrant on criminal
behaviour differs with respect to immigrants’ demographic characteristics.
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Figure 2.1. Immigration Rates and Crime Rates through time∇ 
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 The Immigration rate statistics are provided by the OECD Stat. Extracts 
  The Recorded Crime rate statistics are constructed using data from the Home Office – Research Development Statistics. 
 
 
Figure 2.2. Crime Indexes through time: Recorded crime Vs BCS◊ 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
∇
 This graph is constructed without adjustments for the change in recording of crime method happened in April 1998 and the 
introduction of the National Crime Recording Standard (NCRS) across England and Wales in April 2002. Both changes had the 
effect of increasing the number of crimes recorded by the police and thus, numbers of recorded crimes are not comparable with 
previous years. Therefore, the positive tendency for recorded crime between 1998 and 2003 can be considered as a result of these 
changes, and not as a true increase in crime rates. In figure 2, where the crime data are adjusted for the change in 1998 but not for 
the introduction of NCRS, it is clear that there is a negative trend up to 2002. The British Crime Survey also coincides with this 
negative growth rate for crime. It needs to be stressed that criminologists consider the BCS as more reliable than recorded by police 
crime, since many crimes are not reported to the police, and some reported crimes are not recorded. 
◊ This figure is taken by the independent review of Smith (2006), carried out for the Home Office, page 2. 
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Figure 2.3. MisProbit: Interpretation as Misclassification 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4. MisProbit: Interpretation as Zero-One-Inflation 
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Table 2.1 ESS 2002              Table 2.2. ISSP 1995(n=996) / 2003(n=834)                    
 
 
Source: ESS(2002), ISSP(2003) 
 
Table 2.3. Ordered Probit. Determinants of Natives’ Attitudes 
Immigrants Increase Crime 
Rates 
Coefficients 
Robust Standard 
Errors 
ISS 2003 0.372*** (0.054) 
Male 0.267*** (0.055) 
Age 0.008*** (0.002) 
Income -0.013** (0.006) 
Center 0.049 (0.076) 
Right 0.368*** (0.067) 
No party 0.225*** (0.079) 
Low Education 0.599*** (0.073) 
Middle Education 0.390*** (0.066) 
N 1,635 
Log-Likelihood -2,247.69 
     Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
                (***), denotes statistical significance at 1% significance level 
                (**), denotes statistical significance at 5% significance level 
 
 
 
 
Immigrants make country’s 
crime problems worse or better % 
Crime problems made worse 8.3 
1 5.8 
2 13.5 
3 16.5 
4 16.9 
5 30.8 
6 4.0 
7 2.2 
8 1.3 
9 0.3 
Crime problems made better 0.3 
Total 100 
Immigrants increase crime 
rates 
1995 2003 
Agree strongly 7.8 13.6 
Agree 18.2 26.3 
Neither agree nor disagree 34.9 32.6 
Disagree 31.7 24.5 
Disagree strongly 7.3 3.1 
Total 100 100 
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Table 2.4. Tabulation of OCJS Respondents by Sample Type 
Sample Type Total Immigrants Natives 
 N % N % N % 
Core 10-65 6,771 58.08 729 36.25 6,042 62.63 
Boost 10-25 3,098 26.57 186 9.25 2,912 30.19 
Ethnic Boost 1,789 15.35 1096 54.50 693 7.18 
Total 11,658 100.00 2,011 100.00 9.647 100.00 
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  Table 2.5. Tabulation of Number of Property Crimes 
 Frequency Percent Cum. 
0 10,927 94.17 94.17 
1 251 2.16 96.33 
2 123 1.06 97.39 
3 67 0.58 97.97 
4 40 0.34 98.31 
5 48 0.41 98.72 
6 29 0.25 98.97 
7 6 0.05 99.03 
8 11 0.09 99.12 
9 5 0.04 99.16 
10 12 0.1 99.27 
11 14 0.12 99.39 
12 9 0.08 99.47 
13 4 0.03 99.5 
14 1 0.01 99.51 
15 3 0.03 99.53 
16 1 0.01 99.54 
17 1 0.01 99.55 
18 1 0.01 99.56 
19 4 0.03 99.59 
20 8 0.07 99.66 
21 1 0.01 99.67 
22 3 0.03 99.7 
23 3 0.03 99.72 
24 1 0.01 99.73 
25 2 0.02 99.75 
27 1 0.01 99.76 
28 1 0.01 99.77 
30 4 0.03 99.8 
33 1 0.01 99.81 
34 1 0.01 99.82 
35 4 0.03 99.85 
36 1 0.01 99.86 
40 2 0.02 99.88 
41 1 0.01 99.89 
50 1 0.01 99.9 
54 1 0.01 99.91 
55 1 0.01 99.91 
56 1 0.01 99.92 
57 1 0.01 99.93 
60 1 0.01 99.94 
73 1 0.01 99.95 
100 2 0.02 99.97 
113 1 0.01 99.97 
168 1 0.01 99.98 
194 1 0.01 99.99 
225 1 0.01 100 
Total 11,604 100  
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Table 2.6. Descriptive Statistics 
Variables N Mean Weighted Mean Min Max 
 All Nat. Imm.  All Nat. Imm.   
Crime Variables          
Any Property Crime last year 11,658 9,647 2,011 0.063 0.055 0.057 0.039 0 1 
Any Violent Crime last year 11,667 9,641 2,026 0.072 0.054 0.056 0.036 0 1 
Number of Property Crime 
last year 
11,604 9,598 2,006 0.371 
0.342 
(5.858)◊ 
0.366 
(6.011) 
0.160 
(2.218) 
0 225∅ 
          
Independent Variables          
Immigrant 2,069   0.174 0.119∇   0 1 
Native 9,853   0.826 0.881     
Age 11,922 9,853 2,069 32.549 
36.738 
(17.473) 
36.554 
(17.146) 
38.098 
(19.017) 
10 66 
Male 5,755 4,748 1,007 0.483 0.497 0.496 0.505 0 1 
Female 6,167 5,105 1,062 0.517 0.503 0.504 0.495   
          
White 9,284 8,702 582 0.779 0.909 0.956 0.553 0 1 
Black 743 291 452 0.062 0.023 0.010 0.120 0 1 
Asian 1,116 496 620 0.094 0.045 0.022 0.214 0 1 
Other 350 91 259 0.029 0.012 0.003 0.073 0 1 
Mixed 429 273 156 0.036 0.012 0.008 0.039 0 1 
          
North 3,249 2,898 351 0.273 0.274 0.288 0.175. 0 1 
Midlands 2,822 2,480 342 0.237 0.235 0.246 0.150 0 1 
South 3,856 3,352 504 0.323 0.351 0.358 0.298 0 1 
London 1,992 1,122 870 0.167 0.139 0.107 0.376 0 1 
          
Truthfulness 11,118 9,271 1,847 0.933 0.942 0.946 0.915 0 1 
Other Present 3,768 3,171 597 0.327 0.285 0.288 0.263 0 1 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
◊  Weighted standard deviations in paretheses. 
∅ The max for immigrants is 60 property crimes, while the max for natives is 225 property crimes. 
∇ Notice that the weighted mean for the core sample only is 0.091 which is very close to the percentage of 
immigrants in the UK from other sources.  The weighted mean presented here is calculated from the combining 
sample (core & youth boost & ethnic minorities boost). Although the weights are used to restore 
representativeness of the sample, these weights are designed to restore representativeness with respect to age 
and race composition (and also with respect to non respondents). Therefore, it is not surprising to notice a 2.8 
percentage points difference.  
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Table 2.7. Probit Estimates for all Crime Categories 
Any … in last year Coefficient Robust St.Error Log - Likelihood N 
Property Offence -0.184** (0.089) -2,467.26 11,658 
Violent Offence -0.209*** (0.082) -2,440.57 11,667 
Drugs related Offence -0.091 (0.144) -680.19 11,866 
Vehicle Theft -0.137 (0.255) -358.43 11,873 
Criminal Damage -0.468*** (0.134) -693.62 11,858 
Burglary -0.485** (0.210) -131.93 11,870 
Robbery -0.231 (0.277) -31.87 11,897 
Other Theft -0.149 (0.091) -2188.28 11,713 
Assault -0.210*** (0.082) -2438.79 11,676 
   Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
   (***), denotes statistical significance at 1% significance level 
   (**), denotes statistical significance at 5% significance level 
 
Table 2.8. Negative Binomial Estimates for all Crime Categories 
Number of ….. in last 
year 
Coefficient 
Robust 
St.Error 
Alpha 
Log - 
Likelihood 
N 
Property Offences -0.825** (0.351) 57.46*** -2,400.98 11,604 
Violent Offences -1.062*** (0.236) 50.02*** -2,397.71 11,640 
Drugs Offences -0.144 (0.645) 406.34*** -675.27 11,862 
Vehicle Thefts -1.792** (0.722) 542.04*** -289.88 11,869 
Criminal Damages -2.451*** (0.494) 182.86*** -571.78 11,856 
Burglaries -3.035*** (0.932) 2,123.43*** -115.21 11,869 
Robberies -2.373** (1.105) 7,695.16*** -25.65 11,897 
Other Thefts -0.664* (0.366) 64.41*** -2,157.15 11,695 
Assaults -1.060*** (0.237) 50.05*** -2,393.85 11,649 
Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
(***), denotes statistical significance at 1% significance level 
(**), denotes statistical significance at 5% significance level 
(*), denotes statistical significance at 10% significance level 
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Table 2.9. Probit Estimates 
Probit  (1) (2) (3) 
 Coefficient 
Robust 
S.E 
Coefficient 
Robust 
S.E 
Coefficient 
Robust 
S.E 
Probability of Committing a Property Offence in Last Year 
Constant -1.204***      (0.127)       -1.454*** (0.143)       -1.134*** (0.129) 
Immigrant -0.127      (0.102)       -0.025      (0.111)       -0.014 (0.109) 
Age -.0178**      (0.007)   -0.018*** (0.007)   -0.018** (0.007) 
Age2 0.0001   (0.0001)   0.0001  (0.0001)   0.0001 (0.0001) 
Male 0.362*** (0.049)       0.362*** (0.049)       0.364*** (0.049) 
White   0.331*** (0.077)         
Black     -0.201* (0.119) 
Asian & Other     -0.501*** (0.101) 
Mixed     -0.016 (0.115) 
Region South 0.089       (0.082)       0.028       (0.082)       0.034 (0.083) 
Region Midlands 0.061       (0.084)       0.007    (0.085)      0.012 (0.086) 
Region North 0.066       (0.086)       0.009    (0.085)       0.015 (0.086) 
Sample Size 11,658 11,658 11,658 
Log Likelihood -1,452.88 -1,447.94 -1,445.82 
Predicted.Prob.Crime 0.064   0.061 0.062 
 
                         Table 2.10. Negative Binomial 2 Estimates 
NegBin2  (1) (2) (3) 
 Coefficient R.S.E Coefficient R.S.E Coefficient R.S.E 
Expected number of Property Offences in Last Year 
Constant -1.299*** (0.505) -1.897*** (0.529) -1.065*** (0.484) 
Immigrant -0.441 (0.356) -0.309     (0.352) -0.232     (0.353) 
Age 0.001 (0.031) 0.002    (0.030) 0.003    (0.030) 
Age2 -0.001*  (0.0004) -0.001*   (0.0004) -0.001*   (0.0004) 
Male 0.669** (0.278) 0.672** (0.275) 0.663** (0.276) 
White   0.788*** (0.268)   
Black     -0.736** (0.328) 
Asian & Other     -1.337*** (0.366) 
Mixed     0.112 (0.435) 
Region South 0.504* (0.284) 0.305    (0.279) 0.244   (0.283) 
Region Midlands 0.593** (0.272) 0.441    (0.269) 0.370    (0.274) 
Region North 1.256** (0.501) 1.065** (0.507) 1.008** (0.503) 
Sample Size 11,604 11,604 11,604 
Log Likelihood -2,346.791 -2,344.4531 -2,342.7878 
Alpha 47.06*** 46.66*** 46.33*** 
Predicted.Num.Crimes 0.407 0.388 0.388 
       Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
       (***), denotes statistical significance at 1% significance level 
       (**), denotes statistical significance at 5% significance level 
       (*), denotes statistical significance at 10% significance level 
   119 
    
   Table 2.11. MisProbit Estimates for Property Crime: Constant Misclassification 
Mis.Probit  (1) (2) (3) 
 Coefficient 
Robust 
S.E 
Coefficient 
Robust 
S.E 
Coefficient 
Robust 
S.E 
Probability of Committing a Property Offence in Last Year 
Constant 0.395       (0.954)       -0.226      (0.701)       0.678 (1.016) 
Immigrant -0.217      (0.278)       0.055       (0.334)       0.091 (0.379) 
Age -0.056      (0.045)       -0.060      (0.046)       -0.064 (0.051) 
Age2 0.000    (0.000)   0.000    (0.000)   0.000 (0.000) 
Male 0.914** (0.379)       0.926*** (0.379)       0.997** (0.443) 
White   0.826** (0.405)         
Black     -0.511 (0.362) 
Asian and Other     -1.341* (0.714) 
Mixed     -0.064 (0.344) 
Region South 0.291       (0.283)       0.147       (0.250)   0.199 (0.297) 
Region Midlands 0.156       (0.241)       0.024       (0.225) 0.063 (0.257) 
Region North 0.230       (0.264)      0.109       (0.250)       0.164 (0.297) 
Prob of Misclassification of One as Zero (Under-reporting or Zero-Inflation) 
Constant 0.813*** (0.070)       0.811*** (0.066)       0.819*** (0.060) 
Prob of Misclassification of  Zero as One (Over-reporting) 
Constant 0.013*** (0.005) 0.012*** (0.005)   0.013*** (0.005) 
Sample Size 11,658 11,658 11,658 
Log Likelihood -1,452.05 -1,446.92 -1,444.77 
Predicted.Prob.Crime 0.295 0.280 0.295 
Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
(***), denotes statistical significance at 1% significance level 
(**), denotes statistical significance at 5% significance level 
(*), denotes statistical significance at 10% significance level 
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Table 2.12. MisProbit Property Crime: Covariate-Dependent Misclassification of 1 as 0 
Mis.Probit  (1) (2) (3) 
 Coefficient R.S.E Coefficient R.S.E Coefficient R.S.E 
Probability of Committing a Property Offence in Last Year 
Constant 2.597***    (0.895)     2.335*** (0.896)       2.833*** (0.926) 
Immigrant -0.431*    (0.251)    -0.254      (0.273)       -0.277 (0.275) 
Age -0.248*** (0.045)    -0.259*** (0.046)             -0.255*** (0.047) 
Age2 0.003*** (0.001)     0.003*** (0.001)   0.003*** (0.001) 
Male 0.439*** (0.156)     0.440*** (0.156)       0.429*** (0.156) 
White   0.542*        (0.293)         
Black     -0.559* (0.323) 
Asian and Other     -0.638 (0.430) 
Mixed     0.004 (0.391) 
Region South 0.300    (0.219)     0.273       (0.231)       0.272 (0.227) 
Region Midlands 0.151    (0.209)     0.124       (0.228)       0.124 (0.223) 
Region North 0.501*     (0.282)     0.496       (0.318)       0.498 (0.317) 
Prob of Misclassification of One as Zero (Under-reporting or Zero-Inflation) 
Constant 2.196*** (0.522)     2.267*** (0.507)       2.072*** (0.516)       
Immigrant -0.391    (0.371)    -0.410      (0.346)       -0.437      (0.359)       
Age -0.205**    (0.081)    -0.195*** (0.074)       -0.193*** (0.074)       
Age2 0.003**    (0.001)     0.003*** (0.001)   0.003*** (0.001)   
Male -0.260*    (0.144)    -0.277*      (0.142)       -0.285*** (0.142)       
White   -0.198      (0.224)         
Black     -0.264      (0.447)       
Asian and Other     0.467       (0.327)       
Mixed     0.104       (0.281)       
Region South 0.201    (0.228)     0.262       (0.224)       0.252      (0.221)       
Region Midlands 0.151    (0.215)     0.224       (0.215)       0.211       (0.212)       
Region North 0.432**    (0.211)     0.490**    (0.212)       0.480**    (0.207)       
Truthfulness 0.876*** (0.319)     0.868*** (0.256)       0.854*** (0.255)       
Prob of Misclassification of Zero as One (Over-reporting)
 +
 
Constant -2.244***      (0.292)       -2.234*** (0.204)       -2.256***      (0.210)       
Sample Size 11,658 11,658 11,658 
Log Likelihood -1,427.97 -1,422.05 -1,419.99 
Predicted.Prob.Crime 0.285        0.292        0.295 
Predicted.Prob.Under 0.681     0.709        0.709 
Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
(***), denotes statistical significance at 1% significance level 
(**), denotes statistical significance at 5% significance level 
(*), denotes statistical significance at 10% significance level 
                                                 
+
 Which corresponds to probability of misclassification of zero as one of Φ(-2.234)=0.0127       
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Table 2.13. Negative Binomial 2 Models 
 NB2 NB2-Logit ZI-NB2-Logit 
 Coefficient R.S.E Coefficient R.S.E Coefficient R.S.E 
Expected number of Property Offences in Last Year 
Constant -1.897*** (0.529) 8.633** (3.671) 10.950** (5.288) 
Immigrant -0.309 (0.352) -0.617 (0.636) -0.757 (0.721) 
Age 0.002 (0.030) -0.677*** (0.224) - 0.711** (0.308) 
Age2 -0.001* (0.000) 0.009*** (0.003) 0.010** (0.005) 
Male 0.672** (0.275) 1.457*** (0.443) 0.657 (0.498) 
White 0.788*** (0.268) 0.196 (0.611) -0.939 (0.706) 
Region South 0.305 (0.279) 1.024 (0.696) 1.504** (0.694) 
Region Midlands 0.441 (0.269) 0.247 (0.561) 0.501 (0.682) 
Region North 1.065 ** (0.507) 1.676** (0.662) 2.733*** (0.949) 
Probability of  Reporting a Committed Crime 
Constant   -12.253*** (3.510) -13.285*** (4.520) 
Immigrant   0.451 (1.043) 0.130 (0.869) 
Age   1.008*** (0.206) 1.058*** (0.230) 
Age2   -0.015*** (0.003) -0.015*** (0.004) 
Male   -1.333* (0.687) -0.406 (0.625) 
White   0.638 (1.062) 1.053 (0.994) 
Region South   -1.508 (0.937) -1.890** (0.771) 
Region Midlands   0.255 (0.954) -0.480 (0.878) 
Region North   -1.628 (1.027) -2.800*** (1.010) 
Truthfulness   -1.237*** (0.475) -1.963*** (0.468) 
Probability of Zero-Inflation 
Constant     -1.212 (1.133) 
Immigrant     -0.533 (0.549) 
Age     0.138** (0.060) 
Age2     -0.001 (0.001) 
Male     -0.960*** (0.259) 
White     -1.634*** (0.387) 
Region South     0.490 (0.480) 
Region Midlands     0.136 (0.561) 
Region North     0.820* (0.479) 
Sample Size 11,604 11,604 11,604 
Log Likelihood -2,344.45 -2,313.99 -2,258.49 
alpha 46.66*** 41.64*** 15.474*** 
Pred.Pr. of Reporting  0.430 0.376 
Pred.Pr. of ZI   0.617 
      Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
      (***), denotes statistical significance at 1% significance level 
      (**), denotes statistical significance at 5% significance level 
      (*), denotes statistical significance at 10% significance level 
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Table 2.14. Weighted Property Crime versus Weighted Violent Crime versus  
Unweighted Property Crime 
Mis.Probit 
Weighted Property 
Crime 
Weighted Violent 
Crime 
Unweighted Property 
Crime 
 Coefficient 
Robust 
S.E 
Coefficient 
Robust 
S.E 
Coefficient 
Robust 
S.E 
Probability of Committing an Offence in Last Year 
Constant 2.335*** (0.896)       2.778** (0.925) 2.576*** (0.569) 
Immigrant -0.254      (0.273)       -0.241 (0.341) -0.493** (0.210) 
Age -0.259*** (0.046)             -0.315*** (0.056) -0.270*** (0.035) 
Age2 0.003*** (0.001)   0.004*** (0.001) 0.004*** (0.001) 
Male 0.440*** (0.156)       0.428*** (0.102) 0.464*** (0.125) 
White 0.542* (0.293)       0.447*** (0.172) 0.487** (0.189) 
Region South 0.273       (0.231)       -0.063 (0.241) 0.050 (0.162) 
Region Midlands 0.124       (0.228)       -0.085 (0.242) -0.032 (0.177) 
Region North 0.496       (0.318)       -0.140 (0.246) 0.103 (0.201) 
Prob of Misclassification of One as Zero (Under-reporting or Zero-Inflation) 
Constant 2.267*** (0.507)       6.174*** (1.250)       2.509*** (0.526)       
Immigrant -0.410      (0.346)       -0.553      (0.416)       -0.209      (0.262)       
Age -0.195*** (0.074)       -0.646*** (0.154)       -0.261*** (0.066)       
Age2 0.003*** (0.001)   0.012*** (0.003)   0.004*** (0.001)   
Male -0.277* (0.142)       -0.229      (0.149)       -0.179      (0.130)       
White -0.198      (0.224)       -0.057 (0.264) -0.074 (0.211) 
Region South 0.262       (0.224)       -0.237      (0.310)       0.151      (0.178)       
Region Midlands 0.224      (0.215)       -0.063       (0.309)       0.222       (0.184)       
Region North 0.490** (0.212)       -0.256       (0.316)       0.299       (0.192)       
Truthfulness 0.868*** (0.256)       0.876*** (0.253)       1.181*** (0.197)       
Prob of Misclassification of Zero as One (Over-reporting) 
Constant -2.234*** (0.204)       -2.081*** (0.088)       -2.175*** (0.121)       
Sample Size 11,658 11,667 11,658 
Log Likelihood -1,422.05 -1,303.74 -2,441.32 
Predicted.Prob.Crime 0.292        0.223       0.260 
Predicted.Prob.Under 0.709        0.514        0.650 
     Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
     (***), denotes statistical significance at 1% significance level 
     (**), denotes statistical significance at 5% significance level 
     (*), denotes statistical significance at 10% significance level 
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Table 2.15. Truthfulness versus No Exclusion versus Other Present, for Property Crime  
Mis.Probit 
(1) 
Property Crime 
(Truthfulness) 
(2) 
Property Crime 
(No Exclusion) 
(3) 
Property Crime 
(Other Present) 
 Coefficient Rob. S.E Coefficient Rob. S.E Coefficient Rob. S.E 
Probability of Committing an Offence in Last Year 
Constant 2.335***       (0.896)       2.298       (1.558)       0.985       (5.056)       
Immigrant -0.254      (0.273)       -0.232      (0.276)       -0.143      (0.528)       
Age -0.259***       (0.046)             -0.242***       (0.083)             -0.170      (0.285)             
Age2 0.003***       (0.001)   0.003***       (0.001)   0.002   (0.004)   
Male 0.440***       (0.156)       0.401***       (0.149)       0.382***       (0.122)       
White 0.542*              (0.293)       0.369       (0.297)       0.369*              (0.219)       
Region South 0.273       (0.231)       0.175       (0.247)       0.085       (0.456)       
Region Midlands 0.124       (0.228)       0.066       (0.203)       0.022      (0.212)       
Region North 0.496       (0.318)       0.379       (0.297)       0.369       (0.219)       
Prob of Misclassification of One as Zero (Under-reporting or Zero-Inflation) 
Constant 2.267***       (0.507)       3.070***       (0.715)       2.906**      (1.179)       
Immigrant -0.410      (0.346)       -0.343      (0.305)    -0.387     (0.399)       
Age -0.195***       (0.074)       -0.192*            (0.107)       -0.244      (0.367)       
Age2 0.003***       (0.001)   0.003**       (0.001)   0.004   (0.005)   
Male -0.277*      (0.142)       -0.239      (0.169)       -0.168      (0.394)       
White -0.198      (0.224)       -0.239      (0.240)       -0.103      (0.760)       
Region South 0.262       (0.224)       0.200      (0.194)       0.188      (0.558)       
Region Midlands 0.224       (0.215)       0.126       (0.208)       0.086       (0.355)       
Region North 0.490** (0.212)       0.438** (0.181)       0.475*             (0.266)       
Truthfulness 0.868***       (0.256)           
Other Present     0.294 (0.505) 
Prob of Misclassification of Zero as One (Over-reporting) 
Constant -2.234***       (0.204)       -2.552***       (0.709)       -2.941 (2.019)       
Log Likelihood -1,422.05 -1,432.94 -1,430.67 
Predicted.Prob.Crime 0.292        0.291        0.170        
Predicted.Prob.Under 0.709        0.684        0.475        
       Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
       (***), denotes statistical significance at 1% significance level 
       (**), denotes statistical significance at 5% significance level 
       (*), denotes statistical significance at 10% significance level 
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Table 2.16. Truthfulness versus No Exclusion versus Other Present, for Violent Crime  
Mis.Probit 
(1) 
Violent Crime 
(Truthfulness) 
(2) 
Violent Crime 
(No Exclusion) 
(3) 
Violent Crime 
(Other Present) 
 Coefficient Rob. S.E Coefficient Rob. S.E Coefficient Rob. S.E 
Probability of Committing an Offence in Last Year 
Constant 2.778**       (0.925) 2.470***       (0.677) 2.354***       (0.645) 
Immigrant -0.241 (0.341) -0.177 (0.271) -0.169 (0.259) 
Age -0.315***       (0.056) -0.296***       (0.044) -0.291***       (0.040) 
Age2 0.004***       (0.001) 0.004***       (0.001) 0.004***       (0.001) 
Male 0.428***       (0.102) 0.410***       (0.093) 0.419***       (0.092) 
White 0.447***       (0.172) 0.429***       (0.158) 0.447***       (0.172) 
Region South -0.063 (0.241) -0.050 (0.213) -0.042 (0.212) 
Region Midlands -0.085 (0.242) -0.085 (0.216) -0.074 (0.210) 
Region North -0.140 (0.246) -0.128 (0.158) -0.117 (0.211) 
Prob of Misclassification of One as Zero (Under-reporting or Zero-Inflation) 
Constant 6.174***       (1.250)       7.666***       (0.927)       7.509***       (0.995)       
Immigrant -0.553     (0.416)       -0.502     (0.423)       -0.503     (0.440)       
Age -0.646***       (0.154)       -0.723***       (0.110)       -0.742***       (0.135)       
Age2 0.012***       (0.003)   0.014***       (0.002)   0.014***       (0.004)   
Male -0.229     (0.149)       -0.283*       (0.150)       -0.276*      (0.157)       
White -0.057 (0.264) -0.060 (0.266) -0.071 (0.269) 
Region South -0.237     (0.310)       -0.186     (0.319)       -0.165     (0.337)       
Region Midlands -0.063       (0.309)       -0.050       (0.321)       -0.020       (0.343)       
Region North -0.256       (0.316)       -0.259       (0.327)       -0.252       (0.330)       
Truthfulness 0.876***       (0.253)           
Other Present     0.350***       (0.160) 
Prob of Misclassification of Zero as One (Over-reporting) 
Constant -2.081***       (0.088)       -2.108***       (0.085)       -2.095***       (0.085)       
Log Likelihood -1,303.74 -1,307.16 -1,305.09 
Predicted.Prob.Crime 0.223       0.207       0.207       
Predicted.Prob.Under 0.514        0.470        0.483       
       Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
       (***), denotes statistical significance at 1% significance level 
       (**), denotes statistical significance at 5% significance level 
       (*), denotes statistical significance at 10% significance level 
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Table 2.17. NegBin2-Logit – Truthfulness versus Other Present 
NegBin2-Logit 
(1) 
Truthfulness 
(2) 
Other Present – A – 
(3) 
Other Present – B – 
 Coefficient R.S.E Coefficient R.S.E Coefficient R.S.E 
Expected number of Property Offences in Last Year 
Constant 8.633** (3.671) 7.572** (3.009) -5.849***       (1.538) 
Immigrant -0.617 (0.636) -0.475 (0.595) -0.306 (0.640) 
Age -0.677***       (0.224) -0.619***       (0.180)  0.422***       (0.145) 
Age2 0.009***       (0.003) 0.009***       (0.003) -0.007***       (0.002) 
Male 1.457***       (0.443) 1.462***       (0.394) 0.125 (0.477) 
White 0.196 (0.611) 0.175 (0.662) 0.869 (0.611) 
Region South 1.024 (0.696) 0.860 (0.601) -0.270** (0.507) 
Region Midlands 0.247 (0.561) 0.161 (0.558) 0.694 (0.627) 
Region North 1.676** (0.662) 1.588** (0.711) -0.201 (0.575) 
Probability of  Reporting a Committed Crime 
Constant -12.253***       (3.510) -11.470***       (3.664) 11.870***       (2.799) 
Immigrant 0.451 (1.043) 0.189 (0.972) -0.094 (0.931) 
Age 1.008***       (0.206) 0.910***       (0.208) -0.939***       (0.182) 
Age2 -0.015***       (0.003) -0.014***       (0.003) 0.014***       (0.003) 
Male -1.333* (0.687) -1.325** (0.659) 1.139 (0.708) 
White 0.638 (1.062) 0.734 (1.191) -0.525 (0.974) 
Region South -1.508 (0.937) -1.024 (0.902) 0.992 (0.771) 
Region Midlands 0.255 (0.954) 0.519 (0.995) -0.416 (0.878) 
Region North -1.628 (1.027) -1.373 (1.164) 1.903 (0.845) 
Truthfulness -1.237***       (0.475)     
Other Present   -0.677 (0.533) -0.600* (0.349) 
Sample Size 11,604 11,604 11,604 
Log Likelihood -2,313.99 -2,314.29 -2,314.61 
alpha 41.64***        41.94***        41.99***        
Pred.Pr. of Reporting 0.430 0.448 0.464 
       Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
       (***), denotes statistical significance at 1% significance level 
       (**), denotes statistical significance at 5% significance level 
       (*), denotes statistical significance at 10% significance level 
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Table 2.18.a Interaction Terms 
Covariate Dependent MisProbit 
(1) 
 Ethnicity 
(2) 
 Regions 
 Coef R.S.E Coef R.S.E 
Constant 2.777*** (0.898) 1.997** (0.838) 
Immigrant -0.196 (0.287) -0.917*** (0.352) 
Age -0.252*** (0.046) -0.248*** (0.036) 
Age2 0.003*** (0.001) 0.003*** (0.001) 
Male 0.428*** (0.158) 0.521*** (0.140) 
White   0.571 (0.372) 
Black 0.013 (0.367)   
Asian and Other -0.617 (0.457)   
Mixed 0.372 (0.541)   
Region South 0.275 (0.237) 0.009 (0.217) 
Region Midlands 0.139 (0.228) -0.051 (0.226) 
Region North 0.489 (0.316) 0.301 (0.289) 
Immigrant*Black -0.934 (0.583)   
Immigr*Asian&Other 0.054 (0.730)   
Immigrant*Mixed -0.615 (0.919)   
Immigrant*South   1.483*** (0.570) 
Immigrant*Midlands   0.690 (0.556) 
Immigrant*North   0.240 (0.539) 
Sample Size 11,658 11,658 
Log Likelihood -1,418.40 -1,413.96 
Predicted.Prob.Crime 0.297 0.243 
 
Table 2.18.b. Interaction Terms (Specification (1) Cont) ⊕  Table 2.18.c. Interaction Terms (Specification (2) Cont) 
   
Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
(***), denotes statistical significance at 1% significance level 
(**), denotes statistical significance at 5% significance level 
(*), denotes statistical significance at 10% significance level 
 
                                                 
⊕
 This model is exactly the same with the one presented in Table 7.7, apart from the way we define the variables associated with the 
interaction terms. Thus, all the other coefficients are exactly the same with specification (1) of Table 7.7 and therefore, not presented 
here. The same holds for the second specification 
Covariate Dependent MisProbit 
(2) 
Regions 
Immigrant*London   
Immigrant*South 1.492*** (0.484) 
Immigrant*Midlands 0.639 (0.504) 
Immigrant*North 0.541 (0.459) 
Native*London 0.917*** (0.352) 
Native*South 0.927*** (0.308) 
Native*Midlands 0.867*** (0.320) 
Native*North 0.541*** (0.459) 
Covariate Dependent 
MisProbit 
(1) 
Ethnicity 
Immigrant*Black   
Immigrant*Asian&Other 0.359 (0.709) 
Immigrant*Mixed 0.678 (0.780) 
Immigrant*White 0.921* (0.475) 
Native*Black 1.131** (0.522) 
Native*Asian&Other 0.501 (0.585) 
Native*Mixed 1.490** (0.669) 
Native*White 1.117*** (0.404) 
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Appendix A. Zero-Inflated MisProbit
As mentioned in Section 2.5, it would be a good idea to incorporate a zero inflation proba-
bility in the MisProbit model in an attempt to separate under-reporting from zero-inflation.
In other words this model will attempt to separate potential criminals from genuine non
criminals. In this Appendix, this model together with some empirical results are presented.
To this end, assume that there is a fraction of people, ξ, that never commit and consequently
never report a crime. The remaining fraction of individuals, 1− ξ, follow the binary choice
model with misclassification. The corresponding response tree is presented in figure 2.5. The
conditional probabilities for the reported crime now become,
Pr(yi = 1|xi) = (1− ξ) [(1− F (x′iβ)) a1 + F (x′iβ)(1− a0)]
Pr(yi = 0|xi) = ξ + (1− ξ) [(1− F (x′iβ)) (1− a1) + F (x′iβ)a0]
(A.1)
Then, we specify the log-likelihood function as in (2.14) and we find the values of ξ, a0, a1,
and β that maximize it. In case the probability of zero inflation is given by a Logit model,
such as ξi = e
q′iu/(1 + eq
′
iu), the log-likelihood takes the following form,
lnL(β, u, a0, a1) =
n∑
i=1
− ln(1 + eq′iu) + yi ln [(1− F (x′iβ))a1 + F (x′iβ)(1− a0)]
+ (1− yi) ln[eq′iu + (1− F (x′iβ))(1− a1) + F (x′iβ)a0].
(A.2)
Estimation of this model seems difficult if probabilities of misclassification and zero-inflation
are all covariate-dependent, since with one data set we try to estimate four distinct processes.
Instead, given quite large samples, estimation could be feasible if for example, zero-inflation
probability is allowed to depend on regressors but one of the misclassification probabilities
is considered as constant. In any way, estimation of these models is a hard task, particularly
when noisy data such as crime data are used.
The estimation analysis has shown that, although identifiable theoretically, misclassi-
fication and zero-inflation probabilities cannot be estimated if they are all considered as
constants.The zero-inflation parameter remains unidentified even when under-reporting de-
pends on covariates. However, if zero-inflation depends on regressors, both the ZI-MisProbit
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model with constant misclassification and the covariate dependent ZI-MisProbit model be-
have better. First, the case of constant misclassification is presented, followed by the covari-
ate dependent ZI-MisProbit.
Constant Misclassification
Although under-reporting seems to be covariate dependent, here the results of a model
of constant under-reporting is presented. Naturally, zero-inflation should depend on the
same vector of regressors. Here, truthfulness, which is assumed to affect the zero-inflation
probability, is used to facilitate the optimization procedure. However, an extra exclusion
was required (here in the form of not including age squared in the reporting process), even
though there was no specific reason for this. Otherwise, misclassification probabilities were
forced to be negative, and therefore, not helping the separation of zero-inflation from under-
reporting. This is also the reason why this model was not presented in the main results
analysis, as its behaviour was not trustworthy, perhaps because of the combination of noisy
data and complicated models. Nevertheless, a few results which will be presented in this
Appendix indicate that this model “works”, as it can potentially separate zero-inflation from
under-reporting.
These results are presented in Table 2.19. In the first column results of the MisProbit
model with constant misclassification are presented, whereas the ZI-MisProbit results are
presented in column 2. It is very interesting that, after controlling for zero-inflation, the
probability of under-reporting is predicted to be 0.48, almost 33 percentage points lower
than the model in column 1. The predicted probability of zero-inflation is 39.3%. Thus, this
model says that almost 40% of people (about 3,680 individuals) never commit crimes and
consequently they do not report any, and from the rest of them, 48% report no crimes even
though they have committed at least one.1 Furthermore, we can notice that all coefficient of
the zero-inflation process are statistically insignificant. We finally see that both the predicted
probability of committing a crime and the probability of over-reporting is almost the same
across the two models.
1Apart from the case where age squared was included in both processes, all other specifications show
that given the set of controls, zero-inflation probability is around 40% and probability of under-reporting is
around 35%.
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Covariate-Dependent Under-reporting
As we have seen from the main results, the mix of under-reporting and zero-inflation is
covariate-dependent. In the previous part only zero-inflation was allowed to depend on
covariates. In this part we will have a look at the model where both processes are covariate-
dependent. Misclassifying a zero as one will still be considered as constant. Before proceeding
to the results, we must stress that with one data set we try to identify the parameters of
three different processes. In addition to that, we must be cautious not to misspecify the
model by excluding variables that must be included. For example, in the previous model I
did not include age squared in the zero-inflation process without a special reason. Therefore,
this model is too demanding to produce reliable estimates with such noisy data. However,
some results are presented in Table 2.20, which show that this model also “works”.
Once more, the first column replicates the second specification of Table 2.12. First of all,
we notice that all parameters of this model are identified. It can be said that, this is a “better
specified” model, since there is only one exclusion restriction from both the zero-inflation
and crime processes. This role, as before, is played by the dummy “truthfulness”. On the
other hand, as mentioned before, this is a too complicated model relative to the quality of
data and trustworthiness is a question here.
Unfortunately, the results of this model do not coincide with ZI-MisProbit with constant
misclassification. In this model, we see that the predicted probability of crime is around 51%,
which says that from potential criminals (since we have separated the genuine non criminals)
almost half of them commit at least one property crime. Moreover, we can also notice that
the predicted probability of zero-inflation is around 8%, which is much smaller than the
predictions of the previous model. Nonetheless, there is one common finding across these
two. In both models, apart from truthfulness which seems to be significant in the current
model, the independent variables do not seem to affect the probability of being genuine
non-criminal. However, the values of their corresponding coefficients differ considerably. For
some of these variables even the direction of the effect is the opposite one.
Comparing the first column with the second, there are a few things that merit some
discussion. Although we would expect the predicted probability to be lower, the ZI-MisProbit
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gives almost the same probability of under-reporting and an extra zero-inflation probability
of 8%. Thus, this model, at least for the data of this study, does not seem to separate
zero-inflation from under-reporting. Regarding the immigrant coefficient, in contrast with
column 1, the ZI-MisProbit model says that being an immigrant increases the probability of
crime, but the coefficient is statistically insignificant. Although the rest of the coefficients in
the crime process follow the same direction as the coefficients of the first column, they are
very different in terms of magnitude. The rest of the coefficients of the two processes are not
discussed further since this model is just presented to show that if there are good reasons to
believe that the generating data process follows a ZI-MisProbit model, given a richer data
set, there might be gains from using it.
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Figure 2.5. Zero Inflation MisProbit 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 2.6. Zero-Inflation – Poisson-Logit 
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Table 2.19. MisProbit Vs ZI-MisProbit. Constant Misclassification 
 MisProbit ZI-MisProbit 
 Coefficient Robust S.E Coefficient Robust S.E 
Constant -0.226      (0.701)       0.671 (0.977) 
Immigrant 0.055       (0.334)       0.095 (0.439) 
Age -0.060      (0.046)       -0.126** (0.057) 
Age2 0.000    (0.000)    0.001* (0.000) 
Male 0.926***       (0.379)       0.546*** (0.212) 
White 0.826**       (0.405)       0.719* (0.388) 
Region South 0.147       (0.250)       0.484 (0.493) 
Region Midlands 0.024       (0.225) 0.489 (0.453) 
Region North 0.109       (0.250)       0.627 (0.505) 
Prob of Misclassification of One as Zero (Under-reporting) 
Constant 0.811***      (0.066)       0.480* (0.288) 
Prob of Misclassification of Zero as One (Over-reporting) 
Constant 0.012***       (0.005)    0.014** (0.006) 
Prob of Zero-Inflation 
Constant   2.509 (6.468) 
Immigrant   0.136 (0.977) 
Age   -0.075 (0.053) 
Male   -0.448 (0.383) 
White   -0.073 (0.668) 
Region South   1.013 (1.364) 
Region Midlands   1.283 (1.179) 
Region North   1.359 (1.216) 
Truthfulness   3.668      (4.989) 
Sample Size 11,658 11,658 
Log Likelihood -1,446.92 -1,429.16 
Predicted.Prob.Crime 0.280 0.269 
Predicted Prob. of ZI  0.393 
Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
(***), denotes statistical significance at 1% significance level 
(**), denotes statistical significance at 5% significance level 
(*), denotes statistical significance at 10% significance level 
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Table 2.20. MisProbit Vs ZI-MisProbit. Covariate-Dependent Misclassification 
 (1) (2) 
 Coefficient R.S.E Coefficient R.S.E 
Prob of Property Offence in Last Year 
Constant 2.335***       (0.896)       5.959 (3.660) 
Immigrant -0.254      (0.273)       0.756 (0.748) 
Age -0.259***       (0.046)             -0.386* (0.203) 
Age2 0.003***       (0.0006)   0.003* (0.002) 
Male 0.440***       (0.156)       1.225 (0.828) 
White 0.542*       (0.293)       1.380* (0.787) 
Region South 0.273       (0.231)       1.650 (1.585) 
Region Midlands 0.124       (0.228)       1.973 (1.902) 
Region North 0.496       (0.318)       1.951 (1.642) 
Prob of Misclassification of One as Zero (Under-reporting) 
Constant 2.267***       (0.507)       -1.068**       (0.505) 
Immigrant -0.410      (0.346)       0.061 (0.185) 
Age -0.195***       (0.074)       0.165***       (0.039) 
Age2 0.003***       (0.001)    -0.003***       (0.001) 
Male -0.277*       (0.142)       -0.306***       (0.085) 
White -0.198      (0.224)       -0.394***       (0.140) 
Region South 0.262       (0.224)       0.132 (0.144) 
Region Midlands 0.224       (0.215)       0.305**       (0.144) 
Region North 0.490**       (0.212)       0.208 (0.155) 
Truthfulness 0.868***       (0.256)       0.623***       (0.138) 
Prob of Zero-Inflation  
Constant   -44.141 (68.415) 
Immigrant   0.271 (0.847) 
Age   8.640 (12.355) 
Age2   -0.406 (0.533) 
Male   -0.557 (0.498) 
White   0.354 (0.718) 
Region South   -0.394 (0.632) 
Region Midlands   -0.754 (0.849) 
Region North   -0.503 (0.948) 
Prob of Misclassification of Zero as One (Over-reporting) 
Constant -2.234*** (0.204)       -2.140*** (0.083) 
Log Likelihood -1,422.05 -1,415.86 
Predicted.Prob.Crime 0.292        0.509 
Predicted.Prob.Under 0.709        0.719 
Predicted.Prob.Inflation  0.076 
     Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
     (***), denotes statistical significance at 1% significance level 
     (**), denotes statistical significance at 5% significance level 
     (*), denotes statistical significance at 10% significance level 
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Appendix B. NB1-Logit, Generalized-NB-Logit, ZI-Poisson-
Logit, and ZI-NB2-Logit
In subsection 2.5.2 we discussed that identification of the NB2-Logit model requires exactly
the same conditions established for the Poisson-Logit model (exclusion restriction on count
process or sign restrictions on reporting process). A model that is identified even without
the restrictions described above is the Negative Binomial 1-Logit (NB1-Logit), which is
obtained if we assume that αi depends on regressors in the following manner, αi = θ/λi (see,
Papadopoulos, 2011a, and Papadopoulos and Santos Silva, 2008). According to this form
of variance of i, the variance of yi changes to ωi = µi + θλiΛ
2
i . It should be noted that
identification of the conditional mean is easier only because we impose more structure on
the variance. Hence, if the variance form of αi is misspecified, the estimates of θ will be in
general inconsistent.
Instead of assuming the form of the variance, we can specify a generalization of it as
ωi = µi + θλ
2−c
i Λ
2
i , where c is an extra parameter to be estimated. In case c = 0, a NB2-
Logit is obtained, whereas in case c = 1, a NB1-Logit is obtained. Therefore, identification
becomes “weaker” as c gets closer to 0. According to this general parameterization of the
variance the following log-likelihood arises,
lnL(θ, c, β, γ) =
n∑
i=1
ln
(
Γ(yi + θ
−1λci)/Γ(yi + 1)Γ(θ
−1λci)
)−
(θ−1λci + yi) ln(1 + θλ
1−c
i Λi) + yi(lnλ
1−c
i + ln Λi + ln θ) (B.1)
Similarly to the models for binary choice, models for count data with under-reporting can
also be generalized to take into account zero-inflation. First, the Zero-Inflation-Poisson-Logit
(ZIP-Logit) specification is presented. A construction of a response tree similar to (5.2) is
helpful to derive the conditional probabilities of interest. As before, there is a fraction of
people, ξ, that never commit and consequently never report crimes. The remaining fraction
of individuals, (1 − ξ) , can either commit or not commit crimes, but their responses are
subject to under-reporting, meaning that they follow the Poisson-Logit model. Therefore,
zeroes come from zero-inflation, or, from the Poisson-Logit mixture distribution. That is,
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zeroes because of under-reporting, or zeroes because of the choice not to commit crimes.
The response tree is presented in figure 2.6 (page 122). In this case, ξ cannot distinguish
between zeroes because of never committing crimes (zero inflation) and always reporting
zeroes (total under-reporting), which was the case in the binary choice model.
In this tree, e−µi , is the probability of zero from the Poisson-Logit model, and µi = λiΛi.
According to this model, the conditional probabilities of zero and positives are the following,
Pr(yi = 0|xi) = ξ + (1− ξ)e−µi ,
Pr(yi > 0|xi) = (1− ξ)e
−µiµyii
yi!
.
(B.2)
The mean of this model is given by νi = (1− ξ)µi and variance ωi = (1− ξ)(1 + ξµi)µi, so
that there is overdispersion. If ξ is a constant, the log-likelihood is given by,
lnL(u, β, γ) =
∑
y=0
ln
(
ξ + (1− ξ)e−µi)+∑
y>0
ln
(
(1− ξ)e
−µiµyii
yi!
)
. (B.3)
However, ξ can also depend on covariates, so that we try to model what are the characteristics
that lead people never committing crimes or always reporting no crimes. If ξ is a Logit, with
ξi = e
q′iu/(1 + eq
′
iu), then we can write the log-likelihood function of the ZIP-Logit as,
lnL(u, β, γ) = −
n∑
i=1
ln
(
1 + eq
′
iu
)
+
∑
y=0
(
eq
′
iu + e−µi
)
+
∑
y>0
(−µi + yi lnµi − ln(yi!)) .
(B.4)
Identification of this model requires the same assumptions established for the Poisson-Logit,
so that exclusion restrictions in the Poisson part, or sign restrictions on the Logit part are
required.
Reformulation as a Zero-Inflation-NB2-Logit (ZI-NB2-Logit) model is straightforward.
The probability of an observed zero outcome from the NB2-Logit is now given by (1+αµi)
α−1 ,
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and if ξ is a Logit, the resulting log-likelihood is given as,
lnL(θ, u, β, γ) = −
n∑
i=1
ln
(
1 + eq
′
iu
)
+
∑
y=0
ln
(
eq
′
iu + (1 + αµi)
α−1
)
+
∑
y>0
ln
(
Γ(yi + α
−1)/Γ(yi + 1)Γ(α−1)
)−
(α−1 + yi) ln(1 + αµi) + yi(lnµi + lnα).
(B.5)
The mean of the ZI-NB2-Logit is given by νi = (1 − ξ)µi as before, and the variance is
given by ωi = (1− ξ)(1 + ξµi + θµi)µi. Again, identification of this model requires the same
conditions established for the Poisson-Logit and the NB2-Logit models.
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Appendix C. More Robustness Checks
In this Appendix we consider three extra robustness checks. All results of the these three
exercises are presented in Table 2.21. The first specification of this table gives the results of
the second specification of Table 2.12 for the sake of comparisons. Note that the covariate-
dependent MisProbit is used to obtain all the estimates presented in this Appendix. However,
Table 2.21 presents only the results of the crime part. The estimates of the reporting part
are available from the author on request.
Dropping Very Recent Immigrants
As a first exercise we drop from the sample immigrants who have reported that have been in
the country for less than 12 months. This serves two purposes. Firstly, the OCJS does not
record crimes that happened outside the UK. Since the crime questions concern individuals’
criminal behaviour during the 12 months prior to the day of the interview, there might be
some cases of very recent immigrants who have committed crimes outside the UK which are
not recorded. Thus, the immigration coefficient would be downward biased if we overlooked
those cases. However, at the same time, some of the most recent immigrants may have
committed crimes in their source countries and mistakenly recorded them as happened in
the UK. Nevertheless, we would not like to include these reported crimes in our sample either
as we are only interested in the criminal behaviour of immigrants in the host country, since
their countries of origin may exhibit very different characteristics associated with property
crime, such as different economic opportunities and deterrent factors. Therefore, by dropping
immigrants that have been in the UK for less than a year we avoid these two ambiguous
scenarios. From specification 2 of Table 2.12 we notice that when we drop these 117 cases,
the coefficient on migration status slightly increases in magnitude but it is still statistically
insignificant.
Dropping very Young Individuals
The analysis so far has included people from 10 to 66 years old. In this exercise we are
looking at the consequence of dropping very young individuals, as responses of children
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might be less reliable. However, notice that dropping even very young individuals, since we
include a youth-boost (3,185 individuals) we lose many observations which are essential for
the behavior of the model. The results are presented in four specifications. Specification
3 excludes respondents younger than 11 years old, specification 4 also excludes 12 year
olds, specification 5 also excludes 13 year olds and specification 6 also excludes 14 year
olds. First notice that the immigration coefficient becomes more negative if we drop ten
year olds and keeps increasing in magnitude as we drop individuals of 11, 12, and 13 years
of age and it actually becomes significant at 10% in specification 5. However, notice that
although the remaining individuals might provide more reliable information, the precision
of all estimates substantially decreases in specifications 4 to 6. Although not presented in
the table, the precision of the coefficients of the under-reporting (zero-inflation) part also
decreases considerably. This is because, as explained throughout this study, given the low
variation of the dependent variable, the noisy nature of self-reports and the complexities of
the MisProbit MLE, the sample size is very important. Thus, dropping 1,443 individuals
in specification 6 results in very harmful consequences for the behavior of the model. Also
notice that if we drop 14 years old individuals, which reduces the sample size by 1,785
observations, results in no convergence of the estimation procedure.
Without Criminal Damage
Even though criminal damage is also a crime against the property, it entails only psycholog-
ical gains to the offenders and therefore, it is not very clear whether it is proper to include
it in the property crime variable. This is because as it is the case for violent crime, criminal
damage cannot be well explained by the economic model of crime. First, excluding criminal
damage (1.51% positives) reduces the probability of observing a property crime from 5.47%
to 4.91%. The results in specification 5 and 6, where in specification 6 we have no exclusion
restriction, show that the immigration-property crime differential slightly reduces in magni-
tude but it still retains its sign. Notice however, that increasing the number of zeroes also
results in less precise estimates for all estimates, as in the previous exercise.
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Table 2.21. More Robustness Checks 
Mis.Probit 
Property 
Crime 
(1) 
 
Property 
Crime 
(2) 
 
> 1 year 
Immigrants 
(3) 
 
Age>10 
 
(4) 
 
Age > 11 
 
(5) 
 
Age>12 
 
(6) 
 
Age>13 
 
(7) 
No 
Criminal 
Damage 
(8) 
No Cr.Damage 
No 
Truthfulness 
2.335*** 2.220** 1.872** 1.816* 1.462 1.362 1.912* 2.363 
Constant 
(0.896) (0.881) (0.812) (1.049) (1.217) (1.118) (1.005) (1.666) 
-0.254 -0.301 -0.325 -0.524 -0.668* -0.713 -0.162 -0.201 
Immigrant 
(0.273) (0.287) (0.286) (0.403) (0.374) (0.466) (0.278) (0.306) 
-0.259*** -0.249*** -0.241*** -0.225*** -0.190** -0.187** -0.254*** -0.254*** 
Age 
(0.046) (0.044) (0.045) (0.065) (0.091) (0.084) (0.052) (0.076) 
0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002* 0.002* 0.003*** 0.003*** 
Age2 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
0.440*** 0.463*** 0.434*** 0.339 0.209 0.176 0.531*** 0.458*** 
Male 
(0.156) (0.160) (0.169) (0.281) (0.338) (0.309) (0.160) (0.170) 
0.542* 0.439* 0.566** 0.553 0.449 0.545 0.609* 0.375* 
White 
(0.293) (0.259) (0.283) (0.409) (0.493) (0.645) (0.329) (0.381) 
0.273 0.228 0.382 0.552 0.798 0.892 0.315 0.245 Region 
South (0.231) (0.218) (0.257) (0.466) (0.788) (0.844) (0.257) (0.284) 
0.124 0.096 0.208 0.292 0.337 0.348 0.211 0.160 Region 
Midlands (0.228) (0.218) (0.242) (0.344) (0.529) (0.588) (0.247) (0.235) 
0.496 0.416 0.564 1.008 1.393 1.345* 0.526 0.462 Region 
North (0.318) (0.289) (0.350) (0.710) (0.958) (0.869) (0.351) (0.432) 
Sample 
Size 
11,658 11,541 11,365 10,997 10,620 10,215 11,658 11,658 
Log 
Likelihood 
-1,422.05 -1,413.88 -1,392.28 -1,358.77 -1,322.63 -1,265.83 -1,321.94 -1,329.40 
Predicted. 
Prob.Crime 
0.292 0.272 0.249 0.313 0.355 0.357 0.250 0.302 
Predicted. 
Prob.Under 
0.709 0.678 0.657 0.753 0.791 0.798 0.664 0.715 
Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
(***), denotes statistical significance at 1% significance level 
(**), denotes statistical significance at 5% significance level 
(*), denotes statistical significance at 10% significance level 
 
 
Chapter 3
The Relationship between
Immigration Status and Victimization
3.1 Introduction
The link between immigration and crime is well discussed among scholar and non-scholar
communities. Nevertheless, most of the discussions by non-scholars concern immigrants’
involvement into criminal activities as offenders. This one-dimensional treatment has led to
the sentiment that immigrants are more involved in illegal actions. This is in most cases
in contradiction with scholars’ findings (mostly by criminologists and sociologists) which
suggest the opposite.1 For instance, Papadopoulos’ (2010b) findings, in a study for England
and Wales, suggest that immigrants’ participation in criminal activities as offenders (both
in property and violent crimes) is slightly lower than natives’ one as opposed to the public
sentiment.2
Since scholars have also focused on the immigration-crime link from the offending point
of view, they have overlooked the other important side of the coin which concerns the en-
gagement of immigrants in crime as victims. To my knowledge there are no comprehensive
studies that concentrate on this relationship,3 as most studies focus on the determinants
1For a review of the literature for the involvement of immigrants as offenders refer to Papadopoulos
(2010b).
2These results are obtained using the Offending, Crime and Justice Survey of 2003 and appropriate
estimators to correct for possible under-reporting of self-reported crime.
3To the author’s knowledge, the only finding on this link for the UK comes from Machin, Bell and Fasani
(2010) study, who find that immigrants are less likely to be victimized using British Crime Survey data from
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of victimization in general (see, for example, Miethe, Stafford and Long, 1987, Smith and
Jarjoura, 1989, Kennedy and Forde, 1990, Mustaine and Tewksbury, 1998, Wiles, Simmons
and Pease, 2003, Tseloni, Wittebrood, Farrell and Pease, 2004, and Tseloni, 2006). More
relevant studies look at the experiences of ethnic minority groups without distinguishing
between native and immigrant populations (see, for instance, Clancy at al, 2001, Jansson,
2006) and some of them are criminological studies that focus on a very specific aspect of vic-
timization experiences by ethnic minorities, namely, racially motivated crime, or differently,
“hate” crime (see, Gabbidon and Greene 2009, Spalek, 2008, and Kalunta-Crumpton, 2010).
This study, therefore, intends to fill this gap by investigating the victimization differences
between immigrants and natives in England and Wales.1 Looking into victimization would
complete the crime picture and possibly provide many interesting insights for immigrants’
behaviour towards criminal activities. Moreover, this study would shed some light on the
social integration of immigrants into the society. As a result, the findings of this work could
be a useful tool for policy makers.
The first aim of the present study is to comprehensively examine whether immigrants are
more or less at risk of becoming victims of crime and whether differences would still exist
if immigrants shared the same demographical characteristics with the native population. In
a second step we try to identify the reasons that lead to higher or lower victimization of
immigrants. For the purposes of the above analysis we use the 2007-08 sweep of the British
Crime Survey (BCS), a representative victimization survey where respondents were asked
in face-to-face interviews about their victimization experiences in household and personal
crime.2 We need to note that the nature of the victimization incident is very different across
different crime categories, such as property crime (burglaries, vehicle thefts, other thefts,
criminal damage) and personal crime (personal thefts, violence). Therefore, the immigration-
victimization link will be examined separately for the different crime categories, but more
attention will be paid to violent crime.
2004 to 2008. However, the victimization part concerns only a very small part of their paper, so that they
give only a very narrow picture of the immigration-victimization link.
1This study examines the victimization experiences of immigrants and natives only in England and
Wales, as Northern Ireland and Scotland are excluded from the British Crime Survey because of their
distinct criminal justice system.
2The BCS data used in this study are sponsored by the Home Office and provided by the UK Data
Archive.
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Although the present study is mainly empirical, and to some extent methodological, some
theory developed by criminologists and sociologists will still be presented in the next sec-
tion, that formalizes the theoretical expected link between immigration and victimization.
This theory is based on potential victims’ lifestyle-exposure (Hindelang, Gottfredson, and
Garofalo, 1978) and routine activities (Cohen and Felson, 1979) which shape their so-called
criminal opportunity structure. In the present study these theories are adjusted to incorpo-
rate simple notions from the seminal economic models of crime by Becker (1968) and Ehrlich
(1973).
According to the above theories there are many channels, at least for instrumental crime1
both against the household and against the person, through which immigration and victim-
ization are linked either positively or negatively. For instance, immigrants would be more
victimized as they are disproportionately located in deprived areas where crime rates are
much higher. On the other hand, immigrants are less attractive as targets since they usually
possess fewer properties, or relatively less valuable objects. Therefore, the theory cannot
provide a clear-cut relationship between immigration and pecuniary crime; this is rather an
empirical question. As our data provide a lot of information on attributes that are associated
with instrumental crime, we are able to acquire a better understanding of the reasons why
we (do not) observe differential risks of victimization between immigrants and natives.2
The case of violent crimes is less obvious, as violence refers to expressive actions where
the offender intends to hurt the person and not to acquire his/her property. In violent crime,
contrary to property crimes, inter-relations and interactions between potential offenders and
potential victims are important. Thus, personal behaviour is a much stronger predictor of
violent victimization compared to instrumental victimization. Although the above theories
are still valid (given some conceptual modifications), it is difficult to identify the theoretical
channels through which immigrants become more or less likely to be victimized, as most
determinants of the violent victimization incident are unobserved factors determined by the
1By instrumental I mean pecuniary, or differently, a crime that the intention of the offender is to acquire
victim’s property and not to hurt the person itself.
2For example, even if it is the case in the raw data that immigrants face the same risk of becoming
victims of burglaries, we know that immigrants would actually face a lower risk of burglary victimization if
they were located in natives’ residents, as immigrants are located in relatively more deprived areas where
the crime rates are higher.
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potential victim and his/her relationship and interactions with potential offenders. For in-
stance, some people would be less likely to suffer a violent crime if they followed particular
lifestyles associated with lower crime. However, since most aspects of this lifestyle are un-
observed, only speculations can be done to explain the factors that have generated this
differential risk of victimization among different groups of individuals.
Nevertheless, there is one channel that is very clear. Holding all other factors associated
with victimization constant, immigrants would still be at higher risk of violent victimization
than natives because of racially motivated crime. To what extent can racially motivated
crime explain differences in the victimization patterns between immigrants and natives?
This is also an interesting issue that will be examined. Moreover, violent crime consists
of three distinct types of very different nature, namely crime suffered by strangers, crime
suffered by acquaintances and crime suffered by family members (or ex-family members,
such as ex-partners). As will be seen later, modeling these three crime types separately will
provide some very interesting insights on the immigration-victimization nexus.
Another important point is that, since the questionnaire of the BCS involves some ques-
tions that try to elicit very sensitive information, misreporting is a concern. For instance,
there is evidence that respondents tend to under-report domestic violence perhaps because
of fear of reprisal, or because they want to protect the offender (Walby and Allen, 2004,
and Felson at al, 2006). If immigrants’ reporting behaviour differs from natives’ one then,
the coefficient representing the difference in domestic victimization between immigrants and
natives will be biased. However, in Section 3.6, by utilizing two different strategies we show
that immigrants do not under-report by more than natives.
Once the above relationships are established using a thorough examination of sensitivity
tests, some equally interesting topics will be examined. For example, exploiting the number
of victimization incidents we will be able to develop a better understanding of the victim-
ization experiences of immigrants. Is the use of count data models going to change the
picture obtained by the binary choice models? If yes, count data models have something to
say about differential repeated victimization experiences between immigrants and natives.
As will be clear later, conventional count data models, such as the Poisson or the Negative
Binomial regression models, are inadequate to explain the underlying relationship between
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immigration and victimization due to limitations of the data set, such as the presence of
a few extreme cases where respondents reported a very high number of victimization inci-
dents, or, the very large number of zeroes. Therefore, models that take into account these
limitations are used.
Other interesting topics that will be investigated involve whether the ethnic composition
or the location of immigrants matters, whether there are assimilation patterns in the immi-
grants’ victimization experiences and whether immigrant victims perceive their victimization
experiences as more serious than otherwise comparable natives.
We need to note that there will be no separate section for the econometric models used
throughout this study. Instead, if the econometric models used in each section deserve a
formal presentation or at least some clarifications or discussions, they will be given at the
beginning of each corresponding section.
The rest of this study is organized as follows. In the next section a brief exposition
of a victimization theory together with a short discussion of the link between immigration
and crime is presented. Section 3.3 is devoted to explaining some technical parts of the
BCS and the construction of the dependent variables. Additionally, a description of the
data used in the empirical analysis and some descriptive statistics are presented. In Section
3.4 a basic analysis for household crime follows, where we investigate whether immigrants
are less or more likely to be victims of household crimes, focusing on inside and outside
burglaries. Section 3.5 examines the experiences of personal crime. Although some results
on personal theft are also presented, this section puts more weight on violent victimization.
Section 3.6 provides a thorough sensitivity analysis with regard to the results of the previous
section. Section 3.7 delivers a few results of interaction terms and perceived seriousness of
victimization incidents. A comprehensive analysis of count data models follows in Section
3.8. Finally, Section 3.9 consists of concluding remarks.
3.2 Theoretical Perspectives on Victimization
Before discussing the theoretical concepts of victimization it is worth noting that although
this study also presents results on inside and outside burglaries and on personal thefts, most
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of the attention is paid to violent victimization. The results for the other crime types, such
as vehicle crime, criminal damage and household thefts will be briefly discussed but not
presented in detail. Moreover, as these crime types are of a very different nature, we need
to emphasize that to some extent the theoretical concepts apply differently to the different
crime groups.
When it comes to the offender-victim relationship it is natural to argue that in many
cases full responsibility falls onto the offender (although victims could still be unintentionally
responsible). For instance, think of a young girl whose purse gets stolen in a station of
London’s Underground. This is not always the case though. Even early theories (see,
for example, Von Hentig, 1940 and Wolfgang, 1958) admit that there are cases in which
offenders do not bare full responsibility, but the crime is a function of the underlying offender-
victim relationship evolving prior to the victimization incidence. Crimes are considered as
interactive acts that depend upon the actions of both parts. Thus, these theories rule out
the factor of “randomness” in victimization incidents.1 For instance, precipitation theory,
first discussed by Wolfgang (1958), argues that to some extent it is the victims’ provocative
behaviour that initiates subsequent crimes against them (see, Schultz, 1968, and Curtis,
1974). Clearly, the above theories seem more appropriate to describe violent crimes where
for instance, the victim using gestures or offensive language initiates an assault. Or, we could
think of a case of domestic crime where the interaction of family members is very important.
However, the theories that have attracted most both theoretical and empirical research
are based on the concepts of lifestyle-exposure (Hindelang, Gottfredson, and Garofalo, 1978)
and routine activities (Cohen, and Felson, 1979). Earlier concepts, such as the importance
of offender-victim relationship are integrated into these more recent ones. We need to note
that although each of these theories was initially developed for different purposes, they
are closely related and the present study treats them as a single comprehensive theoreti-
cal framework (see, Meier and Miethe, 1993, for an elaborate exposition of these theories).
According to them, routine activities and particular lifestyles of potential victims shape a
criminal opportunity structure which consists of four distinct risk factors that are associ-
1By “random” victimization incidents I mean situations where, there is no prior relationship between the
offender and the victim and the victimization incident does not depend on the interaction between offenders
and victims.
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ated with victimization. These factors are: proximity, exposure, attractiveness and capable
guardianship. Proximity and exposure create the criminal opportunity structure, whereas
attractiveness and ability of effective guardianship determine the criminals’ choice of victims
(Miethe and Meier, 1990).
Proximity is defined as the physical distance between locations that potential targets
tend to spend most of their time in and locations where potential offenders mostly act.
For instance, living in highly deprived areas, where the crime rates are high, increases the
probability to be victimized, as it increases the probability of contacting potential offenders.
This concept becomes less relevant as the mobility of the target increases, since the task of
identifying the distance between offenders and victims becomes more difficult. Therefore,
although the concept of proximity is very clear for household crimes, it loses some trans-
parency once we deal with personal crime. However, it is still important as most victims
tend to socialize in areas close to their residences.1
Exposure refers to the physical visibility or availability of potential victims. The meaning
of this concept changes substantially between different types of crime. For personal violence,
exposure can be conceptualized as the general routine activities or lifestyles of potential
victims, associated with higher or lower likelihood of victimization. For instance, people
that mostly stay at home and do not socialize in bars or pubs tend to be less likely to
suffer a violent crime. Here, general lifestyle also includes relationships and interactions of
potential offenders with potential targets. Thus, this concept also incorporates the earlier
theories of precipitation. For household crime, this risk factor takes a very different meaning.
For instance, for inside or outside burglaries exposure may refer to the location of the house
(such as main road or cul-de-sac), or the amount of properties someone possesses. For vehicle
crime just a high number of cars owned by an individual can be considered as an indicator
of high exposure.
Target attractiveness is defined as the material (for acquisitive crimes) or symbolic (for
violent crimes) desirability (value) of targets to potential offenders. The notion of attractive-
1According to the victim forms of the 2007/08 BCS around 20% of all personal victimization incidents
happened inside or immediately outside victims’ residence. From the rest of them, 6% occurred in workplace,
18% at pub/bar/club, 35% in other public or commercial location and 22% elsewhere. Moreover, it is very
interesting that for the incidents that did not happen inside or outside residence, 40% of them took place
within 15 minutes from victim’s residence.
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ness is again very different across acquisitive and violent crimes. For instance, in household
crime of acquisitive nature, the appearance of the house, or the information of offenders
for valuable objects inside the house increases attractiveness. For personal thefts, the gen-
eral appearance can indicate a level of attractiveness. On the other hand, violence is an
expressive crime, as offenders target to hurting the victim itself without being interested in
victim’s valuable possessions.1 Just the ethnicity of a potential victim can be considered as
highly attractive attribute for an extremist. In other cases attractiveness develops through
interactions and interrelations among people. For example, a member of a gang finds as an
attractive target a member of another gang (with regard to the symbolic utility that the
offender gains if he/she commits the crime). Or, two persons with a history of previous
arguments find one another more attractive to a potential offence.
Finally, physical or social guardianship is the effectiveness of objects (physical guardian-
ship) or people (social guardianship) in preventing crime from occurring. For personal crimes,
guardianship is the ability of the person, or the ability of people around him/her, to protect
him/her. Having a weapon in apparent place, or guards, is a type of physical guardianship.
Also demographic features as height, weight, age, appearance, could indicate an ability of
protection. Physical guardianship for dwellings and vehicles could be for example security
measures, neighbourhood watching program, etc. On the other hand social measures could
be number of hours house left unoccupied, number of household members (more members
indicates that the house is left unoccupied less hours per day, which decreases the likelihood
to be burglarized), knowledge on what to do in case someone breaks into the house, etc.
The basic economic theory of crime is closely related to the above sociological views.
A two-stage model which borrows simple notions from the early economic models of crime
by Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1973) could be formulated to describe the victim-offender
relationship. According to these early models of crime, individuals use a rational cost-benefit
analysis where they weigh the expected costs and benefits in utility terms and subsequently
decide how much time to allocate in legal and criminal activities in order to maximize their
net expected utility. Since crime involves uncertainty, because of potential apprehension
1We need to note that for robberies there is a violent act together with the theft. However, as the
primary target of the offender is instrumental I consider robbery as personal theft.
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and consequent future punishment, the notion of risk aversion is very important. At the
same time, uncertainty and risk aversion are also very important from the potential victims’
point of view, as the actions of potential victims could not perfectly determine the criminal
activity against them.1
Although in reality the situation is much more complicated, a simple model could be for-
mulated as follows: in the first period the (rational) potential victims, given the level of risk
aversion and the initial values of attractiveness, exposure, proximity and capable guardianship
(as these are determined by their exogenous socio-economic and demographic attributes),
consider a set of different strategies and the possible consequent actions of potential offenders
for each different strategy. Consequently, they re-evaluate their position by determining to
some extent the optimal levels of attractiveness, exposure, proximity and capable guardian-
ship in order to maximize the net benefits. For instance, people that are highly afraid of
potential offenses (such as older people), which could translate into very high risk aversion,
would decide to exhibit very low exposure, for example, by staying mostly at home and
avoiding going out at night, or to increase guardianship by taking higher physical measures
of protection. On the other hand, people that value enjoyment by much more than safety
(such as younger people), which could be related to lower risk aversion, would disregard many
potential dangers and exhibit high exposure and attractiveness for the sake of amusement.
In the second stage, once the opportunity criminal structure is set by the determination
of proximity, exposure, attractiveness and guardianship, potential criminals come into play.
Each of the four risk factors can be translated into costs and benefits for the offender.
For instance, a highly attractive person or household would result in higher utility for the
offender, a well protected house increases the uncertainty of success of the criminal action and
therefore increases costs, a household of high exposure decreases uncertainty and therefore,
decreases costs, and so on. Consequently, potential criminals, comparing their legal and
illegal opportunities and taking into account their criminal ability and risks they are willing
to take, decide whether to commit crimes and consequently which targets to hit in order
to maximize their expected utility. Of course, the whole procedure is more complicated
since potential victims cannot perfectly observe the actual risks of victimization for each
1For instance, a burglary cannot be avoided with certainty even if the potential victim is very cautious.
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strategy they follow, and in a similar manner in the second period the four risk factors
are not perfectly observed by the potential criminal. Moreover, this model also ignores the
possibility that potential victims can at the same time be potential offenders. Nevertheless,
this simple form together with the socio-criminological views could give some predictions on
the immigrant-victimization relationship.
We need to emphasize that all ascribed or acquired attributes, such as age, gender and
race, or education, income, family and employment conditions, respectively, are associated
with victimization likelihood through their effects on the described risk factors. For example,
males generally prefer to socialize more frequently in dangerous places and they exhibit a
more aggressive behaviour relatively to females. Therefore, they would decide to be more
exposed to criminal activities, which makes them more likely to become victims of violence.
However, the situation is very different for domestic crime. Males within a family are vic-
timized to a lesser degree because they exhibit higher guardianship. Moreover, the effect of
some other attributes is ambiguous as they affect victimization risk through two or more
risk factors. For instance, more aﬄuent households are associated with both higher or lower
risk of a burglary, since high household income may indicate a better protected house (more
capable guardianship) or a very attractive target (since there are many valuable objects both
in the house and outside the house).
3.2.1 The Immigration-Victimization Link
Immigration status (at least for the purposes of the empirical analysis) can be considered
as an attribute ascribed to an individual.1 Although immigrant population is rather het-
erogeneous, immigrants share some common characteristics. In Table 3.3 some descriptive
statistics from the BCS 2007-08, by immigration status, can be found. From this table it
is clear that immigrants are relatively younger, more from ethnic minorities and relatively
more married. It is also clear that they are more unemployed and there is evidence that
they are on average poorer and face lower legal opportunities relative to natives (see, for
example, Algan at al, 2010). Given all the above characteristics, and assuming that labour
outcomes enter the problem exogenously, immigrants evaluate their initial levels of attrac-
1Thus, we consider immigrants’ behaviour after the decision to migrate.
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tiveness, exposure, proximity and guardianship, as all these exogenous attributes are to some
extent associated with these four risk factors.1 Consequently, they reevaluate their position
by following strategies that minimize the victimization risks for each crime group given all
the aforementioned constraints.
For instance, location, and consequently proximity, is constrained by the labour outcomes
of immigrants. As we can see from the descriptive statistics immigrants are disproportion-
ately located in deprived inner city areas, mostly of London. This could be the consequence
of the following reason. As immigrants face unfavorable labour outcomes they can only
afford to reside in areas where the rents are relatively low. It happens that these areas are
relatively more deprived with high crime rates and therefore, of higher proximity. Neverthe-
less, given the above constraint, immigrants reduce the risk of both personal and household
victimization by choosing to reside (within these areas of high proximity) in locations with
high concentration of the same ethnic group. This develops a type of natural protection, or
provides a higher insurance against risk of victimization by increasing social guardianship.
At the same time, household physical guardianship is also constrained by their labour out-
comes, as they could not afford means of high protection. Residing in the aforementioned
areas performs as a natural social guardianship that intends to balance the lower physical
guardianship.
Moreover, as immigrants disproportionately belong to ethnic minority groups they are
in higher danger of racially motivated violence, since they are relatively more attractive
to extremist groups. Therefore, they might choose to balance this unfavorable position by
choosing routine activities and lifestyle exposure associated with lower victimization (and
therefore, by reducing exposure). In addition, a proportion of immigrants might feel alienated
and react in this perceived hostile environment by following strategies that reduces the risk
of victimization. Finally, immigrants could naturally exhibit different exposure, because of
cultural differences that are associated with different lifestyles.
As mentioned in the introduction, violence consists of three crime types of very different
nature, namely crime by strangers, crime by acquaintances, and domestic crime. Theoretical
1For example, younger people prefer to have a social life associated with higher exposure. Married people
on the contrary follow lifestyles associated with lower exposure.
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predictions on the association between immigration status and domestic crime or crime
by acquaintances can be given by immigrants’ relative participation in the illegal sector
as offenders. For instance, according to the “homogamy” principle immigrants tend to
socialize with other immigrants of the same ethnic group and therefore, a large proportion
of immigrants’ acquaintances or family members are immigrants as well. If we accept that
immigrants, according to Papadopoulos (2010b), are slightly less likely to commit violent
crimes, holding everything else constant, we would expect a negative relationship between
being an immigrant and violent crime suffered by acquaintances or family members.1
However, a negative relationship could be also observed because of “network effects”, a
concept closely related to exposure. For instance, crime suffered by acquaintances could be
lower for more recent immigrants due to the fact that more recent immigrants know fewer
people. Therefore, the “pool” of acquaintances is larger for natives or earlier immigrants.
According to this, we could expect that as time spent in the host country increases, immi-
grants enlarge their group of acquaintances, and therefore, to some extent they assimilate
to natives’ risk of victimization by acquaintances.
As it is clear from the discussion of this section, the unobserved interactions and inter-
relations among people are relevant for violent crime, but not for household burglaries and
personal thefts. Household burglaries more or less depend on observed household charac-
teristics. The fact that the household reference person is an immigrant should not affect
the risk of victimization, given that we are able to control for all household characteristics
associated with burglary victimization.2 The only unobserved (by the author) characteristic
that might be important to describe instrumental victimization risks is the size of potential
victims’ possessions (apart from the number of vehicles which is observed).3 Fortunately, the
BCS provides a rich set of household characteristics directly associated with lifestyle-exposure
1As an example, consider the following simple calculation. Assume that the probability to commit a crime
is 6% and 10% for an immigrant and a native respectively. Also, assume that 5% of natives’ acquaintances
are immigrants, but 60% of immigrants’ acquaintances are immigrants. According to these assumptions,
holding everything else constant, the probability for an immigrant to suffer a crime by an acquaintance is
6% × 0.60 + 10% × 0.40 = 7.6%, but this figure is 9.8% for natives, so that the difference is 2.2 percentage
points.
2Unless criminals seek places that are inhabited by immigrants or criminals have information about the
immigration status of residents and tend to prefer targeting these places. However, for a household crime it
is the instrument that is much more important than the person who owns it or resides in it.
3This can be considered as more important for properties outside the dwelling as they are directly
observed by potential criminals, as opposed to interior properties.
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and routine activities, such as hours home left unoccupied, being in a neighbourhood watch-
ing program, house condition, type, location, etc (see, next section). he situation of personal
thefts is a bit more complicated due to the fact that it entails personal contact and thus,
the potential criminal can directly observe the potential victim. However, as for burglaries,
personal theft is in a sense more “random” in the sense that personal behavior is not an
important predictor of the action.
Nevertheless, for violent crime, the risk of victimization highly depends on the unobserved
strategies associated with particular lifestyle-exposure and routine activities that immigrants
set in order to reduce the victimization costs. As described above, lifestyle-exposure and
routine activities might be very different between immigrant and native groups and therefore,
the theory cannot provide a clear-cut relationship. This should instead be established by
the empirical analysis. Hopefully, the empirical analysis would also provide many insights
on the reasons behind the observed immigrants-natives violent victimization differentials.
In addition, we need to recognize that immigrant population is highly heterogeneous and
the different groups of immigrants (for example, according with their ethnic background, or
the time spent in the UK) might be associated with different unobserved victimization-prone
factors. This subject will be examined in Section 3.7. Finally, for some reasons explained in
Section 3.8, repeated victimization may be different between immigrants and natives. Count
data models will provide insights on this relationship.
3.3 BCS, Dependent Variables and Descriptive Statis-
tics
In the first subsection of Section 3.3 a brief description of the British Crime Survey together
with some important issues concerning the construction of the dependent variables is pre-
sented. A description of the data together with some descriptive statistics follow in the
second subsection.
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3.3.1 The British Crime Survey and Dependent Variables
The British Crime Survey 2007-08 (BCS), carried out by the Home Office, is a representative
(primarily) victimization survey where respondents in England and Wales were asked in
face-to-face interviews about their victimization experiences in both household and personal
crime. As will be described later, the BCS also includes computer-based self-completed
interviews for the more sensitive crimes. such as domestic violence and sexually motivated
offences. Moreover, it does not interview people from Scotland and Northern Ireland as
they now conduct separate surveys. The reference period for all interviews refers to the
victimization incidents during the last 12 months prior to the date of the interview. It is
one of the largest social surveys in England and Wales as it interviews approximately 47,000
respondents per year.
This survey is ideal to identify determinants of victimization since, together with in-
formation on victimization experiences, a large set of demographic characteristics together
with information on household and personal characteristics associated with victimization are
available. Note that, since the BCS interviews only private households, it does not cover
commercial victimization, frauds and victimless crime, crime against children, crime against
people currently in institutions, and murders (for details of the BCS refer to Bolling, Grant,
and Donovan, 2008, I).
For the purposes of this study, information from three separate files of the BCS 2007-
08 was combined using the unique identifier variable from the three data sets. These files
are: 1) the Main BCS data set, where information for all respondents and their households
regardless of their victimization experiences is included, 2) the Victimization Form data set,
in which details of each crime reported by victims are given, and 3) the Self Completion
data set of domestic violence, where all people between 16-59 years old, by participating
in computer-based self-reported interviews, provided information on their experiences of
domestic violence.1
These three data sets were constructed by using a complicated procedure whose main
steps are briefly described as follows: interviewees, after giving some information on de-
1There is evidence that respondents under-report by less in computer-based self-reports (see, for example,
Turner at al, 1998). Therefore, as mentioned in the introduction, the purpose of using this information is to
check whether immigrants under-report violent crime by more or less than natives.
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mographic and other individual and household characteristics, were asked a list of screener
questions about whether they suffered any type of victimization incidents during the last 12
months (against them or against their household). In case the respondent reported a suf-
fered crime, a victim form was given for each crime suffered. The victim forms assigned to
each individual were limited to six. Each victimization form contained detailed information
on the crime incident. This information was next used by trained coders to assign either
a valid or an invalid victimization code.1 The cases in which the conductor was uncertain
about the offence code to be assigned were sent to Home Office to be crosschecked by Home
Office experts. There, a finalized code was assigned. If a particular crime in a given victim
form was described as a “series” crime, where a series crime is defined as “the same thing,
done under the same circumstances and probably by the same people”, the number of the
incidents was recorded. The classification of crime codes is depicted in Table 3.1.
It is important to note that some incidents included a sequence of crime events which
might have been of different nature. For instance, we could imagine a case where a stranger
broke into a house to steal valuables but during the act of burglary the victim tried to
prevent the incident resulting in suffering an assault with serious wounding. Eventually, the
offender also burned the house. This incident (which is of course extreme and not very likely
to have happened) involves three separate crimes but it will be recorded as arson because
arson takes priority over burglaries and serious wounding. In similar cases the final coding
depends on the seriousness of the incident. For details on the coding and which crimes take
priority over other ones refer to Bolling, Grant and Donovan (2008, II).
The dependent variables used in this study were created from the offence code variable
given in the Victim Forms data set (see, Table 3.1). As the question of interest in this
study is to identify whether immigrants are more or less likely to be victims of criminal
activity (and in extension whether immigrants are more frequently victimized than natives)
a grouping of the individual codes was required. Otherwise there was not enough variation
in the dependent variable to give precise and robust estimates for the coefficients of the
1The incidents are given invalid codes if the offence was a duplicate, if the offender was described as
mentally ill, if the offender was a police member on duty, and if incidents that initially were given a victim
form decided to be coded as no crimes after a scrutinized examination. Note that incidents outside England
and Wales were given a valid code.
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models. Seven main groups were constructed according to the nature of each crime code (as
judged by the author being of the same nature), five of them for household crime and two
for personal crime. For household crime these are: Inside Burglaries (codes 51-53), Outside
Burglaries (codes 50, 57, 58), Vehicle Thefts (codes 60-64, 71, 72), Household Thefts (codes
55, 56, 65-67, 73)1 and Vandalism (codes 80-86).2 Regarding personal crime, these are:
Personal Theft (codes 41-45) and Personal Violence (11-13, 21).3
For all constructed variables I use both the binary information, which is used in the
first part of the empirical analysis (Sections 3.4-3.7), and the count form (number of crimes
suffered), which is used in the second part (Section 3.8). For each crime group, the binary
dependent variable is just a dummy that takes the value one if the individual reported
a victimization of that crime group in at least one victim form and zero otherwise. The
count variables are created by using the “series” information from the victim forms. For
example, if an assault with wounding was considered as a “series” crime, the number of
assaults forms the count variable. Moreover, if the same individual suffered another assault,
for instance without injury, the number of assaults from this victim form, as indicated by
the “series” information, are added to the previous count.4 Finally, note that it is possible
two victimization forms to be assigned by the conductor for two very similar crimes, which
even belong to the same code, if some characteristics of the first (series of) incident(s) are
considered by the coders to be different from the second (series of) incident(s).5
As mentioned in the introduction, the personal violence variable is the mix of three crimes
1Separation between inside, outside and other thefts was also considered.
2A separation between home vandalism and vehicle vandalism was considered to be interesting.
3For details on the crimes that each individual code included refer to the Offence Coding Coders Manual
in Bolling, Grant, and Donovan (2008, II).
4We need to note that the main data provides derived crime variables which are used by the Home Office
to calculate prevalence and incidence rates. However, for each crime code in these variables a cap of five
crimes is imposed. Therefore, the total count for a crime group, say violent crime, will be the sum of crimes
from each victimization form that fall within this crime group, where the number of crimes in each victim
form is censored in five crimes. Thus, the resulting count variable will be the sum of up to six censored at
five crimes. According to this, it is not proper to use a simple right censored at 30 crimes count data model
but a model that allows for censoring at 5 crimes for each victimization form someone gets. This of course
will result in a very complicated situation. Moreover, these derived variables do not include cases where the
coder was uncertain what code to assign.
5For instance, consider a case where a victim suffered 15 assaults without injury (1st victimization form)
and 5 assaults again without injury (2nd victimization form). The difference between these two series of
crimes is that, for instance, the first series of assaults were committed by an acquaintance whereas the second
series by a partner. Therefore, although these two crimes at the end take the same code (number 13), two
different victimization forms are assigned. To construct the count of assault without injury for this individual
we need to sum the count from the 1st victimization form and the count from the 2nd victimization form.
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of very different nature. Crime suffered by strangers, crime suffered by acquaintances and
domestic crime. Since these three crimes are different in many dimensions it is more proper
to treat them as three separate crime categories. Fortunately, this information is also given
in the Victim Forms data set and three separate dummies or count variables can be created.1
This will be well discussed in Section 3.5.
However, another question is raised. Is it appropriate to treat these three types as being
independent from each other (and therefore, model them as three independent equations)?
For instance, when we consider crime by acquaintances, is it appropriate to consider an
individual who suffered a domestic crime but not a crime by acquaintances as being the
same with an individual who did not suffer crimes at all? It might be more proper to
take into account the fact that people who suffered a violent crime of one type may share
common unobserved characteristics with people that suffered a violent crime of another type.
Allowing for these unobserved factors to be correlated might result in efficiency gains. This
will be further discussed in Section 3.6.
Finally, for each (series of) crime event(s) the information whether it is (they are) per-
ceived as a racially motivated crime, together with the reason why it is (they are) perceived
as such, is available. Therefore, (perceived) racially motivated crime can be controlled for.
3.3.2 Description of the Data
To begin with, although in the empirical analysis I focus on burglaries, personal thefts and
violent crime, the distribution of the count form of all dependent variables is presented in
Table 3.2. However, the full distribution of the violent crime variables is presented separately
in Table 3.22. There are two main issues that deserve a brief discussion. Firstly, the number
of zeroes is very large for most of the variables. Thus, for some variables it is hard to obtain
precise estimates because of the low variation in the dependent variable, particularly for count
data models which are not very robust when the presence of zeroes is very high. Secondly,
there are few cases of victims that reported extreme number of crimes. For instance, in
variable Personal Theft there is only one person above ten crimes, who actually reported
1The ‘do’ files (Statar format) for the creation of dependent variables from the Victim Forms data set
are available from the author upon request.
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97 crimes, or, for Inside Burglary there are eight people that reported between 70 and 100
crimes. In this table for ease of exposition we cap the crime count at ten plus more. Count
data models are very sensitive to these cases, particularly when the positive counts are too
few to identify the parameters assumed to affect the conditional mean, and when the extreme
cases are very dispersed from the less extreme cases. Someone would think of dropping these
cases because they could be considered as highly unreliable. However, this practice would
result in sample selection issues. Therefore, as will be discussed in Section 3.8, we also
use several modified count data models that are both (in a sense) more robust under these
cases and more appropriate to explain the observed distribution of victimization incidents.
Finally, it is also clear that the dispersion of most variables is very high. Therefore, the
Negative Binomial distribution that allows for over-dispersion may be more appropriate to
fit the observed data.
Moreover, descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent variables are presented
in Table 3.3. The mean for native and immigrant groups for all variables is also given in order
to have a first indication on the victimization differences between immigrants and natives.
In addition, we will be able to observe the aspects in which immigrants differ from natives
with regard to their observed characteristics. It must be noted that, the immigration status
variable is created as a dummy that takes the value 1 if the respondent or the house reference
person is not born in the UK. Moreover, the information of how many years the respondent
lives in the UK can be exploited to examine assimilation patterns of the immigration-native
victimization differentials. This will be examined in Section 3.6.
A first look at the raw data shows that there are victimization differences between immi-
grant and native groups, although they are very small in most cases. Regarding acquisitive
crime, both household and personal, we can see that the probability and the mean victimiza-
tion are higher for immigrants, apart from Outside Burglary (and Outside Thefts or Other
Thefts).1 Moreover, Home Criminal Damage is slightly lower but Vehicle Criminal Damage
is slightly higher for immigrants. Concerning Violent Crime, which is the crime group most
discussed in this study, we can see that immigrants are less victimized. However, the picture
1Here I do not discuss statistical significance of the differences as these descriptive statistics are used
just as a first indication.
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is different if we break violence into the categories discussed before, as immigrants are much
less victimized by acquaintances and family members, but slightly more by strangers.
In addition, in Table 3.3 the independent variables which will be used in the main anal-
ysis are also presented. Again, the mean for both immigrants and natives is given. Note
that the means for the respondent’s and the household reference person’s characteristic are
separately given. This is because the appropriate variables in personal crime are the personal
characteristics, but in household crime it is the household characteristics. The main observed
differences between immigrants and natives is that immigrants are younger (which can be
considered mainly as a measure of exposure) and that they are relatively more concentrated
in London, urban and inner city areas, but most importantly that they reside in relatively
more deprived areas (which can be thought as proximity measures).1 Thus, a first question in
the main analysis would be: what would be the immigrant-native differences in the likelihood
to suffer a crime if immigrants displayed the same basic demographic characteristics?
Moreover, immigrants are more married, more of nonwhite ethnic groups, more renters
and they reside relatively more in flats (mainly exposure measures). They also live fewer
years at their current home or area (which is a measure of social guardianship) and finally,
they possess fewer cars (measure of exposure). There are no strong differences in income
and education. Hence, another question would be: if there still are differences, can they be
explained by the remaining observed individual and household characteristics?
Finally, notice that for some of the independent variables there are many missing cases.
Dropping all these cases would result in losing too much information. Therefore, a dummy
is created for each variable that contains a considerable number of missing cases that takes
the value one if the particular variable displays a missing value and zero otherwise. Thus,
1The Deprivation Index is the “Multiple Deprivation Index of England and Wales” for 2007, constructed
as a weighted mixture of the individual deprivation indices (Income deprivation, Employment deprivation,
Health deprivation and disability, Education, skills and training deprivation, Barriers to housing and services,
Living environment deprivation, and Crime deprivation index) provided by the Department of Communities
and Local Governments for England and Welsh Assembly Government for Welsh. Very briefly, this index,
that takes integer values from 1 to 10, provides a measure of multiple deprivation at the Lower Super
Output Areas (LSOAs) level by considering some indicators of deprivation. These values indicate the decile
of deprivation in which someone scores. For example, if someone scores at the 7th decile, only 30% of the
population resides in more deprived areas. Each respondent, depending on the small level area that he/she
resides, is matched by the Home Office with the corresponding decile of this variable. For more information
on these indices refer to Noble at al (2008). In the empirical analysis I include this variable as an 1 - 10
integer index that measures the effect of scoring at a one decile higher on the probability of victimization.
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these dummies intend to absorb the effects of the missing cases of each characteristic on the
dependent variables.
In a summary of this subsection, we saw that immigrants suffer in general slightly more
property crime and personal theft (apart from outside thefts and home criminal damage) but
less violent crime than natives, although they live in more deprived inner city neighbourhoods
where violent crime is much higher. However this picture changes if we distinguish crime
by strangers from crime by acquaintances and family members. More on these relationships
will be discussed in the next two sections.
3.4 Risk of Household Crime
In this section simple Probit results for household crime are presented.1 As discussed in the
previous section household crime was separated in five mutually exclusive groups. However,
here mainly the results of Inside Burglaries plus Attempts and Outside Burglaries plus At-
tempts are presented. The results of the other variables are briefly discussed in the second
subsection. Full results are available from the author on request. The regressors believed to
affect the conditional expectation of the dependent variables are assumed to be the same for
both crime groups.2
In the results that follow four specifications of the conditional mean are presented. In
specification 1 the effect of the household reference person (hrp) being an immigrant on the
likelihood of victimization is considered without taking into account that immigrants differ
from natives in many dimensions. In specification 2 some important proximity measures
are controlled for. In specification 3 some important characteristics of the hrp are also
included, which are thought in literature to be associated mostly with the risk factor of
exposure. Finally, in specification 4 some extra important household characteristics that are
theoretically associated with exposure, attractiveness and guardianship are used.
1All the empirical results in this study are obtained using Statar and TSPr econometrics software.
2Thus, we assume that the factors that affect the criminal opportunity structure through their effects
on the four risk factors are generally the same for the two crime variables.
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3.4.1 Inside Burglary
Before discussing the results we need to note that 81% of the Inside Burglaries plus At-
tempts incidents the victim did not know the offender, whereas only 10% of the cases
happened because of preexisted personal relationship/history between the victim and the
offender. Therefore, although there are a few cases where interrelations and interaction be-
tween victim-offender matter, inside burglary can be considered in a high degree as “random”
where criminals solely target the property without interest in the household composition
and without intentions to victimize household members. Thus, we can assume that offend-
ers target specific dwellings not because of the composition of the residents, but because
these specific dwellings exhibit characteristics associated with higher risk of inside burglary
victimization. Moreover, notice that most of the times, criminals’ information about inte-
rior properties is limited, so that the value of the interior properties would not be a large
factor for the risk of victimization. Instead, attractiveness is approximated by the external
household characteristics.
According to the above, we would expect that if a relationship between immigration and
inside burglaries exists, it is not because criminals prefer targeting immigrants’ properties,
but because immigrants’ household characteristics are associated with more or less victim-
ization, as discussed in Section 3.2. These characteristics refer to both direct household
characteristics such as location and external condition, and indirect characteristics associ-
ated with the four risk factors, such as household reference person’s age, marital status, or
how many hours the house is left unoccupied. Therefore, we would expect that this associa-
tion would fade out if we were able to control for the characteristics that make immigrants’
properties subject to higher or lower victimization.
The Probit results are presented in Table 3.4. First of all, we can see that the likelihood
of victimization increases if the hrp is an immigrant. The marginal effect is 0.74 percentage
points (which is statistically significant at 1% significance level) which is fairly large in
magnitude if we bear in mind that the probability to suffer an inside burglary is 2.99% for
immigrants and 2.25% for natives, a relative effect of 33%. Note that the result is almost
identical if we control for respondent’s immigration status rather than hrp’s immigration
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status. This was expected because according to the “homogamy” principle it is highly
possible that if the respondent is an immigrant the hrp is also an immigrant.1
Hence, dwellings in which the hrp is an immigrant are disproportionately victimized.
However, a major part of this difference can be explained by the fact that immigrant dispro-
portionately reside in urban areas where the deprivation index is much higher, two factors
that are highly associated with the risk of inside burglary.2 Moreover, from specification 3
it is clear that the rest of the difference is explained by hrp’s basic characteristics indirectly
associated with exposure, attractiveness, and capable guardianship. The association even be-
comes negative if we include the extra controls of the fourth specification. It is important
to note that, as the research question mainly concerns the immigration-native victimization
differentials, discussion of the effects of the other variables will not be given in the main text
but as a note for each different crime group.3
3.4.2 Outside Burglary
Outside Burglaries plus Attempts (burglaries of non-connected domestic garage/outhouse)
are considered separately due to the following two reasons. Firstly, as immigrants dispropor-
tionately reside in flats or maisonettes, they probably possess fewer outside properties, such
as non-connected to the main house garages, outhouses, storehouses and conservatories.4
Therefore, controlling for other characteristics, the risk of outside burglary is expected to
still be lower for immigrants. Unfortunately, information of outside properties is not given in
the BCS. Secondly, outside properties can be considered as “safer” targets because of lower
1The tetrachoric correlation coefficient (see, Edwards and Edwards, 1984) is 0.9841.
2The marginal effect decreases to 0.29 percentage points and it is statistically insignificant.
3We can see that if the hrp is older, married, employed and owner, the victimization risk falls. However,
the gender of the hrp does not affect risk of victimization. For the rest of the coefficients in specification 4 we
have the following relationships: as the perceived condition of the house increases, risk of victimization also
increases. Also, condition of the dwelling relative to the other dwellings in the neighbourhood is important
as both better and worse condition houses are of higher risk of victimization. Moreover, detached houses,
and properties located on main or the side of the road are associated with more crime. Number of adults in
the house and hours that the house is left unoccupied have no effect. On the other hand, if the respondent
is a lone parent the risk of victimization increases. The longer the respondent resides in the same house
the lower the likelihood of an inside burglary. In addition, if the property is in a neighbourhood Watching
Program the risk of victimization decreases (significant at 10%). The joint effect of income dummies, having
less than 10,000 pounds of annual income as the reference group, is significant at 1% with 50+ group being
the only group associated with more crime than the base group (significant at 10%). Finally, education
dummies are jointly significant at 10%, with more crime for higher educated people.
4We need to stress that theft of outside properties and car thefts are not included in outside burglaries
but they are treated separately.
162
physical and social guardianship. Using the Victim Forms data set we can see that in 96%
of the cases the criminal was a stranger1 and that in 99% of the cases the incident could
not be attributed to previous personal history or relationship. Hence, the same argument in
favor of “randomness” used for Inside Burglaries plus Attempts holds here as well. Finally,
notice that for this crime category we observe very few positives (99% of zeroes).
The results are depicted in Table 3.5. In spite of the fact that the variation of the
dependent variable is very low, Table 3.5 shows that the immigration coefficient is very
robust across all specifications. We see that the likelihood of victimization is lower for
immigrant households and statistically significant at 5% regardless of the control variables.
To evaluate the magnitude of this difference marginal effects are calculated. For example, for
specification 2, evaluated for a household that is located in an average deprived area, in the
inner city of an urban area in London, the probability of an Outside Burglary plus Attempt
is around 0.3 percentage points lower for households in which the hrp is an immigrant, with
a relative effect of around 60%.
Thus, even though immigrants live in relatively more deprived areas, they face a much
lower probability of victimization. This may be attributed, as mentioned before, to the
fact that immigrants possess fewer domestic outside properties. Unfortunately, there is no
information on non-connected domestic outside properties and therefore, we are not able to
test the above argument. However, a zero-inflation (ZI) count data model could be relevant
in this case (see, Mullahy, 1986, and Lambert, 1992). According to the ZI model some
households will never experience an outside burglary just because they do not own any
outside properties. It is interesting that, in accordance with this previous argument, ZI
models for counts show that the immigration status coefficient is positive in the inflation
equation and significant at least at 10% significance level in most specifications. A zero-
inflated Probit model was also employed, whose log-likelihood function resembles the log-
likelihood of the MisProbit model presented in Papadopoulos (2010b) if the one inflation
probability is constraint to be equal to 0. Although the behaviour of this model in terms of
estimation was not trustworthy, its results also indicate that the proportion of immigrants
1Of course, this might be because in most of outside burglaries it is highly likely that the victim had no
contact with the offender, and therefore, could not be able to evaluate whether he/she knew the offender.
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in the zero inflation category is more than the proportion of natives and significant at 5%
level of significance. All results are available from the author on request.
Moreover, we could think that earlier immigrants are better settled and therefore, their
outside properties would be more similar to natives’ ones. Thus, we expect to observe a
lower risk of outside burglaries for earlier immigrant with an assimilation pattern as the
number of years in the country increases. Unfortunately, Number of Years in the Country is
not provided for the hrp, but we could approximate it with respondent’s Number of Years
in the Country since, as in the previous section, using the variable Immigrant instead of
Hrp Immigrant the results were identical. The results, which are presented in the first two
rows of the second part of Table 3.5, are quite supportive of the above argument.1 We
can see that when we include the linear trend for the number of years of an immigrant in
the host country, more recent immigrants are associated with a much lower probability of
victimization (even lower than before) and that this probability converges to natives’ one as
years in the country increase (although the marginal effects show that it takes more than 40
years for immigrants to assimilate to natives’ probability of outside burglary victimization).
Note that the “assimilation” coefficient is insignificant in specifications 1 and 2 because we
do not control for age, as immigrants that are more years in the country are relatively older,
and older people are associated with lower victimization risks. Once we control for age, the
coefficient of immigration dummy increases in magnitude and the “assimilation” coefficient
becomes significant at 5% significance level. Finally, we need to note that most regressors
have an insignificant effect on the probability to suffer an outside burglary.2
3.4.3 Remaining Household Crime Groups
In this subsection the main results of the association between immigration and the risk of vic-
timization for Vehicle Thefts, Household Thefts and Criminal Damage are briefly discussed.
1Here, only the coefficients of interest are presented. Full results are available upon request.
2For the coefficients in specification 4 we have the following relationships: only relative condition affects
victimization, as the better the condition relatively to other houses, the higher the risk of victimization. There
is no effect for worse condition. The dummies for the type of the house have no joint effect. Being located in
a main road increases the risk of victimization but being in a side road does not affect it. Number of Adults
has no effect as well. On the contrary, as for inside burglary, lone parents’ households experience higher
risk. Moreover, there is no effect for, Hours Unoccupied, Years at Home and Years in Area, neighbourhood
Watching Program and income dummies. Finally, education is jointly significant at 1%, with more crime for
more educated people (more than a-levels).
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The results are not presented but are available from the author on request.
To begin with, contrary to burglaries, Vehicle Thefts are much more often, as the prob-
ability of victimization in the raw data is 6.53%. Therefore, the estimates obtained for this
crime group are much more precise. Once more, we expect that holding everything else
constant, immigrants would experience a lower risk of vehicle thefts just because they own
fewer vehicles. However, as opposed to outside burglary, in this case we have information
on both the number of cars a household owns and on ownership of motorbikes and bicycles.
The results show that immigrants face a higher risk of vehicle thefts (statistically significant
at 1%) even though they own fewer vehicles, if we do not control for demographic disad-
vantages of immigrants. Thus, the coefficient of the effect of immigration status on vehicle
crime increases once we control for this fact by including the natural logarithm of vehicles
as a regressor and considering only the population that possesses vehicles.1 However, as
expected, if basic demographic differences between immigrants and natives are controlled
for, the difference in the likelihood of victimization fades out.
Household Thefts consists of Inside Thefts (0.25% positives), Outside Thefts (2.62% pos-
itives), Other Household Thefts that do not fall within these two categories (1.76% positives)
and Attempted Thefts (0.16% positives).2 The results indicate that immigrants do not ex-
perience a higher risk of being victims of Household Thefts even thought they have some
demographic disadvantages (the coefficient is 0.002 and very insignificant). Therefore, as we
1The reason why we include the number of vehicles in the natural logarithm form is the following: firstly,
it is important to note that any binary choice model could be thought of as a censored at 1 crime count data
model. For example, in the Poisson case, the probability of the zero outcome is e−λ and the probability of a
positive is 1− e−λ where λ is the Poisson conditional mean. Thus, the structure of the conditional mean of
the binary model should be consistent with the structure of the conditional mean of a count data model. As
it is very common in count data models, in order to ensure nonnegativity we consider the mean to be given
by λi = e
x′iβ . Moreover, it is natural to assume that the risk of suffering a vehicle crime is proportional
to the number of vehicles someone possesses (in the same way we model cases where different individuals
are exposed on the outcome y for a different time interval), since the number of vehicles can be considered
as a direct measure of exposure. Thus, if N is the number of vehicles someone possesses, the mean in this
particular case is given by λiN = e
x′iβ ⇒ λi = N · ex′iβ . Therefore, the number of vehicles should be included
in the regression framework as the ln of N , so that λi = e
x′iβ+lnN . From the last expression it is clear that we
cannot include the households with zero vehicles. Intuitively, considering only the population that possesses
vehicles, we directly control for the zero-inflation probability which is the probability of not suffering vehicle
crimes just because of no possession of any vehicles (No exposure).
2The differences between a burglary and a household theft are explained in detail in Bolling, Grant, and
Donovan (2008). Very briefly, inside thefts consist of the cases where there was a theft by a person who
was in the house with the consent of households members. Outside thefts consists of thefts of properties
outside the house without any sign of outside burglary. Other household thefts include all other categories
of household thefts excluding personal thefts.
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control for demographic differences the coefficient becomes negative and significant at 5%.
It has to be stressed that these results are driven by Outside Thefts, as it is the variable
with the most positives. If we break household thefts in the three categories we observe the
following: for Inside Thefts immigrant coefficient is always positive but insignificant in all
specifications. For Outside Thefts it is negative but insignificant in specifications similar to
1 and 2 of Tables 3.4 and 3.5, but negative and significant at 10% if we include further con-
trols. Finally, for Other Thefts it is positive and insignificant in specification 1, but negative
and insignificant in specifications 2, 3 and 4. Thus, immigrants face a lower probability of
Household Thefts probably because they do not own many outside properties, or because
they are more capable of protecting and monitoring their outside properties.
Finally, the nature of Criminal Damage is very different, since vandalism is an expres-
sive crime, as opposed to the other crimes discussed above which can be considered as
acquisitive crimes. Criminal Damage includes Home Criminal Damage (2.48% positives),
Vehicle Criminal Damage (5.37% positives), Other Criminal Damage (0.11% positives) and
Arson (0.001% positives). The empirical analysis shows that, as for Household Thefts, al-
though immigrants stay in disadvantageous areas, they experience the same risk of vandalism.
Therefore, the coefficient of immigration status becomes negative and significant at 5% in
specifications 3 and 4 (but not significant in specification 2). Further analysis shows that the
previous effect is driven by the effect of immigration on Home Criminal Damage, as there is
no relationship for Vehicle Criminal Damage (as it was the case for Vehicle Theft).
3.5 Risk of Personal Victimization
In this section the results of personal victimization are presented. First of all, personal
victimization differs from household victimization in one essential element; it entails personal
contact with the victim. Therefore, personal characteristics of the victim might directly
affect the criminal action. The implications of this crucial difference on the immigration-
victimization relationship can be quite important. This is mostly because, as potential
offenders directly observe potential victims, they are able to approximately determine the
ethnic background of the potential victim. Thus, the fact that someone is an immigrant
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might have an effect on the victimization probability even after controlling for a large set
of observed individual characteristics, if there are still immigrants’ characteristics associated
with personal victimization that are observed by potential offenders but unobservered in the
data. For instance, immigrants may appear as more vulnerable and therefore, they could be
considered as an easier and safer target.
In addition, there is also a crucial difference between the two main personal crime types,
Personal Theft and Personal Violence, which indicates that they should be treated sepa-
rately. Personal theft is an instrumental type of crime whereas violent crime is an expressive
type. Therefore, contrary to personal theft, as discussed in Section 3.2, a violent action
in most cases requires personal interaction between the potential victim and the potential
offender. This should not be translated as prior history in the victim-offender relationship,
as there can still be interactions that generate a violent act even for individuals that were
unknown to each other prior to the incident, such as brawls or arguments in pubs and bars.
According to this, there might even be cases where the victim is at the same time an of-
fender, which is unlikely for personal theft. On the other hand, personal theft is mainly
“random”.1 The potential offender observes the potential victim and once a set of infor-
mation is obtained, an evaluation of the expected utility follows. If the expected gains are
higher that the expected costs the individual commits the crime.2 In the first subsection
the risk of personal theft is examined, whereas the analysis for violent crime follows in the
second subsection.
3.5.1 Risk of Personal Theft
First of all, it is important to note that in the present study robberies are considered as
personal thefts although they entail violence. I examine robbery in this category rather than
in violent crimes because primary target of the offender is to acquire victim’s valuables and
not just to hurt the victim. Personal Thefts (1.59% positives) consists of Robberies plus
Attempts (0.42% positives), Snatch Thefts from the Person (0.15% positives), Other Thefts
1Although the victim might sometimes consider himself/herself as responsible for the action (in the
sample 6% of victims of personal theft considered themselves as responsible for the action), the responsibility
is unintentional.
2For a formal model on the decision to commit property crimes see, Papadopoulos (2010b).
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from the Person (0.73% positives), and Other Attempted Personal Thefts (1.39% positives).
As described before, although personal theft can be considered mainly as “random”, personal
observed by the offender characteristics are still important for the final outcome as personal
theft entails personal contact. An indicator for the “randomness” of personal theft is that,
94% of personal thefts were committed by strangers, 98.8% thefts did not happen because
of prior history/relationship between the offender and the victim and from the cases where
the victim consider himself/herself as responsible for the action (6% of the incidents) there
is no incident where the victim provoked the offender.
Table 3.6 presents the results in four specifications. In the first specification the effect of
being an immigrant on the risk of a personal theft is examined, without taking into account
that immigrants differ from natives in some important characteristics. Predicted probabil-
ities and marginal effects are also presented. Specification 1 shows that the probability of
victimization is much higher for immigrants (61.2% higher). As shown in specification 2,
this difference cannot be totally explained by immigrant-native differences in some important
demographic characteristics (the relative effect of 34.9% is still very high).1 Thus, even after
controlling for the fact that immigrants are relatively younger and less white and that they
disproportionately reside in deprived urban areas could not explain the difference in the risk
of victimization.2 However, the third specification reveals that immigrants are more likely
to become victims of personal theft because they disproportionately reside in London, which
is, according to the estimates, the place with the highest risk of personal theft. However,
the coefficient still preserves its sign. If we consider that the variation of the dependent
variable is very low (although the sample is quite large) we cannot ignore this relationship.
From specification 4 we can see that even after controlling for other important characteristics
associated with the risk of victimization, the coefficient still preserves its magnitude.
Hence, there are still some unobservables, specific to immigrants, that increase their risk
of victimization. For instance, they might be considered by potential offenders as more
vulnerable targets of lower risk.3 Or, immigrants might follow some lifestyle activities as-
1The marginal effects are calculated for a white male, between the age of 36 and 45, who stays in an
urban area where the deprivation index takes the average value.
2It seems that ‘ethic group’ matters for personal theft. Black individuals experience a higher risk, while
Asians, Chinese and Others experience a lower risk.
3As an example, offenders might think that immigrants are not familiar with the criminal justice system,
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sociated with higher crime, such as staying out relatively more than natives at the streets
of crowed disadvantageous neighbourhoods where the risk of a theft is higher. However, we
should finally stress that if no controls for ethnic group are included in specifications 3 and
4, the immigration coefficient goes very close to zero (0.003 with a p-value of 0.959). This is
because immigrants are disproportionately from the Asian, Chinese & Other ethnic group,
which faces much lower risk of victimization in the 3rd and 4th specifications. However, in
the second specification, not adding ethnic dummies even increases the significance of the
estimated immigration status coefficient (the value of the coefficient is 0.110 with a p-value
of 0.024).1
3.5.2 Risk of Violence
Violent Crime (2.54% positives) includes Assaults with Serious Wounding (0.21% positives),
Assaults with Other Wounding (0.55% positives), Common Assaults (1.6% positives), and
Attempted Assaults (0.32% positives).2 We need to stress that violent crimes with sexual
motive and robberies are not included in this group. As discussed before, violence is an
expressive type of crime where interrelations and interactions between potential victims and
potential offenders are vital. As an indicator of this, the Victim Forms data set shows that
in 23.03% of the victimization incidents the victim knew the offender casually, and in 34.44%
he/she knew the offender very well. Moreover, in 27.34% of the cases the incident happened
because of previous history/relationship between the victim and the offender. Finally, in
6.31% of the cases (81 incidents) the respondent considers himself/herself as being responsible
for the action, while in the 65.43% of these 81 incidents there was provocation by the victim,
and consequently, that to some extent they do not know how to proceed after a personal theft against them
takes place. This directly decreases the risk of apprehension for the offenders and thus, uncertainty.
1For the last specification, the effects of the variables whose estimates are not presented in the table are
the following: education dummies are jointly significant at 1% (having no qualification as the baseline group),
with more than a-levels people being the most victimized group. Income dummies are jointly significant as
well, but the relationship is not very clear. People of the lowest income category (10,000 or less) face higher
risk than the 10,000-20,000 income category. The group from 20,000-40,000 face lower risk but the effect is
insignificant, while the group 40,000-50,000 experience more risk but the effect is again insignificant. Finally,
the group 50,000 more experience higher risk but still insignificant. For the dummies of employment status
(where employed people is the baseline dummy) and marital status (with married people being the baseline
dummy), employed and married people face the lowest victimization risk. Finally, owners experience lower
risk relative to renters.
2You can notice that adding up the 4 violent crime groups together you obtain a probability of victimiza-
tion equal to 0.0268 which is higher than the probability to suffer a violent crime (0.0254). This is because
it is possible that a person suffers more than one type of crimes.
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which means that probably the victim initiated the action. As explained in Section 3.2
and in the introduction of this section, unobserved (in the data) characteristics associated
with routine activities and lifestyle-exposure could be important on explaining remaining
differentials in the immigration-victimization relationship.
The results for this crime category are presented in Table 3.7. Specification 1 shows
that, without controls, immigrants face a lower risk of victimization but the difference is
statistically insignificant. However, the marginal effect is significant at 10%.1 As it is clear
from specification 2, victimization decreases considerably with age, and since immigrants are
relatively younger, controlling for age (using dummies) results in increasing the magnitude of
the immigration status coefficient. Therefore, if immigrants faced the native age distribution
they would experience a much lower risk of violence. The marginal effect shows that being an
immigrant decreases the probability of a violent incident from 3.61% to 2.48%, a difference of
1.13 percentage points. According to the estimates of specification 3, the risk of victimization
remains relatively the same, with marginal difference to be 1 percentage point, or around
43% lower for immigrants. Note that, this effect increases in magnitude if we do not include
regional dummies. This is very interesting, because London is the place the residents of
which go through the lowest risk of violent victimization, as opposed to personal theft, where
London was the place with the highest risk of victimization. Finally, it is quite important
that the effect of immigration preserves its magnitude even when we use some other observed
characteristics associated with risks of violence.2
Furthermore, in Table 3.8 we present the results of the same specifications once we
include dummies for ethnic background. As expected, inclusion of ethnic dummies affects
the immigration status coefficient (which becomes more significant in specification 1, but
1The standard errors of the marginal effects are calculated using the delta method (command ‘nlcom’ in
Statar).
2The effect for the rest of the controls in specification 4 is the following: the education dummies (where
baseline group is no qualification) are not jointly significant. However, it seems that the risk of victimization
increases with higher education. Being married lowers the risk while being single has the highest risk.
Unemployed individuals have higher risk than employed ones, while inactive individuals endure the same
risk. Regarding income dummies effects (where the base is less than 10,000 pounds), all groups suffer lower
violence than the poorest group, however, the statistical significance decreases as income increases. Finally
the risk increases for lone parents and bigger households. Also note that the marginal effects are evaluated
for the following representative individual: a male, between 35-44 years old, residing in an average deprived
urban area in the East of England, who has a-levels qualifications, and also he is married, employed, owns
the place he lives and finally belongs to a family with 2 household members.
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less significant in specifications 2-4), since immigrants are disproportionately from ethnic
minority groups. This can be also seen by the marginal effects.1 Concerning the effect of the
ethnic dummies, although it seems that Asians and to a smaller extent Blacks experience a
lower risk of victimization relative to Whites, their joint effect is insignificant. Even in the
last specification where both the effect of Asians and Blacks relative to Whites is significant
at 5%, the Wald test fails to reject the null (the p-value from the Wald test is 0.123).2
Therefore, it seems that immigrants experience a lower risk of violent victimization be-
cause of some unobserved characteristics specific with this group. A general explanation for
this could be that immigrants set strategies that correspond to unobserved differences in
routine activities or lifestyle-exposure associated with lower criminal activity. For instance,
immigrants may avoid socializing in places where there is a high risk of violence, such as
pubs or clubs.3 Or, as (according to Papadopoulos, 2010b) immigrants are less violent,
they directly demonstrate a lower exposure in violent crime, since violence is strongly as-
sociated with the criminal behaviour of both potential victims and potential offenders. As
evidence of this, we can see that according to the BCS Victim Forms immigrant victims
exhibit a less provocative behaviour than native victims.4 Moreover, a part of the estimated
difference could be explained by the following hypothesis, also consistent with the results of
Papadopoulos (2010b) and closely related to the one above. If we accept that immigrants
socialize mostly with other immigrants, and if we also assume that immigrants socialize with
1The marginal effects are calculated for the same individual as before, plus the extra characteristic that
he is white.
2In addition, we need to mention that there are two variables derived from the questions, “how often have
you visited a pub in the last month” and “how often have you visited a club in the last month”, which are
asked by the conductors to be used as a proxy for exposure. However, this information can be considered as
a poor measure of exposure if we are not able to control for day-life activities and other activities associated
with more or less exposure. Thus, this regressor is measured with error for representing a lifestyle-exposure,
which attenuates the immigration coefficient since there is a strong and statistically significant association
between being and immigrants and going to pubs and clubs (being an immigrant decreases the probability
of going to clubs or bars by around 18 percentage points, a relative effect of around 53%). Nevertheless, the
coefficient of immigration status is still significant at 5% in specifications 2, 3 and 4. The only case that
immigration coefficient turns insignificant is when both controls for going to the pub/club and ethnicity are
used.
3According to the BCS data 35% of all immigrants, but 53% of all natives, have been to a pub or a bar
during the month prior to the interview.
4From the 980 victimization incidents where the victim finds himself/herself as responsible for the inci-
dent, we observe that only 6.32% of immigrant victims provoked the offender, but 8.93% of native victims
provoked the offender. Note that here I include all types of crime. If we consider violent crime only, these
figures change to 50% for immigrants and 65.79% for natives, but note that there are only 4 violent crime
incidents where an immigrant considered himself/herself as responsible for the incident.
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the same number of people as natives do, the probability of violent victimization would be
lower for immigrants just because immigrants are less violent.
However, as discussed in the introduction and in Section 3.3 this result may be misleading
as violent crime is composed of three different types: Domestic Crime, Crime by Acquain-
tances, and Crime by Strangers. In the next subsections we investigate the immigration-
victimization relationship once violence is decomposed into the three distinct crime types.
3.5.2.1 Domestic Crime
In the present study, Domestic Crime refers to inter-family antisocial behaviour. This also
involves violence from ex family members such as ex partners. Note that the variation of this
variable is very low, as only 0.51% of the respondents reported that they had experienced
domestic violence.
The Probit results are presented in Table 3.9 in four specifications.1 The coefficient of
the marital status dummies are also presented as they seem very important in explaining
variations in domestic crime. We can see that the likelihood of an immigrant being a victim
of domestic violence is much lower in all specifications. Being an immigrant almost halves
the probability of domestic violence.2 Someone would argue that this is driven by the
fact that some immigrants, particularly younger or more recent ones, leave their families
back as they intend to work a few years and return back. However, from the distribution
of the number of household members across families we can see that (even more recent)
immigrants have actually more members in their families, even if we control for differences
in age distribution.3 Hence, it seems that families that consist of immigrants, perhaps
because of cultural differences, exhibit family values associated with lower domestic crime.
1Ethnic dummies are not used for domestic crime, as they do not affect the probability of domestic crime
even when we do not control for immigration.
2The marginal effects are evaluated for a female, between 36-45 years old, with all other characteristics
the same as in the previous subsection.
3Actually, a Poisson regression of the number of household members on immigration dummy and a
linear trend for the number of years in the country, and controlling for differences in immigrant-native age
distribution (including a cubic on age), shows that being a very recent immigrant (who just entered the
country) increases the mean number of family members from 2.28 to 2.39, a difference that is statistically
significant at 1%. Moreover, being an extra year in the country adds 0.002 members in a family, which is
also significant, but only at 5%. As expected, if we do not control for ‘age’, being an immigrant increases
the size family by almost one person, but being an extra year in the country decreases the family size by
0.028 members. Both differences are very statistically significant.
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However, it might also be the case that due to cultural differences immigrants might be less
willing than natives to report inter-family violence.1 This issue will be examined in the next
section.
From Table 3.9 we can also see that men are less victimized than women as expected.
In addition, it is noteworthy that divorced and separated individuals face the highest risk of
victimization. Thus, women get victimized by ex partners during the 12 months prior to the
interview, or victimized individuals tend to move forward incidents that happened long time
ago, or married people for some reasons tend to under-report disproportionately. Finally, it
is worth mentioning that the deprivation index is not associated with higher crime once we
control for marital status.2
3.5.2.2 Crime by Acquaintances
Crime by Acquaintances refers to crime suffered by people who are familiar to the victim, but
not family members. Only one percent of respondents suffered a crime by familiar people. As
for domestic crime, prior history is also important for this type of crime. As an indication, in
around 30% of Crime by Acquaintances prior history was responsible for the incidence and
in 55% out of the 36 cases where victims consider themselves as responsible for the incident,3
the victim provoked the offender.
The results, depicted in Table 3.10, are striking. From specification 2 we can see that
natives are more than 100 percent more likely to suffer a crime by acquaintances, once
we control for some basic demographics.4 The immigration status coefficient preserves its
significance and magnitude even under a rich set of controls for observed characteristics. In
specification 4, where we also include controls for ethnic status (as now ethnicity dummies
have a joint significant at 5% effect), immigration coefficient loses some of its significance
1If immigrant families are in a sense more “traditional” or more patriarchal, fear of reprisal could be
higher for them, resulting in higher under-reporting.
2With regard to the effects of the other variables we have the following relationships: education dummies
have no joint effect. Income dummies are jointly significant with poorest people being the group associated
with the highest risk of victimization. Lone parent has a positive and significant effect even after controlling
for marital status and number of household members. However, bigger households are not associated with
higher or lower victimizations. The effect of regional dummies is significant at 5%, London being the region
with the lowest risk of domestic victimization.
3The victim believed that he/she is responsible for the incident in 36 out of 507 cases (7.1%).
4The marginal effects are calculated for a person between 36-45 years old, and rest of characteristics the
same as the individual in Violent Crime results.
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and magnitude (as now being an immigrant decreases the probability of victimization by
around 60%) as anticipated, but it is still significant at 10%, which is still important given
the very few zeroes in the dependent variable (even though the data set is quite large).
This result is consistent with the findings of Papadopoulos (2010b). According to the
“homogamy” principle, acquaintances of one ethnic group consist in a high proportion of
people from the same ethnic group. Therefore, we expect that in a high proportion, immi-
grants’ (natives’) acquaintances are immigrants (natives) as well. Since immigrants are less
prone to violent crime as offenders, we expect that immigrants would be less likely to suffer
crimes by acquaintances relatively to natives. Moreover, if immigrants are less anti-social,
following a less “criminal” behaviour, they would not initiate arguments and fights, but at
the same time they would avoid socializing with “dangerous” people, or avoid being in places
where they know that there is a person with whom a prior history existed. On the other
hand, it could also be that immigrants are less likely to suffer a crime by acquaintances just
because they have smaller networks of acquaintances (“network effects”), a feature directly
associated with exposure. If this is true, we expect that assimilation patterns would exist,
assuming that immigrants increase their networks of acquaintances as they stay longer in
the country. This hypothesis will be examined in the next section. Finally, as for domestic
crime, we cannot exclude the possibility that immigrants might be less willing than natives
to report crimes that suffered by friends and other familiar individuals.1
3.5.2.3 Crime by Strangers
Crime by Strangers involves brawls in pubs and bars (31% of the cases), arguments and
fights on the streets or in public transportation means, and so forth. In the data, 1.09%
of respondents went through a victimization incident by a stranger. Although this crime
can be considered as more “random” than crime by acquaintances and domestic crime,
interactions between offenders and victims are still important. For instance, it is not very
likely that someone will be attacked in the street without any reason, unless the primary
1The effects of the variables whose coefficients are not presented in Table 3.10 are as follows: regional
dummies affect victimization significantly, London being the place with lowest victimization. Risk also
increases for bigger households. The effect of income is significant as well, and the risk of victimization
becomes smaller as income increases. On the other hand, education is jointly insignificant. Finally married
people and owners face a lower risk of victimization by acquaintances.
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target is to acquire victim’s property which is, however, recorded as a robbery (or attempted
robbery if offender’s effort fails). According to our data, only in 17 out of 529 incidents the
victim considered himself/herself as responsible for the action (2.26%), 9 of which the victim
provoked the offender (52.94%).1
The results for this crime category are presented in Table 3.11. Contrary to the other
two types of crime, immigrants are equally likely to suffer a crime by a stranger, even af-
ter controlling for disadvantageous characteristics of immigrants. Thus, the results of Total
Violence were driven by Domestic Crime and Crime by Acquaintances. This is in contrast
with the “anti-criminal” social behaviour of immigrants discussed in the previous subsection.
We would expect to observe a similar pattern between being an immigrant and Crime by
Strangers, and being an immigrant and Crime by Acquaintances, if immigrants do avoid crim-
inal actions in general. The difference could be lower, since it is more likely that strangers
are not immigrants themselves, and natives exhibit slightly more violent behaviour (accord-
ing to Papadopoulos, 2010b).2 Moreover, it would be lower because a few cases could be
totally “random” (not depending on social interactions), so that the unobserved immigrants’
behaviour associated with lower victimization would make no difference in these “random”
cases. But still, we should have observed a negative, even insignificant, relationship.
Thus, this finding raises some important questions. Why do we observe a significant neg-
ative immigrant-victimization association for Domestic Crime and Crime by Acquaintances,
but no association for Crime by Strangers? How can this difference be explained? Is it
because immigrants under-report domestic crime and crime by acquaintances? Or, is the
“randomness” of Crime by Strangers enough to close the gap in the probability of victimiza-
tion between immigrants and natives? Nevertheless, there is another possible reason which
1Note also, that 222 of the crimes by strangers (41.9%) happened because the offender was under the
influence of alcohol or drugs and 98% because of an attack by young people, teenagers or mindless vandalism.
2Following the simple calculation in subsection 3.2.1, assume again that the probability of committing
a crime is 6% for an immigrant and 10% for a native. However, now assume that there is 10% probability
for a native to interact with a stranger immigrant (which is about the proportion of immigrants in the UK)
but there is 25% probability for an immigrant to interact with a stranger immigrant (since it is still more
likely that an immigrant will interact with strangers from the same ethnic background due to concentration
of immigrants in specific areas.) Thus, according to this simple example, holding everything else constant,
the probability for an immigrant to be recipient of a crime by stranger is 6%× 0.25 + 10%× 0.75 = 9%, but
6%×0.10+10%×0.90 = 9.6% for immigrants, a difference of 0.6 percentage points. However, this difference
for crime by acquaintances was 2.2 percentage points.
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is not considered yet. Holding everything else constant, immigrants are more likely to be
victims of racially motivated crime compared to natives. This is because racially motivated
crime is highly associated with ethnic minorities, and immigrants are disproportionately
from ethnic minorities. Finally, could the “network effect” hypothesis explain some of this
difference? These issues are examined in the next section.
3.6 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section a series of robustness checks in relation to the results found in the previous
section for violent crime are presented. Initially, we compare the results of violent crime,
found on the previous section, with a Trivariate Probit model that controls for the possibility
of correlated unobserved factors across the three crime variables, Domestic Crime, Crime
by Acquaintances, and Crime by Strangers. Next, we attempt to shed light on the reasons
why we observed a significant difference on the immigrant-native victimization association
for crime by acquaintances and domestic crime, but no difference for crime by strangers.
Following two different approaches we will claim that this is not due to under-reporting
of victimization incidents by immigrants. Moreover, we intend to show whether racially
motivated crime can explain some of the observed differences between crime by strangers
and crime by familiar people. Finally, we examine whether some of this difference can be
explained by “network effects”, by looking at assimilation patterns.
We need to stress that henceforth, we will be controlling only for the following basic
demographic characteristics: Gender, Age, Deprivation Index, Regions, Urban and Inner
City. Thus, all the following results look at the differences in the likelihood of victimization
between natives and immigrants, if these two groups exhibited the same basic demographic
characteristics.
3.6.1 Controlling for Correlated Errors
As mentioned in the end of subsection 3.3.1 it might not be appropriate to treat the three
violent categories as independent from each other. It would be more proper to take into
account the fact that people who suffered a violent crime of one group may share common
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unobserved characteristics with people that suffered a violent crime of another group. Thus,
there might be individual unobservable factors common to the three crime groups that make
some individuals more inclined to victimization than others. Accordingly, we could use a
model that allows for correlated errors across the three crime groups, similar to the Seemingly
Unrelated Regression framework (see, Parks, 1967). This can be done by using a Trivariate
Probit model which might result in efficiency gains as it exploits the information that some
sets of unobserved characteristics appear in all equations (see, Greene, 2008, for a formal
representation of Bivariate and Multivariate Probit models).
A complexity here is that, although there are algorithms to evaluate univariate and
bivariate normal integrals, these algorithms cannot evaluate M -variate normal integrals (see,
Greene, 2008). On this direction, a simulation-based integration has been developed (see,
Cappellari and Jenkins, 2003). Therefore, for the purposes of this analysis a simulated
maximum likelihood three-equation Probit estimator that uses the Geweke-Hajivassiliou-
Keane smooth recursive simulator is used (see, Terracol, 2002).1 Obtaining estimates by
using this estimator is time demanding and therefore, the number of draws selected is quite
important. According to Cappellari and Jenkins (2003) this estimator is consistent when
the number of draws and the sample size go to infinite. However, they find that a number
of draws close to the square root of the sample size is a reasonable number to use. In my
case, it is found that the estimated coefficients change very little if the number of draws is
larger than 200.2 The results in Table 3.12 are obtained using 300 draws. The results of this
model are presented in Table 3.12.
We can see that the estimates of this model, both for the immigration coefficient and
the coefficients of the other regressors, are very similar to the estimates when we treated
the three crime group as independent. The only change is that the estimated coefficient of
immigration status in the domestic equation loses a little of its magnitude. However, since
this coefficient is more precisely estimated, its statistical significance remains the same.
It is also very interesting that we estimate a significant at 1% significance level positive
1To obtain these estimates the ‘tribrobit’ command in econometrics software Statar, written by Antoine
Terracol (2002) was used. A similar Statar command that is generalized to account for a larger number of
equations is written by Cappellari and Jenkins (2003).
2Only changes after the second decimal points of the estimates were observed. However, the estimated
correlations between the error terms seem more sensitive to the number of draws selected.
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correlation of the errors between Domestic Crime and Crime by Acquaintances, and between
Crime by Acquaintances and Crime by Strangers, but no correlation between Domestic Crime
and Crime by Strangers. This implies that there are common unobserved characteristics
between victims of domestic and by acquaintances crime and different common unobserved
factors between people that suffered crime by acquaintances and people that suffered crime
by strangers. Moreover, we can see that the likelihood ratio test rejects the hypothesis that
the three equations are independent.
However, as the estimated coefficients are very similar between the single equation Pro-
bits and multivariate Probits, and since this is a highly time consuming estimator, we keep
presenting the results of the conventional Probit models. Alternatively, the estimated corre-
lations of the errors suggest that (the much simpler in terms of time and numerical intensity)
bivariate Probits between the two crime pairs could be used. However, even these results
are very close to the ones obtained by conventional Probit models.1
3.6.2 Examining Differences in Reporting Behaviour
As discussed above, a reason why we observe a different pattern in the immigrant-native
victimization differentials between crime suffered by strangers and crime suffered by familiar
people might be that immigrants under-report by more than natives crime experiences by
familiar people. Thus, the question is: is it that immigrants do not hesitate to report crimes
suffered by strangers (and thus, observing no differences in the risk of victimization between
the two groups) but hesitate to report crimes by acquaintances and (ex) family members? To
explain the differences in the victimization patterns between crime groups we must be able
to exclude the possibility of differential under-reporting between immigrants and natives. In
the next two subsections, following two different strategies, we show that immigrants do not
under-report, at least by more than natives. Firstly, we use self-reports on domestic violence
and secondly, we exploit the available information on whether the partner was present during
the face-to-face interviews. Both of them will provide important insights on differences on
immigrants-natives reporting differentials.2
1These results are available from the author upon request.
2A third approach that uses two parametric models which are more appropriate under the presence of
under-reporting was also followed for both binary and count data models. The binary model, which is based
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3.6.2.1 Use of the Self-Completions on Domestic Violence
As mentioned in the introduction there is evidence that respondents under-report domestic
crime (see, for example, Walby and Allen, 2004). Self-completions, as opposed to face-to-face
interviews, are used as a technique to elicit more reliable responses to sensitive questions
(see, Turner at al, 1998). For this purpose, people from 16 to 59 years of age were asked
to self-complete a computer-based questionnaire for domestic crime. Therefore, a dummy
Self-Completed Domestic Crime was constructed which takes the value one if the individual
revealed (in the computer-based questionnaire) that he/she suffered a crime by any family
member and zero otherwise. This variable consists of assaults and serious threats. Note that
sexual abuse is not used. Regarding under-reporting the results are striking. Only 0.51%
of the respondents reported a domestic crime in face-to-face, but 3.64% in self-completion
interviews.1
Thus, given that under-reporting is much lower in self-completions for both immigrants
and natives, if in face-to-face interviews immigrants under-report by more than natives, we
would expect to observe a quite smaller immigrant-native victimization differential for Self-
Completed Domestic Crime than for Face-to-Face Domestic Crime, as immigrants would
now report more freely.
There is a small complication that does not allow us to directly use conventional Probit
models though. This is because some individuals did not participate in the self-completion
procedure, probably because they refused participation. Is this because the most victimized
individuals are more reluctant to participate, or just because some people did not want to
participate for unrelated to crime reasons, such as being older, language difficulties, and so
forth? In addition, there is an extra complication. Some people who accepted participation,
on Hausman, Abrevaya and Scott-Morton (1998), is the model presented in Papadopoulos (2010b) under the
name of MisProbit apart from the difference that the probability of over-reporting in the present study is set
to zero. Note that this binary model shares the same likelihood function with the Detection Control Estimator
of Feinstein (1990). References for the count data models include Papadopoulos (2010a), Papadopoulos and
Santos Silva (2008), Winkelmann and Zimmermann (1993), Mukhopadhyay and Trivedi (1995), Cameron
and Trivedi (1998) and Winkelmann (2008). The results of these models show that if anything, immigrants
under-report by less than natives. However, these results were very unreliable, probably because of both the
very low variation in the dependent variable and the noisy nature of victimization data. Thus, they are not
presented in this study but they are available upon request.
1However, we must be cautious with this difference between self-reports and face-to-face interviews,
as the questionnaires between these two different types of interviews and the whole procedure followed to
construct the two data sets are very different (for details refer to, Bolling, Grant, and Donovan, 2008)
179
for some reasons asked for the help of the interviewer to complete this questionnaire. These
people did not answer the crime questions of the self-completed questionnaire.
First of all, comparing immigrants and natives’ participation rates we find that the
probability of an immigrant to participate in the self-completion procedure is much lower
than natives’ one. 5.58% of natives between 16-59 years old did not participate compared
to 13.98% of immigrants. Moreover, from people that accepted participation 13.06% of
natives did not complete the relevant crime questions while the 21.46% of immigrants did
not complete them. Thus, altogether, 32.44% of immigrants did not complete the self-
questionnaire compared to 17.91% of natives. Therefore, if people that did not participate
are the ones that are victimized the most, and given that respondents report more truthfully
in self-reports, then the coefficient measuring the immigrant-native Self-Completed Domestic
Crime differential would be downward biased.
Therefore, Sample Selection Probit models would be more appropriate if sample selection
problem exists (see, Heckman, 1979). In this subsection I use the estimator proposed by Van
de Ven and Van Praag (1981), which is a maximum likelihood modified Probit model that
provides consistent and asymptotically efficient estimates if sample selection exists. Two
different specifications for the Sample Selection Probit are considered. In the first one, we
treat people that accepted participation, but did not answer the crime questions (because
they asked from the interviewer to complete the supposedly self-completed questionnaire),
as being the same with the ones that did not participate at all, and we use a sample selection
model including in crime equation only people who self-completed crime questions. In the
second one, we exclude people that initially rejected participation and we keep only the sam-
ple of people that accepted participation. In this model the selection process includes only
individuals who accepted participation, whereas in the first case it includes all individuals
between 16-59 years old. Using these models we can actually test whether sample selection
is a problem. If there is no evidence of sample selection, we can use simple Probit models
for the sample of completers only.
The results are depicted in Table 3.13.1 As can be seen from this table four separate
1According to the results of the previous section, marital status dummies are very important factors of
domestic violence. However, the results of these models, which are not presented here but are available on
request, are very similar even when we include these dummies.
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specifications are used. In the first specification we present the simple Probit estimates of
face-to-face interviews for all respondents between 16-59 years old for the sake of compar-
isons. In the second specification a model that does not correct for sample selection for the
sample of the individuals that contributed to the self-completions only is given. Finally,
in specifications 3 and 4 we present the results of the two Sample Selection Probit models
discussed above. First of all, we note that the censoring of the sample to individuals between
16 and 59 years of age alone does not bias our results. This can be seen by specification 1,
which will be the reference model for comparisons. Note also that the sample in specification
4 is different from the sample in specification 1 even though both models include all respon-
dents between 16 and 59 years old. This is because there are some people whose answers on
self-reported crime questions were recorded, for unspecified reasons, as missing cases.
It is well known that the sample selection models are better behaved if at least one exclu-
sion restriction is imposed on the crime equation. Otherwise there is severe multicollinearity
and identification is obtained only due to nonlinearity of the functional form. For this rea-
sons in model 4 we use No Qualification and Other Present as two dummies that belong
to the selection equation only. Other Present is a dummy variable that takes the value one
if someone else was present during the face-to-face interview. Here we assume that others’
presence and low education might have affected the selection process but not the crime pro-
cess. The presence of someone else during the interview might have affected the selection
process as the respondent might feel some kind of pressure from the other members. For
instance, in an extreme case, the husband could have prohibited respondent from complet-
ing the self-report questionnaire. In another direction, the presence of others might indicate
that respondents needed help during the interviews and therefore, they did not answer the
relevant crime questions. No Qualification could be a proxy for not participation, because
of difficulties in using the computer.1 In specification 3 a more appropriate variable is used.
Once they accepted self-completion, respondents replied to the question whether they have
language difficulties, which is a major factor for asking help to complete the questions but
not a factor for reporting domestic crimes. However, this variable cannot be used in model
1Note that the No Qualification dummy has no effect on the crime equation once we include it in the
selection process. Actually, none of the variables used as “instruments” have a significant effect in the
“victimization” process once they are included in the “selection” process.
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4 as answers on this question are conditional on accepting participation.
Table 3.13 gives some very interesting findings. First of all, we can see that the probability
of an immigrant to take part and subsequently, answer the crime questions is much lower.
Moreover, it is also clear that the variables used only in the selection equation have strong
negative effects in the likelihood of selection. We also notice that the immigration status
coefficient is still negative and very significant.1 Nevertheless, most importantly, there is
no support of sample selection, as suggested by the estimated correlation coefficients which
are not statistically significant different from zero. Moreover, notice that the estimated
coefficients are very similar between the sample selection models and the simple Probit model
of specification 2. Therefore, in accordance with the above, the results of specification 2 can
be used.
From the results in specification 2 we can see that the coefficient of immigration status is
slightly smaller than in face-to-face interviews. Using the representative individual used in
the previous section for domestic violence we find that, the probability of an immigrant to
suffer a domestic crime is 2.36%, while the same probability for their native counterparts is
3.92%. Thus, the estimated difference is 1.55 percentage points or a decrease of around 66%,
which is lower than the relative effect in face-to-face interviews. However, the difference in the
estimated victimization-immigration gap between face-to-face and self-completed interviews
is too small to be interpreted as more under-reporting by immigrants. We might observe this
difference just because of the different nature of the self-completion questions or, because of
differences in the sample size.2
3.6.2.2 The Presence of Others during the Face-to-Face Interview
Presence of other family members during the (mainly face-to-face) interview process may af-
fect the reporting behaviour of the respondents (see, for example, Conti and Pudney, 2008),
1Note that more positives help to obtain more precise estimates, but lower sample reduces precision.
2Note that when we run a Probit model in face-to-face interviews holding only the sample from specifi-
cation 2, the immigration coefficient becomes insignificant. However, it is high likely that this is because of
the very low variation of the domestic crime variable combined with the relatively smaller sample. Moreover,
regarding the effects of the other variables on the crime equations from models 2 to 4 we have: risk decreases
with age and London is the least risky place. Concerning the selection equation in specifications 3 and 4 we
observe that the probability of selection decreases as age increases. Full results are available from the author
on request.
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and it may actually result in under-reporting if the questions refer to very sensitive informa-
tion (see, Acquilino, 1993). Particularly, we would expect that the presence of respondent’s
partner, mainly if the respondent is a female, would reduce the reporting of domestic crime.
This might be because of respondent’s fear of reprisal if the partner is also the offender, or
because the respondent does not want to reveal to partner a crime that suffered by other
family member, such as parents. As a first indicator, the data show that the probability to
report a domestic crime is only 0.19% if the partner is present but 0.57% if the partner is
not present, an increase of 200%.
Thus, using this information we could say something about the reporting behaviour
of immigrants relative to the reporting behaviour of natives. On this direction, we could
examine whether the effect of being an immigrant on the risk of victimization in the cases
where the partner is present is different from this effect in the cases where the partner is not
present. According to this, if immigrants under-report by more than natives, the estimated
gap will be larger in the cases where partner is present (more negative). This could be
formulated using the Probit model below,
E(yi|xi) = Φ(β0 + β1Immigrant+ β2Par.Present+ β3Immgrant× Par.Present), (3.1)
where yi, as before, is the binary variable that takes the value one if a person is victimized by
a family member and zero otherwise. The coefficient of the interaction term β3 is the one of
interest. Holding everything else constant, if immigrants under-report by more than natives,
we expect this coefficient to be negative. Of course, here we also assume that immigrants’
reporting behaviour does not differ from natives’ one under no presence of the partner.
Most importantly, this strategy requires that Partner’s Presence is assigned randomly,
so that people whose partner was present are not different from people whose partner was
not present. However, this is not the case. Probit results show that people whose partner
was present are relatively more males, less educated, more married, less employed, and stay
relatively more in more deprived and urban areas. Also, age has an inverse U-shaped effect
on the probability of the partner being present. Therefore, a more appropriate strategy
would be to examine the differences in reporting behaviour between immigrants and natives
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once we control for these characteristics. If β3 is still negative, there is evidence of more
under-reporting by immigrants relative to natives.
The main results are presented in Table 3.14.A in three specifications (without controls,
after controlling for age, gender, and area dummies, and after controlling for the previous
set of variables plus dummy variables for marital, education, and employment status). Table
3.14.B shows the predictions of these models for the representative individual used in the
previous section for domestic crime. The results are very interesting. We can see that in
specification 1, βˆ3 (the estimate of β3) is actually positive and statistically significant, which
indicates that if one group under-reports it is the one of natives. Although this estimated
coefficient becomes insignificant once we use the previously discussed regressors, it is still
positive and preserves some of its magnitude. Particularly, the predictions show that this
difference exists due to the following: a) immigrants whose partners are present actually
report (insignificantly) more that immigrants whose partners are not present (but the same
in specifications 1 and 2), but b) natives whose partners are present report (insignificantly)
less than natives whose partners are not present (but significantly less in specifications 1 and
2).1 Thus, this might indicate that immigrants’ reporting behaviour does not alter in the
presence of their partners but natives’ one does.
For the above result to take the interpretation of under-reporting by natives we conduct
two further exercises. Firstly, we examine the reporting behaviour in self-completions, where
the presence of the partner should have a much smaller effect both because respondents
under-report relatively less in self-completions and because there were clear instructions by
the interview conductor that the partner was not allowed to disrupt the interviewee by any
means (for instance, not allowed to look at the computer’s screen). The results which are
again shown in Table 3.14.A and Table 3.14.B are quite interesting. From specifications
1 and 2 we can see that both immigrants and natives report significantly less crime when
partner is present than in the cases when partner is not present. However, this is due to
differences in observed characteristics between people whose partner is present and people
whose partner is not present, as in specification 3 it is clear that the reporting behaviour of
1Differently, immigrants without the presence of their partner report significantly less than natives
without the presence of their partner, but immigrants with the presence of their partner report insignificantly
more than natives with the presence of their partner.
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both immigrants and natives does not change under the presence of their partner.
Secondly, although the presence of the partner may affect the reporting behaviour in
domestic crime, it should not affect the reporting behaviour for crimes suffered by acquain-
tances (or, it should affect it by much less). Indeed, the results in the lower parts of Tables
3.14.A and 3.14.B are very similar to the results of self-completions. Specification 3 shows
that the probability of both immigrants and natives to report a crime by an acquaintance is
exactly the same with and without the presence of their partner. In other words, being an
an immigrant decreases the probability to suffer a crime by acquaintances by 0.4 percentage
points regardless of the presence of the partner.
Overall, from both strategies used we can conclude that, there is no evidence that immi-
grants under-report by more than natives and perhaps, immigrants report more accurately
than natives. Thus, there is also no reason to believe that immigrants would under-report
by more than natives crime suffered by acquaintances either. Therefore, the different pat-
tern in the immigrant-native differences in the probability of victimization between crime
by strangers and crime by familiar people cannot be attributed to under-reporting. In the
contrary, if we observed the true victimization incidents the differences in the probability to
suffer a crime could be even larger. Thus, there should be other reasons to explain the above
pattern. This is examined in the following two subsections.
3.6.3 Controlling for Racially Motivated Crime
Racially motivated crime (RMC) has been the subject of many monographs, such as Gab-
bidon and Greene (2009), Spalek (2008) and Kalunta-Crumpton (2010) to mention only a
few. Traditionally associated with ethnic minorities, RMC refers to “hate crime” against
individuals of different ethnic group. As opposed to violent crime in general, RMC does not
require interactions or interrelations between the potential victims and potential offenders.
Offenders, most probably extremists of one race, violently abuse people of a different race,
colour, or religion, without any pre-existent argument and in most cases without any pro-
voking action by the victim. A 43% of immigrant population in the BCS data consists of
nonwhite individuals as opposed to only 2.5% for natives.
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Of course, a basic complexity in empirical studies of RMC is that it is very difficult to
find appropriate data. Moreover, as RMC is traditionally associated with ethnic minorities,
occasionally, researchers ignore that white people can also be victims of RMC.
In the present study I deal with RMC as follows. For each victimization incident a
question is asked about whether the victims think that the incident was racially motivated.
As the question is asked to every victim, we control for RMC against white people as well.
However, the problem is that I observe perceived RMC rather than actual RMC. Therefore,
we need to take into account that, as RMC is traditionally associated with minority groups,
ethnic minorities could be more likely to consider a violent crime as being of race motive
compared to whites, even if the crime is of the same nature. Nevertheless, in this study
I assume that victims’ perceived RMC coincides with actual RMC. In the data only 37
victims of violent crime out of 1,190 victims perceived an incident suffered as RMC (3.11%).
From these 37 victims 17 were immigrants (around 17% of immigrant victims) and 20 where
natives (which is only the 1.83% of native victims).
Thus, I can identify all cases of racially motivated incidents and control for them by
replacing their values with zeroes.1 First of all, from Table 3.15, we can see that apart
from one case, RMCs were committed by strangers, which is consistent with the argument
that pre-existed history and interrelations are not needed for this crime to take place. In
Table 3.16, as a first indicator, a simple mean comparison is presented before and after
controlling for RMC. We can see that the immigrant-native difference in the probability to
suffer a violent Crime by a Stranger alters sign. However, it is still far from the differences
in Domestic Crime and Crime by Acquaintances.
In the next stage we look at the relationship between Immigrant and Crime by Strangers
once we control for RMC and for basic demographic characteristics. This is examined in
Table 3.17. In the first specification the results for Crime by Strangers without controlling
for RMC are given. The second specification presents the estimates for Crime by Strangers
once we replace the cases of RMC with zeroes. Finally, specifications 3 and 4 present the
results of Crime by Acquaintances and Domestic Crime for the sake of comparisons. From
specification 2 we can see that if RMC did not exist and if immigrants faced the same area,
1I have also tried dropping the RMC from the sample. The results are almost identical.
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gender and age distribution, they would be less victimized by strangers, a difference that is
statistically significant at 10%. The marginal effects, using the representative individual of
subsection 3.5.2.2, show that after controlling for RMC, being an immigrant does reduce the
probability of Crime by Strangers by 0.49 percentage points (which is significant at 5%), a
relative decrease of around 37%, whereas there is no change in the estimated probability of
crime if we do not control for RMC.
Thus, we can see that controlling for these very few cases of RMC is enough for changing
the picture for crime suffered by strangers. However, comparisons with specifications 3 and
4 show that controlling for RMC is not enough to explain the estimated differences between
the three crime types. As we can see from specification 2 and 3 the relative effects are much
larger for Crime by Acquaintances and Domestic Crime. Thus, although RMC is able to
explain some of the unexpected difference in the estimated immigrant-native victimization
differentials by relationship status, some unobserved reasons remain.
3.6.4 Network Effects and Assimilation Patterns for Violent Crime
As discussed in subsection 3.5.2.2 a reason why immigrants are less likely than natives
to suffer a Crime by Acquaintances could just be that immigrants are also more likely,
particularly the most recent ones, to have a smaller network of acquaintances. However, this
cannot be the case for domestic crime because, as we saw in subsection 3.5.2.1, immigrants’
households consists of more members (even for the most recent immigrants). Unfortunately,
the BCS does not provide any information on the number of acquaintances the respondent
has. Nevertheless, in this subsection, I examine the “network effect” hypothesis by assuming
that immigrants expand their networks of acquaintances as they stay longer in the country.
Therefore, a linear trend that measures the number of years of an immigrant in the country
is used, once I control for immigration status and basic demographic characteristics. If the
aforementioned hypothesis holds, we expect the linear trend to have a positive significant
effect.
At a first glance, the results which are presented in Table 3.18 provide some support on
the above hypothesis. We can see from specification 1 that the linear trend has a positive
and significant at 10% effect. Thus, more recent immigrants are much less victimized than
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natives, but immigrants’ victimization probability converges to natives’ one as time spent
in the host country increases, perhaps because of network effects. However, we can also see
that this assimilation is very slow as it takes around 70 years for immigrants to reach natives’
victimization probability. Moreover, the results in specification 3, where I use four assimila-
tion dummies, also show that more recent immigrants are less victimized by acquaintances.
However, they also indicate that time spent in the country does not affect the victimization
probability linearly but a quadratic trend would be more appropriate. This is evident in
specification 2 as well, where a quadratic term is also included. It is clear that starting with
a very large difference, the victimization differential between immigrants and natives closes
but it never becomes zero. The gap reaches its minimum at around 30 years in the country
and then starts increasing.
If the effect of the trend was purely due to networks effects, we would expect it to have a
linear effect. Therefore, we must be cautious with the interpretation of these results as there
might be some other unobserved factors involved that give rise to the observed relationship.
From specification 4 we can see that there is a linear assimilation trend for Domestic Crime as
well, even though, as we saw before, immigrants’ families are larger.1 Moreover, specification
5 indicates that a weak quadratic assimilation pattern exists for Crime by Strangers too,
even though networks should make no difference in crime by strangers.
Given the evidence from all crime types, it seems that if networks effects exist in Crime
by Acquaintances, they are quite weak. According to these results the following story could
be more appropriate. More recent immigrants, perhaps because they consider themselves
more vulnerable, set strategies associated with lower victimization. As time spent in the
country increases, immigrants assimilate in natives’ lifestyle, or increase their networks of
familiar people, resulting in a smaller victimization difference for all crime types. However,
for earlier immigrants, the picture looks different for Crime by Acquaintances and Crime by
Strangers. Earlier immigrants seem to suffer fewer violent incidents even though we control
for differences in the age distribution.2 Hence, earlier immigrants, due to some unobserved
1The quadratic trend does not fit well in domestic crime.
2It is essential to control for Age because earlier immigrants are older and therefore, they have a lower
victimization probability. Moreover, it is important to stress that controlling for Age by including a quadratic
or a cubic term instead of dummies makes no difference in the assimilation patterns found for domestic and
crime by acquaintances (but slightly weakens the assimilation relationship for crime by strangers). Therefore,
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factors (perhaps cultural), follow social lifestyles associated with lower victimization than
natives with the same basic demographic characteristics.
Summing up, immigrants face a lower probability of violent victimization and we have
argued that this might be because immigrants follow social lifestyles associated with lower
victimization. However, further analysis showed that this difference exists only for crime by
familiar people, as immigrants face the same victimization probability for crime by strangers
if we do not control for racially motivated crime. This should be considered as unexpected if
immigrants follow a lifestyle that draws them away from crime activities, given that violent
crime depends a lot on interactions between potential victims and potential offenders. How-
ever, we provided evidence that this difference is not because of more under-reporting by
immigrants. Moreover, some of this difference can be explained by racially motivated crime,
and perhaps in a small degree by “network effects”. In addition, we should not ignore that
crime by strangers is more “random”. Finally, the fact that the proportion of immigrants in
the “strangers group” is probably smaller than the proportion of immigrants in the “family
and acquaintances group”, as natives account for the 90.5% of the population (at least in
the BCS data of 2007-08), could be another reason to explain the aforementioned difference,
given that as found by Papadopoulos (2010b), immigrants are slightly less violent as offender
than natives.
An interesting question emerging from our analysis is the following: if immigrants set
the aforementioned lifestyle strategies, why do we still observe the positive (although in-
significant) association for personal thefts? First of all, as has been stressed throughout this
paper, personal behaviour is a highly more important determinant for violent crime than for
personal thefts. This is closely related to the “randomness” that I have discussed through-
out this study. Therefore, the aforementioned lifestyles of immigrants would have a much
stronger effect on violent crime than on personal thefts, which has as a result to overbalance
the positive victimization-immigration association because of higher proximity for violent
crime, but not for personal thefts. In a cost-benefit setting, the above can be explained by
the fact that it is much more costly (in the sense that it needs much higher effort) to reduce
we can argue that it is not the case that we observe the negative relationship for earlier immigrants because
we were not able to capture the age distribution properly.
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the uncertainty of suffering a personal theft than to reduce the uncertainty of suffering a
violent crime.
3.7 Further Topics
3.7.1 Decomposition of Immigrants by Ethnicity and Location
So far, we have ignored the fact that there is a great deal of ethnic heterogeneity in im-
migrant population. It might be that, due to cultural differences, immigrants of different
ethnic background may follow different social lifestyles associated with different risks of vi-
olent victimization. Moreover, location of immigrants is not randomly assigned. Different
locations may attract different types of immigrants, or immigrants located in different places
may face different conditions, which in turn may affect the strategies they set with regard
to their social lifestyle-exposure and routine activities.
We first look at the former by including interaction terms between immigration status and
ethnic background. The results are presented in Table 3.19 for all violent crime categories.
Note that, although only the coefficients of interest are included, we use the specification
where we control for gender, age dummies, and location characteristics (as in the third spec-
ification of Tables 3.7 and 3.8). Regarding Total Violence, we find that the results shown
in Table 3.8 (where immigration status has a negative significant at 5% effect on violent
victimization) is primarily driven by the differences in victimization experiences between
White immigrant-native counterparts, and Chinese & Other immigrant-native counterparts,
as there are no differences between the other three ethnic group of immigrant-native coun-
terparts.1 Moreover, only Asian natives suffer lower violence than White natives.
The picture is different if we decompose violent crime by relationship status. It is im-
portant to stress that for Domestic Crime and Crime by Strangers we only use interactions
between White and Immigrant because, otherwise, the variation was not enough to esti-
1Comparing a white immigrant with a white native, who are both males, between 26 and 35 years of age
and live in average deprived urban areas of East England, we find that being an immigrant decreases the
probability of violent victimization by 1.09 percentage points (from 0.0534 to 0.0425, a significant difference
at 10% significance level). Moreover, regarding the ‘Chinese & Other’ ethnic group we find the for the same
representative individual, Chinese and Other immigrants’ victimization probability is -0.067 percentage
points lower than Chinese and Other natives (from 0.0238 to 0.0908, a significant difference at 5%).
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mate all coefficients of interest. As far as Crime by Acquaintances is concerned, it is clear
that White immigrants still face a lower probability of victimization than White natives
(and significant at 5%), but this gap closes for Asians and Chinese & Other ethnic groups.
Conversely, the difference even increases in magnitude for Black individuals.1 Note that, al-
though negative, the difference in the probability of victimization by acquaintances between
non-White immigrants and non-White natives is statistically insignificant.2 However, the
picture is quite different for Domestic Crime. In contrast with Crime by Acquaintances, here
the main difference is observed to be between non-White natives and non-White immigrants.
Non-White immigrants suffer much less domestic crime than non-White natives but this gap
closes for White people.3 Finally, note that, there are no statistically significant immigrant-
native differences across ethnic groups for Crime by Strangers. In this study I do not go
into further investigation on the rationale of the aforementioned observed relationships but
I keep the analysis totally descriptive. Thorough investigation would require a much larger
data set as the variation between crime by relationship status (which is a very rare event)
and immigration status by ethnic groups is quite low to estimate robust relationships. This
analysis is left for future research.
Next, I consider decomposition of immigrants by regions. First of all, in order to be able
to identify all coefficients of interest I group regions in four categories, keeping London as the
baseline area.4 Again, I present only the coefficients of main importance but I also control
for gender, age, and other location characteristics. The results are presented in Table 3.20.
Concerning Total Violence, the results suggest that there are not many differences across
regions. Both immigrants in London and immigrants not in London are less likely to be
victimized than their native counterparts,5 but this difference is higher for immigrants of
London. However, if we consider the four regional groups separately we find that although
1A Wald test that compares Black-immigrants against Black-natives shows that this difference is signif-
icant at 5% (p-value of 0.0362).
2The coefficient of the difference is -0.194 with the robust standard error of 0.163.
3However, there was not enough variation to further examine this relationship.
4These groups are, North (North East, North West and Yorkshire & Humberside, 12,863), Midlands
(East Midlands, West Midlands and East of England, 15,973 obs), South (South East and South West,
10,142 obs) and Wales (4,243 obs).
5Running a regression of Total Assault on the dummy London, its interaction with immigration status,
and the rest of the characteristics, shows that immigrant not from London also face lower crime than
immigrants not from London.
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the sign on the immigration-victimization relationship is still negative it turns insignificant.
The only area for which the difference is still significant is Midlands.1 Almost the same
relationships hold for Crime by Acquaintances, with the only difference that now, the dif-
ference between immigrants and natives of London is higher in magnitude and that the
difference is also significant for the regional group South. For Domestic Crime, the results
are very insignificant probably because of the low variation between the dependent variables
and the interaction terms. However, we still find that immigrants not in London are less
likely to be victims of domestic crime than natives not in London.2 Moreover, it is found
that immigrants of Midlands suffer less domestic crime than natives of Midlands.3 Finally,
no statistical relationships are found for Crime by Strangers, even if we control for racially
motivated crime.4
3.7.2 Seriousness of Crime
So far, we have found that if immigrants exhibited the same basic demographic characteristics
with natives, they would face a lower probability of violent victimization but a similar
probability of property victimization. However, we have not made any reference on the
seriousness of crimes they have suffered. In this subsection I exploit information from the
Victim Forms, where all victims were able to rank the “seriousness” of the crimes they
suffered in a scale from 1 (not serious) to 20 (very serious). Since each victim could take up
to six victim forms, I averaged the “seriousness” score for each victim and then I created
1This is the case perhaps because it is the region with the highest number of observations. A Wald test
of the difference gives a p-value of 0.0348. For South, the Wald test gives a p-value of 0.115.
2A regression of Domestic Crime on the dummy London, its interaction with immigration status, and
the rest of the characteristics, shows that immigrant not from London face lower crime than natives not
from London with a coefficient of -0.240 which is statistically significant at 5%.
3The Wald test gives a p-value of 0.03.
4Finally, note that further exercises using interactions (which results are not presented here but are
available on request) show that the highest differences between immigrants and natives exist for, residents
of the most deprived areas (although the effect of the interaction term is statistically insignificant), people
who rent, people who are less educated, and single individuals (but only for domestic crime). Moreover,
there are no interaction effects between gender and immigration status, apart from crime by strangers (once
we control for racially motivated crime) for which we find that immigrant males suffer less crime than
native male (significant at 5%), but this difference closes for females. In general, it seems that the highest
differences exist for the most vulnerable groups of immigrants. Perhaps immigrants who believe that they
are in weak positions (lower guardianship or higher proximity) are more in fear of a potential crime against
them and therefore, decide to balance their position by exhibiting lower exposure. As the findings indicate,
the result is to suffer lower crime than their native counterparts, perhaps because the effect of lower exposure
overbalances the effect of higher proximity and lower guardianship. This subject is left for future research.
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an ordinal variable that takes value ‘1’ if victims believed that the “seriousness” of the
crimes experienced is between 1 and 5 (Not Serious), ‘2’ if it is between 6 and 10 (Relatively
Serious), ‘3’ if it is between 11 and 15 (Serious) and ‘4’ if is between 16 and 20 (Very
Serious).1
It is clear that since this is a measure of perceived “seriousness”, the coefficient of immi-
gration status would be upward biased if for some reasons immigrants tend to score incidents
of the same actual seriousness as being more serious. The results for total crime are pre-
sented on Table 3.21. Specification 1 uses no controls, while in specification 2, in line with
previous regressions, we control for basic demographics and in specification 3 we include
further controls that might be associated with perceived seriousness. What we find is that,
regardless the controls we use (look at specifications 1 to 3), immigrants strongly believe
that crimes they suffer are much more serious than what natives believe. As we mentioned
before, this might not indicate that immigrants are recipients of more serious crimes if they,
for some unobserved reasons, tend to overvalue the seriousness relatively to natives. Using
the cutoff estimates and the estimated coefficients from specification 2, this model predicts
that being an immigrant victim:2 1) decreases the probability for an experienced crime to
be considered as Not Serious (1-5) by 8.3 percentage points, a relative effect of 11%, but
2) increases the probability for a crime to be considered as Relatively Serious (6-10) by 5.3
percentage points, a relative increase of 26%, 3) increases the probability for a crime to be
considered as Serious (11-15) by 2.3 percentage points, but with a relative effect of 56% and
finally, 4) increases the probability for a crime to be considered as Very Serious (16-20) by
0.7 percentage points, which account for an even higher relative effect of 89%. Note that all
these differences are statistically significant at 1%.
Moreover, specification 4 shows that the immigration status dummy has no effect if we
control for ethnic background (but it is still significant at 5% if we include the ethnicity
dummies on specification 3). However, specification 5, where we interact immigration status
1Note that from the 11,208 victims, 66% believed that the victimization incidents they experienced are
of seriousness from 1 to 5, 25% from 6 to 10, 7% from 11 to 15 and only 2% from 16 to 20. Moreover, note
that creating an ordinal variable with 8 categories gives very similar results.
2For these predictions we use the representative individual who is a male between 25 and 35 years old,
and live in an average deprived urban area in the East of England. The estimated probabilities, differences
and relative effect, are calculated with the “nlcom” command in Statar.
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with ethnicity dummies, provides further interesting insights. Although White immigrants
do not perceive crimes they suffer as more serious than their native counterparts, non-
White immigrants do. Actually, a regression where we only interact immigration status
with ethnic group White shows that being a non-White immigrant significantly increases
the probability to perceive a crime as more serious relative to a non-White native.1 In
more detail, specification 5 shows that apart from White and Mixed ethnic groups, Black,
Asian and Chinese & Other immigrants value their crime experiences as more serious than
their native counterparts, although the estimated difference is statistically significant (at
5% significance level) only for the group of Asians. Finally, further analysis where we look
at household crime, personal theft and violence separately shows that the above negative
relationship holds for each crime category, but it is a bit less significant for personal crime.2
3.8 Count Data Models
All previous analysis concerned the conditional probability of victimization and provided
some very robust results regarding the difference in the probability of victimization between
immigrants and natives across the different crime types. However, the count nature of the
victimization variable was totally neglected. Considering the count form of the crime vari-
ables and utilizing several count data models could provide some further insights on the
determinants of victimization in general, and particularly, on the immigration-victimization
relationship. For instance, even though immigrants face a lower probability of violent vic-
timization, the implications of our analysis would be very different if, as will be discussed
further below, immigrants experience a higher number of crime incidents than natives.
Count data are directly related to the problem of repeated victimization, as someone is
said to be a “repeated” victim if he/she has suffered more than one incident of the same
crime type within the reference period.3 Together with the causes of a single crime incident,
1The coefficient is 0.292 with a robust standard error of 0.082.
2It is actually significant at 10% for violence, but insignificant for personal theft. However, notice that
we only have 1,186 cases of violence and 745 cases of personal theft. Full results are available from the
author on request.
3In general criminologists distinguish between the term “repeated victim” and the term “multiple victim”
(see, for example, Hope at al, 2001). A person is a multiple victim if he/she suffered more than one type
of crimes in the reference period, regardless of the number of crimes of the same crime type. For instance,
a person experiences in the last 12 months both an inside burglary and an assault. However, other studies
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the understanding of the channels through which repeated victimization occurs has also
received a lot of attention by criminologists, in an attempt to find alternative effective
policies for crime reduction which would in turn allow policy makers to efficiently allocate
scarce resources in the areas where people or households face the greatest risks (see, Sparks,
1981, Farrell, 1992, Farrell, Phillips and Pease, 1995, and Osborn at al, 1996). This is
important, as crime is found to be concentrated among a small group of people and areas
(see, Spelman, 1995, Ellingworth, Farrell and Pease, 1995) and because prior victimization
is found to be a very strong predictor of future victimization (Hindelang, Gottfredson and
Garofalo, 1978, Ellingworth at al, 1997, and Wittebrood and Nieuwbeerta, 2000). Several
researchers have attempted to understand the process of repeated victimization by using
count data models (see, for example, Nelson, 1980, Tseloni and Pease, 2003, 2004).
There are a couple of reasons to expect that the process of having suffered a single
incident is to some extent different from the process of repeated victimization. According to
this, we implicitly allow for the effects of the characteristics associated with victimization to
differ between the probability of a single incident and the number of incidents conditional
on victimization. First of all, criminologists have made some effort towards understanding
whether there is some kind of dependence among crimes suffered by the same individuals
or, it is just that the characteristics associated with higher risks responsible for a first crime
incident persist over time resulting in further actions against them. Event-dependence among
sequences of crimes against the same individuals could be possible if a first crime initiates
a positive or a negative “contagious” process. For example, a positive “contagion” (mostly
for household crimes) could be the consequence of some kind of transmission of information
amongst offenders concerning the vulnerability or attractiveness of some targets. Differently,
a positive “contagion” for violent victimization could exist if following the victimization
incident, victims choose to revenge or retaliate, which in turn would expose the victim to
further violence. On the other hand, negative “contagion” would be the result of reevaluation
of strategies following an incident, which would make victims, for instance, to increase their
guardianship or reduce their exposure. However, we need to stress that these dynamics cannot
do not distinguish between these two terms (see, Farrell, 1992). In the present study, the victim is said to
be “repeated” if he/she suffered more than one crime (depending on the crime type I consider) within the
reference period of 12 months prior to the interview.
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be identified in the absence of panel data, which is the case in the present study. This is
because, firstly, we are not able to observe when the first action occurred, and secondly
because the cross-section models used in this study assume independency of the incidents.1
Secondly, the effect of the regressors could be different between the two processes (vic-
timization or not, and the number of incidents conditional on victimization), if there is
unobserved heterogeneity within the same variables which is associated with differential
victimization across the two processes. As an example, consider the relationship between
gender and violence. As males exhibit a much higher exposure, the victimization probability
is much higher for them. However, the picture could be different if we consider only victims,
as females might be victimized more frequently, perhaps because of domestic violence. A
similar story can be considered for immigrants. Given that immigrants are generally more
vulnerable (lower risk for offenders) they decide to set strategies associated with lower ex-
posure on crime. As a result, according to the findings of the previous sections, immigrants
are on average less likely to be victims of violence. However, if we consider the popula-
tion of the victims only, it might be the case that here we have either the immigrants that
failed to successfully set the low exposure strategies, or groups of immigrants whose cultural
characteristics are associated with higher exposure relative to the groups of less victimized
immigrants. According to this, immigrant victims could be equally or even more victimized
than native victims. Therefore, if the above were true, we would expect that the coefficient
in the count data models to be less negative than in binary models, as the number of the
incidents is also taken into account.
In this study I consider Poisson and Negative Binomial 2 models, as the latter also
takes into account over-dispersion (by allowing for an unobserved gamma distributed error)
which, as described before, is evident in my victimization data.2 However, the nature of
victimization data gives rise to two issues that require special attention. Firstly, as crime
1We need to note that although the Negative Binomial distribution is consistent with a count generation
process with positive “contagion”, in the absence of panel data we cannot distinguish between “contagion”
and “heterogeneity” among different groups. For interesting details on the genesis and other aspects of
the Negative Binomial distribution the reader may refer to Johnson, Kemp and Kotz (2005), Cameron and
Trivedi (1998), and Winkelmann (2008).
2It is well known that the Poisson distribution assumes equi-dispersion meaning that the first two mo-
ments are equal to each other. For more details on count data models refer to Winkelmann (2008) and
Cameron and Trivedi (1998).
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is a rare event (at least if we want to consider the different crime types separately), the
number of zeroes is very large. Moreover, the (very few) positives are quite dispersed for
most of the crime categories. This has harmful consequences on the robustness of the count
data estimators. Secondly, there are few cases of victims that reported extreme number of
crimes.1 Count data models are very sensitive to these cases, particularly when the positive
counts are too few to identify the parameters of the variables assumed to affect the mean.
I deal with the second issue using two different approaches. Firstly, I censor the crime
variable at different points of the violent crime distribution and then I use a Poisson model
with a modified likelihood function that takes into account the censoring in the dependent
variable (for details in censored count data, see, Terza, 1985, and Brannas, 1992). Not only
does this strategy tests for the robustness of the estimates of the conventional count data
models, but it also adds some robustness to the estimator.2
Furthermore, I use the “Quantile Estimator for counts” developed by Machado and San-
tos Silva (2005) and successfully used by Winkelmann (2006), Booth and Kee (2006), and
Miranda (2008). Usual quantile estimators are developed for continuous data (see, Koenker
and Bassett, 1978) and are not available for counts, or other discrete choice variables. How-
ever, very briefly, Machado and Santos Silva (2005) suggest a method that overcome this
problem by adding a uniformly distributed noise to the count outcome (a method called “jit-
tering”), which artificially generates the required smoothness of a continuous variable. Then,
quantile estimation proceeds by using standard quantile techniques. Moreover, they propose
averaging out the uniformly distributed noise by considering m jittering samples which in-
creases efficiency of the estimator.3 Utilization of this estimator serves two purposes. Firstly,
the quantiles are insensitive to the extreme cases, and secondly, we can estimate the effect
of the regressors on different parts of the distribution (which might be different according
to the repeated victimization theories). However, as the number of zeroes in my dependent
1The maximum they could report in each victim form was 97 crimes. Therefore, in the extreme, someone
could report 582 crimes.
2On the other hand, the results of censored count count data models are at same time less “robust”
because the results of the Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (see, Gourieroux, Monfort, and Trognon,
1984) do not hold. Thus, the censored model would be misspesified, if the remaining counts above the
considered cut-off point do not follow the poisson distribution. In the contrary, the Poisson distribution only
requires correct specification of the conditional mean, with valid inference given by the Pseudo Maximum
Likelihood standard errors, or differently, Eicker-White robust standard errors.
3For details on this estimator refer to Machado and Santos Silva (2005).
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variables is very high, it is more reasonable to look at the effects of the variables on very
high quantiles.
Alternatively, a model that would be also consistent with the story of differential repeated
victimization could be a hurdle (two-part) model, where the “hurdle” is set at no crimes.
According to this model (see, Mullahy, 1986), zeroes or positives (without distinction on the
number of incidents) are generated by a distribution appropriate for binary choice models. If
the realization is positive, the hurdle is crossed, and positives are generated by a truncated
at zero (see, Grogger and Carson, 1991, and Gurmu, 1991) distribution for counts, such
as the truncated at zero Poisson or the truncated at zero Negative Binomial distribution.1
Hence, this model explicitly allows to separately model the binary outcome (victimized or
not) from the positives (number of incidents given victimization, or differently, repeated
victimization).2 Therefore, we can directly observe whether the independent variables have
different effects below and above the hurdle (thus, at different parts of the distribution).
Again, the very low number of positives and the extreme reports by some individuals will
constraint my analysis. Nevertheless, as an alternative and in line with the Censored-Poisson
model, I develop a two-part model for censored counts. Details on the probability and
likelihood functions of this modified Hurdle-Censored Poisson model are presented in the
Appendix.
In this study I only present results on violent victimization, which was the centre of
attention in the main analysis. Furthermore, because of the aforementioned large number
of zeroes, the estimation analysis is not so reliable if we further decompose violent crime by
relationship type, particularly when I use the Hurdle-Censored Poisson estimator. Thus, I
mainly present results on total violent victimization and I refer to results of the separate
groups when necessary.3 Before presenting the count data results, the complete distribution
together with the three unconditional moments of the violent crime variables are presented
1Count hurdle models (together with some modified count hurdle models) are very successfully used in
health economic literature (see, for example Pohlmeier, Ulrish, 1995, and Gurmu, 1997), or other contexts
(see, for example, Gurmu and Trivedi, 1996, Arulampalam, Booth 1997, Santos Silva and Covas 2000, and
Helstrom, 2006).
2By taking into account the different data generating process below the hurdle and above the hurdle, we
explicitly take into account the exceptional nature of zeroes. Moreover, the hurdle model accounts for both
over-dispersion and under-dispersion.
3All results that are not present here are available from the author upon request.
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in Table 3.22. It is clear that Total Violence is a rare event as only 3.54% of respondents
reported at least on violent incidence. It is also clear that incidents of violence are highly
dispersed and skewed to the right, a feature driven by Domestic Crime and Crime by Ac-
quaintances, as Crime by Strangers is generally concentrated on the first 10 counts.
The results of the count models are presented in Tables 3.23, 3.24 and 3.25. The second
and the third specifications of Table 3.23 depict the results of the conventional Poisson and
Negative Binomial 2 (NB2) regression models, whereas specification 1 gives simple Logit
results for the sake of comparisons. The rest of the specifications present the Censored-
Poisson model, where we censor the dependent variable at 5, 10, 15, 20 and 25 crimes. Table
3.24 displays the estimates resulting from the Quantile estimator for counts, where we look
at the effect of the variables at the 25th, 50th, 70th, 80th, 90th, 95th, 99th, 99.9th, and
99.99th percentiles of the distribution. We explore unusually high quantiles because, as I
mentioned earlier, it is important to explore the impact of the regressors on the very right
end of the distribution. It is also important to note that my results are obtained using
100 jittered samples. Finally, Table 3.25 shows the results from a simple Hurdle-Poisson
model and the results from the modified Hurdle-Censored Poisson model, where I censor at
5 and 10 crimes.1 Specifically, the first column gives the probability of crossing the hurdle
for which the Poisson distribution is also used,2 the second specification shows the Zero-
Truncated results without censoring and the rest of the specifications provide the findings
of the Zero-Truncated Censored models.
To begin with, apart from the coefficient on Urban and the fact that regional dum-
mies have a smaller effect (relative to London) in NB2, the results of Poisson and NB2 are
fairly similar. According to the NB2 model, there is quite strong evidence in favor of over-
dispersion.3 However, it is important to stress that although the Poisson regression model
assumes equi-dispersion (conditional mean equal to conditional variance), which implies that
1The estimation procedure was numerically unstable when censoring at higher than 10 crimes was con-
sidered. This is probably because of the small number of observations above the hurdle (1,190 observations).
Therefore, the results of censoring the variable at a higher value are not presented here.
2These estimates are closely comparable to Logit ones. Actually, the Logit probability function can be
also obtained from considering only the zero probability from the Geometric version of the Negative Binomial
distribution for count data (see, Mullahy, 1986).
3In this table, ‘alpha’ is the estimated variance of the gamma distributed unobserved effect. According
to the NB2 model the conditional variance of the dependent variable is given by ω = λ + αλ2. As the
estimated ‘alpha’ is around 40 and statistically significant, the variance is much higher than the mean.
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the variance-covariance matrix is misspecified under the presence of over-dispersion, it is ab-
solutely valid even in the cases of very over-dispersed data. This is because, as the results
of the pseudo-maximum likelihood show (see, Gourieroux, Monfort and Trognon, 1984), the
Poisson Maximum Likelihood Estimator consistently estimates the conditional mean and
valid inference for the variance matrix of the estimator is obtained by using robust (Eicker-
White) standard errors.1
Comparing the binary information with the conventional count data models several in-
teresting points emerge that need some discussion. Firstly, we can see that although the
Immigrant coefficient is still negative, it is now insignificant. However, this should not be
interpreted as higher repeated victimization of immigrants without further investigation.
Indeed, the Censored-Poisson models, regardless of the cut-off point of censoring, show that
the effect of immigration is still very significant and not much different in magnitude than
when we use the binary information only. This suggests that the long right tail of the ob-
served distribution affects the precision of the effect of Immigrant on Total Violence. The
results of the Quantile estimator and the Hurdle-Censored Poisson model are relatively in
line with the aforementioned analysis. Regarding the Quantile Estimator results, although
the immigration dummy has no effect on the first quartile and the median, as expected due
to the small number of positives, its effect is negative and significant along the right part of
the distribution. It is also clear that the effect starts diminishing when considering very high
quantiles. Finally, from Table 3.25, the zero-truncated but uncensored Poisson assigns a pos-
itive but very imprecisely estimated coefficient to the immigration dummy which, however,
turns negative in Zero-Truncated Censored models if we censor at 10 crimes. Overall, these
results indicate that the very few observations at the end of the observed distribution reduce
the influence of the immigration dummy. This suggests that if a differential repeated vic-
timization between immigrants and natives exist relatively to the risk of victimization from
the binary choice model, this is only for individuals that suffer a large number of incidents.
Unfortunately, the sample size does not permit further investigation and safer conclusions.
The most striking result is that although being a male increases the probability of suffer-
1However, note that if the true data are truly generated by a Negative Binomial distribution, Poisson
Pseudo Maximum Likelihood is less efficient.
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ing a crime, it actually decreases the mean number of crimes. The Hurdle-Poisson models
present this picture clearly. Conditional on being victimized, being a male significantly
decreases the number of incidents. The effect is smaller for the Zero-Truncated Censored
models but still very significant. Further investigation shows that this result is primarily
driven by the relationship between gender and Domestic Crime. Nevertheless, a negative
relationship holds for Crime by Acquaintances too, although it is less significant, but not for
Crime by Strangers. Thus, there is some evidence that although males are more exposed on
the incident of violence, females are more repeatedly victimized. This is probably because
some women are captured in “unhealthy” relationships that bring them in situations of a
constant high risk of victimization.
Finaly, it is also interesting that although the effect of Urban is positive but insignificant
in the binary models, it turns negative in the count models. From the Quantile regressions
we can observe that the effect of Urban is the highest between the 90th and the 95th per-
centiles and then decreases turning negative after the 99th percentile. Similar conclusions are
obtained from examining the Hurdle-Censored Poisson model. Further analysis shows that
this result is driven by the impact of being in an urban area on Crime by Strangers.1 Even
though people in urban areas face a significantly higher risk of victimization by strangers,
repeated victimization by strangers is higher in rural areas if we only victimized individu-
als. This indicates that in rural areas there is a higher concentration of Crime by Strangers
among the same individuals compared to urban areas. This is an interesting finding, but
further research is required to identify the reasons behind this relationship.2
3.9 Conclusion
This study presented a comprehensive analysis of the relationship between immigration
status and victimization in England and Wales using the 2007/08 sweep of the British Crime
Survey.
1Being in urban areas significantly increases the victimization risk, where the estimated coefficient of
Urban in the Logit model is 0.358 with a p-value of 0.005. However, in the Zero-Truncated Poisson this
estimate is negative (-0.647) with a p-value of 0.014.
2Further investigation of these models with regard to the effects of the other variables can result in many
interesting implications. However, as this paper concentrates on the victimization-immigration relationship
this analysis is skipped here, but it is subject to future research.
201
Initially, we presented some evidence on the immigration-victimization relationship for
Inside and Outside Burglaries. Immigrants’ households are more at risk of Inside Burglaries
but this is mostly explained by the fact that immigrants reside relatively more than na-
tives in urban and more deprived areas where the incident of an Inside Burglary is highly
more likely. On the other hand, a negative relationship was found between immigrants’
households and the incident of Outside Burglaries. We argued that this is probably because
immigrants possess a smaller amount of properties that are subject to Outside Burglaries
such as, outhouses, garages, etc. This argument was supported with results on assimilation
patterns (earlier immigrants are better settled and therefore, possess more outside properties
than more recent immigrants) and zero-inflation count models (which show that a higher
proportion of immigrants belong to the zero inflation category, meaning that immigrants are
in lower risk just because they own fewer outside properties).
Furthermore, we showed evidence on Personal Thefts, a crime that is of a very different
nature since, although instrumental as well, it entails personal contact. The results indicated
that immigrants are in higher risk of Personal Thefts, but most of this positive association
can be attributed to the fact that they disproportionately reside in the areas of London where
the incident of a Personal Theft is much more probable than any other region in England
and Wales.
Next we presented a series of evidence for Violent Crime, in which this work focuses on.
Violent Crime, as opposed to the aforementioned categories, is an expressive type of crime
where interrelations and interactions between the potential victims and potential offenders
are vital. According to this, personal behaviour is a much stronger predictor for violent vic-
timization than for Personal Thefts and Household Crime. Even after controlling for a rich
set of characteristics associated with violent victimization, the empirical analysis indicated
that immigrants are still at lower risk of violence. A possible explanation, which relies on
the theoretical views of this paper, is that immigrants set strategies (that determine their
lifestyle-exposure and routine activities) that are associated with a lower risk of violent vic-
timization. Nevertheless, a closer examination indicated that the negative association is due
to the lower risk of victimization by Acquaintances and lower risk of Domestic Crime, since
the regression results showed that there is not any association between being an immigrant
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and crime suffered by Strangers. This result is, at a first glance, not in line with the hypoth-
esis mentioned above, since if immigrants follow a particular lifestyle associated with lower
exposure and therefore, lower crime, we expected to observe a negative association for crime
by strangers as well. Thus, the next section attempted to shed light on the differences in the
estimated immigration-victimization associations across the three (by relationship status)
Violent Crime types.
Firstly, we examined the reporting behaviour of respondents towards Domestic Crime,
as there is evidence that respondents tend to under-report domestic crime in face-to-face
interviews. Thus, if immigrants tend to under-report crime suffered by (ex) family mem-
bers, the observed immigration-victimization association will be downward biased. However,
both strategies that we followed showed no evidence that immigrants under-report Domestic
Crime by more than natives, and therefore, there is no reason to believe that they would
under-report crime by Acquaintances either. Particularly, in the first strategy we used data
on computer-based self-reported crime, as there is evidence that people respond much more
truthfully in computer-based than in face-to-face interviews. The results from computer-
based interviews are in line with the results from face-to-face interviews, that is, immigrants
are significantly less likely to be victims of domestic violence. In the second strategy, we
explored the information on whether respondents’ partners were present during the face-
to-face interviews, as people may under-report domestic crime by more in the presence of
their partner. After a thorough analysis, also comparing with results in crime by acquain-
tances and computer-based self-reports of domestic crime, we concluded that if one group
under-reports, this is the group of natives.
In the second step, the differences in immigration-victimization patterns among Violent
Crime types were attempted to be explained by “racially motivated crime” and “network
effects”. Interestingly, we showed that if we control for (the only 37 cases - 20 for natives and
17 for immigrants - of perceived) racially motivated crime, which is a much more “random”
crime highly associated with ethnic minorities, the risk of suffering a Violent Crime by
Strangers becomes negative and significant at 10%, but not of the magnitude observed
for crime by familiar people and (ex) family members. Next, using the “network effect”
hypothesis, meaning that immigrants increase the number of acquaintances as time in the
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country increases, we tested whether the lower risk of victimization by Acquaintances that
immigrants face is just because of the fact that the groups of acquaintances are relatively
smaller for more recent immigrants. Therefore, connecting that to assimilation patterns, we
showed that more recent immigrants are actually in lower risk of victimization than earlier
ones. However, showing some further evidence, we argued that the observed assimilation link
was most probably driven by other unobserved assimilation features. If “network effects”
exist, they are relatively weak, and by no means could they explain the observed differences
across violence crime types.
Finally, we considered further reasons that might explain the rest of the difference.
Firstly, crime by strangers is in a sense more “random” than crime by familiar people,
meaning that personal behaviours, and thus social lifestyles, have a smaller effect on the
victimization outcome. Moreover, looking at the behaviour of immigrants as offenders can
provide some interesting insights. For example, according to the “homogamy” principle,
a high proportion of immigrants’ (natives’) acquaintances and family members are immi-
grants (natives) as well. But according to Papadopoulos (2010b), immigrants are (slightly)
less likely to commit violent crimes, and therefore, we expect that, everything else constant,
the risk of victimization by Acquaintances and Domestic Crime would be higher for natives.
Finally, violent behaviour is a direct measure of exposure, and therefore, since immigrants
exhibit a less violent behaviour, they are also of lower risk of violent victimization. However,
this effect is incorporated into the aforementioned general lifestyle activities of immigrants.
Next, we briefly discussed the seriousness of the crimes that victims face. We actually
found that although immigrants are less likely to be victims of violent activity, they consider
the crimes they suffer as more serious than the crimes natives suffer. Of course, if for
any reasons, immigrants tend to perceive crime of the same actual seriousness as more
serious, all results of this section are biased upwards. Moreover, a very brief analysis of
decomposition of immigrants by ethnic status and location did not reveal any important
relationships. However, a much closer examination is required, perhaps using even larger
data sets (by pooling several sweeps from the British Crime Survey), since in the present
study the variation between the crime variables and the different immigrant groups was too
small to obtain robust results.
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After establishing the above relationship for the probability of victimization we consid-
ered count data models, exploiting the count nature of the Violent Crime variable. Count
data analysis is important because it is directly connected with the concept of repeated vic-
timization. As explained in detail in Section 3.8, some characteristics, such as gender, could
have a different effect on the probability of suffering a crime and on the number of crimes
suffered given victimization. Thus, the implications of our analysis would be very different
if immigrants were disproportionately victims of repeated crimes. Several models were con-
sidered (Poisson, NB2, Censored Poisson, Quantile Estimator for counts, Hurdle-Censored
Poisson) to explore the association between the number of violent victimization incidents
and immigration. Initially, conventional Poisson and NB2 models showed that once we take
the count information into account, immigrant coefficient loses much of its significance and
magnitude. However, this should not be interpreted as differential repeated victimization
by immigrants, as the Censored(-Hurdle) Poisson, and the “Quantile for counts” estimator
showed that this result was driven by the very end of violent crime distribution. This means
that if differential repeated victimization between immigrants and natives exists, it does only
among highly victimized individuals. Therefore, according to these results, the effect of be-
ing an immigrant on victimization is relatively similar in both, the probability of suffering a
crime and the number of crimes suffered. However, data limitations (very few and dispersed
positives) did not allow us to examine the above relationships by relationship status.
Nevertheless, the use of the count information together with appropriate count data
models is very promising and it can provide many interesting insights not only about the
relationship between immigration and victimization but also about the determinants of vic-
timization is general. For instance, we showed evidence that the victimization probability is
higher for males because of their higher exposure, but once considering the victimized indi-
viduals only, females are victimized much more frequently perhaps due to repeated domestic
violence. Further analysis is subject to future research, perhaps considering pooling several
sweeps from the British Crime Survey in order to increase the sample size, and consequently,
the robustness of the estimated relationships.
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Table 3.1. BCS Crime Codes1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 This table is taken by the BCS 2008-09 User Guide pages 19 and 20. 
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Table 3.1. Continued 
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Table 3.2. Count Data Tabulations for each Crime Group 
 
 Acquisitive Crime 
 Total 
Inside 
Burglary 
Outside 
Burglary 
Vehicle 
Theft 
Inside 
Theft 
Outside 
Theft 
Other 
Theft 
 N % N % N % N % N % N % N % 
0 40,738 86.87 45,805 97.68 46,421 98.99 43,832 93.47 46,774 99.75 45,663 97.38 46,068 98.24 
1 4,646 9.91 921 1.96 407 0.87 2,496 5.32 86 0.18 1,001 2.13 742 1.58 
2 950 2.03 97 0.21 43 0.09 398 0.85 18 0.04 148 0.32 55 0.12 
3 296 0.63 26 0.06 15 0.03 99 0.21 4 0.01 41 0.09 16 0.03 
4 120 0.26 12 0.03 1 0.00 35 0.07 4 0.01 19 0.04 6 0.01 
5 47 0.1 8 0.02 0 0.00 19 0.04 0 0.00 5 0.01 3 0.01 
6 29 0.06 4 0.01 2 0.00 1 0.00 3 0.01 4 0.01 1 0.00 
7 17 0.04 3 0.01 1 0.00 5 0.01 1 0.00 3 0.01 0 0.00 
8 8 0.02 2 0.00 0 0.00 1 0.00 0 0.00 1 0.00 1 0.00 
9 5 0.01 1 0.00 0 0.00 9 0.00 1 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
10+ 37 0.08 14 0.01 3 0.00 6 0.01 2 0.00 8 0.02 1 0.00 
 
 
 
 Criminal Damage Personal Theft 
 Total  
(+ Other, Arson) 
Home Vehicle Total Mugging Theft 
 N % N % N % N % N % N % 
0 43,331 92.40 45,733 97.5 44,421 94.73 46,292 99.00 46,630 99.00 46,549 99.30 
1 2,418 5.16 776 1.65 1,776 3.79 554 1.18 228 0.49 333 0.71 
2 603 1.29 190 0.41 409 0.87 33 0.07 23 0.05 10 0.02 
3 264 0.56 79 0.17 161 0.34 4 0.01 2 0.00 1 0.00 
4 105 0.22 33 0.07 48 0.10 2 0.00 3 0.01 0 0.00 
5 46 0.10 12 0.03 32 0.07 3 0.01 4 0.01 0 0.00 
6 41 0.09 24 0.05 18 0.04 3 0.01 2 0.00 0 0.00 
7 9 0.02 2 0.00 3 0.01 1 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
8 6 0.01 4 0.01 2 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
9 8 0.02 1 0.00 1 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
10+ 62 0.01 39 0.08 22 0.05 1 0.00 1 0.00 0 0.00 
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Table 3.3. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variables Mean Min Max Mis 
 All Native Immigrant    
Personal Crime Variables       
Violence by Strangers (Binary) 0.011 0.011 0.013 0 1  
Violence by Strangers (Count) 
0.015 
(0.20) 
0.015 
(0.20) 
0.018 
(0.20) 
0 11  
Violence by Acquaintances (Binary) 0.010 0.011 0.006 0 1  
Violence by Acquaintances (Count) 
0.027 
(0.93) 
0.027 
(0.85) 
0.034 
(1.47) 
0 97  
Domestic Violence (Binary) 0.005 0.005 0.003 0 1  
Domestic Violence (Count) 
0.026 
(1.30) 
0.028 
(1.37) 
0.007 
(0.17) 
0 194  
Mugging (Binary) 0.006 0.005 0.008    
Mugging (Count) 
0.009 
(0.46) 
0.009 
(0.48) 
0.010 
(0.12) 
0 97  
Other Personal Theft (Binary) 0.007 0.007 0.011    
Other Personal Theft (Count) 
0.008 
(0.09) 
0.007 
(0.09) 
0.012 
(0.112) 
0 3  
       
Household Crime Variables       
Inside Burglary (Binary) 0.023 0.023 0.030 0 1  
Inside Burglary (Count) 
0.046 
(1.20) 
0.044 
(1.17) 
0.060 
(1.48) 
0 100  
Outside Burglary (Binary) 0.010 0.010 0.007 0 1  
Outside Burglary (Count) 
0.014 
(0.47) 
0.015 
(0.50) 
0.010 
(0.15) 
0 97  
Vehicle Theft (Binary) 0.065 0.064 0.076 0 1  
Vehicle Theft (Count) 
0.085 
(0.40) 
0.083 
(0.40) 
0.099 
(0.41) 
0 20  
Inside, Outside, & Other Thefts  
(Binary) 
0.047 0.047 0.046 0 1  
Inside, Outside, & Other Thefts  
(Count) 
0.073 
(1.10) 
0.074 
(1.12) 
0.068 
(0.94) 
0 98  
Home Criminal Damage (Binary) 0.025 0.025 0.022 0 1  
Home Criminal Damage (Count) 
0.075 
(1.72) 
0.077 
(1.74) 
0.057 
(1.48) 
0 97  
Vehicle Criminal Damage (Binary) 0.053 0.052 0.055 0 1  
Vehicle Criminal Damage (Count) 
0.092 
(1.03) 
0.090 
(0.96) 
0.106 
(1.53) 
0 97  
       
Respondent’s Characteristics       
Immigrant 0.095   0 1  
Age 
50.45 
(18.58) 
51.01 
(18.64) 
45.17 
(17.16) 
16 101 66 
Gender (female) Male 0.454 0.455 0.444 0 1  
Marital Status 
Married 
Cohabiting 
Single 
Widowed 
Divorced 
Separated 
0.476 
0.088 
0.204 
0.115 
0.087 
0.030 
0.470 
0.089 
0.204 
0.119 
0.090 
0.027 
0.527 
0.074 
0.209 
0.071 
0.067 
0.054 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
20 
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Table 3.3. Continued 
 
Variables Mean Min Max Mis 
 All Native Immigrant    
Employment 
Status 
Employed 
Unemployed 
Inactive Student 
Inactive Retired 
Inactive Other 
0.562 
0.017 
0.002 
0.281 
0.117 
0.558 
0.016 
0.002 
0.292 
0.112 
0.605 
0.023 
0.004 
0.176 
0.157 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
64 
Education 
None 
O-level / gcse 
A-lavel /Apprent. 
Degree /Diploma 
Other 
0.283 
0.199 
0.170 
0.304 
0.043 
0.287 
0.208 
0.176 
0.289 
0.040 
0.250 
0.112 
0.113 
0.449 
0.076 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
81 
Ethnic Group 
White 
Black 
Asian 
Chinese / Other 
Mixed 
0.933 
0.018 
0.031 
0.012 
0.006 
0.976 
0.006 
0.010 
0.004 
0.004 
0.528 
0.133 
0.233 
0.086 
0.019 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
7 
       
Hhd Ref Person’s Characteristics       
Immigrant 0.095   0 1  
Age 
52.60 
(17.13) 
53.18 
(17.10) 
47.08 
(16.44) 
16 101 105 
Gender (female) Male 0.624 0.624 0.622 0 1  
Marital Status 
Married 
Cohabiting 
Single 
Widowed 
Divorced 
Separated 
0.513 
0.090 
0.150 
0.118 
0.095 
0.033 
0.511 
0.092 
0.147 
0.123 
0.097 
0.030 
0.538 
0.070 
0.181 
0.074 
0.076 
0.061 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
23 
Employment 
Status 
Employed 
Unemployed 
Inactive Student 
Inactive Retired 
Inactive Other 
0.610 
0.011 
0.009 
0.280 
0.089 
0.603 
0.011 
0.007 
0.291 
0.087 
0.675 
0.016 
0.029 
0.177 
0.102 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
65 
        
Hhd Caracteristics       
Tenure Type 
(Renters) 
Owners 0.702 0.719 0.543 0 1 127 
Condition (Bad) 
Indifferent 
Good 
Very Good 
0.219 
0.416 
0.332 
0.213 
0.417 
0.339 
0.284 
0.405 
0.264 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
2746 
Relative Condition 
(Same) 
Better 
Worse 
0.085 
0.062 
0.085 
0.062 
0.077 
0.070 
0 
0 
1 
1 
3059 
Accommodation 
Type 
Detached 
Semi Detached 
Terrace 
Flat/ Maisonette 
Other 
0.265 
0.332 
0.280 
0.119 
0.005 
0.273 
0.339 
0.277 
0.107 
0.005 
0.179 
0.265 
0.316 
0.237 
0.003 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2549 
Location (Other) 
Main Road 
Side Road 
0.142 
0.536 
0.142 
0.535 
0.139 
0.548 
0 
0 
1 
1 
 
Number of Adults 
1.898 
(1.898) 
1.881 
(0.809) 
2.061 
(0.984) 
1 10  
Lone Parent 0.051 0.051 0.054 0 1 107 
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Table 3.3. Continued 
 
Variables Mean Min Max Mis 
 All Native Immigrant    
Hours Away 4.587 4.577 4.682 1 
6 
(index) 
127 
Years Home 4.902 4.996 4.015 1 
7 
(index) 
4 
Years Area 5.475 5.588 4.401 1 
7 
(index) 
1 
Neighbor Watching Program 0.272 0.275 0.242 0 1 10743 
Income 
under £10,000 
£10,000-£19,999 
£20,000-£29,999 
£30,000-£39,999 
£40,000-£49,999 
£50,000 or more 
nothing 
0.202 
0.224 
0.175 
0.135 
0.095 
0.153 
0.016 
0.201 
0.227 
0.177 
0.136 
0.096 
0.150 
0.014 
0.205 
0.199 
0.157 
0.133 
0.089 
0.187 
0.030 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
10026 
Number of Cars 
1.265 
(0.924) 
1.284 
(0.925) 
1.091 
(0.894) 
0 4(+)  
Motorcycle 0.067 0.070 0.039 0 1  
Bicycle 0.444 0.452 0.370 0 1  
        
Area Characteristics       
Regions 
North East 
North West 
Yorkshire 
East Midlands 
West Midlands 
East of England 
London 
South East 
South West 
Wales 
0.066 
0.118 
0.091 
0.111 
0.100 
0.130 
0.077 
0.111 
0.106 
0.091 
0.070 
0.122 
0.095 
0.114 
0.101 
0.129 
0.055 
0.110 
0.109 
0.096 
0.026 
0.076 
0.060 
0.088 
0.091 
0.133 
0.290 
0.123 
0.076 
0.038 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
 
Urban 0.744 0.730 0.880 0 1  
Inner City 0.079 0.069 0.167 0 1  
Deprived 
5.232 
(2.824) 
5.161 
(2.80) 
5.911 
(2.93) 
1 10  
10th percentile 0.109 0.110 0.096    
20th  0.108 0.110 0.083    
30th  0.115 0.118 0.084    
40th  0.110 0.113 0.080    
50th  0.098 0.100 0.073    
60th  0.104 0.104 0.107    
70th  0.098 0.097 0.105    
80th  0.090 0.088 0.115    
90th  0.088 0.084 0.126    
100th percentile 0.082 0.077 0.126    
     Standard deviations are presented in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
   211 
Table 3.4. The Risk of Inside Burlglury plus Attempts 
Inside Burgury + Attempts 1 2 3 4 
Probit coeff se coeff se coeff se coeff se 
HRP IMMIGRANT 0.123*** 0.040 0.048 0.043 0.004 0.044 -0.022 0.046 
Deprived   0.046*** 0.005 0.025*** 0.005 0.027*** 0.006 
London   0.024 0.048 0.010 0.049 -0.017 0.052 
Urban   0.237*** 0.036 0.203*** 0.036 0.215*** 0.037 
Inner City   -0.010 0.045 -0.045 0.046 -0.040 0.047 
Hrp Age     -0.012*** 0.001 -0.008*** 0.001 
Hrp Male     -0.037 0.029 -0.021 0.030 
Hrp Married     -0.111*** 0.030 -0.101*** 0.034 
Hrp Employed     -0.146*** 0.033 -0.106*** 0.038 
Owners     -0.136*** 0.03 -0.103*** 0.034 
Condition, Type 
Location, Num Adults, 
Lone Parent, Hours Unoccupied 
Years in home/area, 
Watching neighborhood,  
Income, Education 
   √ 
Constant  -2.004*** 0.013 -2.448*** 0.040 -1.474*** 0.075 -1.510*** 0.135 
Log Likelihood -5,165.03 -5,061,08 -4,897.71 -4,822.63 
R2 0.0009 0.0193 0.0479 0.0615 
N 46,810 46,810 46,588 46,525 
 
Table 3.5. The Risk of Outside Burlglury plus Attempts 
Outside Burgury + Attempts 1 2 3 4 
Probit coeff se coeff se coeff se coeff se 
HRP IMMIGRANT -0.160** 0.068 -0.173** 0.072 -0.180** 0.073 -0.182** 0.076 
Deprived   0.038*** 0.007 0.042*** 0.007 0.043*** 0.008 
London   -0.091 0.075 -0.082 0.076 -0.123 0.078 
Urban   0.092** 0.044 0.082** 0.044 0.098** 0.045 
Inner City   -0.057 0.067 -0.050 0.067 -0.045 0.067 
Hrp Age     -0.005*** 0.001 -0.003* 0.002 
Hrp Male     -0.030 0.040 -0.006 0.043 
Hrp Married     0.062 0.040 0.021 0.048 
Hrp Employed     -0.008 0.050 -0.033 0.054 
Owners     0.139*** 0.046 0.088* 0.051 
Condition, Type 
Location, Num Adults, 
Lone Parent, Hours Unoccupied 
Years in home/area, 
Watching neighborhood,  
Income, Education 
   √ 
Constant -2.310*** 0.017 -2.580*** 0.048 -2.449*** 0.106 -2.972*** 0.190 
Log Likelihood -2,636.27 -2,613.27 -2582.01 -2535.72 
R2 0.0012 0.0099 0.0157 0.0298 
N 46,810 46,810 46,588 46,525 
Assimilation          
Immigrant -0.286** 0.116 -0.322*** 0.121 -0.397*** 0.127 -0.376*** 0.135 
Immigrant’s number of years in Country      0.003 0.003 0.005 0.003 0.007** 0.003 0.006* 0.004 
Immigrant (plus hrpage) -0.404*** 0.118 -0.419*** 0.123     
Immigrant’s no. years in Country (plus hrpage)     0.007*** 0.003 0.008** 0.003     
Robust standard errors are presented in italics. 
(***) denotes statistical significance at 1% significance level,  
(**) denotes statistical significance at 5% significance level, 
(*) denotes statistical significance at 10% significance level 
   212 
Table 3.6. The Risk of Personal Theft 
 
Personal Theft 
(Incl. Attempts) 
1 2 3 4 
Probit coeff se coeff se coeff se coeff se 
Immigrant 0.190*** 0.047 0.113* 0.059 0.036 0.060 0.030   0.060 
Male   -0.082** 0.032 -0.082** 0.033 -0.076** 0.035 
Age 26 – 35   -0.339*** 0.053 -0.341*** 0.054 -0.211*** 0.059 
Age 36 – 45   -0.472*** 0.054 -0.476*** 0.055 -0285*** 0.065 
Age 45 – 56   -0.470*** 0.057 -0.474*** 0.058 -0.273*** 0.069 
Age 56 – plus   -0.479*** 0.046 -0.477*** 0.046 -0.196*** 0.073 
Black   0.186* 0.097 0.064 0.099 0.012 0.100 
Asian & Other   -0.117 0.083 -0.159* 0.084 -0.163* 0.087 
Mixed   -0.142 0.202 -0.217 0.202 -0.389* 0.228 
Deprived   0.022*** 0.007 0.031*** 0.007 0.027*** 0.008 
Urban   0.138*** 0.043 0.076* 0.045 0.073 0.045 
Inner City   0.191*** 0.052 0.129** 0.053 0.111** 0.054 
North East     -0.441*** 0.083 -0.402*** 0.085 
North West     -0.373*** 0.068 -0.319*** 0.069 
Yorkshire     -0.364*** 0.073 -0.292*** 0.074 
East Midlands     -0.361*** 0.070 -0.304*** 0.071 
West Midlands     -0.322*** 0.069 -0.259*** 0.070 
East of England     -0.311*** 0.067 -0.259*** 0.069 
South East     -0.156** 0.065 -0.118* 0.066 
South West     -0.391*** 0.074 -0.334*** 0.075 
Wales     -0.504*** 0.083 -0.440*** 0.084 
Education, Marital, 
Employment, Tenure, 
Income 
     √ 
Constant -2.254*** 0.017 -2.083*** 0.062 -1.760*** 0.082 -2.062*** 0.117 
Log Likelihood -3,198.49 -3,090.00 -3577.29 -2,974.69 
R2 0.0024 0.0362 0.0467 0.0662 
N 46,827 46,820 46,820 46,567 
Pr(Y=1|Immigrant=1) 0.0195 0.0116 0.0093 0.0040 
Pr(Y=1|Immigrant=0) 0.0121 0.0086 0.0084 0.0036 
Diff 
(se) 
0.0074***  
(0.0021) 
0.0030* 
(0.0018) 
0.0009   
(0.0015) 
0.0003 
(0.0007) 
Ratio 1.612 1.355 1.104 1.094 
Robust standard errors are presented in italics. 
(***) denotes statistical significance at 1% significance level,  
(**) denotes statistical significance at 5% significance level, 
(*) denotes statistical significance at 10% significance level. 
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Table 3.7. The Risk of Violent Victimization 
 
Total Assault (Incl. Attempts) 1 2 3 4 
Probit coeff se coeff se coeff se coeff se 
Immigrant -0.068 0.044 -0.165*** 0.046 -0.157*** 0.049 -0.151*** 0.051 
Male   0.179*** 0.026 0.185*** 0.026 0.240*** 0.029 
Age 20 – 24   -0.195*** 0.056 -0.216*** 0.057 -0.200*** 0.063 
Age 25 – 34   -0.426*** 0.049 -0.432*** 0.049 -0.354*** 0.061 
Age 35 – 44   -0.671*** 0.049 -0.663*** 0.049 -0.542*** 0.064 
Age 45 – 54   -0.824*** 0.053 -0.813*** 0.053 -0.659*** 0.070 
Age 55 – 64   -1.119*** 0.059 -1.107*** 0.06 -0.924*** 0.079 
Age 65 – 74   -1.361*** 0.074 -1.353*** 0.075 -1.139*** 0.098 
Age 75 – plus    -1.897*** 0.138 -1.889*** 0.139 -1.757*** 0.168 
Deprived     0.025*** 0.005 0.010* 0.006 
Urban     0.059*** 0.034 0.066* 0.035 
Inner City     0.023 0.048 0.010 0.049 
Regions     √ √ 
Education, Marital, 
Employment, Tenure, Income, 
Lone Parent, Hhd members 
      √ 
Constant -1.948*** 0.013 -1.306*** 0.043 -1.654*** 0.078 -1.861*** 0.127 
Log Likelihood -5,536.52 -4,989.29 -4,959.87 -4,777.29 
R2 0.0002 0.1002 0.1055 0.1275 
N 46,827 46,827 46,827 46,532 
Pr(Y=1|Immigrant=1) 0.0219 0.0248 0.0228 0.0265 
Pr(Y=1|Immigrant=0) 0.0258 0.0361 0.0327 0.0372 
Diff  
-0.0038* 
(0.0023) 
-0.0113***    
(0.0028) 
-0.0100*** 
(0.0029) 
-0.0107*** 
(0.0036) 
Ratio  0.8512 0.6872 0.6971 0.7121 
 
Table 3.8. The Risk of Violent Victimization – Including Ethnic Group Dummies 
 
Total Assault (Incl. Attempts) 1 2 3 4 
Probit coeff se coeff se coeff se coeff se 
Immigrant -0.093* 0.054 -0.114** 0.053 -0.103** 0.055 -0.093* 0.057 
Black 0.005 0.102 -0.130 0.105 -0.149 0.108 -0.216** 0.110 
Asian 0.053 0.081 -0.156** 0.080 -0.174** 0.081 -0.170** 0.087 
Chinese or Other 0.108 0.115 -0.022 0.123 -0.033 0.124 -0.037 0.126 
Mixed 0.242* 0.139 -0.020 0.145 -0.035 0.146 -0.116 0.153 
Log Likelihood -5,534.43 -4,980.17 -4,950.12 -4,769.33 
R2 0.0006 0.1006 0.1061 0.1283 
N 46,820 46,818 46,818 46,526 
Pr(Y=1|Immigrant=1) 0.0205 0.0281 0.0262 0.0304 
Pr(Y=1|Immigrant=0) 0.0256 0.0363 0.0331 0.0373 
Diff 
-0.0051* 
(0.0023) 
-0.0082*** 
(0.0035) 
-0.0069** 
(0.0034) 
-0.0070* 
(0.0041) 
Ratio 0.8015 0.7740 0.7919 0.8132 
Robust standard errors are presented in italics. 
(***) denotes statistical significance at 1% significance level,  
(**) denotes statistical significance at 5% significance level, 
(*) denotes statistical significance at 10% significance level. 
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Table 3.9. The Risk of Domestic Violence 
 
Domestic 
(Incl. Attempts) 
1 2 3 4 
Probit coeff se coeff se coeff se coeff se 
Immigrant -0.177* 0.091 -0.248** 0.100 -0.219** 0.107 -0.207* 0.112 
Male   -0.438*** 0.056 -0.419*** 0.057 -0.337*** 0.061 
Age 26 – 35   0.123* 0.069 0.167** 0.074 0.114 0.081 
Age 36 – 45   -0.131* 0.073 -0.121 0.082 -0.138 0.09 
Age 45 – 56   -0.346*** 0.087 -0.335*** 0.104 -0.283** 0.115 
Age 56 – plus   -0.794*** 0.090 -0.682*** 0.115 -0.646*** 0.14 
Deprived   0.027*** 0.010 0.017 0.010 -0.003 0.011 
Urban   -0.005 0.060 -0.015 0.062 0.003 0.063 
Inner City   0.086 0.085 0.090 0.087 0.065 0.089 
Regions   √ √ √ 
Cohabiting     0.129 0.097 0.136 0.098 
Single     0.363*** 0.073 0.238*** 0.084 
Widowed     -0.093 0.195 -0.204 0.194 
Divorced     0.621*** 0.084 0.450*** 0.096 
Separated     0.882*** 0.092 0.711*** 0.106 
Education, Employment, 
Tenure, Income, 
Lone Parent, Hhd members 
     √ 
Constant -2.556*** 0.023 -2.668*** 0.150 -2.954*** 0.166 -2.673*** 0.226 
Log Likelihood -1,492.38 -1,345.71 -1,283.47 -1,232.80 
R2 0.0014 0.0996 0.1412 0.1684 
N 46,827 46,827 46,811 46,532 
Pr(Y=1|Immigrant=1) 
Pr(Y=1|Immigrant=0) 
Diff 
(se) 
ratio 
0.0031 
0.0053 
-0.0022** 
(0.001) 
0.593 
0.0041 
0.0084 
-0.0042** 
(0.002) 
0.494 
0.0017 
0.0034  
-0.0017** 
(0.001) 
0.505 
0.0011 
0.0022 
-0.0011*       
(0.001) 
0.511 
Robust standard errors are presented in italics. 
(***) denotes statistical significance at 1% significance level,  
(**) denotes statistical significance at 5% significance level, 
(*) denotes statistical significance at 10% significance level. 
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Table 3.10. The Risk of Victimization suffered by Acqaintances 
By Acquaintances 
(Incl. Attempts) 
1 2 3 4 
Probit coeff se coeff se coeff se coeff se 
Immigrant -0.209*** 0.070 -0.299*** 0.078 -0.274*** 0.081 -0.165* 0.087 
Male   0.198*** 0.037 0.219*** 0.040 0.222*** 0.041 
Age 26 – 35   -0.384*** 0.050 -0.225*** 0.056 -0.224*** 0.056 
Age 36 – 45   -0.589*** 0.053 -0.391*** 0.064 -0.398*** 0.064 
Age 45 – 56   -0.722*** 0.061 -0.484*** 0.077 -0.494*** 0.077 
Age 56 – plus   -1.18*** 0.064 -0.896*** 0.095 -0.91*** 0.096 
Deprived   0.031*** 0.008 0.011 0.008 0.013 0.008 
Urban   -0.022 0.047 -0.012 0.049 -0.005 0.049 
Inner City   0.009 0.068 -0.003 0.069 -0.003 0.070 
Regions   √ √ √ 
Education, Marital, 
Employment, Tenure, Income, 
Lone Parent, Hhd members 
    √ √ 
Black       -0.193 0.162 
Asian       -0.582*** 0.184 
Other       -0.188 0.200 
Mixed       -0.056 0.189 
Constant -2.300*** 0.018 -2.121*** 0.105 -2.348*** 0.161 -2.332*** 0.163 
Log Likelihood -2,675.70 -2,392.23 -2,297.46 -2,289.76 
R2 0.0019 0.1076 0.1301 0.1330 
N 46,827 46,827 46,532 46,526 
Pr(Y=1|Immigrant=1) 0.0060 0.0049 0.0032 0.0046 
Pr(Y=1|Immigrant=0) 0.0107 0.0112 0.0072 0.0074 
Diff 
-0.0047*** 
(0.0013) 
-0.0063*** 
(0.0016) 
-0.0039*** 
(0.0013) 
-0.0028**  
 (0.0014) 
Ratio  0.564 0.438 0.451 0.625 
 
Table 3.11. The Risk of Victimization suffered by Strangers 
By Strangers (plus Attempts) 1 2 3 4 
Probit coeff se coeff se coeff se coeff se 
Immigrant 0.084 0.053 0.010 0.056 -0.004 0.059 -0.009 0.061 
Male   0.441*** 0.038 0.444*** 0.038 0.411*** 0.041 
Age 26 – 35   -0.341*** 0.05 -0.339*** 0.051 -0.279*** 0.057 
Age 36 – 45   -0.518*** 0.052 -0.506*** 0.052 -0.402*** 0.062 
Age 45 – 56   -0.672*** 0.06 -0.658*** 0.061 -0.543*** 0.074 
Age 56 – plus   -1.029*** 0.058 -1.012*** 0.058 -0.795*** 0.088 
Deprived     0.011 0.007 0.015* 0.008 
Urban     0.138*** 0.048 0.136*** 0.049 
Inner City     -0.015 0.066 -0.007 0.067 
Regions     √ √ 
Other regressors  
(as for by acquaintance crime)  
      √ 
Constant -2.304*** 0.018 -2.013*** 0.041 -2.223*** 0.094 -2.565*** 0.154 
Log Likelihood -2,806.62 -2,534.25 -2,525.73 -2,456.38 
R2 0.0004 0.0974 0.1005 0.1127 
Robust standard errors are presented in italics. 
(***) denotes statistical significance at 1% significance level,  
(**) denotes statistical significance at 5% significance level, 
(*) denotes statistical significance at 10% significance level. 
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Table 3.12. A Trivariate Probit Model for Violent Victimization 
 
Trivariate Probit  
(300 draws) 
1st Equation 
Domestic 
2nd Equation  
By Acquaintances 
3rd Equation 
By Strangers  
 coeff se coeff se coeff se 
Immigrant -0.213** 0.089 -0.298*** 0.077 -0.013 0.059 
Male -0.433*** 0.054 0.195*** 0.037 0.445*** 0.038 
Age 26 – 35 0.118* 0.068 -0.382*** 0.050 -0.338*** 0.051 
Age 36 – 45 -0.142** 0.072 -0.586*** 0.053 -0.504*** 0.052 
Age 45 – 56 -0.324*** 0.081 -0.724*** 0.061 -0.665*** 0.061 
Age 56 – plus -0.805*** 0.091 -1.178*** 0.063 -1.008*** 0.058 
Deprived 0.027*** 0.010 0.030*** 0.008 0.011 0.007 
Urban 0.002 0.060 -0.023 0.047 0.140*** 0.048 
Inner City 0.086 0.084 0.004 0.068 -0.010 0.066 
North East 0.230 0.152 0.271*** 0.101 0.088 0.093 
North West 0.255* 0.135 0.107 0.097 0.019 0.083 
Yorkshire 0.421*** 0.133 0.177* 0.099 -0.023 0.090 
East Midlands 0.455*** 0.131 0.166** 0.098 0.112 0.082 
West Midlands 0.344*** 0.134 0.237** 0.096 0.021 0.085 
East of England 0.211* 0.136 0.086 0.099 0.027 0.083 
South East 0.306** 0.136 0.206** 0.099 0.051 0.085 
South West 0.404*** 0.136 0.069 0.104 0.046 0.087 
Wales 0.391*** 0.139 0.183* 0.103 0.033 0.091 
Constant -2.660*** 0.144 -2.118*** 0.105 -2.231*** 0.094 
Log Likelihood -6,254.93 
N 46,827 
Rho between 1st & 2nd  0.153*** 0.058 LR test for Rho12=Rho13=Rho23=0
Rho between 1nd  & 3rd  0.013 0.059 chi2(3)=17.48 
Rho between 2nd  & 3rd  0.142*** 0.046 Prob>chi2=0.0006 
   Robust standard errors are presented in italics. 
   (***) denotes statistical significance at 1% significance level,  
   (**) denotes statistical significance at 5% significance level, 
   (*) denotes statistical significance at 10% significance level. 
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Table 3.13. Comparisons Between Face-to-Face and Self-Reports 
 
Self-Completion 
Domestic 
Face-to-face 
Simple Probit 
(16 – 59) 
No Sample 
Selection Correction 
Correcting for 
Sample Selection 
(given acceptance) 
Correcting for 
Sample Selection 
(16 - 59) 
      Crime Equation 
 Coeff se Coeff se Coeff se Coeff se 
Immigrant -0.284*** 0.103 -0.223*** 0.062 -0.214*** 0.074 -0.258*** 0.066 
Male -0.434*** 0.057 -0.191*** 0.032 -0.190*** 0.032 -0.192*** 0.031 
Deprived 0.028*** 0.010 0.035*** 0.006 0.037*** 0.008 0.032*** 0.007 
Urban 0.011 0.063 0.009 0.039 0.008 0.039 0.009 0.039 
Inner City 0.061 0.088 0.028 0.057 0.028 0.057 0.026 0.057 
Age & Regional dummies √ √ √ √ 
Constant -2.667*** 0.152 -1.824*** 0.086 -1.820*** 0.089 -1.844*** 0.086 
       Selection Equation 
Immigrant     -0.235*** 0.031 -0.440*** 0.026 
Male     -0.048** 0.019 -0.054*** 0.017 
Deprived     -0.050*** 0.004 -0.029*** 0.004 
Urban     0.013 0.024 0.016 0.022 
Inner City     0.009 0.036 0.004 0.032 
Age & Regional dummies   √ √ 
Language Difficulties     -0.877*** 0.047   
Other Present       -0.159*** 0.019 
No qualification       -0.632*** 0.022 
Constant     1.818*** 0.055 1.451*** 0.048 
Rho (p-value from Wald Test)     -0.077 (0.816) 0.233 (0.215) 
Log Likelihood -1,254.06 -3,650.27 -14,448.08 -17,519.96 
N Total 30,711 24,363 28,339 30,324 
N Uncensored   24,344 24,346 
N Censored   3,995 5,978 
Pr(Y=1|Immigrant=1) 0.0040 0.0236 0.0252 0.0197 
Pr(Y=1|Immigrant=0) 0.0090 0.0392 0.0406 0.0358 
Diff 
(se) 
-0.0050***           
(0.0018) 
-0.0155***         
(0.0039) 
-0.0155***      
 (0.004) 
-0.0161***    
(0.0035) 
Ratio 0.447 0.604 0.619 0.550 
Robust standard errors are presented in italics. 
(***) denotes statistical significance at 1% significance level,  
(**) denotes statistical significance at 5% significance level, 
(*) denotes statistical significance at 10% significance level. 
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Table 3.14.A. The Presence of the Partner – Probit Estimates⊕ 
 
 Coeff se Coeff se Coeff se 
  Domestic Face-to-face 1 2 3 
Immigrant -0.227** 0.102 -0.281** 0.110 -0.275** 0.119 
Partner Present -0.408*** 0.093 -0.314*** 0.100 -0.125 0.113 
Immigrant & Partner Present 0.446** 0.235 0.335 0.254 0.377 0.256 
  Domestic Self-completion 1 2 3 
Immigrant -0.187*** 0.062 -0.209*** 0.066 -0.186*** 0.070 
Partner Present -0.157*** 0.054 -0.118** 0.056 0.067 0.061 
Immigrant & Partner Present 0.006 0.183 -0.067 0.186 -0.023 0.190 
  Acquaintance 1 2 3 
Immigrant -0.204*** 0.075 -0.285*** 0.083 -0.249*** 0.084 
Partner Present -0.237*** 0.058 -0.131** 0.062 0.005 0.068 
Immigrant & Partner Present 0.007 0.213 -0.049 0.226 -0.021 0.226 
        Robust standard errors are presented in italics. 
        (***) denotes statistical significance at 1% significance level,  
        (**) denotes statistical significance at 5% significance level, 
        (*) denotes statistical significance at 10% significance level. 
 
 
Table 3.14.B. The Presence of the Partner – Predictions 
 
PREDICTIONS Pr(y=1) 
Difference 
(s.e) 
Ratio 
Pr(y=1) 
Difference 
(s.e) 
Ratio 
Pr(y=1) 
Difference 
(s.e) 
Ratio 
  Domestic Face-to-face 1 2 3 
Immigrant & Partner Present 0.0034 
0.0004 
(0.0022) 
0.0089 0.0005 0.0069 
0.0036 
(0.0043) 
Immigrant &  NO Partner Present 0.0031 1.119 0.0084 1.060 0.0033 2.075 
Native & Partner Present 0.0017 
-0.0043*** 
(0.0006) 
0.0077 
-0.0097*** 
(0.0029) 
0.0052 
-0.0022 
(0.0019) 
Native & NO Partner Present 0.0060 0.291 0.0174 0.440 0.0074 0.702 
  Domestic Self-completion 1 2 3 
Immigrant & Partner Present       
Immigrant &  NO Partner Present       
Native & Partner Present       
Native & NO Partner Present       
  Acquaintance 1 2 3 
Immigrant & Partner Present 0.0034 
-0.0033 
(0.0024) 
0.0032 
-0.0022 
(0.0023) 
0.0033 
-0.0002 
(0.0022) 
Immigrant &  NO Partner Present 0.0067 0.513 0.0054 0.588 0.0035 0.953 
Native & Partner Present 0.0061 
-0.0055*** 
(0.0011) 
0.0083 
-0.0035*** 
(0.1185) 
0.0073 
0.0001 
(0.0014) 
Native & NO Partner Present 0.0116 0.524 0.0118 0.704 0.0072 1.014 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
⊕ Specification 2 also includes age, gender, and area dummies. Specification 3 further includes marital, education, and 
employment status dummies. 
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Table 3.15. Tabulation of Racially Motivated Crime by Relationship Type 
 
 
Racially Motivated Crime 
No                          Yes 
Domestic 237    (99.58%) 1      (0.42%) 
By Acquaintances 481    (100.0%) 0      (0.00%) 
By Strangers 472    (92.73%) 37    (7.27%) 
Immigrants 42      (71.19%) 17    (28.81%) 
Natives 430      (95.56%) 20    (4.44%) 
 
Table 3.16. Mean Comparison of Racially Motivated Crime by Relationship Type 
 
Mean Comparisons Immigrants Natives Diff Ratio 
Crime by Strangers     
Without  controlling for RMC 0.0132 0.0106 0.0026 1.244 
After controlling for RMC 0.0094 0.0102 -0.0007 0.930 
Acquaintances 0.0060 0.0107 -0.0047 0.564*** 
Domestic 0.0031 0.0053 -0.0022 0.593* 
 
Table 3.17. Probit Models before and after controlling for Racially Motivated Crime 
 
 
Strangers 
(No Control 
for RMC) 
Strangers 
(Control 
for RMC) 
Acquaintances Domestic 
Probit Coeff se Coeff se Coeff se Coeff se 
Immigrant -0.004 0.059 -0.122* 0.067 -0.299*** 0.078 -0.248** 0.100 
Male 0.444*** 0.038 0.438*** 0.039 0.198*** 0.037 -0.438*** 0.056 
Age 26 – 35 -0.339*** 0.051 -0.341*** 0.052 -0.384*** 0.05 0.123* 0.069 
Age 36 – 45 -0.506*** 0.052 -0.531*** 0.054 -0.589*** 0.053 -0.131* 0.073 
Age 45 – 56 -0.658*** 0.061 -0.641*** 0.062 -0.722*** 0.061 -0.346*** 0.087 
Age 56 – plus -1.012*** 0.058 -1.013*** 0.06 -1.180*** 0.064 -0.794*** 0.09 
Deprived 0.011 0.007 0.005 0.007 0.031*** 0.008 0.027*** 0.01 
Urban 0.138*** 0.048 0.141*** 0.049 -0.022 0.047 -0.005 0.06 
Inner City -0.015 0.066 -0.013 0.069 0.009 0.068 0.086 0.085 
Regions◊ √ √ √ √ 
Constant -2.223*** 0.094 -2.176*** 0.095 -2.121*** 0.105 -2.668*** 0.150 
Log Likelihood -2,525.73 -2,375.9717 -2,392.23 -1,345.71 
R2 0.1005 0.0997 0.1076 0.0996 
N 46,827 46,827 46,827 46,827 
Pr(Y=1|Immigrant=1) 
Pr(Y=1|Immigrant=0) 
Diff 
(se) 
Ratio 
0.0189 
0.0191 
-0.0002 
(0.0027) 
0.990 
0.0129 
0.0175 
-0.0046** 
(0.0023) 
0.736 
0.0049 
0.0112 
-0.0063*** 
(0.0016) 
0.438 
0.0041 
0.0084 
-0.0042** 
(0.0020) 
0.494 
Robust standard errors are presented in italics. 
(***) denotes statistical significance at 1% significance level, 
(**) denotes statistical significance at 5% significance level, 
(*) denotes statistical significance at 10% significance level. 
 
                                                 
◊ Regions’ effect is jointly insignificant for crime by strangers. 
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Table 3.18. Network Effects and Assimilation Patterns 
 
 
Linear Trend 
(Acquaintnaces) 
(1) 
Quadratic Trend 
(Acquaintances) 
(2) 
Dummies 
(Acquaintances) 
(3) 
Linear Trend 
(Domestic) 
(4) 
Quadratic Trend 
(Strangers NO 
RMC) 
(5) 
Probit Coeff se Coeff se Coeff se Coeff se Coeff  se 
Immigrant -0.405*** 0.106 -0.646*** 0.165   -0.587*** 0.157 -0.342** 0.151 
Number of Years in Country 0.006* 0.004 0.038** 0.017   0.015*** 0.005 0.029* 0.015 
Number of Years in Country2   -0.0006* 0.0004     -0.0006** 0.0003 
Immigrant 1 – 10     -0.388*** 0.114     
Immigrant 11 - 20     -0.315* 0.169     
Immigrant 21 - 40     -0.089 0.136     
Immigrant 41 more     -0.255 0.228     
Male 0.198*** 0.037 0.199*** 0.037 0.199*** 0.037 -0.439*** 0.055 0.439*** 0.039 
Age 26 – 35 -0.385*** 0.050 -0.387*** 0.050 -0.386*** 0.050 0.124* 0.069 -0.343*** 0.052 
Age 36 – 45 -0.594*** 0.053 -0.598*** 0.053 -0.595*** 0.053 -0.142* 0.073 -0.537*** 0.055 
Age 45 – 56 -0.730*** 0.061 -0.732*** 0.061 -0.730*** 0.061 -0.371*** 0.087 -0.647*** 0.062 
Age 56 – plus -1.191*** 0.065 -1.184*** 0.064 -1.184*** 0.064 -0.833*** 0.092 -1.011*** 0.060 
Deprived 0.031*** 0.007 0.031*** 0.007 0.031*** 0.007 0.027*** 0.010 0.005 0.007 
Urban -0.022 0.047 -0.022 0.047 -0.021 0.047 -0.005 0.060 0.142*** 0.049 
Regions √ √ √ √ √ 
Constant -2.116*** 0.105 -2.121*** 0.105 -2.119*** 0.105 -2.649*** 0.149 -2.179*** 0.096 
Log Likelihood -2,391.29 -2,389.52 -2,391.16 -1,341.63 -2,373.892 
R2 0.1079 0.1086 0.1079 0.1022 0.1004 
N 46,808 46,808 46,808 46,808 46,771 
Marginal Effects∇           
1)Pr(Y=1|Immigrant=0) 0.0190 0.0190 0.0189 0.0170 0.0173 
2)Pr(Y=1|Immigrant=1) 0.0066 0.0033  0.0034 0.0071 
Difference  (at 0 years) 2 - 1 -0.0124*** 0.0028 -0.0157*** 0.0030   -0.0136*** 0.0033 -0.0103*** 0.0033 
Difference (after 10 years) -0.0112*** 0.0026 -0.0109*** 0.0027   -0.0117*** 0.0031 -0.0040 0.0027 
Difference (after 20 years) -0.0098*** 0.0025 -0.0055 0.0038   -0.0088*** 0.0030 0.0008 0.0041 
Difference (after 30 years) -0.0082*** 0.0028 -0.0029 0.0045   -0.0047 0.0034 0.0013 0.0049 
Difference (after 40 years) -0.0064* 0.0035 -0.0051 0.0050   0.0012 0.0052 -0.0029 0.0044 
Difference (after 50 years) -0.0043 0.0049 -0.0104 0.0063   0.0092 0.0090 -0.0092** 0.0045 
Difference (after 60 years) -0.0019 0.0068 -0.0154*** 0.0056   0.0201 0.0152 -0.0142*** 0.0039 
Difference (after 70 years) 0.0009 0.0093 -0.0181*** 0.0037   0.0344 0.0240 -0.0166*** 0.0030 
Diff. Immigrant 1 – 10     -0.0121*** 0.0029     
Diff. Immigrant 11 - 20     -0.0105** 0.0043     
Diff. Immigrant 21 - 40     -0.0038 0.0053     
Diff. Immigrant 41 more     -0.0091 0.0062     
Robust standard errors are presented in italics. 
(***) denotes statistical significance at 1% significance level,  
(**) denotes statistical significance at 5% significance level, 
(*) denotes statistical significance at 10% significance level. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
∇ The marginal effects for crime by acquaintances and crime by strangers are calculated for a male, 26 to 35 years old, in 
an average deprived and urban area in East of England. Note that the average ‘number of years in the country’ for an 
immigrant is 26 years.  For domestic crime the marginal effects are calculation for a person with characteristics as before, 
but female. 
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Table 3.19. Decomposition by Ethnic Group 
 
Immigration & Ethnic Background Total Assault Domestic Acquaintances 
Strangers 
(No RMC) 
 Coeff se Coeff se Coeff se Coeff se 
Immigrant -0.110* 0.063 -0.463** 0.193 -0.213** 0.097 -0.079 0.153 
White   -0.063 0.130   0.205* 0.122 
Black -0.184 0.173   0.050 0.198   
Asian -0.236* 0.122   -0.670*** 0.255   
Chinese & Other 0.277 0.173   -0.344 0.37   
Mixed -0.065 0.173   -0.048 0.213   
White & Immigrant   0.331 0.232   0.056 0.174 
Black & Immigrant 0.064 0.220   -0.427 0.321   
Asian & Immigrant 0.107 0.165   0.274 0.335   
(Chinese & Other) & Immigrant -0.535** 0.244   0.260 0.443   
Mixed & Immigrant 0.166 0.323   0.482 0.388   
Log-Likelihood -4,978.06 -1,344.55 -2,382.44 -2,363.39 
R2 0.1010 0.1003 0.1112 0.1013 
 
 
Table 3.20. Decomposition by Location 
 
Immigration & Location Regions Deprivation 
 Total Assault Domestic Acquaintances 
Strangers 
(No RMC) 
Acquaintances 
 Coeff se Coeff se Coeff se Coeff se Coeff se 
Immigrant -0.324*** 0.115 -0.271 0.269 -0.521*** 0.192 -0.206 0.140 -0.052 0.166 
North 0.098 0.066 0.312** 0.146 0.121 0.094 -0.046 0.084   
Midlands 0.123* 0.065 0.372** 0.146 0.121 0.094 -0.010 0.082   
Wales 0.138* 0.076 0.378** 0.161 0.128 0.108 -0.005 0.099   
South 0.112 0.068 0.346** 0.15 0.108 0.099 -0.015 0.086   
Immigrant & North 0.278* 0.149 0.157 0.330 0.332 0.240 0.129 0.203   
Immigrant & Midlands 0.154 0.140 -0.115 0.322 0.225 0.232 0.134 0.176   
Immigrant & Wales 0.171 0.252 0.205 0.458 0.491 0.351 -0.104 0.399   
Immigrants & South 0.153 0.158 0.066 0.343 0.177 0.267 0.065 0.207   
Deprived         0.033*** 0.008 
Deprived*Immigrant         -0.039 0.024 
Log-Likelihood -4,993.37 -1,349.82 -2.395.99 -2.378.46 -2.391.09 
R2 0.0995 0.0968 0.1062 0.0988 0.1080 
      Robust standard errors are presented in italics. 
      (***) denotes statistical significance at 1% significance level,  
      (**) denotes statistical significance at 5% significance level, 
      (*) denotes statistical significance at 10% significance level. 
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Table 3.21. The effect of being an Immigrant on perceived Seriousness 
 
Seriousness 1 2 3 4 5 
Ordinal Probit Coeff se Coeff se Coeff se Coeff se Coeff se 
Immigrant 0.270*** 0.037 0.243*** 0.039 0.281*** 0.040 0.063 0.043 0.003 0.051 
Black       0.515*** 0.085 0.396*** 0.138 
Asian       0.481*** 0.063 0.371*** 0.096 
Other       0.255** 0.105 0.109 0.172 
Mixed       -0.123 0.132 -0.099 0.145 
Immigrant & Black         0.231 0.175 
Immigrant & Asian         0.224* 0.128 
Immigrant & Other         0.278 0.218 
Immigrant & Mixed         -0.075 0.341 
Age dummies, Male, 
Deprived, Urban, 
Inner City, Regions 
 √ √ √ √ 
Marital, Education, 
Employment, 
Income, Tenure 
  √   
Cutpoint 1 0.443 0.013 0.655 0.063 0.340 0.090 0.689 0.063 0.675 0.064 
Cutpoint 2 1.404 0.018 1.629 0.064 1.330 0.091 1.669 0.064 1.656 0.065 
Cutpoint 3 2.131 0.029 2.365 0.069 2.082 0.095 2.414 0.069 2.402 0.07 
Log Likelihood -9,774.44 -9,675.22 -9,495.70 -9,626.40 -9,623.63 
N 11,208 11,208 11,148 11,205 11,205 
Robust standard errors are presented in italics. 
(***) denotes statistical significance at 1% significance level,  
(**) denotes statistical significance at 5% significance level, 
(*) denotes statistical significance at 10% significance level. 
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Table 3.22. Distribution of Violent Crime  
 
 
Total 
Violence 
Violence 
Zero 
Truncated 
Domestic 
Domestic 
Zero  
Truncated 
By 
Acquaintance 
Acquaintance 
Zero 
Truncated 
By Stranger 
By Stranger 
Zero  
Truncated 
Observations 46827 1190 46827 238 46827 481 46827 509 
Mean 0.0692 2.7218 0.0264 5.2017 0.0274 2.6632 0.0153 1.4106 
Std. Deviation 1.613 9.759 1.3048 17.589 0.9262 8.7547 0.1956 1.2464 
Variance 2.6018 95.239 1.7026 309.37 0.8578 76.645 0.0382 1.5535 
Skewness 71.044 11.803 103.48 7.4549 85.974 9.0086 26.721 4.7561 
Percentiles 75% 0 2 0 3 0 2 0 1 
90% 0 4 0 6 0 3 0 2 
95% 0 6 0 12 0 5 0 3 
99% 1 40 0 97 1 50 1 8 
 N % % N % % N % % N % % 
0 45,637 97.46 - 46,589 99.49 - 46,346 98.97 - 46,318 98.91 - 
1 842 1.8 70.76 126 0.27 52.94 349 0.75 72.56 412 0.88 80.94 
2 164 0.35 13.78 42 0.09 17.65 67 0.14 13.93 60 0.13 11.79 
3 64 0.14 5.38 22 0.05 9.24 24 0.05 4.99 15 0.03 2.95 
4 29 0.06 2.44 12 0.03 5.04 7 0.01 1.46 4 0.01 0.79 
5 21 0.04 1.76 7 0.01 2.94 10 0.02 2.08 6 0.01 1.18 
6 23 0.05 1.93 7 0.01 2.94 6 0.01 1.25 6 0.01 1.18 
7 2 0.00 0.17 1 0.00 0.42 1 0.00 0.21 0 0.00 0.00 
8 5 0.01 0.42 2 0.00 0.84 1 0.00 0.21 1 0.00 0.20 
9 1 0.00 0.08 0 0.00 0.00 1 0.00 0.21 0 0.00 0.00 
10 13 0.03 1.09 6 0.01 2.52 3 0.01 0.62 4 0.01 0.79 
11 1 0.00 0.08 0 0.00 0.00 0 0.00 0.00 0 0.00 0.00 
12 2 0.00 0.17 2 0.00 0.84 1 0.00 0.21 1 0.00 0.20 
13 1 0.00 0.08 0 0.00 0.00 0 0.00 0.00 0 0.00 0.00 
15 1 0.00 0.08 1 0.00 0.42 0 0.00 0.00 0 0.00 0.00 
20 6 0.01 0.5 2 0.00 0.84 4 0.01 0.83 0 0.00 0.00 
24 1 0.00 0.08 1 0.00 0.42 0 0.00 0.00 0 0.00 0.00 
25 0 0.00 0.00 0 0.00 0.00 1 0.00 0.21 0 0.00 0.00 
26 1 0.00 0.08 0 0.00 0.00 0 0.00 0.00 0 0.00 0.00 
40 2 0.00 0.17 1 0.00 0.42 1 0.00 0.21 0 0.00 0.00 
48 1 0.00 0.08 1 0.00 0.42 0 0.00 0.00 0 0.00 0.00 
50 1 0.00 0.08 0 0.00 0.00 1 0.00 0.21 0 0.00 0.00 
60 1 0.00 0.08 0 0.00 0.00 1 0.00 0.21 0 0.00 0.00 
75 1 0.00 0.08 1 0.00 0.42 0 0.00 0.00 0 0.00 0.00 
97 5 0.01 0.42 2 0.00 0.84 3 0.01 0.62 0 0.00 0.00 
100 1 0.00 0.08 1 0.00 0.42 0 0.00 0.00 0 0.00 0.00 
194 1 0.00 0.08 1 0.00 0.42 0 0.00 0.00 0 0.00 0.00 
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Table 3.23. Poisson, Negative Binomial 2, Censored Poisson 
 
 Logit Poisson NegBin2 Censored Poisson 
    5 10 15 20 25 
Immigrant -0.371*** -0.240 -0.360 -0.359*** -0.365** -0.381** -0.388** -0.383** 
 0.113 0.427 0.283 0.134 0.149 0.162 0.177 0.194 
Male 0.440*** -0.382** -0.314** 0.236*** 0.167 0.106 0.055 0.023 
 0.060 0.183 0.136 0.070 0.082 0.090 0.099 0.106 
Age 26 – 35 -0.638*** -0.549** -0.631*** -0.660*** -0.648*** -0.653*** -0.669*** -0.670*** 
 0.078 0.237 0.171 0.093 0.109 0.119 0.129 0.136 
Age 36 – 45 -1.185*** -0.672** -0.795*** -1.108*** -1.096*** -1.079*** -1.062*** -1.032*** 
 0.085 0.283 0.207 0.101 0.117 0.131 0.147 0.157 
Age 45 – 56 -1.605*** -1.702*** -1.773*** -1.709*** -1.772*** -1.802*** -1.829*** -1.829*** 
 0.103 0.356 0.217 0.118 0.133 0.145 0.159 0.172 
Age 56 – plus -2.810*** -3.244*** -3.285*** -2.976*** -3.024*** -3.037*** -3.060*** -3.062*** 
 0.112 0.229 0.217 0.128 0.152 0.172 0.191 0.206 
Deprived 0.054*** 0.042 0.048* 0.067*** 0.071*** 0.071*** 0.070*** 0.071*** 
 0.012 0.037 0.028 0.015 0.017 0.019 0.021 0.023 
Urban 0.127 -0.170 -0.365* 0.009 -0.013 -0.037 -0.056 -0.052 
 0.079 0.302 0.217 0.093 0.110 0.124 0.139 0.148 
Inner City 0.034 -0.022 0.126 0.035 0.057 0.060 0.072 0.047 
 0.106 0.211 0.177 0.127 0.149 0.160 0.174 0.177 
North East 0.530*** 0.456 0.306 0.333* 0.361* 0.385* 0.412* 0.412* 
 0.163 0.280 0.244 0.187 0.209 0.221 0.236 0.238 
North West 0.265* 0.270 0.205 0.264 0.267 0.260 0.257 0.255 
 0.153 0.230 0.212 0.177 0.189 0.191 0.192 0.194 
Yorkshire 0.394** 0.746*** 0.468** 0.520*** 0.595*** 0.638*** 0.673*** 0.688*** 
 0.157 0.272 0.239 0.182 0.199 0.209 0.220 0.224 
East Midlands 0.535*** 0.858*** 0.666*** 0.550*** 0.579*** 0.607*** 0.636*** 0.667*** 
 0.151 0.322 0.250 0.176 0.190 0.196 0.204 0.212 
West Midlands 0.447*** 1.054*** 0.888*** 0.569*** 0.696*** 0.781*** 0.840*** 0.866*** 
 0.152 0.303 0.273 0.176 0.193 0.203 0.212 0.219 
East of England 0.230 0.882** 0.664** 0.239 0.337* 0.394** 0.449** 0.465** 
 0.155 0.424 0.337 0.181 0.202 0.211 0.223 0.227 
South East 0.396** 0.730** 0.927** 0.469*** 0.482*** 0.509*** 0.527*** 0.545*** 
 0.156 0.356 0.377 0.177 0.190 0.197 0.204 0.212 
South West 0.342* 0.764** 0.702** 0.351* 0.464*** 0.530*** 0.590** 0.644** 
 0.160 0.347 0.355 0.188 0.213 0.227 0.243 0.257 
Wales 0.456*** 1.549*** 1.178*** 0.498*** 0.605*** 0.701*** 0.791*** 0.876*** 
 0.162 0.477 0.357 0.191 0.220 0.241 0.264 0.284 
Constant -3.342*** -2.277*** -1.980*** -2.801*** -2.714*** -2.659*** -2.605*** -2.600*** 
 0.165 0.467 0.355 0.195 0.221 0.240 0.262 0.275 
N 46,827 46,827 46,827 46,827 46,827 46,827 46,827 46,827 
Alpha   40.06***      
Log-Likelihood -4,989.07 -15,242.52 -6,839.61 -7,879.36 -8,967.57 -9,554.84 -10,103.04 -10,511.68 
Robust standard errors are presented in italics. 
(***) denotes statistical significance at 1% significance level,  
(**) denotes statistical significance at 5% significance level, 
(*) denotes statistical significance at 10% significance level 
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Table 3.24. Quantiles for Counts 
 
Quantiles 0.025 0.500 0.700 0.800 0.900 0.950 0.990 0.999 0.9999 
Immigrant -0.038 -0.319 -0.422** -0.440*** -0.498*** -0.599*** -0.393** -0.609* -0.321 
 0.061 0.981 0.199 0.152 0.141 0.188 0.206 0.326 0.251 
Male 0.054* 0.235*** 0.423*** 0.449*** 0.532*** 0.548*** 0.285** -0.206 -0.514*** 
 0.030 0.052 0.063 0.063 0.081 0.106 0.121 0.209 0.157 
Age 26 – 35 -0.083*** -0.371*** -0.580*** -0.594*** -0.807*** -2.158*** -0.782*** -0.733* 0.121 
 0.035 0.065 0.079 0.079 0.130 0.242 0.225 0.419 0.155 
Age 36 – 45 -0.129*** -0.721*** -1.080*** -1.134*** -1.363*** -3.067*** -1.112*** -0.604 0.075 
 0.044 0.193 0.098 0.090 0.136 0.127 0.216 0.465 0.255 
Age 46 – 55 -0.187 -0.947*** -1.537*** -1.600*** -1.827*** -3.517*** -1.703*** -1.916*** -1.192*** 
 0.164 0.138 0.152 0.180 0.155 0.133 0.242 0.360 0.227 
Age 56 – plus -0.229*** -1.519 -2.714 -2.790*** -3.129*** -4.749*** -6.346*** -2.775*** -2.272*** 
 0.069 4.427 5.025 0.294 0.458 0.152 0.223 0.285 0.142 
Deprived 0.002 0.029*** 0.055*** 0.053*** 0.062*** 0.088*** 0.080*** 0.081*** 0.073*** 
 0.005 0.011 0.013 0.013 0.015 0.020 0.026 0.044 0.025 
Urban 0.001 0.023 0.128 0.113 0.163* 0.182 -0.007 -0.208 -1.165*** 
 0.032 0.073 0.117 0.086 0.096 0.116 0.149 0.203 0.149 
Inner City -0.014 0.024 -0.058 -0.004 0.040 0.024 0.150 0.152 0.269 
 0.063 0.097 0.119 0.115 0.141 0.180 0.261 0.344 0.209 
North East 0.044 0.387* 0.466 0.493** 0.576*** 0.642** 0.071 -0.299 -0.127 
 0.074 0.216 0.335 0.197 0.209 0.264 0.259 0.357 0.227 
North West -0.025 0.224 0.200 0.259 0.308* 0.382 0.237 -0.129 -0.059 
 0.080 0.212 0.329 0.185 0.183 0.249 0.259 0.262 0.223 
Yorkshire 0.012 0.269 0.334 0.374* 0.426** 0.568** 0.327 -0.008 0.037 
 0.073 0.227 0.362 0.193 0.194 0.266 0.267 0.338 0.211 
East Midlands -0.018 0.273 0.478 0.515*** 0.620*** 0.737*** 0.612* 0.260 0.799*** 
 0.097 0.229 0.332 0.184 0.188 0.251 0.329 0.309 0.211 
West Midlands 0.025 0.230 0.346 0.379** 0.488*** 0.627** 0.578* 0.601 1.824*** 
 0.077 0.223 0.334 0.190 0.188 0.251 0.294 0.393 0.194 
East of England -0.011 0.048 0.177 0.229 0.258 0.373 0.167 0.253 1.582*** 
 0.073 1.104 0.335 0.189 0.188 0.245 0.271 0.335 0.250 
South East 0.013 0.256 0.384 0.412** 0.469** 0.659** 0.397 0.610 2.225*** 
 0.107 0.341 0.328 0.189 0.189 0.260 0.290 0.516 0.328 
South West -0.107 0.163 0.242 0.284 0.368* 0.499* 0.273 0.209 2.475*** 
 7.310 0.402 0.381 0.205 0.194 0.263 0.272 0.459 0.271 
Wales 0.049 0.340 0.393 0.396** 0.480** 0.725*** 0.295 1.236*** 2.153*** 
 0.066 0.224 0.354 0.199 0.203 0.275 0.275 0.615 0.281 
Constant -0.512*** -2.313*** -3.479*** -3.449*** -3.430*** -1.974*** 0.225 2.624*** 3.463*** 
 0.074 0.216 0.338 0.195 0.195 0.327 0.329 0.410 0.302 
N 46,827 46,827 46,827 46,827 46,827 46,827 46,827 46,827 46,827 
Standard errors are presented in italics. 
(***) denotes statistical significance at 1% significance level,  
(**) denotes statistical significance at 5% significance level, 
(*) denotes statistical significance at 10% significance level 
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Table 3.25. Hurdle Poisson for Censored Counts 
 
 Hurdle 
Zero Trunc 
Poisson  
Zero Truncated 
Censored Poisson  
   5 10 
Immigrant -0.360*** 0.047 0.002 -0.026 
 0.110 0.512 0.189 0.205 
Male 0.430*** -1.106*** -0.400*** -0.446*** 
 0.058 0.243 0.098 0.114 
Age 26 – 35 -0.616*** 0.018 -0.175 -0.128 
 0.076 0.290 0.130 0.145 
Age 36 – 45 -1.153*** 0.498 -0.022 0.005 
 0.083 0.348 0.130 0.147 
Age 45 – 56 -1.566*** -0.275 -0.491*** -0.547*** 
 0.101 0.551 0.179 0.219 
Age 56 – plus -2.765*** -0.778* -0.693*** -0.652*** 
 0.111 0.410 0.221 0.282 
Deprived 0.052*** -0.032 0.033 0.033 
 0.012 0.048 0.021 0.024 
Urban 0.123 -0.362 -0.268** -0.269** 
 0.078 0.326 0.126 0.145 
Inner City 0.032 -0.077 0.029 0.062 
 0.103 0.274 0.179 0.196 
North East 0.530*** -0.035 -0.504 -0.345 
 0.159 0.441 0.323 0.365 
North West 0.259* -0.023 0.024 0.026 
 0.149 0.317 0.263 0.276 
Yorkshire 0.388** 0.513 0.238 0.327 
 0.153 0.352 0.254 0.275 
East Midlands 0.523*** 0.673 0.080 0.127 
 0.147 0.419 0.258 0.275 
West Midlands 0.437*** 0.954*** 0.303 0.480* 
 0.149 0.369 0.250 0.265 
East of England 0.224 0.985* 0.012 0.207 
 0.152 0.546 0.278 0.301 
South East 0.388** 0.556 0.153 0.157 
 0.156 0.512 0.259 0.278 
South West 0.333** 0.577 0.007 0.210 
 0.157 0.450 0.283 0.308 
Wales 0.446*** 1.426*** 0.089 0.267 
 0.158 0.478 0.273 0.301 
Constant -3.365*** 1.018** 0.360 0.473 
 0.161 0.513 0.288 0.315 
N 46,827 1,190 1,190 1,190 
Log-Likelihood -4,988.90 -4,361.55 -1,326.98 -1,751.82 
            Robust standard errors are presented in italics. 
            (***) denotes statistical significance at 1% significance level,  
            (**) denotes statistical significance at 5% significance level, 
            (*) denotes statistical significance at 10% significance level 
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Appendix: A Hurdle-Poisson Model for Censored Counts
This model combines results from hurdle models and censored models for counts as pre-
sented by Mullahy (1986) and Terza (1985), respectively. The hurdle part of the model
recognizes that the binary outcome (zeroes or positives) is generated by a probability dis-
tribution appropriate for binary models, while the counts are generated by a truncated at
zero distribution appropriate for count data. However, this model is modified to take into
account that once the hurdle is crossed the probability function that has support only over
the positive counts is censored at C. According to this, the probability of a zero, the prob-
ability of a positive but uncensored integer, and the probability of a censored outcome are
given by,
Pr(y = 0) = f1(0),
Pr(y = k|0 < y < C) = (1− f1(0))
(
f2(y)
1− f2(0)
)
,
Pr(y ≥ C) = 1− f1(0)− (1− f1(0))
(
f2(1)− f2(2)− f2(3) . . . f2(C − 1)
1− f2(0)
)
,
where 1− f2(0) is used as a normalization to account for the zero truncation. In the present
study we assume that both f1(.) and f2(.) are Poisson distributed. In a regression framework,
conditional on a set of characteristics x which is assumed to be common in both processes,
f1(.) and f2(.) follow the Poisson distribution with λ1 = e
x′iβ and λ2 = e
x′iγ. The likelihood
function is given by,
L(β, γ) =
n∏
i=1
f1(0)
(y=0) ×
[(
1− f1(0)
1− f2(0)
)
f2(y)
](0<y<C)
×
[
1− f1(0)−
(
1− f1(0)
1− f2(0)
)
(f2(1) + f2(2) + f3(3) + . . . f2(C − 1))
]y≥C
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=
n∏
i=1
(e−λ1)(y=0) ×
[(
1− e−λ1
1− e−λ2
)
e−λ2λyi2
yi!
](0<y<C)
×
[
1− e−λ1 −
(
1− e−λ1
1− e−λ2
)[
e−λ2
(
λ2 +
λ22
2
+
λ32
3!
+ . . . +
λC−12
(C − 1)!
)]]y≥C
,
which collapses to the standard Censored Poisson model if λ1 = λ2. Now, once we mul-
tiply and divide the second term by eλ1 , the log likelihood is the following:
lnL =
n∑
i=1
(y = 0)(−λ1) + (0 < y < C)
[
ln (1− e−λ1)− ln (eλ2 − 1)− ln (yi!) + yi lnλ2
]
+ (y ≥ C) ln
[
(1− e−λ1)−
(
1− e−λ1
eλ2 − 1
)(
λ2 +
λ22
2
+
λ32
3!
+ . . . +
λC−12
(C − 1)!
)]
,
which can be further simplified as,
lnL =
n∑
i=1
(y = 0)(−λ1) + (y > 0) ln (1− e−λ1) + (0 < y < C)
[− ln (eλ2 − 1)− ln (yi!) + yi lnλ2]
+ (y ≥ C) ln
[
1−
(
1
eλ2 − 1
)(
λ2 +
λ22
2
+
λ32
3!
+ . . . +
λC−12
(C − 1)!
)]
.
From the last expression it is clear that the log likelihood function is separable. This simplifies
the estimation procedure as we can separately maximize the likelihood part of the binary
outcome, using all observations, and the likelihood part of the zero truncated censored
counts using only the positive counts. Turning the last term into a fraction with common
denominator, and separating it into two logs we can finally rewrite the likelihood function
as,
229
lnL =
n∑
i=1
(y = 0)(−λ1) + (y > 0) ln (1− e−λ1)
− (y > 0) ln (eλ2 − 1) + (0 < y < C) [− ln (yi!) + yi lnλ2]
+ (y ≥ C) ln
[
eλ2 − 1− λ2 − λ
2
2
2
− λ
3
2
3!
− . . . − λ
C−1
2
(C − 1)!
]
.
Maximum likelihood estimation follows using numerical algorithms, such as the Newton-
Raphson.
230
References
Akins, S., R. G. Rumbaut, and Richard Stansfield (2009), “Immigration, Economic
Disadvantage, and Homicide: A Community-level Analysis of Austin, Texas”, Homicide
Studies, 13, 307-314.
Albrecht, H. (1987), “Foreign Minorities and the Criminal Justice System in The Federal
Republic of Germany”, The Howard Journal of Criminal Justice, 26, 272-286.
Albrecht, H. (1997), “Ethnic Minorities, Crime, and Criminal Justice in Germany”, in
Michael Torny (ed): Ethnicity, Crime, and Immigration. Comparative and Cross-National
Perspective - Crime and Justice: A Review of Research, 21, 31-93. University of Chicago
Press.
Alessie, R., R. Gradus, and B. Melenberg (1990), “The Problem of not Observing
Small Expenditures in a Consumer Expenditure Survey”, Journal of Applied Econometrics,
5, 151-166.
Alesina, A., and E. La Ferrara (2005), “Ethnic Diversity and Economic Performance”,
Journal of Economic Literature, 43, 762-800.
Algan, Y., C. Dustmann, A. Glitz, and Alan Manning (2010), “The Economic
Situation of First and Second-Generation Immigrants in France, Germany and the United
Kingdom”, The Economic Journal, 120, F4-F30.
Anscombe, F.G. (1950), “Sampling Theory of the Negative Binomial and Logarithmic
Series Distributions” Biometrica, 37, 358-382.
Aquilino, W. S. (1993), “Effects of Spouse Presence During the Interview on Survey
Responses Concerning Marriage”, Public Opinion Quarterly, 57, 358 - 376.
Armstrong, C. P. (1935), “Some Mental and Social Inadequates”, The Journal of Abnor-
mal and Social Psychology, 30, 371-383.
Artis, M., M. Ayuso, and M. Guillen (2002), “Detection of Automobile Insurance Fraud
with Discrete Choice Models and Misclassified Claims”, Journal of Risk and Insurance,
69, 325-340.
Arulampalam, W., and A. L. Booth (1997), “Who Gets over the Training Hurdle?
A Study of the Training Experiences of Young Men and Women in Britain”, Journal of
Population Economics, 10, 197-217.
Becker, G. S. (1968), “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach”, Journal of
Political Economy, 76, 169-217.
Beine, M., F.Docquier, and H. Rapoport (2001), “Brain Drain and Economic Growth:
Theory and Evidence”, Journal of Development Economics, 64, 275-289.
Beine, M., F.Docquier, and H. Rapoport (2008), “Brain Drain and Human Capital
Formation in Developing Countries”, The Economic Journal, 118, 631-652.
Bell, B., S. Machin, and F. Fasani (2010), “Crime and Immigration: Evidence from
Large Immigration Waves,” LSE, CEP Discussion Paper No 984.
231
Bianchi, M., P. Buonanno, and P. Pinotti (2008), “Do Immigrants Cause Crime?”,
Paris School of Economics, Working Parer, No. 2008 - 05.
Blanchflower, D. G., J. Saleheen, and C. Shadforth (2007), “The Impact of the
Recent Migration from Eastern Europe on the UK Economy”, IZA Discussion Paper, No.
2615.
Block, M. K., and J. M. Heineke (1975), “A Labor Theoretic Analysis of the Criminal
Choice”, American Economic Review, 65, 314-325.
Bolling, K., C. Grant, and J. Donovan (2008), 2007-08 British Crime Survey (England
and Wales), Technical Report I-II, Home Office.
Bonin, H., A. Constant, K. Tatsiramos, and K. F. Zimmermann (2009), “Native-
Migrant Differences in Risk Attitudes”, Applied Economics Letters, 16, 1581-1586.
Booth. A. L., and H. J. Kee (2006), “Intergenerational Transmission of Fertility Patterns
in Britain”, IZA Discussion Paper No. 2437.
Borjas, G. J. (1994), “The Economics of Immigration”, Journal of Economic Literature,
32, 1667-1717.
Borjas, G. J. (1999a), “The Economic Analysis of Immigration”, in: Ashenfelter O. and
D. Card (ed.) Handbook of Labor Economics, 3(28), 1697-1760. Elsevier.
Borjas, G. J. (1999b), “Immigration and Welfare Magnets”, Journal of Labor Economics,
17, 607-637.
Borjas, G. J. and S. T. Trejo (1991), “Immigrants Participation in the Welfare System”,
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 44, 195-211.
Brannas K. (1992), “Limited Dependent Poisson Regression”, Journal of the Royal Sta-
tistical Society, Series D (The Statistician), 41, 413-423.
Bucher, F. K., and A. M. Piehl (1998a), “Cross-City Evidence on the Relationship
between Immigration and Crime”, Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 17, 457-
493.
Bucher, F. K., and A. M. Piehl (1998b), “Recent Immigrants: Unexpected Implications
for Crime and Incarceration”, Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 51, 654-679.
Bucher, F. K., and A. M. Piehl (2007), “Why are Immigrant’ Incarceration Rates so
Low? Evidence on Selective Immigration, Deterrence, and Deportation”, NBER Working
Paper, No. 13229.
Budd, T., C. Sharp, and P. Mayhew (2005), “Offending in England and Wales: First
Results from the 2003 Crime and Justice Survey”, Home Office Resealrch Study 275.
Budd, T., P. Collier, B. Mhlanga, C. Sharp, and G. Weir (2005), “Levels of Self-
report Offending and Drug Use Among Offenders: Findings from the Criminality Surveys”,
Home Office Online Report 18/05.
Burdett K., R. Lagos, and R. Wright (2003), “Crime, Inequality, and Unemployment”,
American Economic Review, 93, 1764-1777.
232
Cameron, A. C., and P.K. Trivedi (1986), “Econometric Models Based on Count Data:
Comparisons and Applications of Some Estimators”, Journal of Applied Econometrics, 1,
29-53.
Cameron, A. C., and P.K. Trivedi (1998), Regression Analysis of Count Data, New
York, Cambridge University Press.
Cameron, A. C., and P.K. Trivedi (2005), Microeconometrics. Methods and Applica-
tions, New York, Cambridge University Press.
Cameron, S. (1988), “The Economics of Crime Deterrence”, Kyklos, 41, 301-323.
Cappellari L., and S. T. Jenkins (2003), “Multivariate Probit Regression using Simu-
lated Maximum Likelihood”, The Stata Journal, 3, 278-294.
Catcheside, D. G. (1948), “Genetic Effect of Radiation” Advances in Genetics, 2, 271-358.
Caudill, S. B., and F. G. Mixon (2005), “Practitioners’ Corner. Analysing Misleading
Discrete Responses: A Logit Model Based on Misclassified Data”, Oxford Bulletin of
Economics and Statistics, 67, 105-113.
Chapin, W. D. (1997), “Auslnder Raus? The Empirical Relationship between Immigration
and Crime in Germany”, Social Science Quarterly, 78, 543-557.
Chavez J. M, and E. Griffiths (2009), “Neighborhood Dynamics of Urban Violence:
Understanding the Immigration Connection”, Homicide Studies, 13, 261-273.
Chiu, W. H., and P. Madden (1998), “Burglary and income inequality”, Journal of
Public Economics, 69, 123-141.
Clancy. A., M. Hough, R. Aust, and C. Kershaw (2001), “Crime, Policing and
Justice: the Experience of Ethnic Minorities Findings from the 2000 British Crime Survey”,
Home Office Research Study 223.
Cohen, A. C. (1960), “Estimating the Parameters of a Modified Poisson Distribution”,
Journal of the American Statistical Association, 55, 139-143.
Cohen, L. E. and M. Felson (1979), “Social Change and Crime Rate Trends: A Routine
Activity Approach”, American Sociological Review, 44, 588-608.
Conti, G., and S. Pudney (2008), “If you’re Happy and you know it, clap your Hands!
Survey Design and the Analysis of Satisfaction”, ISER Working Paper Series, No. 2008-39.
Cornwell, C., and W. N. Trumbull (1994), “Estimating the Economic Model of Crime
with Panel Data”, Review of Economics and Statistics, 76, 360-366.
Curtis, A. L. (1974), “Victim Precipitation and Violent Crime ”, Social Problems, 21,
594-605.
Duan N., W. G. Manning, C. N. Morris, and J. P. Newhouse (1983), “A Comparison
of Alternative Models for Demand for Medical Care”, Journal of Business and Economics
Statistics, 1, 115-126.
233
Dustman, C., F. Fabbri, I. Preston and J. Wadworth (1997), “The Distribution
of Discrimination in Immigrant Earnings - Evidence from Britain 1974-93”, Institute for
Fiscal Studies, Working Paper no.97/19.
Dustman, C., F. Fabbri, I. Preston and J. Wadworth (2003), “The Local Labour
Market Effects of Immigration in the UK”, Home Office Online Report 06/03.
Dustman, C., F. Fabbri and I. Preston (2005), “The Impact of Immigration on the
British Labour Market”, Economic Journal, 113, F324-F341.
Dustman, C., and Nikolaos Theodoropoulos (2010), “Ethnic Minority Immigrants
and their Children in Britain”, Oxford Economic Papers, 62, 209-233.
Econometric Software (2007), LIMDEP 9.0, New York, Plainview.
Edwards, J. H. and A. W. F. Edwards (1984), “Approximating the Tetrachoric Cor-
relation Coefficient”, Biometrics, 40, 563.
Ehrlich, I. (1973), “Participation in Illegitimate Activities: A Theoretical and Empirical
Investigation”, Journal of Political Economy, 81, 521-565.
Ehrlich, I. (1975), “On the Relation Between Education and Crime”, in F. T. Juster (ed):
Education, Income, and Human Behavior, 313-338, NBER.
Eide, E. (2000), “Economics of Criminal Behavior”, Encyclopedia of Law and Economics,
345-389, 8100.
Ellingworth, D., G. Farrel, and K. Pease (1995), “A Victim Is a Victim. Is a Victim?
Chronic Victimization in Four Sweeps of the British Crime Survey”, British Journal of
Criminology, 35, 360-365.
Ellingworth, D., T. Hope, D. R. Osborn, A. Trickett and K. Pease (1997), “Prior
Victimization and Crime Risk”, International Journal of Risk, Security, and Crime Pre-
vention, 2, 201-214.
Facchini, G., and A. M. Mayda (2009), “Does the Welfare State Affect Individual
Attitudes toward Immigrants? Evidence across Countries”, Review of Economics and
Statistics, 91, 295-314.
Fader, P. S., and B. G. S. Hardie (2000), “A Note on Modelling Underreported Poisson
Counts”, Journal of Applied Statistics, 27, 953-964.
Falaris E. M. (2007), “Misclassification of the Dependent Variable in Binary Choice Mod-
els: Evidence from Five Latin American Countries”, Department of Economics, University
of Delaware, Working Paper No. 2007-05.
Farrell, G. (1992), “Multiple Victimization: Its Extent and Significance”, International
Review of Victimology, 2, 85-102.
Farrell, G., C. Phillips, and K. Pease (1995), “Like Taking Candy. Why Does Repeat
Victimization Occur?” British Journal of Criminology, 35, 384-399.
234
Farrington, D. P., B. Gallagher, B. Morley, L. St. Ledger, and D. J. West
(1990), “Minimizing Attrition in Longitudinal Research: Methods of Tracing and Securing
Cooperation in a 24-year Follow-up Study”, in D. Magnusson, and L. Bergman (ed): Data
Quality in Longitudinal Research, 122-147, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Farrington, D. P. (1986), “Age and Crime”, Crime and Justice, 7, 189-250.
Farrington, D. P. (2003), “What Has Been Learned from Self-Reports About Criminal
Careers and the Causes of Offending?”, Report to the Home Office.
Feilzer, M., and R. Hood (2004), “Differences or Discrimination: Minority Ethnic Young
People in the Youth Justice System”, London: Youth Justice Board.
Feinstein, J. S. (1989), “The Safety Regulation of U.S. Nuclear Power Plants: Violations
Inspections, and Abnormal Occurrences”, Journal of Political Economy, 97, 115-154.
Feinstein, J. S. (1990), “Detection Controlled Estimation”, Journal of Law and Economics,
33, 233-276.
Feinstein, J. S. (1991), “An Econometric Analysis of Income Tax Evasion and Its Detec-
tion”, RAND Journal of Economics, 22, 14-35.
Feldmeyer, B., and D. Steffensmeier (2009), “Immigration Effects on Homicide Offend-
ing for Total and Race/Ethnicity-Disaggregated Populations (White, Black, and Latino),
Homicide Studies, 13, 211-226.
Feller, W. (1968), An Introduction to Probability Theory and Its Applications, Volume 1,
Edition 3, New York, John Wiley.
Felson, B. R., S. F. Messner, A. W. Hosking, and G. Deane (2006), “Reasons for
Reporting and not Reporting Domestic Violence to the Police”, Criminology, 40, 617-648.
Freeman, R. B. (1999), “Economics of Crime”, Handbook in Economics, 52, 3529-3571.
Gabbidon, L., and H. T. Greene (2009), Race and Crime, 2nd Ed., SAGE Publications,
Inc.
Gaudry, M. J. I. (1980), “Dogit and Logit Models of Travel Mode Choice in Montreal”,
Canadian Journal of Economics, 13, 268-279.
Gaudry, M. J. I., and M. Dagenais (1979), “The Dogit Model”, Transportation Re-
search, 13B, 105-111.
Gilpin, N., M. Henty, S. Lemos, J. Portes, and C. Bullen (2006): “The Impact of
Free Movement of Workers from Central and Eastern Europe on the UK Labour Market”,
Department for Work and Pensions, Working Paper No. 29.
Glaeser, E. L., and B. Sacerdote (1999), “Why is There More Crime in Cities?”, Journal
of Political Economy, 107, S225-S258.
Glaeser, E. L., B. Sacerdote, and J. A. Scheinkman (1996), “Crime and Social
Interactions”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 111, 507-548.
Gourieroux, C., A. Monfort, and A. Trognon (1984a), “Pseudo Maximum Likelihood
Methods: Theory”, Econometrica, 52, 681-700.
235
Gourieroux, C., A. Monfort, and A. Trognon (1984b), “Pseudo Maximum Likelihood
Methods: Applications to Poisson Models”, Econometrica, 52, 701-720.
Graif, C., and R. J. Sampson (2009), “Spatial Heterogeneity in the Effects of Immigra-
tion and Diversity on Neighborhood Homicide Rates”, Homicide Studies, 13, 242-260.
Greene, H. W. (2008), Econometric Analysis, 6th Ed., New Jersey, Prentice Hall, Pearson
Education International.
Grogger, J. T., and R. T. Carson (1991), “Models for Truncated Counts”, Journal of
Applied Econometrics, 6, 225-238.
Gurmu, S. (1991), “Tests for Detecting Overdispersion in the Positive Poisson Regression
Model”, Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, 9, 215-222.
Gurmu, S. (1997), “Semi-Parametric Estimation of Hurdle Regression Models With an
Application to Medicaid Utilization”, Journal of Applied Econometrics, 12, 225-242.
Gurmu S., and P. K. Trivedi (1996), “Excess Zeros in Count Models for Recreational
Trips”, Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, 14, 469-477.
Hagan, F. E. (1993), Research Methods in Criminal Justice and Criminology, 3rd Edition,
New York: Macmillan.
Hagan, J., and A. Palloni (1998), “Immigration and crime in the United States”, in
J.P. Smith and B. Edmonston (ed): The immigration debate, edited by. Washington, D.C.
National Academy Press.
Hall, B., and C. Cummins (2005), TSP 5.0 Reference Manual, TSP International.
Hall, B., and C. Cummins (2006), TSP User’s Guide, TSP International.
Hamlyn, B., C. Maxwell, J. Hales, C. Tait (2003), 2003 Crime & Justice Survey
(England and Wales), Technical Report, Home Office.
Hart, H. H. (1896), “Immigration and Crime”, The American Journal of Sociology, 2,
369-377.
Hatton, T. J. (2005), “Explaining Trends in UK Immigration”, Journal of Population
Economics, 18, 719-740.
Hatton, T. J., and M. Tani (2005), “Immigration and Inter-regional Mobility in the UK,
1982-2000”, Economic Journal, 115, F342-F358.
Hausman, J.A., B.H. Hall, and Z. Griliches (1984), “Econometric Models for Count
Data with an Application to the Patents-R and D Relationship”, Econometrica, 52, 909-
938.
Hausman, J. A., J. Abrevaya, and F. M. Scott-Morton (1996), “Misclassification of
the Dependent Variable in a Discrete-Response Setting”, mimeo.
Hausman, J. A., J. Abrevaya, and F. M. Scott-Morton (1998), “Misclassification
of the Dependent Variable in a Discrete-Response Setting”, Journal of Econometrics, 87,
239-269.
236
Heckman, J. J. (1976), “The Common Structure of Statistical Models of Truncation, Sam-
ple Selection and Limited Dependent Variables and a Simple Estimator for Such Models”,
Annals of Economic and Social Measurement, 5, 475-492.
Heckman, J. J. (1979), “Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error”, Econometrica,
47, 153-161.
Hellstrom, J. (2005), “A Bivariate Count Data Model for Household Tourism Demand”,
Journal of Applied Econometrics, 21, 213-226.
Hindelang, M., M. Gottfredson, and J. Garofalo (1978), Victims of Personal Crime:
An Empirical Foundation for the Theory of Personal Victimization, Cambridge, MA:
Ballinger.
Hope, T., J. Bryan, A. Trickett, and D. R. Osborne (2001), “The Phenomena of
Multiple Victimization: The relationship between Personal and Property Crime Risk”,
British Journal of Criminology, 595-617.
Hourwich, I. A. (1912), “Immigration and Crime”, American Journal of Sociology, 17,
478-490.
Jaeger, D. A., T. Dohmen, A. Falk, D. Huffman, U. Sunde, and H. Bonin
(2010), “Direct Evidence on Risk Attitudes and Migration”, The Review of Economics
and Statistics, 92, 684-689.
Jansson, K. (2006), “Black and Minority Ethnic Groups’ Experiences and Perceptions of
Crime, Racially Motivated Crime and the Police: Findings from the 2004/05 British Crime
Survey”, Home Office Online Report 25/06.
Johnson, N. L., A. W. Kemp, and S. Kotz (2005), Univariate Discrete Distributions,
3rd ed., New Jersey, John Wiley & Sons.
Jorgenson, D. W. (1961), “Multiple Regression Analysis of a Poisson Process”, Journal
of the American Statistical Association, 56, 235-245.
Junger-Tas, J. (1997), “Ethnic Minorities and Criminal Justice in the Netherlands”, in
Michael Torny (ed): Ethnicity, Crime, and Immigration. Comparative and Cross-National
Perspectives - Crime and Justice: A Review of Research, 21, 257-307. University of Chicago
Press.
Junger-Tas, J., and I. H. Marshall (1999), “The Self-Report Methodology in Crime
Research”, Crime & Justice, 291-367.
Kalunta-Crumpton, A. (2010), Race, Crime and Criminal Justice: International Per-
spectives, edited by Anita Kalunta-Crumpton, Palgrave Macmillan, New York.
Kelly, M. (2000), “Inequality and Crime”, Review of Economics and Statistics, 82, 530-539.
Kennedy, W. L., and D. R. Forde (1990), “Routine Activities and Crime: An Analysis
of Victimization in Canada”, Criminology, 28, 137-152.
Kershaw, C., S. Nicholas and A. Walker (2008), “Crime in England and Wales
2007/08”, Home Office Statistical Bulletin, 07/08.
237
Killias, M. (1997), “Immigrants, Crime, and Criminal Justice in Switzerland”, in Michael
Torny (ed): Ethnicity, Crime, and Immigration. Comparative and Cross-National Per-
spectives - Crime and Justice: A Review of Research, 21, 375-405. University of Chicago
Press.
Koenker, R., and G. Bassett (1978), “Regression Quantiles”, Econometrica, 46, 33-50.
Kumara, S. S. P. and H. C. Chin (2005), “Application of Poisson Underreporting Model
to Examine Crash Frequences at Signalized Three-Legged Intersections”, Transportation
Research Record, 1908, 46-50.
Lambert, D. (1992), “Zero-Inflated Poisson Regression, with an Application to Defects in
Manufacturing”, Technometrics, 34, 1-14.
Lee, M. T., R. Martinez, and R. Rosenfeld (2001), “Does Immigration Increase Homi-
cide? Negative Evidence From Three Border Cities”, The Sociological Quarterly, 42, 559-
580.
Leece, D. (2000), “Household Choice of Fixed Versus Floating Rate Debt: A Binomial
Probit Model with Correction for Classification Error”, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and
Statistics, 62, 61-82.
Lemos, S., and J. Portes (2008), “New Labour? The Impact of Migration from Central
and Eastern European Countries on the UK Labour Market”, IZA Discussion Papers
Leslie, P. H., and D. H. S. Davis (1939), “An Attempt to Determine the Absolute
Number of Rats on a Given Area”, Journal of Animal Ecology, 8, 94-113.
Li, T., P.K. Trivedi, and J. Guo (2003), “Modeling Response Bias in Count: A Struc-
tural Approach with an Application to the National Crime Victimization Survey Data”,
Sociological Methods & Research, 31, 514-544.
Lochner, L. (2004), “Education, Work, and Crime: A Human Capital Approach”, Inter-
national Economic Review, 45, 811-843.
Lochner, L., and E. Moretti (2001), “The Effect of Education on Crime: Evidence from
Prison Inmates, Arrests, and Self-Reports”, NBER Working Paper No. 8605.
Lochner, L., and E. Moretti (2004), “The Effect of Education on Crime: Evidence from
Prison Inmates, Arrests, and Self-Reports”, American Economic Review, 94, 155-189.
MacDonald Z. (2001), “Revisiting the Dark Figure. A Microeconometric Analysis of the
Under-reporting of Property Crime and its Implications,” The British Journal of Crimi-
nology, 41, 127-149.
MacDonald Z. (2002), “Official Crime Statistics: Their Use and Interpretation”, The
Economic Journal, 112, 85-106.
Machado, J. A. F., and J. M. C. Santos Silva (2005), “Quantiles for Counts”, Journal
of the American Statistical Association, 100, 1226-1237.
Machin, S., and C. Meghir (2004), “Crime and Economic Incentives”, Journal of Human
Resources, 39, 958-979.
238
Maddala, G. S. (1983), Limited-Dependent and Qualitative Variables in Econometrics,
Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.
Martens, P. L. (1997), “Immigrants, Crime, and Criminal Justice in Sweden, in Michael
Torny (ed): Ethnicity, Crime, and Immigration. Comparative and Cross-National Per-
spectives - Crime and Justice: A Review of Research, 21, 183-256. University of Chicago
Press.
Martinez R., and M. T. Lee (2000), “On Immigration and Crime”, Criminal Justice,
US Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, 1, 486-524.
Mayda, A. M. (2006), “Who Is Against Immigration? A Cross-Country Investigation of
Individual Attitudes toward Immigrants”, Review of Economics and Statistics, 88, 510-530.
McCullagh, P., and J.A. Nelder (1983), Generalised Linear Models, Chapman and Hall,
London.
McKenzie, E. (1985), “Some ARMA Models for Dependent Sequences of Poisson Counts”,
Advances in Applied Probability, 18, 679-705.
McBride, D., and C. B. McCoy (1993), “The Drugs-Crime Relationship: An Analytical
Framework”, The Prison Journal, 73, 257-278.
Mears, D. P. (2001), “The Immigration-Crime Nexus: Towards an Analytic Framework for
Assessing and Guiding Theory, Research and Policy”, Sociological Perspectives, 44, 1-19.
Meier, R. F. and T. D. Miethe (1993), “Understanding Theories of Criminal Victim-
ization”, Crime and Justice, 17, 459-499.
Merton, R. K. (1938), “Social Structure and Anomie”, American Sociological Review, 3,
672-682.
Miethe, D. T., M. Stafford, and J. S. Long (1987), “Social Differentiation in Criminal
Victimization: A test of Routine Activities/Lifestyle Theories”, American Sociological
Review, 52, 184-194.
Miranda, A. (2008), “Planned Fertility and Family Background: A Quantile Regression
for Counts Analysis”, Journal of Population Economics, 21, 67-81.
Moran, P. A. P. (1951), “A Mathematical Theory of Animal Trapping”, Biometrika, 38,
307-311.
Mountford, A. (1997), “Can a Brain Drain be Good for Growth in the Source Economy?”,
Journal of Development Economics, 287-303.
Myers, S. L. (1983), “Estimating the Economic Model of Crime: Employment versus
Punishment Effects”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 98, 157-166.
Mukhopadhyay, K., and P.K. Trivedi (1995), “Regression Models for Under-recorded
Count Data,” Paper presented at the Econometric Society 7th World Congress, Tokyo.
Mullahy, J. (1986), “Specification and Testing of Some Modified Count Data Models”,
Journal of Econometrics, 33, 341-365.
239
Mullahy, J. (1998), “Much Ado about Two: Reconsidering Retransformation and the
Two-Part Model in Health Econometrics”, Journal of Health Economics, 17, 247-281.
Mustaine, E. E., and R. Tewksbury (1998), “Predicting Risks of Larceny Theft Vic-
timization: A Routine Activity Analysis using Refined Lifestyle Measures”, Criminology,
36, 829-858.
Nelson, J. F. (1980), “Multiple Victimization in American Cities: A Statistical Analysis
of Rare Events”, American Journal of Sociology, 85, 870-91.
Newman, J. C., D. C. D. Jarlais, C. F. Turner, J. Gribble, P. Cooley, and D.
Paone (2002), “The Differential Effects of Face-to-Face and Computer Interview Modes”,
American Journal of Public Health, 92, 294-297.
Neyman, J. (1939), “On a Class of “Contagious” Distributions Applicable in Entomology
and Bacteriology”, Annals of Mathematical Statistics, 10, 35-47.
Noble, M., D. McLennan, K. Wilkinson, A. Whitworth, H. Barnes, and C.
Dibben (2008), “The English Indices of Deprivation 2007”, Communities and Local Gov-
ernment: London, Crown Copyright.
O’Rourke K. H., and R. Sinnott (2006), “The determinants of individual attitudes
towards immigration”, European Journal of Political Economy, 22, 838-861.
Olkin, I., A. J. Petkau, and J. V. Zidek (1981), “A comparison of N Estimators for
the Binomial Distribution”, Journal of the American Statistical Association, 76, 637-662.
Osborn, R. D., D. Ellingworth, T. Hope., and A. Trickett (1996), “Are Repeatedly
Victimized Households Different?”, Journal of Quantitative Criminology, 12, 223-245.
Ousey, G. G., and C. E. Hubrin (2009), “Exploring the Connection between Immigration
and VIolent Crime Rates in U.S Cities, 1980-2000”, Social Problems, 56, 447-473.
Papadopoulos, G. (2011a), “The Poisson-Logit Model: Identification Issues and Exten-
sions”, First chapter of PhD Thesis, Department of Economics, University of Essex.
Papadopoulos, G. (2011b), “The Relationship between Immigration Status and Criminal
Behaviour: Evidence from the Offending, Crime, and Justice Survey”, Second chapter of
PhD Thesis, Department of Economics, University of Essex.
Papadopoulos, G. and J.M.C. Santos Silva (2008), “Identification Issues in Models for
Underreported Counts”, Department of Economics, University of Essex, Discussion Paper
Series, No. 657.
Pararai M., F. Famoye, and C. Lee (2006), “Generalized Poisson regression model for
underreported counts”, Advances and Applications in Statistics, 6, 305-322.
Parks, R. (1967), “Efficient Estimation of a System of Regression Equations when Distur-
bances are both Serially and Contemporaneously Correlated”, The Journal of the American
Statistical Association, 62, 500-509.
Pohlmeier, W. and V. Ulrich (1995), “An Econometric Model of the Two-part Deci-
sionmaking Process in the Demand for Health Care”, Journal of Human Resources, 30,
339-361.
240
Polczynski O. C., M. K. Laurikkala, L. Huff-Corzine, and J. Corzine (2009), “Im-
migration and Violent Crime: Citizenship Status and Social Disorganization”, Homicide
Studies, 13, 227-241.
Polvi, N., T. Looman, C. Humphries, and K. Pease (1991), “The Time Course of
Repeat Burglary Victimization”, British Journal of Criminology, 31, 411-414.
Raphael, S., and R. Winter-Ebmer (2001), “Identifying the Effect of Unemployment
on Crime”, Journal of Law and Economics, 44, 259-283.
Reid, L.W., H.E. Weiss, R.M. Adelman, and, C. Jaret (2005), “The Immigration-
Crime Relationship: Evidence across US metropolitan areas”, Social Science Research, 34,
757-780.
Reilly, B., and R. Witt (1996), “Crime, Deterrence and Unemployment in England and
Wales: An Empirical Analysis”, Bulletin of Economic Research, 48, 137-159.
Santos Silva, J. M. C., and F. Covas (2000), “A Modified Hurdle Model for Completed
Fertility”, Journal of Population Economics, 13, 173-188.
Schultz, L. (1968), “The Victim-offender Relationship ”, Crime and Delinquency, 4, 135-
141.
Sellin, T. (1938), “Culture Conflict and Crime”. New York: Social Science Research
Council.
Sharp, C., and T. Budd (2005), “Minority Ethnic Groups and Crime: Findings from
the Offending, Crime and Justice Survey 2003”, 2nd Edition, Home Office Online Report
33/05.
Sjoquist, D. L. (1973), “Property Crime and Economic Behavior: Some Empirical Re-
sults”, American Economic Review, 63, 439-446.
Smith, A. (2006), “Crime Statistics: An Independent Review”, Carried out for the Secre-
tary of State for the Home Department.
Smith, A. D. and G. R. Jarjoura (1989), “Household Characteristics, Neighborhood
Composition and Victimization Risk”, Social Forces, 68, 621-640.
Smith, D. J. (1997), “Ethnic Origins, Crime, and Criminal Justice in England and Wales”,
in Michael Torny (ed): Ethnicity, Crime, and Immigration. Comparative and Cross-
National Perspectives - Crime and Justice: A Review of Research, 21, 101-182. University
of Chicago Press.
Solow, A. R. (1993), “Estimating Record Inclusion Probability”, American Statistician,
47, 206-209.
Spalek, B. (2008), Ethnicity and Crime: A Reader, Edited by Basia Spalek in Sandra
Walklate (ed): Readings in Criminology and Criminal Justice Series, Open University
Press, England.
Sparks, R. F. (1981), “Multiple Victimization: Evidence, Theory, and Future Research”,
The Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology, 72, 762-778.
241
Spelman, W. (1995), “Once Bitten, Then What? Cross-sectional and Time-course Expla-
nations of Repeat Victimization”, British Journal of Criminology, 35, 366-383.
Staub, E. K. and R. Winkelmann (2010), “Quasi-likelihood Estimation of Zero-inflated
Count Models”, SOI Working Paper No.0908, Department of Economics, University of
Zurich.
Steffensmeier, D., and E. Allan (1996), “Gender and Crime: Toward a Gendered Theory
of Female Offending”, Annual Review of Sociology, 22, 459-487.
Steutel, F. W. and K. van Harn (1979), “Discrete Analogous of Self-Decomposability
and Stability”, Annals of Probability, 7, 893-899.
Stowell, I. J. (2007), Immigration and Crime: The Effects of Immigration on Criminal
Behavior, LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC, New York
Stowell, I. J., and R. Martinez (2009), “Incorporating Ethnic-Specific Measures of
Immigration in the Study of Lethal Violence”, Homicide Studies, 13, 315-324.
Stowell, I. J., S. F. Messner, K. F. McGeever, L. E. Raffalovich (2009), “Immigra-
tion and the Recent Violent Crime Drop in the United States: A Pooled, Cross-Sectional
Time-Series Analysis of Metropolitan Areas”, Criminology, 47, 889-928.
Swait, J., and M. Ben-Akiva (1987), “Empirical Test of a Constrained Choice Discrete
Model: Mode Choice in Sao Paulo. Brazil”, Transportation Research, 21B, 103-115.
Taft, R. D. (1987), “Does Immigration Increase Crime?”, Social Forces, 12, 69-77.
Terracol, A. (2002), “Triprobit and the GHK Simulator: A Short Note”, mimeo.
Terza, V. J (1985), “A Tobit-type Estimator for the Censored Poisson Regression Model”,
Economics Letters, 18, 361-365.
Thornberry, T. P., and M. D. Krohl (2000), “The Self-Report Method for Measuring
Delinquency and Crime”, Criminal Justice, 4, 33-83.
Tonry, M. (1997), “Ethnicity, Crime, and Immigration”, in Michael Torny (ed): Ethnic-
ity, Crime, and Immigration. Comparative and Cross-National Perspectives - Crime and
Justice: A Review of Research, 21, 1-29. University of Chicago Press.
Tournier, P. (1997), “Nationality, Crime, and Criminal ustice in France”, in Michael Torny
(ed): Ethnicity, Crime, and Immigration. Comparative and Cross-National Perspectives -
Crime and Justice: A Review of Research, 21, 523-5. University of Chicago Press.
Tseloni, A. (2006), “Multilevel Modelling of the Number of Property Crimes: Household
and Area Effects”, Journal of Royal Statistical Society. Series A (Statistics in Society),
169, 205-233.
Tseloni, A., and K. Pease (2003), “Repeat Personal Victimization. ‘Boosts’ or ‘Flags’?”,
British Journal of Criminology, 43 196-212.
Tseloni, A., and K. Pease (2004), “Repeat Personal Victimization. Random Effects,
Event Dependence and Unexplained Heterogeneity”, British Journal of Criminology, 44,
931-945.
242
Tseloni, A., K. Wittebrood, G. Farrel, and K. Pease (2004), “Burglary Victimization
in England and Wales, the United Stated and the Netherlands: A Cross-National Compar-
ative Test of Routine Activities and Lifestyle Theories”, British Journal of Criminology,
44, 66-91.
Turner, C. F., L. Ku, S. M. Rogers, L. D. Lindberg, J. H. Pleck, and F. L.
Sonenstein (1998), “Adolescent Sexual Behavior, Drug Use, and Violence: Increased
Reporting with Computer Survey Technology”, Science, 280, 867-873.
Van De Ven, W., and B. Van Praag (1981), “The Demand for Deductibles in Private
Health Insurance. A Probit Model with Sample Selection”, Journal of Econometrics, 17,
229-252.
Van Praag, B. M. S, and E. M Vermeulen (1993), “A Count-Amount Model with
Endogenous Recording of Observations”, Journal of Applied Econometrics, 8, 383-395.
Vazsonyi, A. T., and M. Killias (2001), “Immigration and Crime among Youth in
Switzerland”, Criminal Justice and Behavior, 28, 329-366.
von Hentig, H. (1940), “Remarks on the Interaction of Perpetrator and Victim ”, Journal
of Criminal Law and Criminology, 31, 303-309.
Ve´lez, M. B. (2009) “Contextualizing the Immigration Crime Effect: An Analysis of
Homicide in Chicago Neighborhoods”, Homicide Studies, 13, 325-335.
Wadswarth, T. (2010), “Is Immigration Responsible for the Crime Drop? An Assessment
of the Influence of Immigration on Changes in Violent Crime Between 1990 and 2000”,
Social Science Quarterly, 91, 531-553.
Wagner, G.G., R.V. Burkhauser, and F. Behringer (1993), “The English Language
Public Use File of the German Socio-Economic Panel”, Journal of Human Resources, 28,
429-433.
Walby S., and J. Allen (2004), “Domestic Violence, Sexual Assault and Stalking: Find-
ings from the British Crime Survey”, Home Office Research Study 276.
Wang, P., I. M. Cockburn and M. L. Puterman (1998), “Analysis of Patent Data: A
Mixed-Poisson-Regression-Model Approach”, Journal of Business & Economic Statistics,
16, 27-41.
Wiles, P., J. Simmons, and K. Pease (2003), “Crime Victimization: Its Extent and
Communication”, Journal of Royal Statistical Society. Series A (Statistics in Society),
166, 247-252.
White, H. (1982), “Maximum Likelihood Estimation of Misspecified Models”, Economet-
rica, 50, 1-25.
White, H. R., and D. M. Gorman (2000), “Dynamics of the Drug-Crime Relationship”,
Criminal Justice, US Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, 1, 151-218.
Winkelmann, R. (1996), “Markov Chain Monte Carlo Analysis of Underreported Count
Data with an Application to Worker Absenteeism”, Empirical Economics, 21, 575-587.
Winkelmann, R. (1998), “Count Data Models with Selectivity”, Econometric Reviews,
17, 339-359.
243
Winkelmann, R. (2006), “Reforming Health Care: Evidence from Quantile Regressions
for Counts”, Journal of Health Economics, 25, 131-145.
Winkelmann, R. (2008), Econometric Analysis of Count Data, 5th ed., Berlin, Springer-
Verlag.
Winkelmann, R., and K.F. Zimmermann (1993), “Poisson Logistic Regression”, De-
partment of Economics, University of Munich, Working Paper No. 93-18.
Witte, A. D. (1980), “Estimating the Economic Model of Crime with Individual Data”,
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 94, 57-84.
Wittebrood, K., and P. Nieubeerta (2000), “Criminal Victimization during One’s Life
Course: The Effects of Previous Victimization and Patterns on Routine Activities”, Jour-
nal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 37, 91-122.
Wooldridge, J. M. (1992), “Some Alternatives to the Box-Cox Regression Model”, Inter-
national Economic Review, 33, 935-955.
Wooldridge, J. M. (2010), Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data, 2nd
Cambridge, MIT Press.
Wolfgang, M. (1958), Patterns in Criminal Homicide, University of Pennsylvania Press;
Philadelphia.
Woplin, K. (1978), “An Economic Analysis of Crime and Punishment in England and
Wales, 1894-1967”, Journal of Political Economy, 86, 815-840.
Yannaros, N. (1993), “Analyzing Incomplete Count Data”, The Statistician, 42, 181-187.
Yeager, M. G. (1997), “Immigrants and criminality: A review”, Criminal Justice Ab-
stracts, 29, 143-171.
